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Abstract 
Was labour involved in the events of 1989-1990 in Germany? Most studies of the East Ger-
man revolution and the subsequent unification of Germany say no. This study argues in the 
opposite direction and by contextualizing the dynamics of East and West German labour of-
fers a new picture of supposedly well-known events.  
The study explores the different ways in which East and West German labour became crucial 
actors in 1989-1990. It first enlightens the participation of East German workers to the revolu-
tion, by revealing the multifaceted overlapping of developments in the shop floors and the 
streets. Dynamics within labour, the work shows, were a core constituent of the political proc-
esses that marked GDR's end.  
The analysis then focuses on the politics of four West German unions (metal, chemistry, me-
dia, and public service) and of their federation (DGB) and unearths the setting up of a tripar-
tite crisis management of the East German economic reforms, between the West German gov-
ernment, employers and unions. Set up as early as February 1990, this formal and informal 
agreement led to the adjunction of the "social" dimension to the Monetary, Economic and 
Social Union of May 1990, i.e. the preservation of the existing West German institutions, 
norms and actors of the social systems and industrial relations in unified Germany. The two 
collective bargaining partners became in charge of keeping social tension to a minimum dur-
ing the economic reforms, through the tools of collective bargaining.    
The flipside of this institutional extension was the rapid setting up of trade unions structures 
in eastern Germany, a last aspect analyzed in this work. The rapid extension of the DGB un-
ions and employers associations was an organizational "tour de force." But it came with a cost 
for the trade unions: the subjection of East German union activists in the "new" unions, and 
the renunciation to core programmatic claims at home. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Waren die Arbeitnehmer bei den Ereignissen 1989/90 in Deutschland involviert?  
Die meisten Untersuchungen über die Revolution und die darauffolgende Vereinigung 
Deutschlands verneinen dies; die vorliegende Untersuchung behauptet aber das Gegenteil. 
Durch die  Kontextualisierung der Dynamiken in der ost- und westdeutschen Arbeitnehmer-
schaft schafft sie ein neues Bild von vermeintlich bekannten Ereignissen. 
Die Studie untersucht die unterschiedlichen Wege auf denen die ost- und westdeutsche Ar-
beitnehmerschaft zu entscheidenden Akteuren 1989-1990 wurden. Zunächst stellt sie die Be-
teiligung der ostdeutschen Arbeitnehmer an der Revolution heraus, durch das Aufdecken von 
vielfältigen Überschneidungen der Entwicklungen in den Betrieben und auf der Strasse. Dy-
namiken innerhalb der Arbeitnehmerschaft, so zeigt die Studie, waren ein Kernbestandteil der 
politischen Prozesse, welche das Ende der DDR markierte. 
Darauffolgenden konzentriert sich die Analyse  auf die Politik von vier Westdeutschen Ge-
werkschaften (Metall, Chemie, Medien und Öffentlicher Dienst) und ihres Dachverband 
(DGB) und deckt die Einrichtung eines Krisenmanagements der ostdeutschen Wirtschaftre-
formen, zwischen der Westdeutschen Regierung, Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften auf. Be-
reits im Februar 1990 gegründet, führte dieses formelle und informelle Abkommen zur Erhal-
tung der existierenden Westdeutschen Institutionen, Normen und Akteure der sozialen 
Systeme und industriellen Beziehungen im vereinten Deutschland. 
Die Kehrseite dieser institutionellen Erweiterung war die schnelle Etablierung der Gewerk-
schaftsstrukturen in Ostdeutschland, der letzte Aspekt, welcher in der Arbeit analysiert wird. 
Die schnelle Verbreitung der DGB Gewerkschaften und der Arbeitgeberverbänden war eine 
organisierte „tour de force“. Die Kosten für die Gewerkschaften waren die Unterwerfung der 
ostdeutschen Gewerkschaftsaktivisten unter die „neuen“ Gewerkschaften und die Abkehr vom 
Kern der programmatischen Forderungen zu Hause. 
Schlagwörter: 
Deutschland, Deutsche Demokratische Republik, Vereinigung, Arbeiterbewegung, Ge-
werkschaften, Sozialpartnerschaft 
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Introduction 
The Genesis of a Ph.D. dissertation 
The 1989 demonstrations in the German Democratic Republic were among my first political 
memories. My experience of these events came by way of the evening news on Canadian 
television, yet I was moved by the images of an insuppressible and jubilant population dem-
onstrating in ever-greater numbers each week and finally toppling the regime. The teenager 
that I was could not hold back the tears when he saw demonstrators climbing on the Berlin 
Wall and, using pickaxes and other tools, tearing it down on November 9, 1989. I was again 
struck by similar emotions a few months later when the television broadcast Nina Hagen per-
formed a somber version of Schubert's Ave Maria in front of the wall. In all honesty, the im-
ages of the East German revolution still cause a tide of emotions to rise within me and, when-
ever I show any clips in my German history classes, I avoid looking at the screen whenever 
possible. 
There is surely a connection between this political and emotional experience and my interest 
in German history. During my four years as an undergraduate student in history in Ottawa, I 
developed a strong interest in the German labor movement. In the 1990s, it was especially 
interesting to study the establishment of the post-war system of industrial relations in semi-
nars on the history of West Germany and to follow, at the same time, its erosion. While I was 
learning more about the major role labor played in the political, economic and social history 
of post-war West Germany, their influence was already in decline. German, British, French 
and Canadian specialists on industrial relations questioned whether the "German model" 
could survive these profound changes in the world economy which was shaped by the effects 
of the newly-termed "globalization". 
This critical situation was not specific to Germany, as trade unions in many countries were 
facing similar difficulties. The German case had certain unique characteristics (i.e., the 1990 
reunification), however, which had increased the challenges faced by trade unions. For the 
topic of my Masters thesis (Diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées (DESS) at Strasbourg's 
Centre d'études germaniques), I chose DGB politics during reunification. The objective of 
this paper was to analyze how the West German Confederation of Trade Unions responded to 
this event so influential on its core activities. Literature on the subject on a whole criticizes 
the DGB's incapacity to implement strategies favoring reunification. With few exceptions, the 
majority of DGB unions is described as having either opposed reunification or begrudgingly 
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adjusted their course to reflect decisions made without their input. To put it in different terms, 
the DGB only accepted reunification late on in the process and was therefore unable to play 
any role. My initial intent was, in the wake of these studies, to look at the causes of DGB's 
reticence. But as I learned more on the subject through various sources, I started to question 
the theory. Producing a broad comparative chronology of DGB's initiatives in 1989-90 was 
one of the major challenges in writing this thesis. A summary of what I believed were the 
main ambiguities in literature on the topic was published as a review article in Centre d'études 
germaniques' Revue d'Allemagne in 2001. 
I came to Berlin to continue my studies of recent changes to West German union politics. An 
initial Ph.D. project aimed at examining the evolution of DGB unions' strategies and program 
during the late 1980s through a comparative study of the two main political episodes of these 
years: reunification and European integration. My goals were to critically investigate in grea-
ter detail the ’Johnny come lately’ theory of 1989-90 and to integrate the European dimension 
into the analysis. 
After months of reading and annotating union documents on Europe from the 1980s, I came 
to the conclusion that the DGB had not conducted a critical review on the European question 
in those years. Only a handful of documents addressed issues crucial to my work, such as un-
ion goals and strategies with regard to European integration, as well as the influence of the 
latter on labor politics and its program. Naturally, the objective of expanding the social di-
mension of the CEE treaty was sometimes touched upon in the union press, for instance in 
1989 when the Maastricht process was launched. Yet most of the hundred articles from the 
years 1983-1990 were mere attempts to familiarize union secretaries and members with Euro-
pean directives and institutions. The DGB’s stances on Europe had obviously been decided 
earlier and were no longer called into question. By contrast, articles on reunification were full 
of interesting insights on the evolution of unions' politics. 
This disparity forced certain methodological adjustments. Three options were available. I 
could expand the temporal framework in order to discover when the choice in favor of Europe 
was made and why this support was no longer brought into question by the DGB. Yet much 
evidence would suggest that pro-European positions were widely held since the 1950s and 
that my research would have to go back to that period. I doubted that a comparison between 
events that occurred in economic and political contexts radically different, i.e., the 1950s and 
the 1980s, would provide any insight into the recent developments of union politics in Ger-
many. The second option was to proceed to an asymmetrical comparison and devote greater 
attention to reunification. From this perspective, European integration would have been re-
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ferred to only in relation to the phenomenon mentioned above, i.e., that it had not brought 
about a rethink among West German unions of their strategies, goals and program. The third 
option was to drop the comparison and focus on reunification.  
This last option appeared to be the most appropriate for two reasons. One related to my cen-
tral interest in the recent developments in labor politics in Germany and the necessity to focus 
on this core issue. The other reason concerned the East German dimension of the topic. In my 
readings of West German union press articles from 1989, I was forced to re-evaluate another 
deep-seated tendency in the historiography on the collapse of the GDR, namely that East 
German workers had not played a role in the revolution – or only in the role as consumers -, 
and that the workplaces had, on the whole, remained unaffected by the events. In 1989, how-
ever, DGB press published several papers on workplace initiatives relating to the implementa-
tion of new structures of worker representation. These articles offered another perspective on 
the 1989 revolution, in which the workplace also had a role in the affecting events. Interest-
ingly, these articles on East German worker initiatives in 1989were in stark contrast to the 
DGB's discourse a few months later. Beginning in March 1990, the DGB unions endorsed, 
with increasing vigor, the theory of the non-involvement of the East German labor movement 
in the revolution. Such an reversal of course on the discourse had a practical corollary, i.e., the 
promotion by the DGB unions of their organizational expansion into the GDR. After standing 
essentially alone in its support of the developments at East German workplaces in the FRG, 
the West German union press now derided them. 
How should this change be interpreted? In order to understand DGB politics in relation to the 
East German revolution and reunification, one cannot avoid examining the situation at East 
German workplaces. To interpret the changing attitude of the DGB, the role of workers and 
labor-related issues in the collapse of the GDR needed to be specifically addressed. Certain 
discoveries made at the East German archives and various articles I read on the subject con-
vinced me to attach ever-greater importance to the East German dimension, until I ultimately 
decided to reject the European dimension altogether. The initial comparative approach was 
thus abandoned in favor of an integrated, or German-German, approach. 
 
The methodological approach  
It would not be uncommon for one to claim that political developments influence academic 
research. While the introduction of political considerations into the free sphere of pure aca-
demic knowledge is often criticized, it can also have a positive influence on developments, for 
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instance the re-evaluation of the paradigms that had governed research on a specific topic to 
date. This is happening in the historiography of contemporary Germany, with the calls for a 
"unification" of post-war German history. The idea is to create one common narrative for the 
history of the East and West Germany. The low key ceremony commemorating the fifteenth 
anniversary of 1990 unification could not conceal the major differences that still persisted 
between East and West Germans. These are also expressed in different relationships to the 
past of the two post-war German states. The dissatisfaction expressed by many East Germans 
at high school history curriculum which paints a picture of the GDR as merely a totalitarian 
footnote in German history is fully understandable. As a result, it would appear as if the unifi-
cation of post-war German history could be historians' contribution to tearing down the "wall 
in the minds of people". 
Reflections on the unification of post-war German history started to gain in importance in the 
years during which this dissertation was written. This can be seen as one crucial step toward 
an even more ambitious project, i.e., that of an integrated post-war European history, inclu-
ding an examination of Eastern and Western bloc countries. The advantages of an integrated, 
German-German approach for the study of labor in the reunification process are immense. As 
I began to scrutinize the problems associated with my work, I came to realize the importance 
of not neglecting one country in concentrating on the other, and to place each country on an 
equal footing in examining them, to use an expression by the East German historian Jörg Roe-
sler. This methodology produced different conclusions to those found in other works on the 
topic. Phenomena, that may at first appear inconsequential when considered in their immedia-
te East or West German context, sometimes reveal broader implications if viewed in terms of 
their relationship to the situation on the other side of the border. 
It is thus my belief that the German-German approach can be quite useful, especially in the 
study of economic, social and labor issues. This work is an attempt to write a German-
German history of the East German revolution and reunification from the perspective of labor. 
My interest in recent developments in labor politics in Germany require that the types of acti-
vity engaged in by labor, as well as their discourse, receive due consideration. In this work, I 
shall attempt to create a balance between these activities (the different levels of labor politics 
and militancy) and discourse (union declarations and theoretical debates). No single aspect is 
given greater weight over the other. On the contrary, the author has made every effort to des-
cribe both aspects in their mutual interrelations. 
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The sections 
The following study is divided in   three parts of varying lengths. The first, and shortest, defi-
nes the framework of analysis. A brief introduction of the questions guiding us through the 
exploration of the topic is followed by a review of the literature on labor and the events of the 
years 1989/90. This discussion of the historiography allows us to clear up the inconsistencies 
mentioned above and to define the core questions which this work shall attempt to answer. A 
description of the actors observed and the methodological approach in use concludes this sec-
tion. This is notably more concise than in standard German dissertations in history. However, 
further concepts and issues related to the historiography are discussed in the course of the 
introduction.  
The second part explores the participation of workers and the role of labor-related issues in 
the collapse of the GDR. It opens with an analysis of the situation in East German workplaces 
in the second half of the 1980s, i.e., in the years and months preceding the revolution. To 
achieve this comparison, the opinion of leaders and workers on the situation within the labor 
movement is brought into the discussion. This comparison examines the major top-down 
struggles over wages and production quotas. Although it is difficult to pinpoint concrete ma-
nifestations of these struggles, the negative economic and political impact thereof is unmista-
kable. The hypothesis that struggles over wages and norms had immediate political implica-
tions in the East German context is examined and observed in two other periods of political 
crisis: 1959-1962 and 1967-1972. The participation of workers in the events of 1989-90 shall 
be considered thereafter. The analysis of worker initiatives at 51 workplaces enterprises and 
the situation in Erfurt indicates important correlations between developments outside and in-
side the workplaces in these months. 
The third part is dedicated to the response of the DGB unions to the East German revolution 
and its strategies on reunification. Throughout this third section, we will track the shift from a 
strategy of support and collaboration toward one dedicated to institutional extension. This 
shift was accompanied by important theoretical debates among the DGB unions, which shall 
also be addressed in these pages.The last two chapters describe the implementation of a stra-
tegy dedicated to the legal extension and organizational expansion in the GDR by the DGB 
unions. It shall show how important the participation of DGB unions was in the reunification 
process with a description of the role assigned to the West German collective bargaining part-
ners in the federal government's reunification roadmap. 
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The retelling of the events surrounding the establishment of a tripartite consensus in West 
Germany – government, employers, trade unions – in support of institutional extension was 
among the most difficult tasks in this study. Only limited sources were available and inter-
views did not provide the information needed to confirm (or disprove) all hypotheses explo-
red here. The recently published study by Gerhard A. Ritter on the decision-making process 
that led to the institutional extension of the West German labor law to the GDR (Der Preis 
der Einheit, Munich: Ch. Beck, 2006) would have been a valuable source of information, but 
alas it was published just as this study was concluded. The analysis of this process put forth in 
the coming pages was not able to fully include Ritter's findings on the subject. 
Quotes cited in the text are generally translated except for longer excerpts which remain in the 
original German. All references to sources are provided in detail in the footnotes. In the case 
of studies, only the last name of the author(s) is indicated, along with the year of publication 
and page numbers in the footnotes. Full details of the sources and studies cited herein are pro-
vided in the bibliography. 
I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Hartmut Kaelble who acted as my guide 
throughout my work over the past years. His comments and questions were always thought 
provoking and insightful. Listening to his remarks during the graduate seminar in social histo-
ry provided the most rigorous training in historical methodology I was to receive. My gratitu-
de also goes out to Professor Frédéric Hartweg who assisted me in the initial phase of this 
study in Strasbourg. I would like to thank my fellow students in the seminars at the Humboldt 
University for providing valuable insight through their work and questions, especially on the 
formulation of hypotheses and in the analysis of sources. If my case is somewhat representati-
ve, the average Canadian Ph.D. candidate in history still suffers lacks in these domains in 
comparison to his or her German colleague. For these very reasons, my thanks go to my col-
leagues and friends at the Centre Marc-Bloch, in particular in the GDR and labor research 
groups. Their comments and suggestions at different stages in my research proved extremely 
valuable. I would like to express my thanks to the German historians, British political scien-
tists and French sociologists who critiqued and corrected sections of this work and prompted 
me to delve deeper in my research. In that respect, I am especially indebted to two former 
East German opposition activists, who always had time for my questions and were great sour-
ces of motivation. I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of my numerous contacts 
at IG Metall, Media Industrial Union and Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union (both 
now part of ver.di) and , Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union and the DGB, who ha-
ve taken the time to talk to me, discuss my theories and furnish documentation. I wish to ex-
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press my gratitude to the archivists at the BStU and Sapmo archives, the BDA, IG Metall's 
Central Library and Archive, and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. I also want to thank the library 
staff at the university and public libraries in Berlin, Strasbourg, Munich, Saarbrücken, Ottawa 
and Montreal, where much of the research for this study was conducted. I express my heartfelt 
gratitude to my friends and family members who supported and motivated me, as well as to 
James Weekes and Wendy Kloke who proof-read this work. And finally, I wish to thank Mé-
lanie for everything. 
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Part 1:  The Framework of Analysis 
This first section of this work presents the methodological underpinnings of the analysis de-
veloped hereinafter. The first chapter introduces the questions which this study will attempt to 
answer (1.1). The discussion of five historiographical issues serves to summarize how these 
questions have been treated in literature to date and, more generally, how the historiography 
portrays the involvement of labor in the revolution and reunification (1.2). This discussion 
allows the author to introduce the approach of this study which is detailed, together with the 
hypotheses and the actors observed, in the subsequent section (1.3). The last section presents 
the different types of sources drawn upon in this study (1.4). 
1.1 Questions tackled, Questions left untouched 
The central story of this work pertains to the role of labor in the events of 1989-90 in Ger-
many. Four core questions form the pillars upon which this story is constructed. 
The first question concerns the role of East German labor in the collapse of the GDR. It tack-
les the issue from two angles: 1) the role of labor as one of the long-term factors that culmi-
nated in the “collapse of the GDR” at the end of the 1980s; 2) and the role of labor in the 
1989-90 “revolution” that brought about the downfall of the GDR. The debate on whether the 
fall of the GDR was the result of a collapse, or a revolution, is addressed in section 1.2. This 
discussion on the role of the East German labor in the collapse of the GDR forms a central 
theme throughout the entire second part of this work. 
The second question concerns the strategies implemented by the West German trade unions in 
the context of the East German revolution and German unification. What goals and motives 
were behind these strategies?  
The implications and impact of West German unions’ strategies for achieving German reuni-
fication constitute the third subject matter addressed in this study.  
Finally, the question of how the episodes of 1989-90 fit into the postwar history of the Ger-
man labor is the fourth main subject on which this work is oriented. These three core issues 
shall be evaluated in the third part. 
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Ph.D. dissertations are as much about the issues they discuss as about the ones they leave un-
touched. The decision to exclude a topic has not always been easy, but it was required in order 
to maintain a certain balance in the narration of the central story. Two issues which are not 
examined in this study, though some reference to them is made, are the disbanding of the Free 
(East) German Confederation of Trade Unions (Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB) 
and the liquidation of its assets. Both are considered some of the key aspects which shaped 
the West German trade unions' strategies. I decided not to provide an account of the tumultu-
ous episodes surrounding the disbanding of the FDGB because this story has already been 
thoroughly researched by other authors.1 The legal and economic legacy of FDGB’s assets is 
a crucial issue which has yet to receive its due attention. The amount of research that would 
have been necessary to properly reconstruct the events surrounding the liquidation of these 
assets raises doubts as to whether it could be told satisfactorily here. Furthermore it is a story 
without an end, as the fate of many of these assets (mainly buildings) is not yet decided. 
These reasons appeared sufficient to exclude this topic from the present analysis. 
A third crucial issue not discussed in this work is the collective bargaining rounds in East 
Germany from July 1990 forward and the relationship of DGB trade unions to the privatiza-
tion agency in charge of the sale of East German enterprises (Treuhandanstalt). It is not for a 
lack of interest in this rather tedious character of collective bargaining rounds that motivated 
this decision. An earlier draft of this dissertation project included a fifth part which would 
have been dedicated to collective bargaining and the Treuhandanstalt, between the years 1990 
and 1993. It is rather a certain degree of realism on the author’s part as to what could be ac-
complished within the framework of this study that ultimately led to the decision to eliminate 
this part altogether. 
Finally, all sector-specific issues (specific to the situation in the shipbuilding industry, the 
chemical industry, etc.) are purposely neglected, as are issues relating to female employees, 
young workers and vocational training.2 Again, these choices are somewhat spurious, as all 
these issues were part of unions’ deliberations and strategies. As such, these topics should 
have found their appropriate place in this study. It is especially regrettable that the gender 
dimension could not be included. Despite all attempts, I was in the end not able to incorporate 
the gender issue in a way that would enhance the treatment of the core questions rather than 
lengthen and obscure it.  
                                                 
1 E.g., Weinert/Gilles 1999. 
2 For information on unions and the vocational training in 1989-90, see: Giraud 1999.   
 10
As so often in studies on the labor movement, the gender dimension is thus omitted with the 
justification that a specific study would be necessary. I am aware of the limits resulted from 
this failure to include such topics will have on the conclusions proposed herein. 
1.2 The historiography on German labor in the revolution and 
reunification 
The second chapter highlights how the historiography discusses five issues that are central to 
the analysis developed in this work. The first issues concerns the writing of labor history to-
day. The second issue involves the role of East German labor in the collapse of the GDR. The 
question of whether or not the West German trade unions were party to the events of 1989-90 
is the third topic examined. An analysis of the literature on institutional transfer and how it 
can be integrated into this analysis is proposed later in the paper. Finally, various models for 
an integrated history of postwar Germany, i.e., the approach adopted here, are discussed. 
1.2.1 Toward a global labor history, or why a dissertation on labor history 
in the first decade of the 21st Century? 
The “end of work” and the crisis in labor history 
When I first arrived at the university in the mid-1990s, the debate over the “end of work” was 
in full swing. The radical segmentation of the labor markets and a manifold increase in the 
number of forms of employment status in the last fifteen to twenty years had produced deep 
qualitative mutations within western societies.3 The repercussions of these mutations can be 
observed in an increase of insecurity and instability in relation to employment.4 The situation 
had also generated worldwide best-sellers in which pessimistic visions of the future of west-
ern societies were detailed. In his essay published around this time, Jeremy Rifkin had pre-
dicted that a loss of up to 40% of all jobs by the year 2000 would split American society in 
two groups: people without jobs and people forced to work up to 60 hours a week.5  
                                                 
3 Castel 1995. 
4 “Instability” is an unsatisfactory translation of the French “précarité”. The use of “prekär” by German social 
scientists is not rare although the translation remains criticized. 
5 Rifkin 1995. 
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At the opposite end of the best-sellers’ lists, many studies in social sciences argued that west-
ern societies were in fact going through a “paradigmatic rupture”. Since no later than industri-
alization, the concept of “work” had been the main factor in the organization of western socie-
ties. Work had locked, managed, employed and distributed people in space and time. It had 
defined the main social conflicts.6 This no longer seemed to be the case.  Work had “been 
objectively displaced from its status as a central and self-evident fact of life.” As a conse-
quence, it had even lost “its subjective role as the central motivating force in the activity of 
workers.”7 Hence, new forms of work had produced mutations in the nature and contours of 
social conflicts as well. The development of “new social movements”, distinct from the “old” 
labor movement, confirmed at the same time that this argument had merits of its own.8  
Despite focusing on the past, history did not remain untouched by this evolution. The “para-
digmatic rupture” induced in social sciences by the decrease in employment rates found its 
corollary in a reassessment of some of the basic assumptions of traditional labor history. La-
bor historians became interested in the longer development toward this “long-term shift in 
standards and values” that now appeared to have been successfully completed by western so-
cieties with the displacement of work from its former central position.9 By the 1990s, the 
broad field of labor history had entered a period of crisis.10 “Is labor history dead?”, asked 
Rae Frances and Bruce Scates (1993). Their uncertainty on the future of the discipline was no 
longer shared by most of their colleagues, who seemed to have buried it for good, as Verity 
Burgmann illustrated in “The Strange Death of Labor History” (1991). 
There were additional reasons for the growing skepticism toward labor history in the 1990s. 
One was the “metamorphosis of the worldwide political constellation”. This expression, bor-
rowed from Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen, refers to a new context marked by the 
exhaustion of the “spirit of the 1960s”, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the programmatic 
crises experienced by social-democratic parties. This political metamorphosis redirected stu-
dents and academics toward other fields of historical research. Still, the crisis of labor history 
in the 1990s cannot be attributed solely to external factors, such as the “end of work” and a 
new political context. Factors linked to the scientific evolution in the field have contributed 
their fair share in instigating this crisis. 
                                                 
6 Gagnon 1996, p. 37. 
7 Offe 1985, pp. 147-148. 
8 Brand 1987. 
9 I draw on the explanations provided by Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen (1999), p. 6.  
10 Van der Linden 1993; Berlanstein 1993; Terry 1994. 
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Two internal factors for the crisis of labor history can be identified in particular. One concerns 
the fragmentation of the field. The numerous studies in labor history made since the 1970s 
have constantly overlapped with other disciplines. Among those disciplines, Marcel van der 
Linden and Jan Lucassen identify “women’s history, urban history, agrarian history, cultural 
anthropology, folklore, social economics, the history of technology, historical government 
theories, industrial relations, the history of law”. This overlap pushed one to the “realization 
that a cohesion of content is lacking.”11 This opening up to the methods and findings of these 
disciplines has as it turned out made it seemingly impossible to create comprehensive and 
unified definitions of the objects and concepts of labor history. What should and should not be 
included under the term “labor”? Which tasks are accomplished by “workers” and which are 
not? Which societies can be described as “societies based on labor” and which cannot? To 
what extent does “wage labor” differentiate between industrialized and non-industrialized 
societies? Advances made in interdisciplinary fieldschallenged labor historians, who faced 
great problems in proposing comprehensive characterizations of “labor”, “workers”, “work-
based societies” (Arbeitsgesellschaften) and even “wage labor”. Confronted by these difficul-
ties, labor history studies simply refrained from generalizing in their findings in a way that 
allowed for a better understanding of the core objects and concepts of their own field.  
The second internal factor for the crisis of the labor history related to the radical criticism of 
previous interpretative frameworks. The difficulty in proposing much-needed new approaches 
was magnified by decades of studies that opened the various shortcomings of the previous 
frameworks developed by Karl Marx and Max Weber to re-assessment, as were the works of 
classical liberal labor historians like Lujo Brentano and members of the academic left, such as 
Lucien Herr of the Ecole normale supérieure in France. According to van der Linden and Lu-
cassen, these frameworks share a “very specific and restricted definitions of labor” and their 
limited account of “the consequences of labor relationships and related organizations”. The 
works produced or inspired by these old school labor historians share a lack of interest for 
“fuzzy and contradictory class locations (self-employment, indentured labor, etc.)” and for 
“conflicting and transnational identities (gender, ethnicity, etc.)”.12 They also shared a limited 
temporal and spatial field of observation, mainly the western and European societies of the 
19th and 20th centuries. This narrow perspective had resulted  nolens volens in normative, eth-
nocentric conclusions. The developments of innovative historical approaches since the 1970s, 
                                                 
11 Van der Linden/Lucassen 1999, p. 6. 
12 Ibid., p. 7. 
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especially in the different ramifications of cultural history, made all these shortcomings ap-
pear more glaring.  
Writing labor history today: The project of a global labor history   
Even in the short summary provided above, the critical state of labor history almost begs the 
question at this early point in the work how labor history can be written today. I believe the 
project of a global labor history, initiated around the turn of the century by historians at the 
International Institute for Social History of Amsterdam, is indeed an interesting and thought-
provoking proposition in that respect.  
The purpose of the global labor history project is to go beyond the observations made in 
Western European and North American industrialized societies and conceive comparative and 
transnational studies on pre-industrial periods and on African, Asian and South American 
civilizations.13 The comparative and transnational perspective should allow for a better under-
standing of how different national labor movements reacted to international structural devel-
opments. It is of special interest to labor organizations (trade unions and political parties) 
founded as international organizations. It aims to integrate into comprehensive concepts vari-
ous realities observed in regions that do not belong to the Western Hemisphere. The so-called 
crisis of  “normal labor relations” which, in most countries, was never the norm, is for in-
stance criticized.14 Another of its main goals is to incorporate the gender- and work-related 
numerous issues  in a more effective manner than tradition labor history has done. The objec-
tive of the global labor history is to integrate the results and generalize the propositions of 
labor history studies, in a way that allows labor to take its “proper and important place in gen-
eral history and in social sciences.”15 In that respect, the revisions initiated in Amsterdam 
regarding the field of labor history takes its rightful place among other attempts to solve the 
great puzzle known in history departments as the “problem of synthesis”.16 
The present work is not an essay on global labor history, as it is not a comparative study and 
does not adopt a transnational perspective. Yet the definition of labor movements and the core 
questions posed by the global labor history are fundamental elements of this study. 
                                                 
13 Van der Linden 2002. See the following studies: Scholliers/Schwarz 2003; Elmhirst/Saptari 2004 and the 
special issue of the International Review of Social History 49/12 on “Popular Intellectuals and Social Move-
ments: Framing Protest in Asia, Africa, and Latin America” (December 2004). 
14 Van der Linden 2003. 
15 Van der Linden/Lucassen 1999, p. 23. 
16 One of the seminal articles on the “problem of synthesis” in labor history is: Brody 1980. 
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One of the main objectives of labor history is, obviously, to study labor movements. Marcel 
van der Linden and Jan Lucassen define labor movements as: “(i) groups of wage earners that 
attempt to realize certain (ii) wishes and demands through (iii) methods of action, possibly in 
(iv) a sustained organizational framework – and who may use (v) a broader ideology to justify 
their actions.”17 Simply reduced to an ensemble of collective projects by wage earners, labor 
movements appear to be a more extensive social phenomenon than usually conceded by social 
scientists in other fields. This broad understanding of labor movements (i and ii) allows and 
requires that they be approached using a multiplicity of questions and methodologies. A 
strong preference, however, is shown for studies on the forms of action and organizations (iii). 
The refusal to overly restrict the criteria (“possibly in a sustained organizational framework”, 
“who may use a broader ideology to justify their action”) also allows the researcher to incor-
porate forms of workers’ actions often not identified with labor movements, i.e., those of a 
more informal nature. Such a definition of labor movements necessarily focuses on the multi-
ple combinations of public and private strategies by workers directed toward defending their 
interests. It invites the researcher to highlight how political and economic conditions influence 
these combinations. This definition of labor movements is crucial for the analysis of the de-
fense of workers’ interests in the GDR elaborated on in the second part of this work.  
The global labor history tackles labor movements’ organizational history with (no less than) 
four “core questions”: how does one define the origin or emergence of labor organizations? 
What factors explains the pattern of growth and development of labor organizations? What 
ideas and philosophies do labor movements promote? Why do individual workers join labor 
organizations?18 The study of the encounter of labor movements from both Germanies in 
1989-90 offers interesting clues for answering the first three of these questions.  
Critics have stressed the difficulties of including such a divergent program under the single 
banner of global labor history. On the one hand, according to their observation, the project is 
sustained by a handful of historians, most of whom have been active for decades in the net-
works associated with the International Institute of Social History. Their argument, in essence, 
is that the limited amount of work that these resolute defenders of labor history have per-
formed makes the quest for a “truly global labor history” (Marcel van der Linden) seem like a 
                                                 
17 Ibidem, p. 18. 
18 These questions are derived from John T. Dunlop’s seminal essay from the late forties titled: “The Develop-
ment of Labor Organizations: A Theoretical Framework”, in: Richard A. Lester and Joseph Shister (eds), 1948, 
Insights into Labor Issues (New York: Macmillan), pp. 163-193, 163, quoted in: Ibid., p. 20. These views are 
still considered valid by the initiators of the global labor history. 
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distant reality.19 On the other hand, it has been underlined that initial attempts at “globaliz-
ing” labor history appear rather meek in comparison with the fine research program that have 
been developed. The gender dimension is still said to be insufficiently incorporated. Critics 
also argue that, despite the inclusion of a broader temporal and spatial perspective, labor his-
tory remains unable to renew the basic concepts and objectives forged through studies of in-
dustrialized Western societies. If its diagnosis on the shortcomings of traditional labor history 
hold true, the global labor history approach would seem incapable of proposing a cure to these 
ills.20 
There is an implicit connection between this study and the project of a global labor history. 
For instance, the depiction of extremely individualized methods of defending workers’ inter-
ests in the GDR should attract the interest of historians comparing how different political and 
economic conditions determine how workers’ interests are defended. But the connection to 
the global labor history project is implicit because the findings contained herein are not dis-
cussed from this perspective. If labor history has yet to overcome its current crisis, the global 
labor history program clarifies the methodological problems at issue, suggests interesting new 
avenues to explore and offers the necessary tools to begin the quest.  
1.2.2 East German labor in the collapse of the GDR and the East German 
Revolution: Actors or spectators? 
If, humans were divined with nine lives like cats, it might theoretically be possible for a per-
son to go through a sizable number of monographs, essays, articles and reports dedicated to 
the final days of the GDR. If, as part of this hypothetical experiment, this avid reader were 
asked about the role played by workers in the events, his or her first reaction would very 
likely be one of silence. Could any other reaction be expected? The topic of workers and their 
role in events is absent from most literature dedicated to the outburst of popular discontent in 
the GDR in 1989. What role could be played by an actor no even mentioned in the credits? 
After this initial surprise, our diligent test subject would now very likely answer that "work-
ers" had not contributed to the fall of the GDR regime. As was the case with other groups in 
East German society (e.g., homosexuals, the aged, twins, etc.), the specific realities of wage 
labor have not found their way into the events of 1989-1990. Speaking as an expert on litera-
ture of the collapse of the GDR, our human guinea pig could come to no other but to state that 
                                                 
19 Hüttner 2004. 
20 Welskopp 2004.  
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the workers indeed played no role and would obviously suggest we shift the discussion to a 
more central aspect of the topic. 
Such an experiment is of course impossible. In light of that fact, how could one possibly sup-
port such a claim that workers are absent from the bulk of contributions on the East German 
events in 1989-1990? Should one compile and submit a page-long list of studies that make no 
reference to workers? That would make for a rather dull  read. I therefore ask the reader to 
accept the argument as axiomatic. It is the author’s personal conclusion based on his readings 
and seminars he has attended on the history of the Wende and reunification. This axiom forms 
the basis for the following discussion. Its function is to stress how the debates described here-
inafter takes its place on the margins of the historiography on the fall of the GDR.  
However, the question of why workers did not play a role in the events of 1989-90 has been 
examined in different studies. In one way, they form the corollary of the axiomatic remarks 
made previously, and can be seen as their justification as well. Different dimensions of this 
alleged lack of participation are hinted at. The passivity observed on GDR's shop floors at the 
end of the 1980s might explain why the workplace had become an unlikely scene of political 
mobilization and action.21 Case studies were said to reveal only minor or insufficient attempts 
by East German workers to reform the structures for defending their interests.22 The inability 
of opposition groups with a keen interest in the fate of the labor movement – e.g., the Initia-
tive for Independent Trade Unions (IUG), the United Left (VL) and certain elements within 
the New Forum (NF) - to win over large numbers of workers to their cause, was also high-
lighted.23  
The ultimate confirmation of the non-existent role of labor in the events of 1989-90 would 
seem to be furnished by East German opposition leaders themselves, who portray the up-
heaval as a "revolution after business hours" (Revolution nach Feierabend).24 The expression 
was used to stress distinct points, but always referred to the lack of strike action and the fact 
that most demonstrations were held in the evening or during the weekends. Wolfgang Thierse 
employed it to call for the rejection of industrial action by many workers. A "very German 
way" to conduct a revolution, he said.25  
                                                 
21 Reichel 2001. 
22 Kädtler/Kottwitz 1990. 
23 Jander 1996. 
24 See the recollection of Democratic Awakening's activist Margot Friedrich (1991), which uses the expression 
as title.    
25 "Revolution machen wir nach Feierabend – Gespräch mit Wolfgang Thierse in Ost-Berlin", express, 12/89, pp. 
4-5, quote p. 5.  
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Social-democrat activist Richard Schröder (from the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
lands, or SDP) uses this expression in his call for participants to respect the same level of or-
der that prevailed at the evening gatherings.26 The "revolution after business hours" character-
izes the 1989-90 events in a light that underlines labor’s lack of a role in events.  
Another frequent characterization of the East German revolution seeks to stress the disconnect 
that existed between workers and the events on the ground:  the "revolution of consumers". 
This expression suggests that there are two types of revolutions: the "revolution of producers" 
and the "revolution of consumers". The desire of the people to move to West Germany and 
enjoy a level of service quality and material comfort comparable to that of their West German 
brethren did play a key role in 1989-90. Certain authors have argued that these considerations 
were of little consequence in the radical transformation of the conditions of production and 
had much more to do with consumerism. For those authors, the Wende and reunification basi-
cally boil down to a "revolution of consumers".27 
The concept of a "revolution of consumers" is implicitly and explicitly discussed at length in 
the second part of this work. As it will become apparent, I refute this argument in the case of 
the East German revolution. Without going into great detail here, I shall nonetheless state the 
reasons for my reservations as to the heuristic value of the concept. I truthfully doubt that the 
East German demonstrators who shouted "We are the people!" made a distinction between 
production stoppages that represented a threat to their pay and the lack of consumer goods. 
Would they have had any reason to draw such distinctions? Shouldn’t their experience have 
led them instead to view both phenomena as the consequence of the same economic prob-
lems? The distinction between "revolution of producers" and "revolution of consumers" re-
mains problematic: a) because producers and consumers are the same persons, b) because 
wages and consumption are mutually dependent, and, finally, c) because in the GDR conflicts 
relating to issues of production or to consumption opposed working people to the regime. 
Until now, different arguments were recalled that support the hypothesis that workers re-
mained on the sidelines during the East German revolution. The 1999 study by the American 
sociologist Linda Fuller, titled Where Was the Working Class? Revolution in Eastern Ger-
many constitutes the most comprehensive contribution to this hypothesis. The arguments de-
veloped in her book deserve special attention in our discussion. 
                                                 
26 "Wende. Wir waren doch keine Kasperletheater", Berliner Zeitung, November 5, 1999, internet edition: 
http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/archiv/.bin/dump.fcgi/1999/1105/politik/0074/index.html. 
27 Schroeder (Wolfgang) 2000, pp. 113-117. 
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Where was the working class? 
The starting point of Fuller's analysis is her characterization of the East German class struc-
ture as divided into two main classes: workers and intelligentsia. The former included blue 
and white-collar workers; the latter, state officials, party members, managers, and intellectu-
als. The East German revolution, in the eyes of Fuller, was propelled forward by one group 
within the intelligentsia: the intellectuals. It was, in her words, a conflict within the ruling 
class, "a struggle that occurred largely between two segments of the intelligentsia – one de-
fending the status quo and the other determined to overthrow it."28 The other class, i.e., the 
working class, were not party to this struggle. Fuller's story of the East German revolution is 
also a story of the "non-involvement of workers".  
This depiction of the events of 1989-90 as a "revolution of intellectuals" is frequently es-
poused in historiography. It places the focus on the role played by authors, artists, scientists, 
students, and priests, and on their over-representation in the citizens’ movement. It stresses 
the importance of theatres and universities as key venues for popular protest.29 But whereas 
most advocates of this argument are satisfied with this interpretation of the revolution, Fuller 
is critical of the inability of the intellectuals to bridge the gap that separated them from the 
working class.30 Years of little or no contact between the groups would not be easily over-
come. On the one hand, explains Fuller, intellectuals did not understand the realities faced by 
workers and cultivated certain prejudices against them. They saw workers as being driven by 
materialistic considerations, as fundamentally apolitical, unable to think for themselves, un-
willing to inform themselves, and uninterested in principles such as democracy and freedom, 
the main objects of their protest.31 On the other hand, she continues, workers looked suspi-
ciously at the intellectuals' movement as just another struggle for power between the ruling 
elite. They did not attach themselves to a protest which they felt was not theirs. Fuller tones 
down her argument by presenting a few examples of workers who felt empowered by the 
revolutionary spirit and its growing presence at the workplace.32 All in all, however, these 
remained exceptions to the rule. For Fuller, it is the failure of intellectuals to reach workers 
that resulted in the failure of the East German revolution, and hence led to reunification. 
                                                 
28 Fuller 1999, p. 33. 
29 Brown 1991, Randle 1991, Reich 1992. Jeffrey Kopstein (1996, footnote 1) underscores that this interpretation 
also implicitly describes most of the democratization studies on Eastern Europe. 
30 For another type of critical assessment of the role of the intellectuals in 1989-90, which seek to support their 
ill-informed pretension of leading the mobilization and reform the GDR, see: Torpey 1995. 
31 Fuller 1999, pp. 98-100. 
32 Ibid., chapter 6. 
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Fuller's criticism of the East German intellectuals finds common ground in the research con-
ducted by a group of sociologists headed by Detlef Pollack in Leipzig. The "masses", accord-
ing to their conclusions, appeared only at the margins of the citizens’ movement's considera-
tions. The working population was occasionally seen as the "target of political activity", more 
often, however, as an obstacle to sound reform.33 
"Where Was the Working Class?" had remained a question not posed in the literature on the 
East German revolution. Linda Fuller is due proper credit for bringing the issue to the fore 
and presenting such a convincing argument in response. Her argumentation, however, has 
been criticized. 
The political scientist Gareth Dale in particular has directed his criticisms towards Linda 
Fuller's methods and conclusions. He dedicates an entire chapter in one of his books to disput-
ing them.34 In a nutshell, his analysis is twofold. Firstly, he questions Fuller's depiction of the 
East German class structure as dividing into two disparate groups, with the intelligentsia on 
the one side and the workers on the other. The intelligentsia, he states, did not constitute one 
ruling bloc. Expanding on the work of the sociologist Günter Erbe, he highlights several im-
portant distinctions within this group, especially between the nomenclatura and the intellectu-
als. The former was distinguished from the latter through its decision-making authority, its 
relation to property, as well as its control over resources, investments, and the production 
process in general.35 But Dale distinguishes between subgroupings within the intellectual 
community as well. He depicts this group as torn between different proposals and philoso-
phies. Some intellectuals had obviously "more to lose than their chains" and assiduously 
bowed to authority. They enjoyed the privileges afforded them by their position and defended 
the regime.36 They certainly fit into Fullers depiction of intellectuals as one component of the 
ruling class. Others, however, were constantly in conflict with the authorities. Their living and 
working conditions forced them into the role of dissidents, however "of a kind that sought to 
achieve change through negotiation." Dale depicts the political stance of these intellectuals as 
an attempt to mediate between the top and bottom strata of the East German society, as "seek-
ing a balance between order and reform". They also cultivated the myth that "the interests of 
ruling and working classes can be ‘properly reconciled’ within the framework of a market 
economy, a notion that found embodiment in the then fashionable discourse on ‘civil soci-
                                                 
33 Pollack et al. (eds.) 1992, pp. 48-50. 
34 Dale 2005, chapter 9. 
35 Dale (ibid., p. 185) refers to: Günter Erbe, 1982, Arbeiterklasse und Intelligenz in der DDR (Opladen: 
Westeutscher Verlag), p. 72. 
36 Dale 2005, p. 173. 
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ety’".37 Despite this criticism, Dale refuses to identify this second group of intellectuals with 
the first. 
The second aspect of Dale's critique of Linda Fuller's approach concerns the thesis of "work-
ers' non-involvement in the revolution". He rejects this altogether. He stresses that Fuller's 
opinion on workers' lack of interest in political issues is based on interviews conducted in… 
1988, in remote cities like Bernau and the surrounding area, as well as Berlin. Her sample of 
workers' attitude toward the state power is not representative of the situation in southern in-
dustrial cities like Leipzig and Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz), the locations of the largest popu-
lar mobilizations. The apathy she noted in 1988 had disappeared one year later, explains Dale. 
His main argument is based on math:  
Between August 1989 and April 1990, 2,600 public demonstrations and over 300 rallies 
took place, as well as over 200 strikes and a dozen factory occupations. The largest 
three of the 2,600 demonstrations attracted well over 1 million people. No accurate figu-
res exist for the total number of participants in demonstrations and public protests. That 
it was several million is indisputable. One researcher has estimated the figure at over 5 
million. Yet there were only 1.6 million graduates in the land. Even had they all muste-
red on the streets in long and learned processions, intellectuals would still have compri-
sed only a minority of the crowds.38 
Hence, if intellectuals had initiated the protest, it was the workers who swelled the ranks of 
the demonstrators. They have been the dynamic element in the mass popular mobilization. 
Dale also points to some studies, which countered the widely held assumption about the 
dominance of intellectuals in the protest movement. For instance, the survey of the origins 
and motives of the Leipzig demonstrators by Karl-Dieter Opp, Peter Voss and Christiane 
Gern concludes that people with a university degree reported the lowest rate of participation 
at the demonstrations – lower than any category of worker.39 Dale concludes: "Workers were 
not only involved, but played the decisive part in toppling the regime."40 
The restoration of the balance of accounts away from one that overemphasized the role of the 
intellectuals is welcome. Dale's counter-argument that the East German revolution was a 
genuine workers' revolution might come as a surprise and it has not been without its critics. 
The historian Gary Bruce believes that Dale's assertion is undermined by the author's failure 
to assess the role of street demonstrations in bringing about the collapse of the GDR. "If East 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 174. 
38 Ibid., p. 180. 
39 Id. Dale refers specifically to Opp/Voss/Gern 1993, p. 214. 
40 Ibid., p. 186. 
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Germany was toppled due more to regime implosion than revolution from below, the role of 
workers in the process may not be as significant as Dale suggests."41 
 
Or maybe the working class was there after all? 
The question of whether the end of the GDR was caused by an implosion or a revolution is 
one of the most hotly debated issues in the historiography on East Germany. I have used both 
concepts so far, without specifying their exact meaning. Implosion implies longer terms fac-
tors in the crisis, for instance, of an economic nature. These reached a climax in 1989, and 
brought about the collapse of the regime. Revolution stresses the role of the popular mobiliza-
tion in the events.42 Gary Bruce suggests that if the end of the GDR corresponds to an implo-
sion, the contribution of the mass mobilization of the working population was limited. This 
assertion is open to qualification. Studies defending the implosion theory, as well as those 
defending the revolution theory, argue that the part played by workers in these phenomena 
was crucial.  
Academic works highlighting the role of workers in 1989-90 are rare in literature. I again will 
stress this point prior to discussing it, with the goal of underlining how the pages devoted to 
the subject in this chapter do not truly reflect their actual place in the historiography. Be that 
as it may, many authors have challenged the dominant theory of the non-involvement of 
workers in the fall of the GDR and we shall take a closer look at their arguments now.  
The story of the regime's implosion as a result of dynamics at the workplace is narrated by 
Peter Alheit and Hanna Haack (2004). Their study on the working class milieu in Rostock's 
Neptune Shipyards during the early years of the GDR is captivating. Building on their case 
analysis, the authors depict the revitalization and consolidation of working class milieus in 
East Germany, which, they argue, was more pronounced than in West Germany after World 
War II.43 The suppression of independent structures of interest representation by the regime 
led this revitalized working class to rapidly develop spheres of autonomy. This autonomy had 
its main expression in informal and formal wage negotiations between workers and managers. 
The introduction of workers’ brigades after 1953 institutionalized these practices and in-
creased worker autonomy, argue Alheit and Haack. The centrally planned economy made 
company managers heavily reliant on an extended workforce. As a result, the scales of the 
                                                 
41 Bruce 2006. 
42 In favor of the implosion thesis, see: Joas/Kohli 1993. In favor of the revolution thesis, see: Zwahr 1994. 
43 Alheit/Haack 2004, chapters 1-3. 
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balance tipped more often than not in favor of the workers. Workers’ brigades also gave them 
the power to prevent any major rise in production quotas, new methods of work organization 
and further compulsory vocational training programs. This would form the basis of a 
"counter-culture of workers". 
The second thesis presented by the authors concerns the consequences of this resulting auton-
omy, mainly demonstrated by these workers’ brigade. On the one hand, the wage autonomy 
undercut company profitability and ultimately led, on a national basis, to the erosion of GDR's 
economic foundation. On the other hand, worker autonomy proved to be an effective deterrent 
against the essential modernization of the country. The impact of worker autonomy, according 
to Alheit and Haack, was a sustained process of economic destabilization, initiated in the 
country's early years, which ultimately led to its fall at the end of the 1980s.44 While "work-
ers" were supposed to be the ruling class in the GDR, their autonomy ultimately served to 
hasten its collapse.45 
These provocative theories do not meet with universal approval. Peter Hübner, one of the 
foremost authorities on East German labor, rejects an argument which ultimately implies that 
the dictatorship of the party and a centralized economy would have worked, if only workers 
had been more amenable to change. The story of the fall of the GDR, Hübner reminds the 
reader, is also the story of its longevity. Other institutional and economic factors, that were 
later to arise, explain why the GDR lasted until and ultimately collapsed in 1989.46 In his 
work, Hübner stresses the importance of the political upheavals of 1961 and 1971 in GDR's 
labor history.47 
Another, less straightforward, variant on the role of workers in the collapse of the GDR is 
proposed by Jeffrey Kopstein. His argument focuses on the "long-term capacity of otherwise 
powerless workers to immobilize the regime through nonpolitical acts of everyday resis-
tance." By this, he means work slow-downs, employee absenteeism and other forms of worker 
protest against the regime's efforts to increase productivity. This resistance resulted into rela-
tively high wages in relation to relatively low productivity rates, weak labor discipline and 
over-employment. East German workers have constantly been able to render ineffective the 
new methods of labor discipline tested by the regime over the years and ultimately "under-
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 445. 
45 Ibid., p. 11. 
46 Hübner 2005. 
47 Hübner 1995, 1999b. 
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mined any hope of meaningful economic reform."48 This conflicting dynamic was crucial in 
the economic decline and the implosion of the East German regime.  
Up to this point, his argument shares much in common with that of Alheit and Haack. But 
Kopstein is more cautious in his arguments, and depicts workers' resistance as a necessary, 
albeit insufficient, factor in itself to cause the fall of the GDR. Despite their "virtual veto 
power over wages, prices, and production quotas," he writes, workers "did not possess an out-
right stranglehold on the East German economy".49 
Kopstein supplements his analysis of the GDR's economic decline with a study of the mid-
ranking regional party secretaries. He shows how their constant recourse to "campaigns" to 
stimulate greater productivity served less to solve the severe economic problems than to reaf-
firm their position as intermediaries. Kopstein illustrates how regional party secretaries, 
caught between the constraints of centralized planning and labor resistance,  had an interest in 
perpetuating the economic crisis. They had become the actors in a political theater preventing 
"alternative ways of conceiving the GDR's economic problems."50 Their activities devoted to 
preserving their own political power contributed to the collapse of the regime. Jeffrey Kop-
stein thus depicts the fall of the GDR as a collapse, largely, though not exclusively, caused by 
workers' resistance at the workplace.  
Other authors nevertheless continue to stress on the role of workers in the fall of the GDR, but 
they depict this process as a revolution and not a collapse. The contributions of the Berlin 
sociologist Renate Hürtgen deserve particular mention here. Her work is discussed in the sec-
ond part of this work. Different arguments have been put forward to support the theory of the 
revolutionary contribution of workers to the fall of the GDR.  
One such postulation concerns the precursors to the revolution in the second half of the 1980s. 
As Dirk Philipsen and others have shown, the story of the East German revolution is not the 
story of a spontaneous uprising.51 Many of these early signs appeared at the workplace. 
Hence, a growing conflict potential emerged between workers and authorities at the work-
place in the years preceding the revolution.52  
                                                 
48 Kopstein 1996, p. 391. Studies on the evolution of wages in the GDR can be seen as confirming many of Kop-
stein's arguments. See for instance: Bust-Bartels 1980, Vollmer 1999.  
49 Kopstein 1997, p. 11. 
50 Ibid., p. 152. 
51 Philipsen 1993. 
52 See the long discussion between East German workplace activists of the late 1980s in: Hürtgen/Gehrke 2001.  
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Furthermore, the desire of workers to halt the downward tendencies in living and working 
conditions, the underlying cause behind these tensions between workers and management at 
the workplace, was crucial in 1989-90. It was the impetus for the exodus to West Germany, 
the popular mobilization, street protests and, ultimately, reunification.53 Signs of political 
forms of protest had also reappeared in workplaces in 1989, after years of dormancy.54 
Another argument rejects the claim that little happened at East German  workplaces during 
the revolution. If the opposition was not present in most enterprises, there were several major 
exceptions to this, where whole groups of workers joined the New Forum or Democratic 
Awakening.55 Political discussion also occurred with great frequency at the workplace during 
those months. The revolutionary spirit of the street did not stop at the factory gates, as at-
tempts at increasing workers' say at work and reshaping the mechanisms of interest represen-
tation were not unheard of.56 Major strikes, and even a few calls to general strikes, were re-
corded, after years of relative inactivity.57 If one includes workers' participation at the 
demonstrations, it is difficult to speak in overall terms of the non-involvement of labor in the 
East German revolution. 
The authors who stress these phenomena refuse to view the manifestations of workers' par-
ticipation as mere inferior indicators, or attendant effects of a revolution otherwise initiated by 
intellectuals. They rather suggest a synergy between the street and the workplace. But do this 
synergy and signs of worker participation together add up to a workers' revolution? More spe-
cifically: to what extent did attempts at reshaping the structures of interest representation take 
hold on East German shop floors? We generally identify strong workers' movements in the 
Eastern Bloc with far-reaching attempts to sweep away the official trade unions and replace 
them with new, independent organizations. Such a broad movement for transformation never 
occurred in the GDR in 1989-90. Can this fact be reconciled with the claim that it was the 
workers who led the revolution? After all, no narrative of the East German revolution that 
took this standpoint has been proposed to date. Is the characterization of the East German 
revolution as a workers' revolution not an inflated view of their role in the events? This ques-
tion has yet to be answered for lack of a narrative incorporating labor into a general history of 
the revolution.   
                                                 
53 Timmer 2000, pp. 90-112; Zatlin 1994. 
54 Stolle 2001, pp. 95-97. 
55 Gehrke 2001a, p. 228. 
56 See the numerous sources published in: Hürtgen/Gehrke 2001. The 120 documented cases are analyzed in the 
second part of this work.   
57 Gehrke 2001b. 
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Another issue which I believe requires further research in order to emphasize the role of 
workers relates to the precise degree of autonomy enjoyed by this group throughout the his-
tory of the GDR (identified as a factor of collapse) and the part it played in the revolution.      
All of these arguments and questions are examined and discussed in the second part. The 
question as to how labor can be integrated into a narrative of the revolution and reunification 
is a central target of the analysis laid out here. To accomplish this task, I shall integrate a di-
mension which is (almost) completely absent from the works cited, namely the activities of 
the West German trade union movement. In the author’s opinion, this is indispensable in un-
derstanding the role played by workers and labor-related issues in 1989-90.  
1.2.3 The West German trade unions in the revolution and reunification: A 
supporting role in act two 
The use of theater analogies to introduce the debates on the participation of the East German 
labor to the events of 1989-90 (actors or spectators) can also be carried forward to the discus-
sion of the politics of West German trade unions. On this issue, however, literature is not di-
vided into two opposing camps. On the contrary, a striking level of consensus is to be found 
on the point of where the West German trade unions were during the "play" of the fall of the 
GDR and reunification. In the first act (revolution), they were observing the play from back-
stage. In the second act (reunification), they had a non-speaking role and were only briefly at 
centerstage. Their entry did not represent any major break in the plot, but rather announced its 
dénouement. The presence on stage of the West German trade unions confirmed the conclu-
sion that the audience had come to expect. 
This is, transposed in theatrical metaphors, how literature has depicted the role of the West 
German trade unions in 1989-90: a minor role in the great drama of reunification, i.e., support 
for the application of the West German legal and economic system in the eastern German ter-
ritories at the eleventh hour. The reader may be somewhat taken aback to see a doctoral can-
didate staking the claim that the entire historiography on a specific subject can be reduced to 
one or two simple hypotheses. Consensus is rare in such fields prone to debating every minor 
detail. If several authors examine the same topic by posing a completely different set of ques-
tions, how could they possible come to the same answers? The risk is high that the readers 
may view this claim of consensus on the historiography as not worthy of the academic pre-
tense of this work.  
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However the case may be, I nevertheless want to attempt the exercise. The point I would like 
to stress is not that all contributions to the politics of the West German trade unions in 1989-
90 state the "same facts". Different issues have, in fact, been tackled by different authors. My 
objective is rather to show that these studies share a common interpretation of the political 
context in which the West German trade unions acted. As a result, their conclusions can easily 
be incorporated into one single narrative on the politics of the West German trade unions re-
garding the revolution and reunification. It is with this in mind that I would like point to the 
existence of consensus on this issue in literature. 
 
The Confederation of German Trade Unions: A step behind events of the East German revo-
lution 
The first comprehensive analysis of the politics of the trade union members of the Confedera-
tion of the German Trade Unions (DGB) in 1989-90 would also be one of the most influen-
tial. Most of the key ideas that allow one to speak of one common approach to the topic in 
literature are to be found in this book. Contrary to most of the studies that borrowed the same 
analytical fulcrums, here the authors explicitly define the interpretation of the reunification 
process that underlies their assessment of the DGB unions' strategy. For these reasons, the 
book by Manfred Wilke and Hans-Peter Müller, entitled Zwischen Solidarität und Eigennutz: 
Die Gewerkschaften des DGB im deutschen Einigungsprozess (1991), should be cited first in 
this discussion. The treasure trove of information contained in this essay makes it an invalu-
able source of reference. It guides the reader throughout this work, though its fundamental 
hypotheses shall be refuted. 
In the first chapter of their book, Wilke and Müller define the 1990 reunification as the exten-
sion of a "core state". The authors state that countries like Italy and Germany were united 
through the extension of core states, Piedmont and Prussia respectively. In that sense, the 
eastward expansion of the "core state" of the Federal Republic of Germany, or, the con-
versely, the entry of the East German Länder into the Federal Republic of Germany, does not 
represent a historical aberration. It is somewhat odd, however, that these authors should re-
gard this "model" as the only available option for Germany in 1990. They do not detail the 
different phases, nor the considerations and tactics of East and West German actors that made 
reunification a process of West German expansion.. They strongly suggest that the purpose of 
the East German revolution from the outset had been the incorporation into the FRG, and that 
the territorial expansion of this core state was the only way to make reunification reality.  
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I find this explanation not fully sufficient. To depict reunification as the goal at the offset of 
the revolution in September 1989 and, additionally, to infer that the East German population 
was motivated by the incorporation into the Federal Republic is historical expediency. How 
the East German revolution evolved into the reunification movement has already been thor-
oughly analyzed. I do not believe it is necessary to go into these debates here. As will be 
made clear throughout the work, however, I think it is crucial to understand this evolution as a 
political process, consisting of many different phases. My interpretation of these events is 
influenced by the explanations of Karsten Timmer (2000), as my numerous references to his 
study indicate. Wilke and Müller's depiction of the East German revolution as a movement 
favorable to the incorporation into the Federal Republic of Germany may have corresponded 
to strong impressions left by events still recent in 1991. I doubt that it offers a satisfactory 
explanation of the complexity of the processes it purports to describe. Yet, this premise in-
forms the analysis of Wilke and Müller and with it, the entire literature on the subject.  
The product of such an interpretation will come as little surprise. Wilke and Müller's depic-
tion of the strategies adopted by the DGB unions becomes the story of the failure of many of 
these unions to properly grasp the pro-unification inclinations of the revolution. The authors 
underline how many West German union leaders were thrown off balance by the "fall of so-
cialism" and refused for months to accept the collapse of the GDR. They depict the DGB un-
ions as lagging behind the political developments in 1989-90, as reluctantly revising their 
discourse and action to the reality on the ground (i.e., reunification) that they long refused to 
publicly admit. Unable to influence the course of the events, they remained "one step behind" 
the political developments during the entire period.   
The main point illustrating the DGB unions' inability to move in step with the course of the 
developments was their late acceptance of reunification. Only after the total collapse of GDR 
state structures in March 1990, did the DGB unions finally overcome their initial displeasure 
with the prospect of reunification, and finally accept what had become inevitable. It would 
appear that the DGB unions had compensated for this delay in reaction only after they had 
finally started to act to expand their structures into the new Länder. The Chemistry, Paper, 
Ceramics Industrial Union certainly defended this option from the end of February 1990 on-
ward, but unions like IG Metall waited until June to do likewise.58 Because they boarded the 
moving train they call reunification rather late in the game, the DGB unions were unable to 
exert influence over its ultimate design. 
                                                 
58 Tiemann/Schmid/Löbler 1993. 
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The 14th Congress of the DGB, held in the midst of the unification process on May 20-25, 
1990, is analyzed in similar terms. The West German trade unions specialists Hans-Hermann 
Hertle and Wolfgang Schroeder, for instance, state that the resolutions on reunification 
adopted by the delegates were small in number and detail the formulation thereof. The mo-
tions adopted called for a constitutional re-definition of Germany, i.e., for the application of 
Article 146 of the Federal Republic's Basic Law (Grundgesetz). Article 146 foresaw the adop-
tion of a constitution by the German people. Among those speaking out against the use of this 
article, many East and West German politicians suggested it would be fully sufficient to in-
voke Article 23, which made allowances for the entry of German territories into the constitu-
tional order of the Federal Republic of Germany. By the end of May 1990, at which time the 
DGB congress was held, the political pressure for invoking Article 23 was very strong. Al-
though the DGB delegates had adopted resolutions stressing their opposition to Article 23 and 
their preference for Article 146, this was not indeed backed by any plan of action. It did not 
go beyond verbal censure, with little political consequence. The delegates also adopted multi-
ple resolutions aimed at guaranteeing the same level of social security for all workers 
throughout Germany. These resolutions merely represented the first to offer supplementary 
proposals on how this objective might be achieved. Hertle and Schroeder portray these posi-
tions without an underlying agenda as a sign of the DGB's inability to go beyond formal dec-
larations of principle and shape the reunification process according to its own set of priori-
ties.59 
The American political scientist David Patton also describes the DGB unions' reservations on 
reunification and their inability to influence its course. He does not, however, simply argue 
that the DGB unions were powerless in their own right, but speaks of Chancellor Kohl’s abil-
ity to discredit all the proposals they supported.60 The analysis is somewhat different, but the 
conclusion remains very similar.  
 
The failure of the trade unions' Ostpolitik 
What reasons could possibly explain why the DGB unions opposed reunification for so long 
and remained, even after this admission, unable to advance their agenda in the process? The 
ability of Helmut Kohl to ignore union proposals is one factor stressed by David Patton. Most 
analysts agree these difficulties can be put down to the active participation of the DGB unions 
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ín the "second phase" of establishing contacts with the East German state. The second phase 
of the Ostpolitik was developed by Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) in 1983, after 
the party went into opposition. The intensification of the contact policy with the GDR had its 
roots in the desire of the SPD to counter-balance the rise in East-West tensions taking place at 
the time with a policy aimed at safeguarding peace and security in Europe. Inevitably, such a 
policy of contact and dialogue placed great emphasis on relations within the official structures 
of the East German regime. Banking on contacts with the party of the German Socialist Unity 
Party (SED) as a guarantee of security, the SPD stated that any destabilization of the regime 
presented a potential threat to peace. Different analysts point to these basic principles of the 
"second Ostpolitik" in explaining the relative lack of collaboration between the SPD and the 
East German opposition in 1989 and the skepticism of many within the party leadership to-
wards reunification.61 
This framework of explanation is employed in the case of the West German trade unions as 
well. Throughout the 1980s, the DGB and its union members had been active supporters of 
the second phase of the Ostpolitik. They regularly met their East German counterparts at the 
Free Confederation of German Trade Unions (FDGB) and jointly established several types of 
collaboration, exchanges and common working groups The inability of the DGB unions to 
come out in favor of deposing the East German regime and, by that fact, the FDGB in 1989-
90, is said to have been the result of this year-long policy of contact. A widely-held argument 
suggests that, had the DGB unions attempted to collaborate with the East German opposition 
instead of maintaining contacts with the FDGB, this would have signified their implicit ap-
proval of the collapse of the regime and removed any specter of neutrality on the issues of 
reunification from the beginning of the revolution.62 Activists from the East German opposi-
tion, reporting on their difficulties in obtaining the support of the DGB unions in 1989, appear 
to confirm this suspicion.63   
Critical assessments of the second phase of the DGB's Ostpolitik many times go a step further 
and blame some of the DGB unions. These are accused of having compromised themselves by 
collaborating with the Eastern Bloc regimes and becoming the tool of these powers in West 
Germany. The Printing and Paper Industrial Union (IG Druck und Papier), which was later to 
merge with other DGB unions to form the IG Medien in 1989, is the target of particularly 
strong criticism. The refusal of this union at the beginning of the 1980s to support the fight of 
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the independent Polish trade union Solidarnosc is given as one clear example of its instrumen-
talization. The Printing and Paper Industrial Union's president at the time, Leonard Mahlein, 
downplayed the significance of the Solidarity movement, which he derided as reactionary and 
antisocialist, as allied of Pope John Paul II and American President Ronald Reagan.64 
If the opinion that the DGB unions' Ostpolitik suffered from different shortcomings is indeed 
nearly universal, the allegation that some DGB unions had become instruments of the Eastern 
Bloc regimes is open to debate. It has been stressed that the contacts of the Printing and Paper 
Industrial Union, together with the FDGB and other trade unions from the Eastern Bloc, do 
not account for the inner developments of this union. The defense of the social and economic 
interests of the Printing and Paper Industrial Union was never negatively affected by these 
contacts.65 In the author’s view, this argument has its merit. 
Finally, it should be stressed that many DGB union leaders in 1990 personally criticized  their 
own inability to accept and assume a role in the reunification process. They also pointed to 
their high-level contacts with the East German FDGB and their lack of a proper understanding 
of the opposition groups in explaining this failure. The head of the Trade Union Education 
and Science, Dieter Wunder, highlighted this point with a play on words: the DGB unions 
have sat too long at the same table with FDGB head Harry Tisch (Tisch, of course, being the 
German word for table).66 An important text by DGB head Ernst Breit demanded that the 
trade union members overcome any reservations they may have in regards to reunification and 
establish contacts with the East German opposition. Up to now, Breit wrote in March 1990, 
the reunification process has proceeded "without and against the opposition of the West Ger-
man trade unions". This situation needs to be reversed, he went on to conclude.67 Even IG 
Medien's president, Detlef Hensche, who was one of the union leaders accused of holding 
sympathies towards the East German regime, admitted at the same time that his union's re-
fusal to support German reunification had been a mistake. This situation, he explained, re-
sulted from IG Medien's (and the former Printing and Paper Industrial Union's) refusal to join 
the chorus of recriminations led by the conservative elites from the FRG and targeted at the 
GDR. This stance by his union was, in retrospect, incorrect and in need of revision, he stated 
at the beginning of March.68 
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 The necessary organizational expansion into eastern Germany 
It might therefore seem as if one could only begin talking about the implementation of a strat-
egy by the DGB unions from the moment where their actions became determined by the re-
unification process, i.e., from March 1990 forward. The preceding months could essentially 
be characterized by a lack of political vision, as the DGB unions would remain entangled in 
its misguided obligations of their Ostpolitik. This interpretation put forward in literature is 
corroborated by the DGB unions themselves, which would make it something resembling an 
official account of their own course of action, as early as 1990.  
As the third part of this work shall make clear, I think it is important to describe the DGB 
unions' strategy prior to their shift to a pro-reunification stance from a positive angle, i.e., 
describe what it was rather than what it was not. I make no attempt to refute the notion of a 
fundamental shift in March 1990, but I do reject the assumption that the line taken previously 
could be labeled as indecisive based on compromises with the East German regime. Such a 
standpoint is overly determined by the issue of the reunification. This perspective was hardly 
conceivable before February/March 1990. At that time, when reunification had not yet been 
placed at the top of West Germany's political agenda, other considerations guided the DGB 
unions' strategy. I believe that an adequate description of what can be called the "first" and 
"second" strategies of the DGB unions puts their action in a different light. It ultimately leads 
one to reverse any assumptions on their lack of influence over the completion of reunification. 
To come back to the theater analogy proposed at the beginning of this discussion, I view the 
role played by the DGB unions in reunification as crucial to the process, and believe that the 
influence brought to bear by the unions is evident in the description of their "first strategy" 
and the reasons that brought about the shift. 
But any discussions on this topic shall be reserved for later examination. This hypothesis is 
presented in greater detail in the next chapter and further expanded on in the third part. Litera-
ture, once again, is dominated by the view that the DGB unions' late conversion to reunifica-
tion prevented them from setting the agenda in the process. As a consequence, they were left 
with no other choice but to do the inevitable, from a trade union perspective, and implement a 
policy of organizational expansion into eastern Germany.  
The organizational expansion of the DGB unions can be interpreted as the adaptation of the 
invocation to Article 23 of the Basic Law on reunification. The state unification was accom-
plished by the entry of eastern Germany into the political, economic and constitutional order 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, whereas the merging of trade unions occurred by East 
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German workers joining West German unions and the establishment of the latter's structures 
in eastern Germany. Analysts depict this process of organizational expansion as one initiated 
and controlled by the DGB unions, but do however argue that it corresponded to the wishes of 
the East German workers.69 The dissolution of the FDGB and its trade unions, by and large 
instigated on behalf of the DGB unions, would have occurred without significant opposition 
and conflict. The enlargement of DGB trade unions through the rejection of the East German 
organizations was a process "completely free and the wish of all actors".70 
This interpretation is so dominant in the historiography that it has been for all intents and pur-
poses implicitly suggested that the organizational expansion of the DGB unions concluded the 
program of the Initiative for Independent Trade Unions (IUG).71 I do not endeavor to retell 
the story of the IUG, a minor union, in this work. I will explain, however, why I believe this 
proposition is misleading. The IUG was no doubt in favor of creating new trade unions in the 
GDR in addition to the restructured organizations based on the former FDGB. But the concept 
of trade union activities that it espoused was based on local, grass-roots democratic pre-
cepts.72 It had little to do with the institution of worker representation as practiced by the 
DGB unions. In fact, IUG's conceptions drew more upon the "localist" and "syndicalist" tradi-
tions of the German labor movements, categorically rejected by the industry-specific West 
German trade unions. Furthermore, the IUG manifesto read by Heiner Müller to the hundreds 
of thousands of demonstrators gathered at Alexander Platz on November 4, 1989, warned 
explicitly against any hijacking of the East German revolution by West German politicians 
and economic actors.73 The allegations that the IUG promoted the expansion of the DGB un-
ions, or that this enlargement bolstered IUG's fight for the establishment of independent trade 
unions in the GDR are, in my view, mistaken. 
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The DGB unions' enlargement is depicted as a successful, basically collaborative process (op-
position to the dissolution of the FDGB coming mainly from the many secretaries and GDR 
loyalists). It has been an organizational tour de force: within 6 months, union structures had 
been set up in eastern Germany and collective bargainings initiated. Michael Fichter and 
Maria Kurbjuhn try to give a more precise description of this enlargement process based on a 
system of classification. They distinguish, for instance, between legal avenues, DGB unions 
that founded new trade unions in the GDR, and those that merged with their East German 
counterparts.74  
I will introduce and discuss the four types of expansion proposed in this system of classifica-
tion in detail in the section 3.7. Let me stress for the time being that the author maintain cer-
tain doubts as to whether this information will truly contribute to a better understanding of the 
dynamics in place during the enlargement process at the DGB unions in 1990. It introduces 
distinctions where characteristics common to all four types - a process initiated in and con-
trolled by DGB unions' headquarters in West Germany - are more significant. At the same 
time, it does not shed any new light on where the origins and roots of these variations lay and 
why different DGB unions followed different tacts in their expansion policy and not one sin-
gle unified course. In the author’s opinion, the reference to the strategy implemented by the 
DGB unions before March 1990 is absolutely necessary to understanding this last aspect. 
Someone looking to evaluate the different legal approaches adopted in the merger of trade 
unions – this issue has gained somewhat in importance with the fall in union membership 
since the 1980s – may find the classification of the different expansion processes of interest. 
In my opinion, its heuristic value in understanding of the eastward expansion of the DGB un-
ions in 1990 is limited. 
 
Processes presented from the point of view of their conclusion 
Once again, the impression that literature leaves in regards to the role of the DGB unions in 
the revolution and reunification is one-sided, in spite of the plurality of issues under discus-
sion. An abridged version of this story might look something like this. The Ostpolitik of the 
DGB unions resulted in their long-held refusal to accept the collapse of the GDR in 1989. 
Their close contacts with the regime prevented them from acting in strict accordance with the 
popular will, as they rejected reunification and, instead, promoted reforms within the East 
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German state and trade unions. With the main exception of the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics 
Industrial Union, most of the DGB unions agreed to base their actions around the process of 
reunification only after it had become a de facto reality. This late conversion left the DGB 
unions with no alternative but to join the bandwagon on reunification, without any possibility 
of influencing its agenda. From March 1990 onward, the DGB unions gradually acted to ex-
pand their structures into the East German regions. The four types of expansion implemented 
by the DGB unions mirroredthe entry of the new Länder in the Federal Republic along the 
lines of Article 23 of the Basic Law. The East German workers began joining the ranks of the 
DGB unions as an immediate effect of the revolution. This solution was approved by all ac-
tors involved.75 
Hence, the processes described here are considered solely from the perspective of reunifica-
tion. They are furthermore presented from the point of view of their conclusion impact, i.e., 
the narrative put forward in literature draws the shortest possible link between the outbreak of 
the East German revolution and the eastward expansion of the DGB unions. The result is, in 
the author’s opinion, not a simplified but a simplistic explanation of the issues and processes 
at play. Crucial programmatic debates, e.g., the long and laborious debate over socialism, that 
shook the West German trade unions in 1989-90 and were part of their strategy reflections, 
are overlooked. Tensions and even conflicts with East German unionists are silenced. In the 
end, the literature on the subject would seem to suggest that the controlled expansion of the 
DGB trade unions was the only possible option in 1990, and that, somehow, none other ex-
isted. The French have a somewhat fatalistic and ironic expression that summarizes what, I 
believe, is how the literature published to date has presented the expansion of the DGB un-
ions: ce qui devait arriver arriva. This work tries to challenge this interpretation by demon-
strating that, as historians often say, things are not that simple. 
1.2.4 The transfer of industrial relations: A paradigmatic model for reunifi-
cation  
The analysis on the West German trade unions’ strategy during reunification suffers from 
significant shortcomings that call for re-evaluation. Another reason to proceed with such a re-
assessment has its origins in multiple studies depicting German reunification as an institu-
tional transfer. The studies considered above portray the East German revolution as motivated 
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by the goal of incorporating the East German territories into the legal and economic order of 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Seen from this perspective, the DGB unions remained 
“outsiders” to the events - one could even say opposed to them – so long as they did not act to 
translating the reunification’s consequences on the field of worker representation: their organ-
izational expansion. Only then, it would seem, did they act in unison with the East German 
popular movement. 
Political scientists who view the reunification process as an institutional transfer propose a 
substantially different interpretation. They refuse to accept the ‘two-step’ explanation, accord-
ing to which reunification was the manifestation of a previously held desire of the East Ger-
man population. They instead regard reunification as the organization by West German fed-
erations and associations of an “ad hoc, big-bang institutional transfer” (Gerhard Lehmbruch) 
from West Germany to the East German territories. It furthermore involved distributing the 
risks associated with the chosen course amongst these West German organizational actors.76 
The assessment of reunification as an institutional transfer initiated in then West Germany 
allows for a dynamic and nuanced approach to the process. Researchers studying the institu-
tional transfer point to a clash, or coming together, of different actors with different agendas. 
For instance, an investigation of different sectoral institutional transfers has clarified the dif-
ferent models of relationships between East and West German actors, ranging from coopera-
tive to confrontational. The arguments presented on the origins of the institutional transfer, the 
West German association system (Verbändesystem), and the diverse interaction between ac-
tors from both countries throughout the process are two valuable contributions made by the 
institutional transfer approach. They are crucial for the analysis developed in this work. 
If the author drew inspiration from the literature on institutional transfer, the time frame and 
the questions examined are broader than those considered in this work. The study on German 
institutional transfer views reunification as a long process, encompassing not only the legal 
aspects, completed in 1990, but also the way in which the institutions and norms were (more 
or less) adapted to the new East German context. I shall limit my research to the year 1990. In 
view of the facts presented above, the specific subject matter of this paper shall be the legal 
transfer of the West German labor law and institutions of industrial relations. Issues relating 
to how the newly transferred institutions performed in the first years post-reunification are not 
examined with. As will be made clear in section 3.6, I shall stress this distinction in talking 
about “legal extension” and avoiding the expression “institutional transfer”. 
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Most of the questions that are of interest to analysts researching institutional transfer do not 
specifically relate to German reunification. These have arisen within the larger theoretical 
debate on the persistence of the systems of norms and institutions, and whether or not such 
systems can be transferred under conditions and within contexts different from those that ini-
tially produced them. These debates shall not be discussed in this piece.77 There is, however, 
one issue raised by analysts on the subject of the institutional transfer that is crucial to this 
work. It is the point that links these studies on institutional transfer and this work. This issue 
concerns the reasons behind the transfer of institutions that were themselves "obsolete". The 
goal is to satisfactorily answer the question of why no new and innovative institutional re-
forms were attempted in 1990, that in spite of the “unique nature” of the transfer process.78 
Different answers have been proposed. The influence of institutional actors’ agendas and the 
tendency of these institutional actors to oversimplify the difficulty involved in overcoming 
these new challenges, i.e., to interpret the original dilemma as a set of circumstances within 
the realm of standard practice, have been underlined.79 Another answer suggests that it had 
less to do with the institutional routines and more to do with the logical attempt by West 
German actors to limit the degree of uncertainty that prompted them to favor the transfer of 
the institutions and norms of the Federal Republic of Germany to the new Länder.80 
Some authors, among them Helmut Wiesenthal, consider both explanations persuasive and 
not mutually exclusive. Institutional constraints, the limit of uncertainty as well as other con-
siderations, Wiesenthal explains, have influenced the actions of West German institutional 
actors. The key aspect for the study of German institutional transfer, according to him, is the 
autonomy of the West German institutional actors, and among those actors, he focuses on the 
associations. The autonomy of the West German associations explains how various considera-
tions compelled them to plan the transfer to the new Länder. It clarifies why the level of 
modification to the East German context varied from sector to sector. It allows one to identify 
different types of interaction between West and East German actors.81 
Helmut Wiesenthal’s argument is not that the autonomy of the West German associations led 
to such a wide range of constellations that common trends cannot be identified. He defines the 
respective limits in the points of convergence and divergence that existed between the numer-
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ous sectoral institutional transfers. I believe that the following three elements can be identified 
as factors of convergence.82 Firstly, all institutional transfers were initially launched as proc-
esses excluding any specific adaptation to the East German context. Any adaptations to the 
new context (hence divergences between the different sectoral institutional transfers) came 
only after gaining initial empirical knowledge of the East German conditions on the ground.83 
Secondly, the strategy of rapid economic and political unification implemented by the federal 
government was thought of, at least in part, as a way to prevent any potential re-evaluation of 
the West German institutional order by the East and West German population. This govern-
ment strategy supported the West German associations in their initial commitment to institu-
tional transfer in its current, unmodified form. Finally, all institutional transfers resulted in a 
loss of influence by local actors in the restructuring of institutions in eastern Germany. Only 
later did relations between East and West German actors begin to take on their own character 
and vary from sector to sector. In some cases, West German actors maintained a rivalry with 
their East German counterparts, while in others, various forms of cooperation were developed. 
I cite these elements highlighted in the study of the institutional transfer in order to stress the 
following point. Of all the sectoral institutional transfers that were part of German reunifica-
tion, Helmut Wiesenthal underlines the unique importance of the transfer of the system of 
industrial relations. This particular sectoral transfer was accomplished by the West German 
trade unions and employers’ associations. Four central elements lend the transfer of the sys-
tem of industrial relations its special importance. Firstly, industrial relations was among the 
first sectors of activity transferred to the GDR. Secondly, this particular transfer was to be-
come (together with the ambulatory health system) the archetype for wholesale transfers, with 
no adaptations to the new context (even after other sectors had started to adapt to the new re-
alities).84 Thirdly, institutions and standards of industrial relations were essential for achiev-
ing the crucial objective of bringing working and living conditions in both east and west into 
line in a unified Germany, as well as for managing the social consequences of the economic 
reforms. Finally, the tense relations between trade union actors from both countries are de-
picted as the prototypical competitive interaction between East and West German actors, 
characterized by the domination of the latter and their ignorance of the East German realities 
on the ground.85 
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Hence analysts of institutional transfer observed how, in many respects, the transfer of indus-
trial relations took on a paradigmatic quality for the achievement of the German reunification. 
It was, in the author’s opinion, this observation, made in the course of studies on German re-
unification, that motivated Helmut Wiesenthal, Wilfried Ettl and Jan Wielgohs to devote spe-
cial attention to the politics of the West German trade unions and employers’ associations. In 
other words, it was not the review of the strategies and actions of the West German social 
partners in 1990 that led them to describe German reunification as a process of institutional 
transfer. It was, conversely, their interpretation of reunification as an institutional transfer that 
allowed them to discern the actual significance of the West German social partners to the re-
unification process.86 
Wiesenthal, Ettl and Wielgohs make use of literature on the politics of the DGB unions pre-
sented in the previous section (1.1.3) in describing the transfer of industrial relations. This 
may appear somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there was a genuine attempt on their part 
to demonstrate the importance of West German social partners in achieving German reunifi-
cation, whilst, at the same time, these same authors refer to studies that would seem to defend, 
as far as West German trade unions are concerned, the opposite point of view. They do not 
however address this contentious issue. On the other hand, while their analysis of reunifica-
tion enables them to highlight facts that were left at the margins of the debate for reasons un-
known, their descriptions of the politics of the West German trade unions in 1990 remain 
somewhat shallow. Their approach should ultimately result in questions being raised as to the 
conclusions put forth in the literature on this topic. They are prevented from doing this by 
avoiding to propose a detailed description of the DGB unions’ politics in 1990.87 I believe 
that, as they lean too heavily on the studies cited in 1.1.3, Wiesenthal, Ettl and Wielgohs 
make certain factual errors in their argumentation in favor of their own hypotheses. 
An example of this will now be introduced. (It shall be examined at greater length in the third 
part of this work.) Wiesenthal, Ettl and Wielgohs raise the issue of the agreement between the 
Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) and the Federation of German Employers’ 
Associations (BDA), ratified on March 9, 1990. In this agreement, both West German social 
partners indicated their resolve to proceed with the transfer of the West German system of 
industrial relations to the GDR. The important point here is, of course, the date. Authors who 
highlight the fact that this transfer represented the will of the East German population stress 
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that this will was expressed in the results of the GDR elections held on March 18. Nine days 
is by no means a long period of time, but this undeniably indicates that the decision of the 
DGB and the BDA was not a reaction to the electoral results. Wiesenthal, Ettl and Wielgohs 
are absolutely right to view this agreement as a sign that the transfer of the West German sys-
tem of industrial relations was based first and foremost on a decision of the West German 
social partners.  
Their claim that Chancellor Helmut Kohl subsequently gave his “de facto” support to this 
decision is, according to my own research, incorrect.88 Evidence pointing to this sequence of 
events (first the DGB/BDA agreement and then the de facto approval by the federal govern-
ment), is not to be found in the literature cited by Wielgohs and Wiesenthal. _This claim 
rather takes the form of a plausible scenario due to the lack of any information on the reaction 
of the federal government to this agreement. Further research on the contacts between the 
federal government, the DGB unions and the West German employers’ associations in 1990 
should have provided them with the facts required to conclude that the events did not occur in 
the sequence they indicate. In this work, I present different and contrary evidence on the es-
tablishment of a tripartite consensus in favor of the transfer of the system of industrial rela-
tions, complemented by details of informal and formal meetings with representatives from the 
West German government, unions and employers’ associations in mid-February. 
In spite of their interest in the politics of the West German social partners in 1990, Wiesen-
thal, Ettl and Wielgohs have not proposed an alternative narrative to the one discussed in sub-
section 1.1.3. However, any re-evaluation of this dominant theory requires a highly-detailed 
study of the politics of the West German trade unions during reunification from the vantage 
point they developed. This is one of the objectives of this work. As the perspective adopted 
here is determined by the study of the politics of labor organizations rather than the study of 
the transfer of institutions of industrial relations, I will refrain from using the expression insti-
tutional transfer. I instead refer to “legal extension” and “organizational expansion”. They 
basically equate to the transfer of the West German labor law and West German trade union 
structures. But whereas the concept of transfer can be understood as a process of importing 
institutions and standards by East German actors, “legal extension” and “organizational ex-
pansion” stress how the impetus for this action came from the West German social organiza-
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tions and the federal government. This more aptly corresponds to the story told in the third 
part.  
1.2.5 Beyond the walls of academia: On the path towards an integrated his-
tory of post-war Germany 
The last issue in the review of topical literature concerns how the post-war history of Ger-
many is being written more than fifteen years after reunification. The question raised deal 
with the treatment given to the forty years of the GDR. Must the history of GDR necessarily 
be considered as distinct and independent from that of the Federal Republic, thereby implying 
that historians of one state cannot write on the other? Is it necessary for one to juxtapose a 
failed East German history against a successful history of West Germany? Or should the his-
tory of both postwar states be merged, and a “German-German” perspective formed? If that is 
indeed the case, how can this be accomplished? The following pages shall introduce the prin-
cipal methods for merging (or de-merging) the histories of the two postwar German states. 
Two models for an integrated history of postwar Germany shall furthermore be presented and 
critically analyzed. 
Beginning in the 1960s, historians of the FRG and the GDR had ceased to write “all-German 
accounts of the postwar era”. They henceforth became specialists in the history of one of the 
respective German states and refrained from considering the two states together. This ap-
proach was to dominate the historiography in both states for the next two decades.89 Until 
reunification, the few accounts of the postwar period that incorporated both German states did 
not challenge the prevailing approach. This literature juxtaposed and defined in separate terms 
the history of each country.90 
This situation changed partially after 1990. Different treatments of the history of the GDR 
were now clearly discernable. One involves a partial integration of the East German history in 
that of the FRG. This is usually achieved by adding a brief summary of GDR’s history into a 
book on the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. This summary is often contained in 
a chapter immediately preceding the one on reunification.91 The result of such a treatment is 
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the GDR is looked upon as nothing more than a “footnote” in German history, with the Fed-
eral Republic as the only legitimate German state in the postwar years.92 
Another approach consists of contrasting the “success” of the Federal Republic with the “fail-
ure” of the GDR. In his recent history of postwar Germany, Peter Graf Kielmansegg, defines 
his interpretation as follows: the presentation of two different and distinct histories; one with a 
future and one without. As far as the latter is concerned, he explains in reference to the GDR, 
one needs to explore the reasons behind this pre-programmed collapse.93 This second ap-
proach, which regards the GDR as a state living on borrowed time, can be combined with the 
first one and shares its shortcomings. 
A third approach consists of keeping the history of the GDR separate and distinct from that of 
the Federal Republic of Germany and refraining from any further comparison. This rein-
forces, of course, the dominant trend in the pre-reunification historiography. The GDR ap-
pears isolated from West Germany and not influenced by developments observed there. His-
torical studies on the GDR further isolate it from its neighbor. According to Jörg Roesler, two 
characteristics of the GDR literature are responsible for that fact. One is the “disproportionate 
moral rigor of the historical judgments” that comprises much of the literature on the GDR. It 
promotes a “tendency towards ‘posthumous overkill’ of the SED system” which impedes any 
comparison with the Federal Republic of Germany.94 The second characteristic concerns 
overspecialization in research on the GDR and the relative lack of comparisons on specific 
topics.95 
The fourth treatment differs radically from the first three. Most authors look at the FRG and 
the GDR as having separate and divergent histories. (Those subscribing the first two ap-
proaches do so explicitly; those endorsing the third, do so implicitly.) A few historians do 
however support the opposite view and insist that similarities did indeed exist between both 
postwar German states. Peter Bender – an essayist and not an academic historian - stresses 
that the history of the two countries evolved on the basis of a common geopolitical situation: 
both had been subject to military occupation, both enjoyed strained relations with their re-
spective allies and both were ardent Cold Warriors.96 Such crucial similarities call for a his-
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politik in beiden deutschen Staaten (Berlin: Hefte zur DDR-Geschichte). 
96 Peter Bender, Episode oder Epoche? Zur Geschichte des geteilten Deutschland (München 1996), quoted in: 
Kleβmann 2005, p. 2. 
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tory of postwar Germany in which West and East German citizens acknowledge their own 
experience and are able to understand the experiences of their compatriots on the other side of 
the border, Bender claims.97  
The treatment of GDR’s history proposed by Peter Bender builds on the numerous “parallel 
developments” observable in the history of both countries and the experiences of their respec-
tive populations. Yet he does not fail to mention the main difference between both countries: 
an alliance with Washington is not comparable to one with Moscow. The study of what 
Bender termed their “mutual relations” allows one to go beyond an approach that simply fo-
cuses on the differences that existed between the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
This methodological counterpoint has paved the way for an integrated history of postwar 
Germany. Two methodological frameworks for an integrated history of postwar Germany 
have been further developed, in a continuation of Bender’s work.  
Christoph Kleβmann has been one of the few (West) German historians to have studied both 
Germanies prior to reunification. The framework he established for an integrated history of 
postwar Germany now goes beyond the separate expositions typical of his previous work. His 
model is built on six different historical dynamics and periods: 1945, representing both an end 
of an era and a new opportunity; internal consequences of the formation of alliances; specific 
developments induced by the division; forms of asymmetrical interdependence; problems 
affecting countries in all alliances; trends toward a new rapprochement.98 Kleβmann argues 
that these six dynamics and periods allow one to conjoin the history of the two Germanies in a 
way that balances the convergences and divergences, mutual influences, and common prob-
lems. This framework stands in opposition to “contrastive histories” (Kontrastgeschichte), 
which ignore the similarities and overlaps, and “national” histories that treat the GDR as a 
mere footnote in German history.  
The phrase “forms of asymmetrical interdependence” indicates, however, that the evolution of 
the GDR “cannot be understood without [continuous references to] the Federal Republic”, 
whereas the opposite is less true. On the one hand, the problems of the East German state (re-
lating to the border, its youth policy, the legitimizing state ideology of antifascism, the policy 
toward organized religion,  the development of the welfare state, the consumption policy,  and 
                                                 
97 Peter Bender, Fall und Aufstieg. Deutschland zwischen Kriegsende, Teilung und Vereinigung (Halle 2002), pp. 
216-217, cited in: Roesler 2006, p. 18.  
98 Kleβmann 2006. Original German quote: 1945 als Endpunkt und Chance, innere Folgen der Blockbildung, 
Eigendynamik der Teilung, Formen asymmetrischer Verflechtung, Systemübergreifende Problemlagen, Trends 
der Wiederannäherung.  
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the active assistance to third world countries) were the product of its competing ambitions 
with the Federal Republic of Germany. These would all become factors in the collapse of the 
GDR. On the other hand, Kleβmann views the influence of the GDR on the FRG as acting to 
reinforce the political system in place in West Germany. The existence of the GDR favored 
the inner political consensus in West Germany and discredited the “alternative social con-
cepts”, for instance, of the labor movement, he argues.99 Kleβmann refuses to consider the 
East German history as a mere footnote in the history of West Germany, though he does stress 
the asymmetry in their relationships. 
A further framework for an integrated history of postwar Germany is proposed by the East 
German historian Jörg Roesler. Despite sharing many characteristics, his approach differs 
from that of Christoph Kleβman on a series of points. One difference consists of his rejection 
of the “primacy of political history”, the approach championed by Kleβmann and Bender. 
Roesler argues for the primacy of the economy. The importance of the economy in both coun-
tries as the principal source of their legitimacy and stability makes it, he believes, a better 
approach for an integrated history. Yet Roesler does not favor a traditional comparative his-
tory of both postwar German economies. He instead makes the case for interlinking the eco-
nomic and social developments. It was less the economic growth as such that was key to the 
history of the FRG and the GDR, he argues, but how economic growth directly impacted on 
the living and working conditions of the respective populations. In the eyes of Roesler, an 
economic and social history approach is the most suitable method for writing an integrated 
history of postwar Germany.100 
Another difference to the framework developed by Kleβmann consists of the periodization 
proposed by Roesler. As it is difficult to determine common political periods for both Ger-
many states – as we have seen above, Kleβmann proposes a blend of historical dynamics and 
periods -, the economic and social history approach permits such a common periodization. He 
proposes the following six periods: the end of the war and the resurgence of the economy 
(1945-48/49); diverging paths in terms of economic prosperity ( up to the mid- 1960s); crisis 
and consolidation through economic reforms (up to the 1970s); different reactions to the oil 
crises (up to the 1980s); consolidation of economic gains by one side and the economic de-
cline of the other (the 1980s); rapprochement and political union (Anschluss) (autumn 1989 
until autumn 1990). These six periods form the structure of Roesler’s book. 
                                                 
99 Ibid., p. 7. 
100 Roesler 2006, p. 22. 
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A final point of divergence to Kleβmann’s approach is also worth mentioning here. It con-
cerns the greater emphasis placed on the “equality of both [postwar German] states in the eyes 
of history”.101 The “asymmetry” that Kleβmann maintains in his study of the overlaps be-
tween both countries, i.e., his insistence on stressing the greater influence of the FRG on the 
GDR than vice versa, is not present in Roesler’s framework. He makes the implicit argument 
that the study of mutual influences requires no pre-qualifications. He highlights East Ger-
many’s influence on the Federal Republic, something overlooked by Kleβmann. This in-
cludes, for instance, how the competition between the two countries played a significant role 
in the introduction of a highly developed welfare state in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The approach used by Roesler in his study of the two German states is indicated in the byline 
to the title: “Eine Analyse auf gleicher Augenhöhe” (English approximation: An analysis on 
an equal footing).  
Roesler examines four points in each of the six periods. The first concerns the obvious differ-
ences between the two countries. The writer must in this case avoid the trap of having the 
descriptions simply devolving into “black and white comparisons” that were characteristic of 
the pre-reunification historiography in both states, writes Roesler. The second point concerns 
the similarities. Under this banner, Roesler means: a common past; a similar standing in the 
international arena; a strong industrial economic foundation; and a similar importance as-
signed to economic growth, consumption and social security. The third point deals with the 
interrelations of the two German states. It encompasses commerce, migration, visit policy, the 
influence of one country’s media in the other state, etc. The fourth point concerns the conflicts 
and competition between the Federal Republic and the GDR, mainly in the area of economic 
performance and social security.102 
Despite different methodological approaches, the frameworks developed by Christoph 
Kleβmann and Jörg Roesler are based on the recognition that significant inadequacies existed 
in the historiography on postwar Germany. Both endeavor to create more nuanced accounts of 
this history by describing the similarities, differences, overlaps, commonalities, and conflicts 
that existed between the FRG and the GDR. This study is an attempt to write an integrated 
history of the German labor during the revolution and reunification.  
                                                 
101 Ibid., p. 18. 
102 Ibid., pp. 18-20. 
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This topic is closer to the economic and social history approach developed by Jörg Roesler, 
although the political dimension, more typical of Christoph Kleβmann’s methodology, is cru-
cial in the argument developed herein.  
The year 1989-1990 is, as we have seen, the last of the six periods designated by Jörg Roesler. 
This is not the best chapter in his book. It is naturally difficult to study the similarities, differ-
ences, mutual relations, and conflicts that existed in such a short period of time. Roesler con-
centrates on the question of how the mutual relations between both states evolved. But if this 
choice can be justified by the relative shortness of the time period under examination, the po-
litical macro-perspective adopted by the author in this chapter is more difficult to compre-
hend. Rosler’s analysis shows how relations between the two states evolved rapidly from one 
of “equals” to assumption of control over the reunification process by the federal government. 
The inability of the East German government under Hans Modrow to counteract this devel-
opment with a negotiated compromise is highlighted here. As the title of the chapter suggests, 
the reunification process is in these pages simply described as an Anschluss, or union, by de-
cision of and under the control of Bonn.103 
I consider this rather conventional interpretation of reunification wanting. It overlooks, among 
others, the role played by the West German associations, as described in the literature on insti-
tutional transfer. Furthermore a glaring omission on the part of Jörg Roesler, who has exten-
sively written on the East German labor, is his failure to incorporate this dimension into his 
discussions on the reunification process. The inclusion of issues related to labor (the percep-
tion of the economic reality of the GDR by workers; the revolution’s manifestations on the 
shop floors; the repercussions of the migration of East German workers on the West German 
labor markets; the reaction of West German trade unions, etc.) would allow for a genuine so-
cial-economic approach of the unification, which Roesler claims his methodology does. As he 
focuses solely on the macro level of the political decision-making process, his contributions to 
the understanding of reunification are rather marginal. Whereas the methodological frame-
work he developed is an important contribution to the writing of postwar Germany’s history, 
its value in the study of reunification has yet to be demonstrated. 
                                                 
103 Ibid., pp. 211-215. 
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1.3 Hypotheses, approach and actors 
This introduction of some of the issues key to this study allow for an examination of the hy-
potheses developed (1.3.1), the approach adopted (1.3.2) and the actors observed (1.3.3) in 
this work. 
1.3.1 The hypotheses 
One hypothesis relates to each of the four questions introduced in section 1.1. For clarity’s 
sake, the four questions will be reintroduced at this point. Each  hypothesis is also rapidly put 
in relation to the historiographical issues discussed above. 
The first question asks whether East German labor should be considered a factor in the col-
lapse of the GDR and whether the East German labor had a role in the revolution.  
Hypothesis 1: Both questions can be answered with yes. The study of workers’ defense 
of its interests reveals ‘hidden’, though long-term, industrial conflicts, with dramatic 
economic and political consequences. A look at the interconnection between what was 
happening inside and outside the East German workplaces in 1989-90 indeed indicates 
that the workers did participate in the revolution.  
This hypothesis, developed in the second part of this study, is a contribution to the small 
number of essays that analyze and highlight the role of labor in the fall of the GDR (1.2.2). 
The second question looks at the strategies adopted by the West German trade unions in reac-
tion to the East German revolution and German reunification. What goals motivated these 
strategies? 
Hypothesis 2) Two different strategies were implemented by the DGB unions. The first 
aimed at supporting and collaborating in the restructuring of the instruments for 
defending workers’ interests in the GDR (until February 1990). The second strategy 
(from the end of February onward) found its basis in the consensus with the federal 
government and the West German employers’ associations, and favored the extension of 
the labor law and the welfare system to the GDR. The organizational expansion of DGB 
structures into East Germany was also a component of the second strategy. 
This hypothesis is critical of how the dominant approach presented the argument that the 
DGB unions remained “one step behind” at all phases of the East German revolution and re-
unification process (1.2.3). 
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 The third question considers how DGB’s strategies influenced the reunification process. 
Hypothesis 3) The DGB unions’ resolute action in favor of legal extension and the 
expansion of their structures was, in the opinion of the federal government, a necessary 
precondition for achieving reunification. The organization of institutional transfer and 
the start of work by these institutions in the GDR constituted, to a large extent, the 
reunification process. For this to be accomplished, the participation of trade unions and 
employers’ associations was necessary. 
This hypothesis shares obvious commonalities with the literature on institutional transfer. 
This study is however more interested in the history predating and leading up to institutional 
transfer, i.e., the conditions under which it was developed and implemented (1.2.4). By shift-
ing the focus away from the institutional transfer and towards the establishment of a tripartite 
consensus between West German actors, one puts a crucial assumption from previous studies 
on its head, namely that West German unions and employers applied pressure on the federal 
government to extend the labor law. The initiative came from the federal government, al-
though each of the parties to the collective bargaining agreement was also rapidly shifting its 
stance to a position favoring transfer. 
The fourth question asks what place the episodes of 1989-90 have in the history of German 
labor. 
Hypothesis 4) Measured in terms of effectiveness, the DGB unions’ strategy of legal 
extension and organizational expansion was an undeniable success, a manifestation of 
their power and the crucial role that they filled in the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet 
the fact that the actors from West German unions were unanimous in supporting this 
strictly defensive strategy was also the product of their general lack of direction in the 
1980s, which could be described as a long and gradual process of programmatic 
exhaustion. 
The way in which the episodes of 1989-90 fit into the previous evolutionary development 
within the German labor movement has not yet received sufficient attention in the historiog-
raphy, a fact that prevented the inclusion of this topic in the previous review of literature. This 
fourth hypothesis is considered within the context of the debates on the future trade union 
politics at the end of the 1980s (3.1.3). 
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1.3.2 The approach 
As the discussion on literature indicates, this work is first and foremost an attempt at writing 
an integrated history of the German labor during the revolution and reunification of 1989-90. 
An integrated approach requires that East German and West German labor movements be 
examined under similar criteria. It dictates that they be considered on their autonomous, ex-
tremely different, developments until 1990. It also prescribes an analysis of how both move-
ments acted and reacted in 1990: the obstacles and problem resolution, the convergences and 
their limits. 
Whereas the integrated perspective is explicit understood, this work additionally pursues an 
implicit goal, which is to contribute to the project of a global labor history. This is done in 
particular in the second part, where worker practices for defending interests in the GDR are 
analyzed. Such a study is relevant to the global labor history and asks how workers unite pu-
blic and private strategies in order to defend their interests in specific economic, political and 
social contexts. The state of East German labor can be considered as an extreme case, where 
only small-scale initiatives for defending individual worker interests were possible. As such, 
it may serve to assist in focusing a broad comparative endeavor like the global labor history 
project.104 Any possible contributions to a global labor history by this study remains however 
implicit, precisely because its conclusions are not discussed in this perspective. 
This study shares certain traits or characteristics embodied by the popular 1960s term “techni-
cal history”.105 The developments under analysis are tracked in detail, on a weekly, even dai-
ly, basis. Chronological accuracy remains a major concern throughout this work. Yet not all 
historical developments are linear. Some cannot be placed in a precise moment in time, e.g., 
reflections of a more theoretical nature, for instance. Such reflections can only be understood 
as dynamic phenomena, and cannot be reduced to single events in time. Hence an effort is 
made not only to “reconstruct” chronological developments (meetings, decisions, initiatives, 
etc.), but also to merge them with those dynamic phenomena permeating the period into one 
single narrative.  
The most obvious manifestations of this concern are: an attempt to illustrate the interaction 
between the actors’ actions and discourse and a refusal to single out one to the benefit or de-
triment of the other (be it through a narrated chronology or discourse analysis).  
                                                 
104 Kopstein 2001 develops a similar concept, although not with the global labor history project in mind.  
105 Kracauer 2006 [1966], chapter 3. 
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The term interaction infers that each party influences the other. On some occasions, actions 
decide the fate of theoretical reflections. In this study, I argue that the unanimous approval of 
a strategy dedicated to the extension of the West German labor law to Eastern Germany, so-
metime between the end of February and the beginning of March 1990, marked the end of the 
debate over the future of trade union politics. It brought an end to these discussions, even if 
they had been launched in a different context than that of reunification.  
The notion of interaction can also be used to describe the desire of this study to express cer-
tain realities often considered as separate topics in literature and consigned to different fields 
of specialty as one reality. It stresses, for instance, the interrelation between East German la-
bor’s experiences from the 1980s and the end of the GDR and the perception of these events 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and the end of the reunification process. Interactions be-
tween and continuities within these phenomena are the particular vantage point selected for 
use in this work to test the conclusions proffered in literature. 
1.3.3 The actors under examination 
1.3.3.1  The “East German labor”  
A portion of this work deals with the study of industrial conflicts in GDR’s workplaces during 
the 1980s. I refer to one of the two actors in those conflicts as “East German labor”. The ex-
pression does not refer to workers from any one specific sector, nor to blue or white-collar 
workers in particular,. It seeks conversely, to meld them. Such an abstraction may appear su-
perficial.106 Did any collective body worthy of the name 'East German labor' exist in the 
GDR? The reference to such an amorphous actor is put into further doubt by the importance 
of individual worker strategies in the struggles aimed at increasing wages while decreasing 
labor norms. What is the true value of observations on micro-phenomena taken from such a 
distant vantage point? Even Toynbee, who prefers to observe historical developments from far 
afield, asserted that the writing of history demanded one take the “ant perspective” as well as 
the “bird perspective”. 
The reason why I decided to restrict myself to the “bird perspective” for the analysis of labor 
conflicts in the GDR relates to the hypothesis developed herein, which concerns intractable 
top-down conflicts at East German workplaces. My aim is not to detail how individual prac-
                                                 
106 I thank Thomas Lindenberger for his remarks which forced me to reflect on the labels used and inspired the 
following explanations. 
 50
tices, adapted to specific workplace conditions, enabled workers to influence wages and pro-
ductivity (a concern which would necessitate a micro-historical approach). My objective is 
rather to focus on the cumulative effect of these many individual practices on the East Ger-
man economy, as well as the regime’s attempts to ban them. This story can be told, I believe, 
from a macro-historical perspective. 
Another problem relates to my use of the expression “East German labor”. One might argue 
that top-down conflicts over wages and working norms set workers against workers – they 
occurred, so to speak, within the “East German labor” -, as managers and party secretaries 
were themselves salaried employees. Furthermore some in the latter group would sometimes 
turn a blind eye to workers’ practices, which could make them more an ally than an adversary. 
Here I ask for a bit of semantic tolerance on the part of the reader. One must keep in mind that 
when I refer to “East German labor” I am speaking of the vast majority of workers from the 
“lower echelons”, with little or no official responsibility. I do not include those salaried em-
ployees from the “upper echelons”, who bore significant responsibility in the regime struc-
tures, in this category. In order to avoid any possible confusion, I define industrial conflicts 
opposing “labor” to “power-holders”. 
The 1989-90 revolution saw the re-emergence of open collective action from workers at the 
workplaces. This shift from individual to collective action allows one to refocus our observa-
tions and to eliminate the category of “East German labor”. From 1989 on it is possible to 
“zoom” in on the activities of certain segments within “East German labor”. Worker activists 
are thus observed at their place of work by disseminating the documentation on 51 different 
worker initiatives displayed over GDR’s territory and Stasi reports on the situation in Erfurt-
based enterprises. 
1.3.3.2 Four trade unions from the German Confederation of Trade Unions  
Unlike its East German counterpart, the West German labor movement can be observed 
through its organizations. The strategies implemented by four trade unions, all members of 
the German Confederation of Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftbund, DGB), are exam-
ined and traced over time in this study. They are: IG Metall; Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics 
Industrial Union (IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik); Public Service, Transport and Traffic Union 
(Gewerkschaft Öffentlicher Dienste, Transport und Verkehr) and Media Industrial Union (IG 
Medien). Aside from these four unions, the acts of intervention by the German Confederation 
of Trade Unions (DGB) will also be examined, though less systematically. The four DGB 
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unions on which this study focuses were chosen for their respective importance, as well as for 
their role in the West German labor movement in general. 
These four organizations were cross-sectoral trade unions, bringing together workers from 
different industrial branches under one umbrella. IG Metall, the Public Service, Transport and 
Traffic Union, and the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Union were the largest three 
of the DGB’s 16 member organizations. Together, these four unions represented 60% of the 
7,757,000 DGB members in 1989. IG Metall and the Media Industrial Union were at the fore-
front of the “activist” wing of the DGB unions, whereas the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics 
Industrial Union was the main exponent of its “accommodationist” wing.107 The Public Ser-
vice, Transport and Traffic Union was a “centrist” union, that often helped to broker com-
promises in case where conflicts arose between the two wings.108 Together, these four unions 
cover a substantial portion of the Federal Republic’s industrial, public and service sectors. 
The numerical and functional importance of these organizations makes them the prime objects 
to observe in understanding the strategies developed by the West German labor movement. 
As mentioned above, I argue that, despite some slight variations, all DGB unions first imple-
mented a strategy of support and collaboration, thereafter followed by a strategy dedicated to 
legal extension and organizational expansion. Hence the sector-related and ideological differ-
ences between these four unions – differences that led the author to select them for his survey 
sample – become a way to highlight the convergence of the West German unions’ politics on 
the occasion of the East German revolution and German reunification. I argue that the course 
pursued by these four unions exemplify an evolution that could be traced by observing any 
other West German trade union. When I refer to these four unions as “case studies”, it is not 
in the same sense that Jacques Revel uses the expression, namely as extreme manifestations 
necessary to identify a phenomenon.109 It is rather as four expressions of the same process, 
four evolutionary developments that do not differ substantially from one another. I also depict 
them as variations on the same theme. 
The prime limitation imposed on any study based on the observation of labor organizations is 
that, in most cases, they do not tell us much about workers’ reactions to unions’ politics.  
                                                 
107 This dichotomy was developed by Andrei S. Markovits (1986). 
108 The relations between activist, centrist and accommodationist unions is again examined in chapter 3.1. 
109 Fabiani and Revel 2005. 
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This study is not an exception to the rule on that front. Its story is told “from the top” and 
does not discuss either how the unions’ politics by rank-and-file West German workers or the 
consequences of said policy. I have tried to circumvent this problem by examining not only at 
the central union policies but also their implementation by the regional organs. Hence the 
camera’s perspective moves from the headquarters to the intermediary structures, but does not 
explore the realities confronted by workers on the shop floor. 
1.3.3.3 Other actors to consider in further research 
One of the most obvious limitations to this study is due to the actors under observation. De-
spite examining 51  worker initiatives in the GDR and analyzing the situation at Erfurt-based 
enterprises and despite incorporating the regional dimension into the discussion on the various 
strategies of DBG unions, the points of observation remain high, to go back to Toynbee’s 
analogy once more. An excellent way to test the hypotheses and the conclusions developed 
over the following pages would be to analyze them “from the bottom up”, i.e., from a per-
spective closer to realities faced by workers. For the study of labor in the GDR and the FRG, 
this could take the form of case studies of workers’ reactions in specific workplaces and cit-
ies.  
1.4 Sources: Narrowing down the choice 
The last chapter in this first part introduces the main sources used in this work. The utilization 
of some of them, such as reports submitted to the GDR State Security agency, raise specific, 
complex issues and questions which are reintroduced in the course of the study. 
1.4.1 Publications of the trade unions and employers’ associations 
The union press is widely cited in this work. The press is a major component of unions’ rela-
tions with the public and with their members. In the 1980s, the DGB unions had over 30 dif-
ferent publications, with a circulation of over 15 million. In terms of total circulation, IG Met-
all’s monthly metall was the single most important publication, with a print run totaling 2.3 
million copies.110 Of these publications, some are targeted at the members, others at unions’ 
secretaries and yet others present studies and analyses crucial to the trade unions. All publica-
tions of this sort are cited in this study. (metall, ÖTV Magazin and Kontrapunkt are dedicated 
                                                 
110 Heilmann 1995, pp. 70-72. 
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to the members of the IG Metall, the Public Service, Transport and Traffic Union and the Me-
dia Industrial Union; Die Quelle and Der Metaller are dedicated to union secretaries at the 
DGB and IG Metall; the publications of DGB’s Economic and Social Science Research Insti-
tute (Wissenschaftlich- und sozialwissenschaftliches Institut des DGB) WSI-Mitteilungen and 
Die Mitbestimmung, as well as DGB’s theoretical review Der Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 
are also widely referred to in this work.) The high journalistic quality of these publications 
and the vast amount of information available therein made them an invaluable resource in 
reconstructing, for descriptive purposes, the exact details of the implementation of DGB un-
ions’ strategies in 1989-90. Press releases are another form of trade union publication used in 
this work. I consulted the collections of press releases by the DGB and the four unions under 
consideration here at IG Metall’s Central Library (Zentralbibliothek) in Frankfurt am Main. 
In order to avoid the risks inherent in using publications in a study of organizations that were 
responsible for their content, clear guidelines were established on how to treat these articles 
and press releases. Editorials in publications targeted at union members are signed by the 
president or a vice-president, and present the union’s positions on critical current issues. They 
can be used to trace the evolution of these stances over time, as a chronic of outlook of vari-
ous DGB unions on the East German revolution and German reunification. As far as articles 
are concerned, they serve as a source of factual information, e.g., dates of meetings, support 
initiatives that were launched, declarations, etc. Finally, the contributions to theoretical de-
bates, to which a good portion of these publications was devoted in 1989-1990, provide an 
excellent assessment of the state of the debate on trade union politics within the West German 
labor movement. 
In comparison with the trade unions, employers’ associations have been relatively slow to 
develop their press service.111 In this study, two publications from the West German such 
associations are examined. The first is the Confederation of German Employers’ Associa-
tions’ bi-monthly, Der Arbeitgeber. Only editorials from this magazine are cited, in the same 
way and for the same purposes as their union counterparts. I also refer to several articles pub-
lished in a bulletin on trade union issues published by the German Economic Institute (IW), a 
research institute associated with the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations, ti-
tled Der Gewerkschaftsreport. These articles and reports furnish information both on the poli-
tics of the DGB unions and on the theoretical debates resounding within the German labor 
movement. 
                                                 
111 Ibid, p. 85. 
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1.4.2 Trade union archives 
One of the main obstacles to research on this subject is the 20-year delay in the opening of 
trade union archives. The dedicated assistance of the DGB archivist Klaus Mertsching was 
alas of little use in circumventing this provision. This calls for a re-evaluation of the hypothe-
ses developed here in four years! Mr. Mertsching's help was nevertheless invaluable, as he 
was able to advise me on the correct dates of some meetings I refer to. He also provided de-
tails on the formation of a Working Group by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Af-
fairs, the DGB, the Confederation of German Employers’ Associations and the Trade Union 
of German Employees (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft), on March 12. This Working 
Group was by no means secret, but I had never to date come across any reference to it. Unfor-
tunately, the minutes from its meetings, given that these files are locked in the archives112, 
will not be available for inspection for four years.  
The same 20-year rule blocks access to the IG Metall archives, located in the organization’s 
headquarters in Frankfurt am Main. Allowances are made for certain exceptional dispensa-
tions, and the DGB or the IG Metall president can grant access to some documents before the 
deadline. In such cases, they reserve the right to decide which excerpts may be cited. Unsur-
prisingly, our requests for access to DGB or IG Metall archives for the months of February to 
June 1990 were rejected.113 
                                                 
112 Klaus Mertsching unsuccessfully searched for the minutes of the discussions in the Federal Chancellery 
building on February 20; the meetings between the DGB unions and Employers’ Associations leading to the 
declaration of March 9, 1990;  the DGB Working Group on inter-German activities meeting from April 26, 
1990;  the DGB Working Group on the GDR discussions from May 9, 1990; the meetings between representa-
tives of the DGB and GDR unions from May 10, 1990; and the discussion between union representatives and the 
chancellor from May 15, 1990. These meetings are discussed in sections 3.6 to 3.8. 
113 Here is an anecdote. In February 2004, I met Bernd Thierron, in charge of international affairs at the IG Met-
all, in Frankfurt to discuss how it would be possible to develop closer contacts between IG Metall and the Qué-
bec Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN). At that time, I was helping the Berlin-Brandenburg-Saxony 
IG Metall and the Canadian Confédération des syndicats nationaux develop a cooperative agreement among 
unions active at Bombardier plants around the world. My request for access to the closed part of IG Metall’s 
archives had already been refused by the union, but once in the Frankfurt headquarters, I made a further attempt. 
I asked to meet the chief archivist and told him about the initiatives to develop a cooperation between unions 
negotiating with the Bombardier management and also mentioned my work on the German union movement. I 
explained to him that I was looking for evidence of meetings between Franz Steinkühler, then IG Metall head, 
and Chancellor Kohl, between the dates of February 6 and March 9, 1990, and if it would be possible to search 
the archives. It would even be possible for me to extend my stay by another day in Frankfurt, if today was not 
possible, I added, demonstrating my flexibility on the matter. But it was not to be. I was told what I already knew 
– since I had experienced it a few months earlier: I should first submit an official request, explaining what in-
formation I was looking for, what this research was about, how the information would be used, etc. Only the 
president’s office could grant exemptions. I thanked him for his time and told him a proper request would be 
submitted. But, as there was little reason to believe a second petition would produce different results. I simply 
abandoned any further attempts. 
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Hence the internal documents quoted – letters and meeting minutes, in particular – were not 
obtained from the unions’ archives but were given to me by individual secretaries whom I 
interviewed. The internal documents from the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Un-
ion were all taken from a variety of sources prepared by this union and published in 1993. 
Such rules are not unusual for any organization’s archives; the 20-year rule regarding free 
public access is actually quite short. (The archive at the employers’ associations, for instance, 
can only be visited with special permission.) Yet I have had excellent experience with the 
BDA archivists, who sent me copies of archived documents, without the need to fill out re-
quests and without imposing any restriction on its eventual use. 
The difficulty in obtaining access to the archived material posed a unique difficulty in the 
analysis of the meetings held between representatives of the federal government, DGB unions 
and BDA employers’ associations, and the establishment of what I refer to as an informal 
tripartite consensus on the extension of the West German labor law and industrial relations to 
the GDR. (This hypothesis is developed in section 3.6.) Yet without access to the minutes, the 
formation of an informal tripartite consensus between West German actors remains merely an 
unproven theory, formulated on the basis of the sudden convergence of strategy of these ac-
tors between February 20 and March 9; these strategies would remain aligned for several 
months to follow. 
1.4.3 Interviews and discussions 
There are alternative ways to gain access to sources where it had previously been denied. For 
instance, sources can be created, i.e., through interviews. Depending on the type of informa-
tion one is looking for, a good interview might even be more fruitful than the minutes of 
meetings, often written in a highly formalistic language. This is certainly the case in regards 
to the hypothesis on the tripartite consensus: if I was able talk to a person who was party to 
those meetings, I might learn what was said there.  
Previous experiences drawing on oral history had convinced me that it can be very useful 
source for the history of the union movement.114 Information on the views of actors in any 
given situation, the tensions within an organization and informal deals with employers, for 
instance, is valuable and likely to come out during an interview. Unless one is blessed with 
                                                 
114 In collecting material for a biography of the trade unionist and former head of the UNESCO in Canada, 
Jacques-Victor Morin, I conducted about 40 hours of interview with this person, and about the same number 
with former colleagues.  See: Denis (Mathieu) 2003. 
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infinite amount of time, it is important to be careful when choosing the interviewees. Based 
on my personal experience, persons from the top hierarchy at trade unions often remain re-
served in their responses and produce conventional explanations. It is frustrating to receive 
standard responses in line with the organization’s official position, when one suspects that, 
due to his or her position within the organizations, the interviewee must surely know the true 
facts behind the story. Mid-ranking union secretaries are often more open in their manner but 
are not always privy to backroom discussions. Persons who were directly involved in the 
events they describe as frustrating are more likely to speak of internal tensions, and bring vital 
new details to their narrative. Such information can be of great value. 
For chapter 3.6, I notably attempted to locate individuals who might be able to confirm or 
deny that informal meetings between Helmut Kohl, DGB head Ernst Breit, IG Metall chief 
Franz Steinkühler and representatives of employers’ associations took place sometime in the 
second half of February 1990. Was there a time and place where union representatives told 
Chancellor Kohl in no uncertain terms that, if the West German labor law and rules of indus-
trial relations were remained as their current state, in unified Germany, they would participate 
to the implementation of the Monetary, Economic and Social Union? If anything to that ex-
tent had actually taken place, who would have know this? 
All attempts to gain an interview with the union’s heads proved futile. Although I had re-
ceived a recommendation from one of his friends, Franz Steinkühler refused my request for an 
interview, based on the fact that he had already given numerous interviews on reunification 
and that all details on the matter could be found in those interviews. I met with Media Indus-
trial Union’s former head, Detlef Hensche, who categorically rejected the notion that informal 
meetings between government’s, unions’ and employers’ representatives from West Germany 
were stated a precondition to the implementation of the MESU. All attempts to contact former 
DGB head Ernst Breit and chemistry union leader Rappe proved unsuccessful. 
As this work will attempt to demonstrate, there was a fundamental change in the actors in-
volved in the process of restructuring the structure for defending East German workers’ inter-
ests. While East Germans had determined the course of the process until February 1990, West 
German actors gained the upper hand at the beginning in March. East German unionists may 
have had an input on the exact nature of this transition, which they may have resented as a 
loss of power? The author’s interviews with “frustrated” East German reform unionists were 
no more successful. Two interviews and one discussion with East German unionists still ac-
tive in IG Metall and the DGB today did not bring me any closer to resolving the issue of in-
formal tripartite meetings, although they did consider the theory plausible. 
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The only indication of informal meetings during the fifteen days from February 20 to March 
9, 1990, came in the form of faint nods of agreement, by one IG Metall secretary. This secre-
tary had been one of the first West German IG Metall secretaries sent to Leipzig at the begin-
ning of 1990. He had been a member of the GDR Working Group established at the union in 
January 1990. He seemed to be the person who could shed light on all my questions. When 
asked why Detlef Hensche had so vehemently rejected the possible occurrence of such infor-
mal meetings, he replied that Hensche had probably never been informed of them, as he was 
not party to any such discussions. When I requested his assistance in gaining access to the 
(closed) minutes of the GDR Working Group, he instead offered to personally answer any 
question I may have. 
My pleasure in having dug up the perfect interviewee was only matched by my disappoint-
ment in not having been able to obtain a proper interview. There was little hint of hesitation in 
agreeing to the interview but, at some point, it was no longer possible to arrange an appoint-
ment with him and all contact with said person faded away.115 
While the time spent seeking out prospective interviewees and preparing the interviews did 
not always produce the desired results, informal discussions with union secretaries, journalists 
and activists, from both parties, were extremely valuable. Even if most of these meetings were 
planned, as I had contacted said person and scheduled an appointment, they were however 
informal in nature. They usually took place at his/her office, home or in a café. During those 
discussions it was not my original intent to gather specific information for for use in the story 
I wanted to tell, although this aspect was present as well. My main priority was instead to un-
derstand the context in which these individuals were involved, the motives behind their ac-
tions, the goals they were pursuing, the factors influencing their actions both positively and 
negatively, and their opinion on these events fifteen years later. To put it in slightly differ-
ently, the author was trying to narrow the gap that separates the analysis of a specific reality 
created by historians and the experience of the actors who experienced the events in their own 
words. I am not saying that, as far as history writing goes, the memories of these actors could 
possibly replace thorough analysis. They, of course, cannot. Yet as this study deals with very 
recent topics, I wanted to dedicate special attention to various actors’ perceptions, in order to 
avoid the risk that, were they to look at the story told in the following pages, they would not 
                                                 
115 His reluctance may not have anything to do with the topics dicsussed in this work: all this took place during 
the 2003 crisis at IG Metall after the failed strike for the introduction of the 35-hour working week in the former 
East German Länder. My contact was constantly out of town. After the storm has passed over the union, how-
ever, he never returned my calls. I was also unsuccessful to see him by appearing unannounced at his office 
twice. 
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recognize the events to which they were party. It is highly unlikely that any of the East and 
West German actors I was able to talk to would agree with the different arguments developed 
in this work. I do hope, however, that they will be able to somehow connect their experiences 
to them.  
1.4.4 Sources for the study of the East German labor between 1986 and 
1990 
In addition to the sources mentioned above, the chapters dedicated to the GDR integrate other 
kinds of information. One of them is the reports compiled by the East German State Security 
(Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, or Stasi for short) on the conditions in the country’s shop 
floors from 1986 to the beginning of 1990. These reports were written by official and unoffi-
cial Stasi employees. They were consulted in Berlin. A list of the reports used for this work is 
furnished in the bibliography. 
During the second half of the 1980s, the Free Confederation of East German Trade Unions 
(Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) was also producing similar reports on conditions on 
the shop floors. These reports were summarized once or twice a year in a longer account, pre-
sented to the FDGB presidium. These reports were published together with other FDGB in-
ternal document of those years.116 
I also make extensive use of the 120 leaflets, declarations and sundry sources documenting 
the depth of penetration of the revolutionary spirit at GDR’s workplaces published by Benrd 
Gehrke and Renate Hürtgen (2001). 
                                                 
116 Eckelmann/Hertle/Weinert 1990. 
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Part 2: East German Labor in the Collapse of the GDR and 
the Revolution 
2.1 Introduction: Absent on Paper: Workers in the East German 
Revolution  
As indicated in the review of literature in the first part of this work, the vast majority of stu-
dies on the collapse of the GDR denies workers any role by refusing to consider them as ac-
tors in the events. Many studies make a case for this implicit negation and go on to explain 
why East German workers did not participate in the revolution.117 The overwhelming histo-
riographical assumption is that labor played either no role or a negligible role in bringing 
about the downfall of the SED government.118 Still, one cannot escape a certain dissatisfac-
tion arising from inconsistencies in literature,119 two of which deserve further investigation.  
First of all: the GDR has been widely described as a ‘society based on work’ (Arbeitsgesell-
schaft) because of its high rate of wage labor, the ideological meaning of work, the industrial 
social policy, etc.120 What is the connection between this fundamental role of work and the 
fall of the regime? Bluntly stated, existing literature conveys the impression that there was 
only a minor link between East German societal structures and the social upheaval of 1989.121 
If this is a indeed paradox, perhaps the resolution thereof might be worthy of future research 
in social science departments around the world. 
                                                
The second question arises from the first. Nearly all East German citizens of voting age were 
workers.122 The bulk of the people that left the GDR and the demonstrators in 1989 were 
workers.123 This specific social position must have heavily shaped their experiences in the 
GDR and their relationship to the regime.  
 
117 Kädtler/ Kottwitz 1990; Fuler 1999. 
118 The work of the few authors, e.g., Renate Hürtgen, Bernd Gehrke and Jörg Roesler, who consider workers as 
actors in the 1989 revolution, is discussed below. 
119 The author tried to expose these inconsistencies through bibliographical references. See: Denis 2001.  
120 Kohli 1994; Reichel 2001.   
121 As argued by Jeanette Madarász (2003). Her analysis of the GDR society ends in 1987, the year the country 
"became unstable."  
122 Author uses word ‘workers’ as short for wage-earners to encompass blue (Arbeiter) and white collar workers 
(Angestellten). 
123 Dale 1005, pp. 177-85. Author thanks Gareth Dale for allowing reading of study prior to publication. 
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The East German revolution, however, has been widely described as a revolution of consu-
mers -- as opposed to a revolution of producers -- since its focal point were gatherings which 
occurred after work hours; it was also said to have been driven by political and material 
considerations. This distinction between two ‘kinds’ of revolution is highly questionable from 
a historical viewpoint. Revolutions emerge as a result of various different experiences, moti-
vations and locations for action. As previously pointed out in 1.2.2, the distinction between 
‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ is problematic because they are one in the same, because wages 
and consumption are intrinsically related (in the standard of living, for instance) and because 
workers were in conflict with the SED regime over both issues. 
Hence, from the point of view of labor, social historical studies on the GDR and analyses of 
the 1989 popular movement are often a poor match. One the one hand, the collapse of a work-
based social organization must necessarily have raised many labor-related issues. On the other 
hand, if consumption was so crucial in 1989, then the East German revolution took one of the 
most classical forms of revolution of producers. The questions thus explored here are as fol-
lows: how could the situation in the Eastern German labor system of the 1980s be a catalyst 
for the East German revolution? How should the role of workers in the revolution be asses-
sed?  
The argument made in this work is that examining labor is essential to understanding how the 
East German society overthrew the regime in 1989. Regarding the first question, the author 
suggests that the conflict of interest between the regime and workers, and the forms those 
conflicts took, were fundamental components of the relationship between the population and 
the regime in the years before 1989, and thus crucial in understanding the factors of its collap-
se. As for the second question, the author will demonstrate that there was indeed a correlation 
between workers’ actions inside and outside the workplace. This correlation brings to light the 
nature of their significant role. The author hopes to convince readers of the role of labor in 
both the history of the East German revolution and the period predating this event. 
The situation in labor in the 1980s can be assessed by analyzing two perspectives (both wor-
kers and leadership) and how they overlap. 
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2.2 The Regime’s Perspective of Labor: Repression and Neutrali-
zation of Workers’ Potential Resistance in the Second Half of 
the 1980s 
The SED’s policy toward the working population combined elements of repression with a 
neutralization of discontent. The concept of neutralization is used to depict measures which 
were supposed to be taken positively by the population and convince them to accept the exis-
ting conditions.124 The workplace -- as the prime source of income, social policy, distribution 
of resources and alleged worker rights -- served as one of, if not the main, centers of the 
SED’s policy of repression and neutralization. Let us examine both aspects.  
2.2.1 Surveillance and Repression In the Workplace 
How were workplaces linked to the chain of the SED regime?125 With the aim of managing 
production, the SED assumed “full control over the labor market.” In other words, the party 
had to carry out all tasks related to qualifying workers, motivating them and encouraging 
greater productivity in the workforce, while at the same time monitoring the internal power 
relations within the workplaces. The word ‘repression’ is thus used in a broad sense, i.e., as a 
means to bring the people to work and accept the conditions set by the leadership, and thus as 
a central component of the SED’s economic policy.   
Verantwortung für den gesamten Arbeitsmarkt zu haben hiess nämlich auch, dass sich 
der SED-Staat nunmehr allein und ausschliesslich in dem allen Unternehmern in Indust-
rieländern gleichermassen ausgesetzten Dilemma befand, die Motivation und das Inte-
resse der lohnarbeitenden Bevölkerung anstacheln zu müssen, ihre Qualifikation und 
Subjektivität zu entwickeln, um die Arbeitsleistung zu erhöhen und eine effektive An-
wendung neuer Maschinerie und Technik zu gewährleisten – ohen jedoch die Machtbe-
ziehungen dabei in Frage stellen oder auch gefährden zu lassen.126 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the workplace and sites of production became the most closely moni-
tored places in the GDR. Among the different networks of surveillance and repression present 
within East German workplaces, the main three are examined in the following pages: the SED 
workplace organization (or Betriebsparteiorganizationen, BPOs), the Ministry for State Secu-
rity (or Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, MfS) and the trade union (or Betriebsgewerkschaft-
                                                 
124 It has been developed and used by the British historian, Tim Mason, in relation to the social policy of the 
Thrid Reich. See: Mason 1995. 
125 Workplace or ‘enterprise’ (Betrieb) is short for any place outside of the home where people work for a wage. 
It encompasses all three traditional industrial sectors.   
126 Hürtgen 2001a, p. 23. 
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sleitung, BGL). These structures were not genuinely independent from each other, as the MfS 
made broad use of the information gathered by the BPOs and the BGLs to supplement ist own 
reports. The objective is to determine how each of these structures assessed the state of top-
down relationships in East German workplaces in the second half of the 1980s. If these depic-
tions somehow converge, one can expect a good representation of the way those in power 
viewed the situation within labor in those years. 
The author does not argue that BPOs and BGLs were only structures of repression. In these 
pages, it is, however, only this crucial aspect of their activities receives attention. 
2.2.1.1 SED Workplace Organizations in the Second Half of the 1980s: The Party is 
Over 
One basic structure used to control and repress workers was the internal organization of the 
SED within the workplace: the BPO. It was in 1954 that the constitution of the SED included 
the introduction of party organizations at the workplace, with the goal of uniting all party 
members at one enterprise. BPOs met once a month and elected their leaders (the Betriebspar-
teileitung, BPL) each year. Depending upon the size of the enterprise, a BPO was divided up 
into Division organizations (Abteilungsparteiorganization, APO) and other smaller organiza-
tional groups (Parteigruppen). The BPO was accountable to the district (Kreis) Party organi-
zation. 
BPO meetings were never democratic as they always worked from a top-down dynamic; their 
purpose was to inform local members of the decisions of the Party leadership. Besides hol-
ding meetings and training its members, the BPO’s main official function was to pass on SED 
labor-related decisions (mainly economic in nature127) to the members within the enterprise. 
Party members were expected to make the case for these decisions with their colleagues.  
Until the mid-1960s, reports of BPO meetings show evidence of some internal life. After this 
period, however, all BPO reports gradually “become standardized, diluted and progressively 
emptied of any meaning. (…) The sources lose their voices.”128  
                                                 
127 Although BPOs have sometimes also played a political role, their members, for instance, were compelled to 
sign petitions in support of the repression of the 1968 Prague upheaval or the expulsion of Wolf Biermann in 
1976.  
128 This is the conclusion the French historian Sandrine Kott who draws on a study of the archives of at least five 
Berlin enterprises. See Kott 2001, pp. 38-39. Michel Christian who has worked on SED structures within enter-
prises shares this understanding. I thank him for his useful explanations. 
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The size of the role played by a BPO within an enterprise in the 1980s seems to have been 
based on the number of party members in the enterprise. In turn, the number of members de-
pended a great deal on the importance, in terms of the size of workforce, of the enterprise (the 
relation between both curves was usually direct: bigger enterprises had a higher rate of party 
members). Studies conducted by the SED district offices in Stalinstadt and Havelstadt in the 
early 1980s show great variations in SED membership in workplaces in different sectors, as 
well as based on the gender composition of the workforce. Figures range from 29% of the 
entire workforce in the steel and rolling mill industries, to a 8% in the textile industry at the 
bottom end, in Havelstadt. Commenting on these figures, Thomas Reichel concludes: 
Daraus ergibt sich der Gesamteindruck, dass es der SED nur in den Grossbetrieben vor 
allem der traditionellen Schwer- und Metallindustrie gelang, ein Viertel oder etwas 
mehr der Belegschaften – auch der Arbeiter – zumindest formal als Mitglieder ihrer Par-
tei zu rekrutieren, während sie in kleineren Betrieben, insbesondere solchen mit einem 
hohen Frauenanteil, kaum den Sprung über die 10-Prozent-Marke schaffte.129 
The number of people leaving the party, especially workers, increased slightly in the 1980s (a 
trend that started in the previous decade). Yet the bulk of members remained in their BPOs 
and continued to take part in (or at least attend) party activities. In fact, the situation within 
BPOs in the 1980s appears to have come to a standstill of sorts. 
If BPOs represented stagnation, petrifying social life within the enterprise, what was the ex-
tent of their influence on the workforce? Reichel considers this evidence of a certain level of 
achieved control, in other words a degree of “discipline and conformity on the part of wor-
kers,” at least of those who remained in the SED.130 
Yet, as mentioned above, BPO reports are not particularly reliable source. Though they reveal 
apathetic tendencies among the workforce, reports by other intelligence-gathering organiza-
tions, the Stasi and the trade unions for instance, offer a different view, at least of the very last 
years of the GDR. Perhaps the formal internal workings of the BPO and the standard language 
of their reports tell us more about the state of the SED’s workplace structures in the 1980s 
than about the actual situation in labor. 
                                                 
129 Reichel 2001, p. 94. 
130 Ibid., p. 96.  
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2.2.1.2 Stasi’s Involvement in Production 
The Ministry for State Security was another structure used for surveillance and repression at 
the workplace. In the 1950s, its presence in enterprises was limited to the implementation and 
protection of the state ownership against former owners. After the June 1953 strike, the MfS 
started to compile reports on the “state of mind and opinions” of workers. Late 1950s, plans 
for setting up a methodical surveillance of production and enterprises by the MfS resulted a 
decade later in the implementation of Security Officials (Sicherheitsbeauftragten), Operative 
Groups (Operativgruppen) and Complementary Service Units (Objektdienststellen) in all 
economic sectors and important enterprises. The objectives of these monitoring activities  and 
intelligence-gathering network were to ensure the successful fulfillment of the production 
plan, to keep tabs on contacts with the West and to explain production troubles and stops.131 
The rise in trade with the West (which increased risks of industrial espionage and escapes) in 
the 1980s and growing failure to achieve production goals generated more work for the Eco-
nomic Section of the Ministry, or the Hauptabteilung XVIII.132 The Solidarnosc crisis in Po-
land (1980-81) further reinforced the Stasi’s interest in workers’ state-of-mind and the atmos-
phere on the shop floors. From the human resources point of view, this need for more eyes 
and ears in the workplace led to an increased call for unofficial collaborators (Inoffizielle Mi-
tarbeiter, IM). In the second half of the 1970s, the HA XVIII had an average of approximate-
ly 11,000 IMs. In the 1980s, each Kombinat had a few hundred IMs reporting regularly on the 
internal situation at the workplace. The VEB Chemische Werke Buna had one IM for every 
152 workers (204 for a total workforce of 31,000), the VEB Leuna, one for every 105 wor-
kers, (306 for 32,000 workers), the chemistry VEB ChemieKombinat Bitterfeld, one for 116 
every workers (173 for 20,000 workers); the machinery WerkzeugmaschinenKombinat Fritz-
Eckert, one for every 70 workers (390 for 27,400 workers). Export-oriented enterprises like 
the latter had a higher proportion of IMs. Enterprises in highly sensitive sectors, i.e. the pro-
duction of armaments, were likely to have an internal Complementary Service Unity -- its 
own local Stasi division. For instance, the Complementary Service Unity within the VEB 
Wismut had about 600 regular collaborators (one for every 30 workers).133  
The Stasi’s activities in the enterprises included scrutinizing why production quotas had not 
been met, investigating reasons for breaks and production stops, espionage, security breaches, 
                                                 
131 Gieseke 2001, pp. 139-140. 
132 Vollnhals 1994, p. 513. 
133 Gieseke 2001, pp. 142-144.  
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contacts with the West, as well as ‘negative statements’ made by workers and underground 
political activities. Hence, the Stasi spied mostly on the top level management. In 1983, three-
quarters of the 23 Operations of Person Control (Operative Personenkontrolle, OPK) laun-
ched in the HA XVIII concerned high-ranking management personnel. It is also at that level 
where it recruited most of its IMs.134 
What role did the Stasi play in controlling the workforce? How do the Stasi reports which 
have emerged to date depict the situation for workers in enterprises in the 1980s? An analysis 
of the Stasi workplace reports is necessary to answer these questions.  
2.2.1.2.1 The Stasi Workplace Reports in the Second Half of the 1980s 
Let us look at 24 Stasi reports about the situation in labor from November 1986 to August 
1989.135 The shortest were a few lines long; the longest over a hundred pages.136 According 
to the author’s observations, the MfS was interested in at least four kinds of disturbances in 
labor: 
1) A critical number of people leaving the FDGB or the SED in a short period of time. Our 
reports include nine cases, ranging from four to 23 exits each. The reports present the per-
son (occupation, views on colleagues, membership in other organizations), the reasons gi-
ven for leaving, the reaction by the BGL’s or BPO’s leaders, and whether or not the worker 
reconsidered her or his decision after discussions with the latter.  
2) Unrest in the workforce. Five cases, each presented as the result of a combination of fac-
tors. The reports describe the prevailing “political-ideological” state of mind of the staff, 
the origins of dissatisfaction, who was involved, and how the BGL, BPO, and manage-
ment reacted. Reporters also give their assessment -- in all of the cases mentioned positive 
-- of the legitimacy of the grievances.   
3) Specific problems in one regional economic sector. Three cases, all caused by supply 
shortages resulting in inability to meet the quota requirements at a regional level. The ca-
ses are based on many enterprise reports. They stress the lack of productivity and the dis-
                                                 
134 Hürtgen 2003, p. 35; Weil 2000, pp. 46-50. 
135 After that date, reports were full of problems ensuing from the chain of events of the fall of 1989. They are 
subject to further investigation below.   
136 BVfS HA XX, 34, S. 427-429; BVfS ZAIG 4222, S. 1-6; ZAIG 16081, S. 14-15; AS Leipzig, HA VII, 2972, 
S. 26-30; BVfS AS Potsdam, AKG 433, KD Zossen, S. 84-87; BVfS AS Potsdam AKG 433, S. 88-90; BVfS AS 
Potsdam, Abt. VXIII, 1390, 1397, 1398; BVfS AS Rostock, Abt. XVIII, 14/89, S. 403-406; BVfS AS Rostock, 
AKG 276/50/89, S. 120-122; BV AS Rostock, KD Rst. A/J, 19, S.1-370; BV AS Rostock, OD KKW Greifs-
wald, Nr. 41, S. 127, 140-143; BV AS Dresden, KD Freital 15440, PI 09/88, S. 1-2; BVfS AS Frankfurt (O), 
Abt. XIX, 4160, S. 4-6;  BV AS Erfurt, AKG 228, S. 1-16. 
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crepancies between the quota and the actual production. The reporters address the fact that 
quota requirements were quite often met only on paper. These reports always emphasize 
the unrest in the workforce because of unpaid bonuses, a detail suggesting that the unrest 
might have been the main reason for the inquiry in the first place. 
4) The context of an upcoming election or congress. Nine such cases are present in the 24 
reports. Before and after events such as an FDGB congress, BGL elections, or municipal 
elections, Stasi people in workplaces were asked to summarize discussions held in assem-
blies and criticisms made by workers. The results of the votes were also analyzed (partici-
pation, blank ballets, incidents, etc.).  
What most strikes the reader of these reports is the wide range of reasons proposed as the cau-
se for dissatisfaction among workers at enterprises in the second half of the 1980s. Labor-
related concerns such as wages (with their corollary of consumption) and professional classi-
fication were strongly represented as the reasons for complaints expressed and claims made at 
the workplace, not least because they were more or less tolerated by the regime. Yet, the mo-
tives covered various aspects of workers’ everyday life -- both inside and outside the work-
place. These other topics included: working conditions, organization of work and production, 
management, work of the BGL, production quotas, the economy, housing, holidays, services, 
culture, media, mass organizations, even political leadership and political conditions, although 
the formulations remained very reasonable. 
The following is a list of reasons for dissatisfaction and claims articulated in labor between 
November 1986 and August 1989, as it appears in the 24 Stasi reports, as well as the number 
of occurrences.137 Different formulations naturally may refer to a same claim, and classifica-
tion proved necessary. An intermediary classification between the simple list and overly broad 
range of categories (as wages, working conditions, etc.) was chosen.  
Those who experienced the events of 1989-1990, who know the history behind them cannot 
help but identify in this list many of their causes as well as the basis of the claims made du-
ring those months. The MfS enterprise reports document the longer history of the East Ger-
man revolution.  
                                                 
137 This paper does not try to qualify in each case the number of workers concerned or the context in which the 
claim was formulated (i.e. conversations? BGL meeting?), though most of them apparently took place during 
official gatherings. In the context of this work, the emphasis is put on the kinds and range of topics addressed by 
workers in enterprises rather than upon the venue. 
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Grounds for workers dissatisfaction and claims made, cited in MfS enterprise reports, 
November 1986-August 1989 
Table 1: Working conditions and relationships within the enterprise (17 occurrences)  
Lack of materials, parts and spare parts 6 occurrences 
Management impropriety 3 occurrences 
Poor labor organization in the enterprise 2 occurrences 
Enterprise cafeteria was closed 1 occurrence 
Insufficient supplies for night workers 1 occurrence 
Growing tension between workers in different divisions 
in enterprise 
1 occurrence 
Need for the introduction of new technologies  1 occurrence 
Poor working conditions 1 occurrence 
Need for improvement of sanitary conditions at work 1 occurrence 
 
Table 2 : Wages and working time (19 occurrences) 
End-of-the-year bonus was not or not entirely paid 6 occurrences 
Need for a wages system partially or totally based on 
performance 
3 occurrences 
Required performance too high / too much overtime 3 occurrences 
Question of wages 2 occurrences 
Overtime was not entirely paid 2 occurrences 
Mistakes in the calculation of wages 1 occurrence 
Need for work time reduction 1 occurrence 
Need to abolish vocational training and classes on 
Saturdays 
1 occurrence 
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Table 3 : Consumer goods (21 occurrences) 
Need for improvements to consumer goods 14 occurrences 
Dissatisfaction over price appreciation 5 occurrences 
Development of ‘two-class system’ because of Inters-
hops 
1 occurrence 
Need for an improvement of the general quality of 
products 
1 occurrence 
 
Table 4 : Trade union and the realization of the quota requirements (12 occurrences) 
Dissatisfaction over the work of the BGL or the FDGB 6 occurrences 
Quota requirements met only on paper (inaccurate 
official statements and articles) 
2 occurrences 
FDGB dues too high and various perceptions 2 occurrences 
Difficulty to meet quota requirements 1 occurrence 
FDGB did not implement announced social policy 
measures 
1 occurrence 
 
Table 5 : Social policy (27 occurrences) 
Lack of rooms at holiday resorts 8 occurrences 
Lack of apartments for worker families 6 occurrences 
Problems in district healthcare facilities and insuffi-
cient medical supplies 
6 occurrences 
Lack of services (transportation, roads, reparations) 3 occurrences 
Need for increase of pensions 2 occurrences 
Need for a better housing subsidy policy 1 occurrence 
Lack of financial resources devoted to culture 1 occurrence 
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Table 6 : Political conditions (14 occurrences) 
Suppression of the magazine Sputnik 1 occurrence 
Restrictions on travel visas 5 occurrences 
Political conditions in the GDR 2 occurrences 
'Government and SED should address the problems' 2 occurrences 
Do not feel represented by SED 2 occurrences 
Refusal of permission to take part in FDJ activities 1 occurrence 
FDJ’s work deemed uninteresting 1 occurrence 
 
Within certain limits which will be defined below, dissatisfaction could be expressed at the 
workplace and thus the Stasi took the pulse of the population there.138 Yet, the diversity of 
views observed in the reports of the last years of the 1980s was new.139 The topics and issues 
addressed by workers in labor between 1986 and 1989 now encompassed and went beyond 
happenings within the factory gates. They point to a deep-seated discontent from various as-
pects of their lives. However, the forms through which this dissatisfaction could manifest it-
self were few. A list of ways workers expressed their dissatisfaction found in the same 24 
Stasi reports bolster this argument. 
  
Table 7 : Expressions of worker dissatisfaction cited in MfS enterprise reports, November 1986 - Au-
gust 1989 
Quitting the FDGB 6 occurrences (61 persons) 
Stop in payment of FDGB dues / refusal to pay a new 
increase (until expulsion) 
4 occurrences 
Critical information (‘kritische Hinweisen’) in BGL 
meeting 
3 occurrences 
Scribbling upon ballots / negative vote in BGL elec-
tions 
2 occurrences 
Quitting the SED / BPO  2 occurrences (16 persons) 
                                                 
138 The former activist Bernd Gehrke, who has written and published many critical studies on the East German 
opposition, made a similar remark in his speech at the conference on “East German Workers and the Events of 
1989-1990” Center Marc-Bloch on February 24, 2004, in Berlin.  
139 For information on the typical claims made by workers in the 1970s and 1980s, mainly related to wages and 
working conditions, see: Hürtgen 2005, pp. 247-298. 
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Boycott of 1989 municipal  elections 2 occurrences 
Leaving the GDR / request for a visa for the FRG 2 occurrences (19 persons in 3 years) 
Quitting the German-Soviet Friendship (enterprise-
based organization) 
1 occurrence (3 persons) 
Quitting the FDJ (enterprise-based cell) 1 occurrence (5 persons) 
Petition to the GDR State Council 1 occurrence (47 signatures) 
Negative statements (until expulsion from FDGB) 1 occurrence 
Refusal to work overtime 1 occurrence 
 
The comparison of the two charts reveals a clear dichotomy between a deep dissatisfaction 
and the modest expressions it would take. While the number of issues addressed by workers 
were broad, the scope of possible actions remained extremely narrow, almost limited to the 
canceling their memberships in mass organizations, the FDGB at the forefront. Sometimes the 
‘exit option,’ to use Hirschmann’s terminology, was used in a passive, less direct way, when 
workers managed to be expelled from the union instead of quitting it. A further section goes 
deeper in the question of the forms taken in defending worker interests. 
Dissatisfaction not directly related to work was sometimes voiced at the workplace. In March 
1989, IM Giltowsky reported on the reasons stated by 24 workers to leave the FDGB, SED or 
the German-Soviet Friendship (or Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft, DSF) in the cable 
workshop Turm in Frankfurt (Oder) since the summer of 1988: rejected requests to travel to 
West Germany, the ban on the pro-Perestroika magazine Sputnik, low pensions for mothers 
and the limited availability of consumer goods.140  
Different reasons provide an explaination of why disapproval of a political decision had re-
percussions in the workplace: many fields of state activity, in social policy matters and the 
availability of consumer goods for instance, were in fact provided in enterprises, and the re-
gime allowed the expression of some forms of criticisms at the workplace. Furthermore, the 
population at work experienced first hand many of the contradictions inherent in the regime: 
inavailability and shortages of goods, never-ending economic problems, discrepancies bet-
ween official discourse and labor reality. Obviously, some workers felt it was appropriate to 
protest against the banning of a magazine by leaving the SED, FDGB or DSF.  
                                                 
140 MfS BV Frankfurt (Oder), “At the meeting on 3/16/1989 the source reported as requested on quitting of SED, 
FDGB, DSF and FDJ membership”, pp. 4-5.  
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2.2.1.2.2 Stasi's Repressive Action in Workplaces in the Second Half of the 1980s 
Like a boxer waiting for the right moment to strike, the eyes of the MfS  worked together with 
its arms and fists. A secret police does not merely compile reports and register complaints: its 
repressive character was intrinsic. In that regard, Renate Hürtgen has shown that MfS’s inter-
ventions in workplaces served to set the limits on workers’ actions and words. She used diffe-
rent cases of Operative Personal Control and Operative Process from 1983 as evidence.141 An 
Operative Personal Control (Operative Personenkontrolle, OPK) against someone was opened 
on the basis of what the Stasi considered a unlawful act, whereas an Operative Process (Ope-
rativer Vorgang, OV) aimed at preventing an unlawful act from occuring.  
Following Renate Hürtgen’s study, workers without any leading functions first fell under Sta-
si’s observation when they were suspected of having caused economic damage or of having 
made hostile or negative statements. An OPK or OV was launched when the ‘incident’ took 
on ‘political character,’ i.e., when it concerned more than one worker. Individual actions, such 
as leaving the SED or the FDGB, were systematically registered, but the MfS came into play 
when such actions could be interpreted as ‘collective’ or ‘public’ - in other words: as soon as 
they were said to be no longer individual in nature. This was one of the clearest limits to the 
expression of worker dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the Stasi was thoroughly capable of un-
dermining an individual’s life through different means of demoralization, criminalization, and 
isolation in the enterprise. It usually began with transfer to another division and travel bans. In 
December 1988, to give just one example, 47 workers of Lubmin signed a 3-page-petition - a 
long and explicit listing of grievances - to the Rostock district powers. The text had gone 
through many hands and rewritings. After intervention by the Stasi, some of the signatories 
had been transferred to other divisions.142  
In the second half of the 1980s, such collective expressions of worker disatisfaction multi-
plied, much to the alarm of authorities. To give one example: between November 1987 and 
April 1988, 13 workers at the energy plant VEB EnergieKombinat Potsdam left the FDGB; 
two of them also left the SED. A Stasi report from June 1988 states that the following state 
structures or persons were in turn informed of this situation: first, the heads of the district di-
rection of the Mine and Energy Trade Union (IG Bergbau und Energie) and the FDGB; the 
SED district offices (which set up a working group on that issue). This was then forwarded to 
FDGB Federal Offices, the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee and finally conclu-
                                                 
141 Hürtgen 2003. 
142 BStU BV Rostock, OD KKW Greifswald Nr. 41, no title, December 16, 1988, p. 126. 
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ded with a discussion between Politburo members Harry Tisch, Günter Mittag, Willi Stoph 
and Erich Honecker.143 Obviously the situation was still considered exceptional, but it was the 
number of said events, until then infrequent, that characterized the Stasi reports on the work-
place in those years. 
The reports written in the context of the BGL elections of 1989 recorded this growth in wor-
ker dissatisfaction. Though the one-list system prevented the election of any other candidates, 
the number of blank ballots increased significantly, especially for high-ranking BGL secreta-
ries. Ballots were spoiled, insults written beside the name of some candidates (i.e. shirker, 
alcoholic, homosexual, criminal, asocial) and even the names of alternative write-in ‘candida-
tes’. At assemblies, workers were more critical than in years past and criticized those union 
secretaries in particular that were members of the SED.144 These exceptional expressions of 
discontent were the result of problems often addressed, but never solved, as well as new ones. 
Probleme, die die Werktätigen seit längerem bewegen, die bereits mehrfach angespro-
chen und bisher nicht verändert wurden, werden unduldsamer zur Sprache gebracht. 
Gleichzeitig informieren Bezirksleitungen, dass es in einzelnen Kollektiven in Industrie 
und Bauwesen angesichts dieser Probleme, begonnen bei der planmässigen Material 
und Ersatzteilbereitstellung bis hin zur Verbesserung der Arbeitserversorgung und den 
sanitären Bedingungen, zunehmend kritische Anfragen und Diskussionen gibt.145 
Reporting over the course of BGL elections in Zossen, Lieutenant Colonel Fleischmann ex-
pressed his worries that the upcoming municipal elections of May 1989 would also be affec-
ted by the same kind of incidents.146 History proved his fears right in that respect. Hence, the 
municipal elections of 1989, often presented as the first station of GDR’s Calvary, took place 
a month after troubled BGL elections. Both events take place in the same context. In other 
words, the workplace was part of the very first expressions of public dissatisfaction in 1989. 
The emergence of a new "public sphere" in the GDR should thus not be limited, as often the 
case, to the observation of the municipal elections of May by citizen groups. 
                                                 
143 MfS BV Potsdam, “Information zu operativ-bedeutsamen Austrittsbewegungen aus dem FDGB im VEB 
EnergieKombinat Potsdam”, June 10, 1988, XVIII1397, pp. 1-4.  
144 MfS BV Potsdam, “Operative Informationen zum VEB Funkwerk Dabendorf”, Zossen, April 18, 1989, AKG 
433; Ibid., “Information zu den Gewerkschaftswahlen”; BV Berlin, “Information über Verlauf und Ergebnisse 
der Gewerkschaftswahlen 1989”, March 20, 1989, ZAIG 16801, p. 14-15. 
145 MfS BV Berlin, “Information über Verlauf und Ergebnisse der Gewerklscahftswahlen 1989”, p. 14. Same 
remarks in: BV Rostock, “Information über beabsichtigte Austritte aus dem FDGB”, Rostock, June 14, 1989, 
AKG Nr. 276, pp. 120-23.   
146 “Gleichzeitig wurden Tendenzen sichtbar, die in differenzierter Form sich auf das Verhalten einzelner Bürger 
bei den Kommunalwahlen auswirken könnten.” MfS BV Potsdam, “Information zu den Gewerkschaftswahlen”, 
p. 88. 
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2.2.1.3 Reports by the Trade Unions in the Second Half of the 1980s  
Beside the SED and the Stasi, the Free Confederation of German Trade Unions (or Freier 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB) established a third structure of surveillance and re-
pression at the workplace. Its reports of the second half of the 1980s offer a portrait of the 
situation similar to those by Stasi employees.  
2.2.1.3.1 The 1969 Directive 
The history of the FDGB starts with the second Soviet military decree of June 1945, which 
extended the right to form trade unions and organizations for defending the interests and righ-
ts of workers. By fall 1945, two million people in the Soviet sector belonged to trade unions. 
These unions formed the FDGB in February 1946 which - rapidly placed under the control of 
the KPD, first in Berlin and then elsewhere - served as a significant vehicle for the fusion with 
the SPD and the creation of the SED during the same year.147 Forty years later, the FDGB had 
become, in terms of size, the most important mass organization of the GDR: its membership 
approached 9.6 million. In other words, in all of the GDR, only about 200,000 workers were 
not members. In 1988, FDGB had about 350,000 union workplace representatives (Vertrauen-
sleute) and 340,000 elected secretaries on social security matters.148  
How did the FDGB do its share in controlling and repressing the workforce? The local union 
(or Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung, BGL) was intended to serve as the structure for defending 
worker interests at enterprises. As stated in the constitution, however, their main duty was to 
mobilize the workforce in order meet the production quota. If workers were unhappy or com-
plained, if production came to a halt, it was the responsibility of BGL work controllers - over 
110,000 in 1988 - to investigate the causes. Where required, the BGL took measures to repri-
mand those involved or it forced them to publicly denounce their own action (Kritik und Selb-
stkritik).149 This process by which the BGL brought workers to retract what they said or fall 
back into line and these methods of coercion and re-education were termed the school of so-
cialism (Schule des Sozialismus). The training of workers, in that specific sense, was regarded 
as another of the BGL’s main tasks.150      
                                                 
147 Gill 1989, p. 100, Leonhard 1955, pp. 428-31. 
148 Hübner 1999, p. 545. 
149 Work controllers also had other functions. They sometimes, in a limited way, criticized some of the manage-
ment decisions, usually without much effect. See: Hürtgen 2005, pp. 180-192.   
150 Weinert/Gilles 1999, pp. 21-22. 
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The FDGB had built its own tight-knit network at workplaces meant to supply the regime 
with information on the situation on the shop floor and on the state of mind of the workforce. 
In that respect, the FDGB directive of February 10, 1969, on the role, tasks and organization 
of information is fundamental.151 In the context post-Prague uprising, the directive’s goals 
were to revise the bottom-to-top flow of information, from the workplace to FDGB district 
and federal structures. According to Wolfgang Eckelmann, head of FDGB Organization Divi-
sion from 1987 to 1990, this directive had three goals. One was to re-organize the writing of 
reports in a way that enables computerized collection and processing of information. As stated 
in the directive:  
Die Vorbereitung und Durchführung jeder gewerkschaftlichen Leitungsaufgabe stützt 
sich auf Informationsprozesse. Die Information dient der Entscheidungsvorbereitung 
und -findung, der Beschlussdurchführung, den Planungs- und Kontrollprozessen sowie 
der gewerkschaftlichen Analysen- und Prognosetätigkeit. 
A second motive was to increase the reliability of the reports. Comparing its information with 
that collected by the MfS or the BPO in enterprises, the FDGB came to the conclusion that 
many informants described the situation on the shop floor in a unduly favorable light. Such 
information was useless in keeping track of problems and discontent on the shop floor and for 
controlling the workforce. After Prague, the FDGB wished more reliable and exact informa-
tion. The directive also intensified the exchange of information between the FDGB and the 
MfS.152 
A third motive was to take a systematic census of all conflicts, damage and stops in produc-
tion that impacted on working and living conditions of workers.153 The reports had to specify 
when and where a conflict or an 'exceptional incident' had taken place, its causes and conse-
quences, its nature and history, the number of workers involved and the measures to be taken. 
To quote Eckelmann: 
Der FDGB sah seine Rolle bei diesen Konflikten nicht darin, Interessenvertretung zu 
betreiben, sondern darin, die Arbeitnehmer davon zu überzeugen, dass Arbeitsniederle-
gungen „nicht der Weg ist, um Probleme zu lösen.“ Die ‚Auseinandersetzungen’, die im 
Anschluss an solche Vorkommnisse in der Regel geführt wurden, zielten durchweg dar-
auf ab, die Arbeitnehmer von der Unsinnigkeit von Streiks im real existierenden Sozia-
lismus zu überzeugen. Diese Vorkommnisse waren für den FDGB nicht Anlass für eine 
Politik der Interessenvertretung, sondern als ‚schule des Marxismus-Leninismus’ und 
                                                 
151 “Richtlinie über Rolle, Aufgaben und Organization der Gewerkschaftsinformation im System der wissen-
schaftlichen Leitungstätigkeit des FDGB”, 10.02.1969, ZGA FDGB 4966, printed in: Eckelmann/Hertle/Weinert 
1990, pp. 199-200. 
152 Ibid., p. 87, Hürtgen / Gehrke 2001, pp. 178-182. 
153 See also the “Ordnung für die Erfassung von Arbeitskonflikten und besonderen Vorkommnissen”, 
27.10.1969, ZGA FDGB 4966; published in: Eckelmann / Hertle / Weinert 1990, pp. 200-203. 
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als Institution des ‚sozialistischen Byzantismus’ (Theo Pirker) übermittelte der FDGB 
die berichteten Vorgänge dem Politbüro und der Staatssicherheit.154 
The implementation of intensified means of surveillance produced immediate results. In the 
first nine months of 1970, 117 work conflicts, ‘acts of sabotage’ and ‘activities of the enemies 
of the working class’ were recorded in enterprises, almost as many as in the entire previous 
year. Of that number, 19 work stoppages by workers (Arbeitsniederlegungen), four threats of 
work stoppage and three petitions related to pay or holiday issues were listed.155 In 1971, the 
number of so-called exceptional incidents had jumped to 306, with 75 work conflicts and 
stoppages and 61 ‘acts of provocation and sabotage.’ According to the FDGB reports, the 
following year saw 63 work conflicts and stoppages and 51 acts of provocation and sabotage, 
for a total of 353 exceptional incidents.156  
It is of great consequence that the majority of the exceptional incidents recorded in those 
years by the FDGB were fires and damage to production (62, 170, 239 cases, respectively). 
This sheds a harsh light on the working conditions in the GDR.  
2.2.1.3.2 The Reports in the Second Half of the 1980s 
With the Solidarnosc crisis in Poland at the beginning of the 1980s, the FDGB kept a close 
watch on East German workplaces in order to prevent any similar protests. Reassured by re-
ports which regarded a “Polish scenario” as improbable, the FDGB leadership seemed con-
vinced of its own contribution to preventing the emergence of dissent in labor - to the point of 
considering its internal organization of model character which could be useful to the Po-
lish.157
ei  Lehrgang für je 40 leitende Funktionäre 
158
the surface by the mid-1980s – at least enough to be noticed by some vigilant West German 
                                                
  
Zur Unterstützung der Qualifizierung leitender polnischer Gewerkschaftskader werden 
durch die Gewerkschaftshhochschule ‚Fritz Heckert’ beim Bundesvorstand des FDGB 
an der Aussenstelle der Gewerkschaftshochschule für Ausländerbildung Grünheide vom 
12.-30.9. und vom 4.-22. Oktober 1982 je n
der Branchengewerkschaften durchgeführt.  
If there was no sign of immediate threat, there was a lot of seismic activity going on beneath 
 
154 Ibid., p. 89. 
155 “Analyse über Arbeitskonflikte und besondere Vorkommnisse, die in den Monaten Januar bis September 
1970 stattfanden”, 22.10.1970, ZGA FDGB 5414, repoduced in: Ibid., pp. 203-205.  
156 Ibid., p. 88. A new FDGB directive of 1973 strengthened its control and “work of persuasion” in labor. 
157 “Orientierung für die weitere Gestaltung der Beziehungen zu den polnischen Klassengewerkschaften”, June 
30, 1982, ZGA FDGB 5349, reproduced in: Ibid., p. 214. 
158 ZGA FDGB 5349, quoted in: Ibid., p. 97. 
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observers.159 In fact, the most reliable sources on these expressions of discontent were the 
reports the FDGB apparatus collected and evaluated each month! As per FDGB specifica-
tions, the reports are full of details and quotes, and are written in a relatively neutral language 
making them very useful to the historian. Mary Fulbrook considers them to be one of the best 
sources of information on everyday life in the GDR.160 
In November 1986, the organizational division in the FDGB had produced an analysis of the 
situation in East German labor following the recent BGL elections. According to Wolfgang 
Eckelmann, who himself introduced it to the secretariat of FDGB federal board (Sekretariat 
des Bundesvorstandes), the report presented a realistic overview of the criticism and sugges-
tions made by workers, based on first-hand information gathered in recent BGL general as-
semblies from at least seventeen VEBs.161 The criticisms focused on the numerous problems 
preventing production from running smoothly. 
Eine Vielzahl der Vorschläge und Kritiken bezieht sich erneut auf die termin-, qualitäts- 
und sortimentsgerechte Bereitstellung von Material und Ersatzteilen sowie auf die Ver-
sorgung mit Werkzeugen und Kleinmechanismen. Kritisiert wurde z.B., dass nicht ge-
nügend Scheren für die Textilindustrie, Handblechscheren für die Werften, Messer für 
die Schlacht- und Verarbeitungsbetriebe, Ständerbohrmaschinen und Winkelschleifer, ... 
Waggons und Container für die Beladung sowie Hubgeräte und Gabelstapler... zur Ver-
fügung stehen. Ausserdem können oft Gabelstapler und andere Technik nicht genutzt 
werden, weil Batterien, Ersatzteile oder Reparaturkapazitäten fehlen.162 
Workers also had much to complain about when it came to their working conditions. The ge-
neral feeling was that they had declined to such a degree during the last years as to threaten 
their health and security at work: roofs and windows leaked; rooms were poorly heated; sho-
wers and toilets were either missing or were not repaired; dust was allowed to accumulate. 
Many expressed the wish to see new technologies introduced to improve productivity. Others 
wanted commuting time to be considered as working time. One general complaint was that 
these problems had been pointed out years ago and that they had worsened as nothing had 
been done to resolve them. As Eckelman explained to FDGB secretariat in 1986: 
Die Mitglieder brachten ihre Unzufriedenheit zum Ausdruck, dass teilweise ihre Vor-
schläge und Kritiken zur Verbesserung der materiellen Arbeitsbedingungen nur unge-
nügend beantwortet und mitunter seit Jahren keiner Lösung zugeführt wurden. Das be-
                                                 
159 Sander 1983 and Bust-Bartels 1980 are two examples.  
160 Fulbrook 1996, p. 277-278. 
161 “Einige Vorschläge, Hinweise und Kritike aus den gewerkschaftlichen Wahlversammlungen”, November 
1986, published in: Eckelmann / Hertle / Weinert 1990, pp. 217-221. 
162 Quoted in: Ibid., p. 101. 
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einträchtigt in einigen Betrieben bereits die Arbeitssicherheit und die Arbeitsbedingun-
gen der Werktätigen.163 
The report did not meet with the expected reaction within FDGB Federal Board, as it was 
sharply criticized as being “unrealistic” by President Harry Tisch. “The mood and the political 
situation are stable,” was the response. The report was immediately rejected and its authors 
rebuked. This touches upon one striking ambiguity of the East German regime in the 1980s: 
the denial of the very discontent it reported upon.  
A new synthesis on the situation in labor was presented ten months later, after union members 
assemblies had been held in August and September 1987. It focused again on wages, shorta-
ges of all kinds and the working conditions. Yet, the problems identified by workers now 
went beyond the factory gates, as they concerned living conditions in a broad sense.  
So wie in den Mitgliederversammlungen im Juli gibt es nach wie vor Diskussionen zur 
Versorgung. (…) Im Vordergrund stehen dabei die nicht ausreichende und territorial un-
terschiedliche Versorgung mit Fleisch- und Wurstwaren sowie Obst und Gemüse. Ver-
ärgert sind Mitglieder auch darüber, dass das Warensortiment auf diesem Gebiet beson-
ders nach 16.00 Uhr ungenügend ist und das vorhandene Obst und Gemüse nicht in 
entsprechender Qualität und Sauberkeit angeboten wird. Erneut löst die nicht bedarfsge-
rechte Bereitstellung von modischer Kinder-, Damen- und Herrenoberbekleidung sowie 
von Schuhen breitere Diskussionen aus. Unverständnis gibt es ebenfalls über das lü-
ckenhafte Sortiment bei Artikeln der Kosmetik und der Haushaltschemie (z.B. Haar-
lack, -farben und –festiger, Nagellack, Feinwaschmitel, Allzweckreiniger). Ausserdem 
wird das Angebot an geleitem Wandfarben, Latex-Aussenanstrichstoffen, Pkw-
Ersatzteilen, Fahrradschläuchen und ‚1000 kleinen Dingen’ bemängelt. 
Recent declarations made by Erich Honecker had aroused some hope in GDR's shop floors. 
During his visit in the FRG, Honecker had stated that peaceful collaboration would lead to 
closer contacts between the two German states. In many BGL assemblies, workers questioned 
this statement’s meaning and expressed their wish that the paperwork required to visit West 
Germany be reduced.164 
The 1987 report received a similar response by Harry Tisch as its 1986 forerunner. He contra-
dicted the reported facts on the basis that the reports by the BPOs – which, as previously seen, 
were no longer a reliable source - did not mention any such problems. He exclaimed: 
Was sollen diese Feststellungen zu den Versorgungsproblemen? Dazu noch diese breite 
Abhandlung. Ich habe alle Berichte der 1. Bezirkssekretäre der SED angesehen. Dort ist 
kein Wort darüber zu lesen. Soll ich diese Probleme lösen?... Was unternehmen denn 
die Bezirksvorstände des FDGB und die Zentralvorstände? Sie schieben uns alles auf 
                                                 
163 Idem. 
164 Ibid., p. 103 and 102. 
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den Tisch, und dann macht mal. Sie selbst müssen das verändern, doch nicht in erster 
Linie wir. Mängel aneinanderreihen, das bringt nichts. 
As to the wish to see a loosening of the formalities involved in travel to West Germany, Tisch 
response to Eckelmann stated that they were “individual claims” and, therefore, of minor im-
portance: 
Das ist doch nicht wahr! Natürlich mag es hier und da den Wunsch geben zu reisen, bit-
te schön, auch weitere Reiseerleichterungen einzuführen. Aber das ist doch nicht die 
Forderung der Mehrheit der Bürger oder unserer Mitglieder... Das sind vereinzelte For-
derungen, deshalb ist die Einschätzung falsch... Du muβt das Wesentliche vom Unwe-
sentlichen unterscheiden.165  
The same problems were seen again in the reports on the situation in labor in 1988 and 1989, 
and as they were becoming more acute, the list of grievances grew longer. Supplies of medi-
cation appeared in the 1988 report, with workers’ complaints about the long waiting periods 
for services, for example.166 The number of exceptional incidents also grew steadily during 
those years: 832 (1986), 893 (1987), 999 (1988). As work conflicts and interruptions decrea-
sed from 29 (1986) to 14 (1988), the vast majority of incidents now took place ‘in the unions’ 
(Vorkommnisse in den Gewerkschaften). This seems to indicate that workers were more open 
than in the previous years.167 In any case, such clashes increased at the eve of the collapse of 
the GDR and, here again, the words of FDGB reports mirrored those of the Stasi:  
Immer unduldsamer reagieren die Mitglieder auf die teilweise schleppende Behandlung 
von Vorhaben für bessere Arbeitsbedingungen, von Neuerervorschlägen, der sozialisti-
schen Gemeinschaftsarbeit, Versäumnissen bei der rechtzeitign Qualifizierung sowie 
der schnellen und realen Information über betriebliche Fragen.168 
It is fascinating to see how the information structures in labor, skillfully developed over years, 
sent clear distress signals to the top leadership in the last half of the 1980s. Informants on the 
shop floor felt the growing sense of displeasure, heard the voices growing louder and saw the 
list of grievances grow. No question, though the highest total ever, 999 recorded ‘exceptional 
events’ in 1988 remained relatively low considering the problems workers had to face on a 
daily basis. While informants - diligently recording each departure from the union and travel 
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request - were concerned about the obvious increase, Harry Tisch - his back to the wall - tried 
to put the situation in a positive light in view of the high rate of FDGB membership compared 
to other trade unions in the world:  
Wir haben ein Organizationsverhältnis von 97.4%. Wo in der Welt gibt es eine Gewerk-
schaft, die über einen solchen Organisiertenstand verfügt? Im Vergleich dazu sind die 
Austritte unerheblich.169 
2.2.2 Neutralization of Worker Discontent  
In regard to the working population, the regime used labor not only as a look-out post but also 
in its active policy of neutralizing potential conflicts of interest.170 SED leaders were prompt 
to present economic, social and legal achievements of labor – i.e. full employment, social 
policy, and extended worker rights - as a testimony to the superiority of real-existing socia-
lism over capitalistic societies. Three aspects of the regime’s neutralization policy in labor are 
considered in the following pages: employment and wage, enterprise-based social policy, la-
bor law and rights of workers. The tightening of the financial resources throughout the 1980s 
limited the regime's capacity to maintain its neutralization policy toward the working popula-
tion. Although attempts were made from the mid-1980s on to go back over some of its fun-
damentals, the measures taken created growing discontent in the shop floors. It is a common 
thread leading to the 1989 upheaval. 
2.2.2.1 Employment and Wage 
The following pages recount how the plan was carried out regarding the number of positions 
and the level of wages. This examination highlights how planning was impossible when it 
came to human resource management. As a consequence, enterprises were able to enjoy a 
great deal of autonomy with respect to the total number of workers and the level of wages.  
2.2.2.1.1 Distorted Plans 
Devising the plan was a sophisticated venture that went through at least the following sta-
tions. The Plan Commission worked out a first draft on the basis of the objectives set by the 
SED leadership. This draft was distributed among the ministries, which dealt out the quotas to 
be filled along the different Kombinate. The Kombinate then carried out the same procedure 
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within their enterprises. The management at each enterprise negotiated with distributors and 
made projections on the amount and type of resources necessary to meet the plan’s require-
ments. This information then went back to the Plan Commission, which balanced the sheets 
and assessed the needs for all kinds of materials, energy, machinery and human resources. 
The plan was ultimately ratified by the government ministers and the People's Chamber.  
Hence, the plan rested entirely on the information the enterprises forwarded to the ministries 
and the Plan Commission, especially regarding human resources. Here, two things were suffi-
cient to make any attempt at planning for human resources hopeless. The first is that nothing 
less than the militarization of close to 10 million workers and the entire labor processes would 
have been required to ensure the plan’s provisions be respected. It would have also supposed 
a tight control over the number of industrial injuries and pregnancies, and over work schedu-
les. 
Um dies zu erreichen, hätte es zusätzlich eines System administrativ-dirigistischer 
Maβnahmen der Arbeitskräftelenkung und umfangreicher Kontrollen bedurft, die letzt-
lich eine vollständige Übertragung militärischer Organizationsprinzipien auf den Ar-
beitskräfteeinsatz impliziert hätten. Betriebe hätten alle benötigten Arbeitskräfte direkt 
von der Zentrale zugewiesen erhalten und wären gezwungen gewesen, nicht mehr benö-
tigte Arbeitskräfte an ihre Leitungsorgane zu melden; private Haushalte hätten Beruf 
und Arbeitsplatz nicht mehr frei wählen können, sondern zentral zugewiesen bekom-
men.171  
As heavy-handed as they were, the repressive structures in labor did not result in militariza-
tion. The second cause preventing the definitive planning of needs in human resources stem-
med from the plan’s rigidity regarding the quantitative goals. As a consequence, enterprise 
managers took advantage of their role in drafting the plan to manipulate it from the outset. To 
obtain the necessary staff for their enterprise and meet the objectives, they could foresee pro-
cesses of production requiring more workers, boost the number of projected injuries, and hen-
ce the number of replacement workers required, and they could increase the needs for admi-
nistrators, which, in fact, would be assigned productive tasks. 
Those practices were expanded in the 1980s, as enterprises had repeatedly been assigned un-
realistic quotas, production interruptions because of shortages or machinery breakdowns, and 
sudden quota readjustments. More workers meant more room to maneuver and meet the quo-
ta. Until the mid-1950s, the regime had tried to supervise to some degree the assignment of 
the workers, along its economic priorities, with coercive and financial incentives. The death 
of Stalin, the 1953 upheaval, and the change in the political climate ultimately spelt the end of 
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such practices. The 1960s and 1970s saw the progressive lifting of all restrictions on the choi-
ce of the workplace.172 Upstream distortions on the needs for worked were inflated.173 In the 
1980s GDR leaders were well aware of these long-established practices.174  
Such practices required the collusion of management and the BPO. And even at higher levels 
of the hierarchy, upstream distortions were considered inevitable and tolerated. Having to 
choose between requests for more workers or risk not meeting the objectives, the plan-makers 
chose to comply. The act of employing too many workers was rarely punished.175   
Full employment resulted from the plan's rigidity and the semi-autonomy of enterprises regar-
ding human resources management. According to Uwe Vollmer, full employment hence cove-
red up an actual unemployment rate of about 15%, in the 1980s.176 When the regime tried to 
increase norms and productivity while decreasing wages, enterprises reacted by hiring more 
workers. The need for a more workers seemed insatiable: approximately two million positions 
were being offered for some 112,000 job seekers - a rate of approximately 20/1 in 1984.177  
2.2.2.1.2 Loosened Wage Control 
The same kind of semi-autonomy of management could be observed with respect to wage 
formation. Wages were made up of a basic pay and bonuses. Bonuses were designed to re-
ward the fulfillment or exceeding of the plan’s norms.178 Plan-related bonuses had a distorting 
effect as described above. They led managers to provide plan-makers with information likely 
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to assign low quotas to their enterprises in order to raise wages and keep workers from beco-
ming tempted to accept another job with better pay.  
In addition to the basic pay and bonuses, many enterprises had their own system of bonuses 
(piece or speed bonuses) rewarding increased efficiency, the so-called Mehrleistungslöhne 
(MLL). MLL were introduced as an added incentive for the carrying out and surpassing of the 
plan and as a means of binding workers to their enterprise. They also granted enterprises a 
decisive influence over a worker’s actual pay. Enterprises used the leeway offered by the 
MLL to secure their workforce and headhunt for new additions. By the mid-1980s, the MLL 
had reached the average of 30% of a worker’s pay, well beyond the estimates of the plan.179  
Even smaller enterprises without MLLs could find ways to outsmart the plan with hidden pay 
increases. Paying artificial promotions or bonuses for tasks that were hardly quantifiable (so-
called fiktive Stücklöhne) was a widespread practice. 
Such practices rendered the planning of employment and wage levels illusory. The plan had 
lost track of the total wage bill such that fiscal policy in the GDR was rendered ineffective in 
the 1980s.180 
2.2.2.1.3 Employment, Wages and Productivity in the 1980s 
The dynamics at work in employment and wages intensified East German economic pro-
blems, which in turn brought enterprises to make greater use of their autonomy and resort to 
increased workforces and hidden wage increases. This vicious economic circle had concrete 
effects on the workers’ productivity: wages tended to lose their value as an incentive. In the 
second half of the 1980s, the situation had become highly problematic.   
Reports indicated that in many enterprises, wages were simply disconnected from one’s per-
formance. Here an excerpt from a personal letter one “consultant” wrote to Erich Honecker in 
December 1988: 
In Berlin-Hessenwinkel wurden Rohre für Gasleitungen 1987/1988 verlegt. Von fünf 
Arbeitern, die Gräben ziehen oder die Rohre einbringen, arbeitet einer, manchmal zwei. 
Die anderen unterhalten sich. Mit einem Arbeiter dieser Gruppe, der Mauerarbeiten ver-
richtet, sprach ich. Er sagte, dass er einen Grundlohn von etwa 800,- Mark habe und 
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durch Leistung etwa 1000,- Mark monatlich verdiene. Die Arbeiter erhalten also für 
vielleicht 50 Prozent der möglichen Arbeitsleistung einen Leistungszuschlag.181  
Many directors tolerated “leveling” practices, through which bonuses were shared between 
workers, regardless of his or her actual performance (so-called Gleichmacherei): 
Durch die Leiter wird in vielen Fällen die Auseinandersetzung mit Werktätigen über 
Mängel in der Arbeit gescheut. (...) Gegenwärtig erhalten in vielen Brigaden alle Kol-
lektivmitglieder unabhängig von ihrem persönlichen Beitrag zum kollektiven Gesamt-
ergebnis den gleichen Lohn. Das führt nach Auffassung der Bauarbeiter zur Gleichma-
cherei.182 
“Unexcused absence from work” (unentschuldigte Fehlstunden) were on the rise since the 
second half of the 1970s: from 3.3 hours in 1976 to 6.3 hours in 1982.183 Productivity was 
falling: 82.4% of the time spent at work was considered to be productive hours in 1982. Seven 
years later, in sectors such as construction, reports assumed this rate had fallen under 70%. In 
his letter to Erich Honecker, Erich Hanke spoke of unexploited reserves in human resources at 
between 30 and 100% depending on the sector.  
Because of the numerous bottlenecks, production stops/breakdowns and shortages, overtime 
also grew steadily in the 1980s, together with unproductive hours and hidden unemployment 
– a rather astonishing combination. Indifference and exasperation was growing among wor-
kers. 
Nicht nur Genossen, sondern grosse Teile der Bevölkerung sind unzufrieden und ver-
stehen die ungenügende Arbeitszeitsausnützung und die geringe Arbeitsdisziplin vieler 
Beschäftigten nicht.184 
Toward the end of the decade, Honecker's entourage was considering the introduction of wa-
ges “entirely based on performance,” as in “capitalist industries.” Honecker ordered discus-
sions on this proposition in the FDGB and had them tested in some enterprises. Not all leaders 
believed it was possible to undertake such a radical step. They rather put forward the so-called 
"productive wage" system, which introduced greater differentiation in wage formation wi-
thout going as far as that envisioned by Honecker and his staff. The latter rejected such, what 
they considered, half-hearted measures.  
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Auch die gegenwärtige Einführung von sogenannten ‘Produktivlöhne’ in der Industrie 
wird die Erwartungen nach einem wesentlichen Leistungsschub nicht erfüllen. (...) Zur 
erreichung unserer Ziele (...) sowie zur Überwindung unserer Arbeitskräfteproblem soll-
ten höhere Arbeitsleistungen durch eine wesentlich wirksamere Stimulierung stärker ge-
fördert werden. Der Lohn der Arbeiter sollte ohne Begrenzung entsprechend ihrer Leis-
tung steigen. Bei der Ausarbeitung entsprechender Methoden sollten wir uns stärker auf 
bewährte Verfahrensweisen kapitalistischer Unternehmer besinnen. Sie waren in Zeiten 
der Konjonktur stark daran interessiert, hohe Arbeitsleistungen wirksam zu stimulieren. 
(...) Ihr wirkliches Interesse an der Arbeit kann sich nur entwickeln, wenn der Arbeiter 
nicht nur durch grössere Leistungen Vorteile hat, sondern auch voll die Verluste 
schlechter Arbeit tragen muss.185 
Yet, it is impossible to overlook that these competitive options discussed in the Politburo at 
the end of the 1980s shared the same goals: decreasing wages and make them depend more 
directly on one's quantitative performance. 
2.2.2.2 Industrial Social Policy 
Industrial social policy was another key component of the regime's neutralizing policy toward 
the working population. A key date here is 1971, when after vicious internal struggles bet-
ween opposite camps, Walter Ulbricht was removed from office and replaced by Erich Ho-
necker as SED First Secretary.186 This episode, which marked the realignment of the GDR 
leadership with the USSR, had the development of social policy at its core. The end of the 
1960s had seen workers becoming restless in many Eastern Bloc countries, as in the case of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Poland two years later. Without questioning the leading role of 
the state parties in the popular democracies, the Soviet leaders showed themselves nonetheless 
favorable to some changes in government policy in the form of an increased standard of living 
in those countries. In the GDR, this new approach in social policy was termed “unity of the 
economic and the social policy” and was introduced by 1972.187 
In addition to the more traditional components of social security, such as health, pensions, 
family support and education, the East German leadership targeted housing and consumption 
as fields of industrial social policy requiring rapid improvements. Between 1971 and 1989, 
the continuous rise of the standards of living was identified as the mechanism for the "pro-
gression of socialism" and linked to social policy. 
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Between 1971 and 1985, almost two million apartments were built or renovated. By 1989, the 
GDR had 426 apartments for 1,000 inhabitants, a relatively high rate by international stan-
dards but nevertheless insufficient: 781,000 applications for new apartments had been registe-
red, the majority on grounds that they lacked modern conveniences.188 The production of 
consumer goods also grew significantly during this period. In 1989, 99% of East German fa-
milies possessed a refrigerator (1970: 56%), 88% a television (1970: 69%) and 99% a was-
hing machine (1970: 53%).189 If the production of motorized vehicles had increased to its 
peak of 217,931 units in 1986, it is a known fact that true demand was never met.190 The state 
also subsidized rents, electricity, water, heating, goods of basic consumption and the cost of 
public transportation.  
2.2.2.2.1 An Industrial Type of Social Policy 
Most administrative tasks accomplished, services delivered and counseling provided in the 
enterprises qualifies East German social policy as industrial (betriebliche Sozialpolitik). A 
quick overview demonstrates its importance. 
In 1988, East German enterprises operated 122 polyclinics, 306 infirmaries (Betriebsambula-
torien), 1,683 medical stations (Arztsanitätsstellen) and 1,327 nurse stations (Schwesternsani-
tätsstellen), as well as outpatient facilities for smaller enterprises. The company-based heal-
thcare system (Betriebsgesundheitswesen) cared for 75% of the GDR’s workforce and 
employed about 18,000 persons. Company doctors were responsible for an average of 3,100 
persons. (This includes persons at large, not only workers, because company healthcare facili-
ties, especially in larger plants, also cared for those living near the enterprise.191) The services 
delivered in company healthcare facilities went well beyond labor-related medical care and 
treatment. 
Enterprises had day-care centers for workers’ children. They shared this responsibility with 
districts, cities and towns. This vast network of highly subsidized day-care centers was among 
the most significant East German family policy measures. It was designed to support a rising 
birth rate and to reduce the tension between family and work, even though campaigns to bring 
women to work were scaled back in the 1980s.192 In the same spirit, and also to foster the 
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development of a strong bond to labor at an early age, enterprises were compelled to design 
cultural and sport programs for school-aged children. 
The trade unions were used to assign apartments intended for worker families; yet as the bulk 
of apartments were reserved for worker families, this task was of great importance. BGL hou-
sing commissions helped workers to complete the request form and counsel district offices in 
the actual decision-making process.193 Furthermore, many enterprises had taken over the 
practice, typical of German entrepreneurs since the Wilhelmine period, of providing a certain 
number of apartments to workers. These “company apartments” (Werkswohnungen) were 
seen as a way to secure enough workers, always a problem at such enterprises. BGL were 
jointly responsible for the distribution of these apartments.194  
The FDGB possessed a large number of holiday resorts, reserved for FDGB members, a fact 
that might shed some light on high membership levels. The number of reservations available 
in FDGB holiday resorts remained stable at about one million throughout the 1960s, but grew 
significantly in the following decades to 1,446,853 in 1975 and 1,863,900 in 1986. This 
would however fall in the second half of the 1980s: 1,833,300 reservations available in 
1989.195 The allocation of available slots in these resorts was assigned to a specific unit wi-
thin BGL and the FDGB: the Holiday Service (FDGB-Feriendienst). Since 1979, the FDGB 
Holiday Service also managed the allocation of the more than three million slots in company 
sanatoriums and health resorts. These company homes and resorts were not only intended for 
use by overworked eomployees; they also served to increase the number of holiday options. In 
the second half of the 1980s, the FDGB Holiday Service managed the allocation of about 7.5 
million holidays (about 1,400,000 in the form of camping), and employed 18,000.196 
                                                
Despite these figures, the availability of slots, especially during the summertime, was consi-
dered insufficient by many workers. At the end of the 1980s, an average member of the 
FDGB was granted summer vacation at a facility once every seven years. In 1987, FDGB 
president Tisch thought a good way to solve the problem was to spread holidays throughout 
the year. 
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Und es ist eine Illusion zu glauben, dass man sich nur im Juni, Juli oder August an der 
Ostsee erholen könnte. Diese Ostsee hat eine Küste, wo man sich das ganze Jahr, be-
sonders auch im Frühjahr, gut erholen kann.197  
In the same vein, many food products, such as bananas, were sometimes supplied to  enterpri-
ses and distributed among workers. In addition, most consultation on social policy issues took 
place at the enterprise level. Beside the 18,000 staff responsible for Holiday Services, about 
400,000 BGL members took part to the managing of social policy in the GDR, of which 
280,000 were elected officials responsible for social issues.198 These main elements of social 
policy all converged to make the enterprise the main administrator and provider of social ser-
vices in the GDR. 
2.2.2.2.2 The Costs of the Social Policy in the 1980s  
In the second half of the 1980s, not only did financing for social policy suffer from a weak 
economy. It had in turn become a burden for the entire economy, which recorded an annual 
deficit of 8 billion and an exterior debt of 20 billion marks in 1988. Hospital service deteriora-
ted, materials for housing were of a poor quality, slots in holiday resorts fell in number, va-
rious everyday products were unavailable. These problems are familiar as detailed in the 
FDGB and Stasi reports previously analyzed.  
Among the Politburo members, this situation manifested  itself in an important controversy 
between Günter Mittag, in charge of the economy, and Gerhard Schürer, president of the State 
Plan Commission. Faced with a growing budget deficit, the latter proposed radical economic 
reforms: a reduction of subsidies for rent/energy and in the supply of consumer goods, toge-
ther with a sharp increase of trade with capitalist countries.199 For Gerhard Schürer and other 
Politburo members like Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, the only way out of the crisis was 
join in a confederation with the Federal Republic of Germany and have this country assume 
its debt. This offer reached chancellor Kohl’s ears and was even discussed between the USA 
and the USSR at the end of 1989.200 Such a confederation would have been based on the res-
tructuring of the East German economic and social policy, as well as a drastic reduction in the 
level of social benefits offered to the East German population and a severe fall in the standard 
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of living. For them, too, at that time, “there was no alternative.” Margaret Thatcher’s course 
for western economies was their plan to guarantee the future of ‘socialism’ in Germany. 
Mittag rejected this proposition altogether and Schürer’s attempts to convince Honecker were 
fruitless. Although he was considering models to lower wages, Honecker did not want to risk 
such a direct confrontation with the population.201 On the contrary: facing growing dissatis-
faction, the Politburo and the FDGB worked to increase retirement pensions, a measure de-
manded by the population.202 The economy and social policy were crumbling, but the resort 
to new social improvements, never to be implemented, was the response of Honecker, Mittag 
and Tisch.203 As head of the FDGB, and as such, responsible for social policy, Harry Tisch 
still had reservations about Schürer’s 1988 proposition, even years later:  
Dass man nun sagt, er [Schürer] mahnte und mahnte, so ist das ja nun nicht. Wenn er 
das heute sagt, dann sagt er auch zuviel über sich. So viel hat Schürer nicht gemahnt. 
Und wenn er sich beruft auf sein Papier, das er 1988 eingereicht hat: Das war ein 
schwaches Papier, das hätte die Lösung auch nicht gebracht. Darum wurde das Papier 
auch zurückgewiesen, es enthielt nur eine Umschichtung, daraus war doch keine Strate-
gie zu entnehmen.204 
Yet failures of the social policy, the scale of the regime’s success, often produced popular 
discontent. The outcome was that measures announced to appease workers may well have 
produced greater antagonism if they were not implemented. For instance, a Stasi report from 
June 1989, noted that a wage increase, announced to quell worker discontent in one division 
of the VEB Düngemittelwerk, could not be paid due to a lack of financial resources. The result 
was greater anger of the workforce here.205  
For our purposes, the importance of this debate, often described as a crucial ideological 
confrontation between reformers (Schürer, Schalck-Golodkowski) and conservatives (Honec-
ker, Mittag, Tisch), should not be overestimated. With respect to the relationships between 
regime leadership and the working population, both the "reformist" and the "conservative" 
camps announced major decreases in the standards of living. If the "conservative" camp main-
tained the social policy, it was unable to finance these provisions. Instead of an ideological 
controversy, we may rather be confronted with different strategies to increase productivity 
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and decrease state expenditures – a combination that resulted in a decrease in the workers' 
standard of living – without prompting unrest among the population. 
2.2.2.3 Labor Law and Workers’ Rights 
What was the status of the law in the GDR? Was the East German state functioning within the 
rule of law or employing extrajudicial practices? There is more at stake here than just the rela-
tionship of the East German regime to legality. Ultimately, it was the meaning of key con-
cepts of legal theory, such as Rechtsstaatlichkeit (rule of law) which is at stake. One crucial 
reflection on that issue concerns the nature of the concept: one definition, in standard use in 
the 1920s, considers Rechtsstaatlichkeit as the recourse to the language of the law by the sta-
te; another in common use today defines it as the respect of certain limits, defined in the laws, 
by the state. Which modern state cannot be said fall under the first definition? Which actually 
meets the requirements of the second one? Unsurprisingly, the question over the status of the 
law in the GDR has led to diverse and contradictory answers that rely on different interpreta-
tions of the notion.206 
The specific aspect of the problem of the status of the law in the GDR raised in this work 
concerns the use of the labor law and worker rights by the regime to neutralize potential 
conflicts with the working population. If labor-friendly laws and workers’ rights were impor-
tant elements of the regime's neutralization policy, during the second half of the 1980s, howe-
ver, worker complaints started to be directed at the fact that worker rights only existed on pa-
per. In 1989 workers claimed to make direct use, for their own benefit, of these rights 
exercised in their name by the FDGB. Hence, the argument developed in the next pages is 
somewhat different than the one proposed thus far on employment, wages and social policy. 
In these matters, the focus was on the exhaustion of the economic foundation for the regime's 
neutralization policy at the workplace. In the case of the labor law, it was the 1989 events that 
offerred a first true indication that worker rights may have played a role in this policy. At-
tempts made that year to transform the East German labor (Arbeistgesetzbuch, AGB) from an 
arm of the regime into an arm against it, suggest that workers viewed it in favorable terms, as 
a genuine victory for labor which needed to be implemented in line with its spirit. In that res-
pect, workers would seem to view laws on labor in a positive light, and as such these laws can 
be considered as one instrument in the regime's neutralization policy of potential conflicts at 
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the workplace. The objective of the following pages is to highlight the extent of labor law's 
role in this policy. 
2.2.2.3.1 The 1974 Revision of the East German Labor Law 
At the SED’s 8th Convention in 1971, Honecker stated that it was imperative to reform the 
labor law of 1961 (the Gesetzbuch der Arbeit, GBA). In a "strengthening socialist society", 
Honecker explained referring to the GDR, workers and their unions were entitled to more 
wide-ranging rights than called for in the GBA. And labor law had to become more unders-
tandable to workers, he stated, so that they would have recourse to it in case of conflict at the 
workplace. Though always presented as a more comprehensive set of texts than that of West 
Germany, the East German labor law had been amended over the course of a decade to inclu-
de 400 new laws, resolutions (Beschlüsse) and edicts (Verordnungen); 150 basic labor agree-
ments (Rahmenkollektivverträge); and about 220 prescriptions on workplace safety (Arbeits-
schutzanordnungen). Not something one could describe as a user-friendly law! The delegates 
at SED’s 8th Convention adopted a resolution calling for a revision of the GBA and, the fol-
lowing year, the FDGB was made responsible for making propositions on how to revise its 
content.207  
During the next years, according to the FDGB, 5.6 million workers took part in different mee-
tings on the revision of the GBA. A total of 147,806 proposals were submitted, while nume-
rous questions were raised and specific information announced. Of those, 39,533 contained 
concrete proposals for modification of the original proposition. In conclusion, 90 changes to 
the content and 144 to the wording found their way into the final proposition made by the 
FDGB.208 The new labor law, the Arbeitsgesetzbuch (AGB), was finally adopted by the Peo-
ple's Chamber in June 1977 and came into force in January 1978. 
The AGB was part of the attempts by the regime to solve the economic difficulties of the se-
cond half of the 1970s through greater control and mobilization of the workforce. The majori-
ty of co-determination rights were exercised at the enterprise level and thus by the BGL. BGL 
co-determination rights touched on all aspects of worker role in the labor process: production 
and labor organization, ratification and control of collective agreements, wages and remunera-
tion, work time, holidays, breaks and paid leave, human resource management, gender-related 
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issues, vocational training and specialization programs, disciplinary action, conflict resolu-
tion, awards for merit, industrial social policy, health and security at work, the supply of 
consumer goods, cultural and sport programs.209  
2.2.2.3.2 Other labor legislations 
In 1972, the FDGB had been granted consultation and co-determination rights at a regional 
and national level, on all matters concerning the “shaping of the developed socialist society 
and the overall enhancement of the socialist state power.” Over the years the FDGB and the 
Council of Ministers drafted numerous joint resolutions on improving working and living 
conditions, health and safety at work, social and wages policies, work culture (Arbeitskultur), 
sport and cultural life of the workers. The following is an excerpt from a Fritz-Heckert FDGB 
University brochure giving the detail of FDGB's objectives: 
Dazu gehör[en] das Recht auf Arbeit, auf Gleichberechtigung der Frau, auf Schutz und 
Förderung der Jugend, auf Mitbestimmung und Mitgestaltung der gesellschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, auf Lohn nach Qualität und Quantität, auf Bildung, Freizeit und Erholung, 
auf Schutz der Gesundheit und der Arbeitskraft, auf Teilnahme am kulturellen Leben, 
auf Fürsorge im Alter und bei Invalidität sowie das Recht auf materielle Sicherheit bei 
Krankheit und Unfällen.210 
Of all these nominal rights, the FDGB was not invoking them in support of workers; the right 
to work needs to be addressed because of the role it was to play in worker demands in 1990. 
Article 24 of the constitution described the right to work as a result of the socialization of the 
economy. Yet this was not meant as a legal right (unmittelbar einklagbares Recht). Its inclu-
sion in the constitution reflected full employment: whoever wanted a job in the GDR could 
have one. The right to work was the term given to a de facto situation which had little to do 
with the defense of workers’ rights or with socialist ideas. Yet its legal formulation as a right 
nevertheless shaped East German workers’ experience. The year 1989-1990 saw a certain 
effort, though unsuccessful, on the part of workers, trade unionists, opposition groups and, as 
a result of their pressure, De Maiziere’s government to include the right to work in the unified 
German constitution. Article 24 was complemented by the protection against dismissals: 
Dem Arbeitnehmer musste vor einer Kündigung zunächst ein Änderungsvertrag  (Ver-
änderung im Betrieb) oder ein Überleitungsvertrag (Arbeistplatzwechsel in einen ande-
ren Betrieb durch dreiseitigen Vertrag) angeboten werden, und die betriebliche Gewerk-
schaftsleitung musste der Kündigung zustimmen, bevor eine ordentliche Kïndigung 
zulässig war. Eine fristlose Kündigung war nur mit der zustimmung der Gewerkschaft 
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unter engen Voraussetzungen (Verletzung staatsbürgerlicher Pflichten oder der sozialis-
tischen Arbeitsdisziplin) möglich. Die Werktätigen waren also beamtenähnlich abgesi-
chert.211   
In case of conflicts, the provisions for protection against dismissals could, on rare occasions, 
be advantageous to workers.212 Yet some formulations of this law hinted at objectives other 
than the protection of workers against arbitrary decisions of managers. For instance, it provi-
ded that workers remain at their job unless they had acted illegaly. Hence one’s protection 
against dismissals was complemented by the “duty to work honorably” (ehrenvolle Arbeits-
pflicht). Obviously, the protection against dismissals was inseparable from attempts to stabili-
ze the distribution of the workforce and to raise productivity rates. Reduced workforce mobi-
lity helped to control wage appreciation, and ultimately should help in planning economic 
growth. On the shop floor, it was the task of the BGL to make sure that both the right to work 
and the duty to work honorably were respected.  
2.2.3 Conclusion 
A top-down perspective on the world of labor reveals a regime’s two-pronged strategy toward 
workers. One aspect was the close surveillance and repression of the workforce. The network 
of information-gathering and repressive structures in enterprises was very tightly intertwined 
with the SED, the Stasi and the FDGB. These networks supplied the top hierarchy with in-
formation on the state of mind of workers and their accusations. If the reports coming from 
SED enterprise structures in the 1980s are of minor interest in that respect, those from the 
Stasi and the FDGB are valuable. They depict with similar concern the rise in dissatisfaction 
in the second half of the 1980s. They drew the attention of the ruling elite to manifold topics 
causing discontent among the working population. Stasi and FDGB reports from enterprises 
document the history leading up to the East German revolution.  
How could worker dissatisfaction and the potential threat it represented to the regime be quel-
led? The second aspect of the regime’s relationship to labor was the implementation of an 
active policy of neutralization of conflicts at the workplace. The reference here is to the rela-
tive autonomy of enterprises in employment and wage formation, the provisions of the indus-
trial social policy and a worker-friendly labor law – although only on paper. Yet, in the se-
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cond half of the 1980s, the GDR faced a critical economic situation, which severely reduced 
the possibility for the regime to maintain its policy of neutralizing conflicts at the workplace. 
Repressive surveillance and neutralizing policies were mutually conditioned and cannot be 
correctly understood separately: the FDGB for instance was at the core of both. At this point 
of presentation, a first conclusion highlights the role of exhausted economic latitude in the 
sustained rise in living standards and the neutralization policy for potential conflicts at the 
workplace. The validity of this preliminary conclusion must in turn be confronted with the 
analysis of workers’ perspective on labor. Does the situation in labor during the 1980s appear 
different when viewed from within? 
2.3 Labor from a Worker’s Perspective: Forms and Extent of the 
Defense of Interests 
What has been written thus far on the repression at the workplace and the neutralization of 
workers’ potential force of reprisal creates the framework of workers’ experience with labor 
in the GDR. It is within these limits established by the regime that the great majority of wor-
kers developed ways to defend their interests. This section is dedicated to the study of defense 
of workers’ interests in the GDR. Workers’ experiences were not exclusively shaped by ten-
sions and conflicts, but also by good social relationships, worker satisfaction and reward, as 
well as by apathy and indifference. There is an obvious limit to the approach centered on the 
defense of interests: it does not adequately give voice to the literature on everyday life in East 
German enterprises highlighting a range of interlinked facets of workers’ life – literature 
which thus does not allow one to view of the workplace solely as a place of conflict.213 There 
are, however, excellent reasons for questioning workers’ defense of interests in the GDR - 
which interests could be defended and how. It allows one to look at the workplace as a loca-
tion from which conflicts were never entirely eradicated, despite the regime's numerous at-
tempts, something often ignored in literature. The first section of this chapter addresses the 
effectiveness of official structures for workers to defend their interests. The second turns to 
hidden forms of interest defense. This chapter asks which interests could be defended, and 
how effective the open and covert forms were. 
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2.3.1 The Official Structures for the Defense of Worker Interests  
The author’s initial inquiry is whether or not the official mechanisms for the defense of wor-
kers’ interests was successful in that role.  
2.3.1.1 The Trade Union 
The BGL’s primary goals were the increase of productivity and the fulfillment of the quota. 
As such, it held regular discussions with the workforce, in order to find way to increase pro-
duction. Driven by considerations over cost-cutting, increases to production quality and work-
force mobilization, they were not a structure to defend workers’ interests.214 The idea that 
they could have been a mechanism for this is “grotesque”, to use the expression of Axel Bust-
Bartels.215  
The extent to which workers’ input in union assemblies was allowed varied from BGL to 
BGL. In many assemblies, there never was anything resembling a discussion.216 Yet if wor-
kers criticized some of management’s decisions publicly, they were likely to do it there. In 
those assemblies where some exchange between workers and union officials took place, criti-
cal issues addressed were restricted to norms, wages and working conditions. Notwithstan-
ding these limitations, these were delicate topics for the regime, and BGL officials were never 
comfortable with union assemblies. The trend was to "muzzle" or suppress them altogether. 
Also fewer workers attended the union assemblies in the 1970s and 1980s.217  
These trends reversed between 1987 and 1989. More workers attended BGL general assem-
blies and took the floor. The BGL elections in 1987 and 1989 became in many enterprises the 
unexpected forum for an avalanche of complaints and expressions of anger by workers, as 
Stasi and FDGB enterprise reports from those years show. Although the halls of union assem-
blies were full of angry voices at the end of the 1980s, the assessment of the role of BGLs in 
defending workers’ interests should not be altered.218  
Variations, of course, existed. The relationship between the workforce and the union could 
develop, among other criteria, based on the size of the enterprise. A bigger enterprise and 
BGL could support better social services, a more diverse cultural program and better holiday 
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resorts. A smaller BGL, with less or no full-time representatives, was more likely to be 
overwhelmed by administrative tasks and unable to offer such services.219 That workers pre-
ferred better social services and holiday resorts is quite clear, but this observation does not 
qualify as a differentiated conclusion as to the function of BGL. 
The assessment of the personal input of individual shop floor delegates (Vertrauensleute, VL) 
exposes nuances. Some VLs used their position to improve working conditions and defend, 
within a very limited scope, their colleagues’ interests.220 Renate Hürtgen admit that some 
VLs could seek the consent of the workers for obtaining a coffee machine for a brigade, a new 
chair for a worker, or a spot in holiday resort for a family. Yet she also clearly stresses that the 
archive of FDGB’s federal executive committee contains only a few letters of VLs attempting 
to defend workers’ interests for the period 1971-1986.221 As the general situation deteriorated 
in enterprises in the 1980s, VLs found themselves in an even tougher position to gain any-
thing for workers. As conflicts developed, most of VLs fell to the wayside and lost their in-
termediary function between the workforce and management.222 Just like it would be unfair to 
ignore the commitment of some VLs towards their colleagues it would be false to conclude 
based on these individual examples that BGL as a structure furthered workers’ interests. 
2.3.1.2 Brigades 
Designed as a self-regulatory workforce structure, brigades were designed to increase worker 
input and productivity – a function they failed to fulfill on a large scale. Internal discipline 
and training by brigades, already formal in the 1970s, vanished in the face of the daily pro-
duction problems in the 1980s.223  
In some cases, brigades could be used to defend a specific kind of worker interest. In order to 
mobilize the workforce and increase productivity, brigades were expected to sign contracts 
with the management. These contracts established the performance and subsequently the wa-
ges, bonus and reward structures for the brigade members. They were not free and open 
contracts, yet their ratification opened a realm which workers tried to use to gain better wages 
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and bonuses. Informal negotiations and compromises over wages were greater up to the end 
of the 1960s. After that period, there was less leeway for such compromises.224  
Despite the reduction in the room for compromise, brigades remained a major force in deter-
mining wages and norms. In 1988, 63% of the GDR workforce (5.5 million workers) were 
organized in brigades, a very high figure given that the percentage had remained stable at 3% 
of the workforce between the 1950s and the mid-1960s.225 In many enterprises they existed 
only on paper.226 Yet, 85% of existing brigades in 1988 had been the recipient of the ‘Brigade 
of socialist work’ bonus at least once. It indicates that their function in redistribution and the 
payment of wages should not to be underestimated.227  
Whether or not brigades existed in an enterprise had a lot to do with the state of internal rela-
tions and the nature of informal agreements between workers and management. They often 
disapeared where they failed to increase productivity, as the management tried to develop 
some other forms of agreement with the workforce (on norms, wages, work organization, in-
ternal discipline).  
These few points demonstrate how brigades had a certain potential to promote workers’ inte-
rests. Yet these possibilities clearly had their limits, as brigades remained dedicated to mobili-
zing the workforce. There is almost nothing in the way of criticism in the brigade journals 
(Brigadetagebücher); they are not a reliable source from which to gauge the state of la-
bor/management relationships.228  
The perspective of interest defense prevents one from making far-reaching conclusions on the 
meaning of brigades in the life of workers. Approaches emphasizing the quality of relations-
hips between brigade members often conclude that brigades were the very core of East Ger-
man social organization. As such, this assumption is taken straight from GDR official docu-
ments. This argument usually stresses the fact that brigade members met outside the 
workplace and went to the theater or concerts together.229  
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Despite the fact that brigades were sometime rewarded with free tickets for concerts or plays 
– this explains why, in some cases, brigade members went out together – other factors forced 
a more nuanced approach when considering the significance of brigades in the East German 
society. It is well-known that some workers grouped together and financed their autonomous 
cultural funds, outside the brigade framework, and were hence free from any ties to norm ful-
fillment.230  
When and where brigades could help to improve their working and living conditions, workers 
were more likely to organize or stay in a brigade. If they felt this was not the case or if local 
relationships with management allowed for better arrangements, workers were rarely involved 
in brigades. Brigades did not play a role in the revolution of 1989 and they had disappeared 
from shop floors by the Monetary and Social Union of July 1990.231 As soon as they loss any 
role in determining wages, norms and supplies, and thus were unable to help workers to de-
fend their interests in those matters, brigades disappeared.232  
2.3.1.3 The Arbitration Commissions 
In case of a conflict, individual workers had the opportunity to refer their case to their compa-
ny arbitration commission (Konfliktkommission, KK). The bulk of cases submitted to these 
commissions resulted from a worker objecting to a management decision about his/her job 
classification, bonuses and wages.233 The commissions also enjoyed a certain autonomy in 
seeking situation-specific compromises in cases of disputes between colleagues.234  
After the legal extension of the West German labor law into the GDR in 1990, East German 
unionists have affirmed that, from time to time and in a limited way, disputes over wages and 
job classification had been settled by KKs in favor of workers. Although these limits were 
somewhat flexible, this should not cause one to overestimate the actual possibilities available. 
The following excerpt is from a discussion between Bergmann-Borsig unionists and editors of 
the West German Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte which took place on April 19, 1990. Al-
though the former secretary in charge of legal disputes emphasises the opportunities offered 
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by the East German labor law, the restrictions to the defense of workers’ interests because of 
KKs are nevertheless quite clear in his statement:   
Ich bin in der BGL für Arbeitsrecht zuständig und war als Parteiloser nie einem Partei-
sekretär gegenüber rechenschaftspflichtig. Ich habe immer versucht, den Spielraum, den 
das Arbeitsgesetzbuch ermöglicht, zu nutzen. Dieser Spielraum war in der Vergangen-
heit grösser als manch einer es vermutet hat und als auch viele Parteisekretäre wahrha-
ben wollen. Aber es war nicht leicht, sich innerhalb der sehr eng gesetzen Grenzen 
durchzusetzen. Oft genug bin ich als gewerkschaftlicher Prozessvertreter in der Kon-
fliktkommissionen (…) in  die Schranken verwiesen worden, weil nicht sein konnte, 
was nicht sein durfte. Das ging bis zu Diskriminierungen. So bin ich vom Justitiar des 
Betriebs als ‘Winkeladvokat’ beschimpft worden, weil ich mich für einen Kollegen ein-
gestezt hatte, der fristlos entlassen worden war. Auch in anderen Fällen habe ich die Er-
fahrung gemacht, dass man alles tun durfte, nur nicht die Grundsätze des Sozialismus in 
Frage zu stellen.235 
Like it predecessor, the KKs resembled a structure that allowed individual workers to success-
fully defend some of their interests against management. They would have been, using this 
interpretation, largely accepted by workers.236 This depiction requires some adjustment The 
roughly 28.000 KKs of the 1980s held on average 2.5 hearings yearly. The bulk of cases 
submitted to them were from management to enforce disciplinary measures or claims for da-
mages against workers. Where the case submitted by the workers was actually accepted by the 
KK, the verdict was rarely in their favor. With this in mind, the argument stating the KKs 
offered workers some protection of his/her rights does not hold up. Renate Hürtgen depicts 
them as "underappreciated" structures  to which workers "had practically no recourse".237 
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2.3.1.4 Petitions 
A final official mechanism for defending workers’ interests, i.e., petitions sent to the FDGB 
executive committee, needs further examination here.238 The appeal to the head of the FDGB 
was an officially sanctioned means to express the concerns and needs of workers. The topics 
ranged from workers’ rights to unpaid bonuses and undelivered vocational training; from the 
gaps in the social policy to complaints about local FDGB officials. In the 1980s, the lack of 
holiday resort spots was the number one topic brought to the FDGB executive committee.  
Renate Hürtgen pinpoints the trends in worker petitions. Firstly, their number increased dra-
matically during the 1980s, from 699 in 1980 to 1,885 in 1988. Secondly, in these petitions, 
workers expressed real criticism and demands on a variety of topics, which broadened and 
became more political toward the end of the 1980s. This was the time at which the reforms by 
Gorbachev, rigged trade union elections, environment protection, the Tiananmen Square mas-
sacre, were being debated. Thus, these petitions demonstrate the levels of growing anger in 
labor at that time. Thirdly, though collective petitions were not uncommon in the 1970s, they 
had almost disappeared by the next decade: five collective petitions of 114 submitted in 1986. 
Petitions in the 1980s were generally written by individual workers, at home, in a somewhat 
deferential tone. They shared certain similarities, writes Hürtgen, with the ancient petitions to 
the king. But in 1988 and in 1989, workers once again began submitting collective petitions, a 
sign of the social upheaval to come.239  
There is no doubt that individual workers used petitions to express their frustrations and inte-
rests. What type of response could the petitioner expect? At least he or she was entitled to an 
answer.240 In the 1980s, the number of positive responses dropped radically, so that by the 
end of the decade the petitioners no longer lost any hope of success in their undertaking. If 
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they wrote in greater number to the FDGB executive committee, it was mainly to express 
their opinions clearly to the leaders.241 
                                                
Overall, the significance of official mechanisms for promoting workers' interests remained 
very limited. It mainly allowed individuals or small groups of workers to be heard on pro-
blems related to wages and norms, professional classification and some management deci-
sions. Still, they are evidence of growing worker dissatisfaction in the late 1980s. 
2.3.2 Defense of Interests beyond Official Structures  
East German workers never limited their action to the restricted potential of defending interest 
permitted by the official structures. A review on how workers defended their interests must 
take other criteria into consideration. 
2.3.2.1 Strikes 
Strikes happened throughout the GDR history. Work stoppages, as they were called after 
1953, were mainly recorded by the FDGB trade unions for construction-forest management, 
metal, and textile-clothing-leather. The majority of work stoppages happened in Karl-Marx-
Stadt (Chemnitz), Halle, Dresden, Gera, Berlin and Rostock in the 1980s. These trends corre-
late to the composition of East German industry, both in its leading sectors and in its geogra-
phical distribution. Strikes had a “defensive character” (Renate Hürtgen) in the GDR. They 
were spontaneous reactions aimed at improving working conditions (repair of toilets and 
showers, the reintroduction of a Sunday premium, better food at the canteen, etc.). After 1953, 
no strike was called in order to bring wages in line with a norm increase. This typical included 
sit-ins lasting a few hours. 
The number of work stoppages fell over time: 138 (1963), 28 (1969), 15 (1978), 0 (1984) and 
2 (1988).242 The number of workers involved in a work stoppage also tended to decrease be-
ginning in the 1970s. Until 1989 it remained very low, usually about 3 to 5, in many cases 
only 1 and sometimes up to 20 workers in extreme cases. By the mid-1980s, strikes had al-
most disappeared from East German shop floors.243 Nevertheless, considered over the whole 
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period, strikes were a sign that struggles between labor and management went beyond official 
structures. To quote Axel Bust-Bartels: “Diese Streiks sind Einzelfälle. Aber wie die Spitze 
eines Eisbergs deuten sie auf die Stimmung und das Widerstandspotential in den Betrieben 
hin.”244 
2.3.2.2 Struggles over Wages and Norms 
One key struggle between the workforce and management concerned the relation between 
wages and norms. This economic relation is essential and can be intepreted in many ways: it 
is closely linked to productivity, the gross national product, and the rate of capital accumula-
tion. In this dispute between workers and management, official structures played a rather su-
perficial role in comparison to more informal means.  
The expression ‘struggles over wages and norms’ refers to attempts by the regime to increase 
work productivity and lower wages, and efforts, on the other hand, by workers to find ways to 
resist those rise in quotas and increase their pay. These struggles took place for instance when 
new technologies were introduced, changes in the criteria for the payment of bonuses were 
made, or new professional classifications introduced, which usually aimed at enhancing pro-
ductivity and lowering worker pay.245 
Worker resistance adapted to the nature of the activity, organization of work, and the state of 
vertical and horizontal relationships (between management and workers, and between wor-
kers). Because of many different forms this took, it is impossible to create a list of the measu-
res taken. Yet without attempting a typology, some general forms can be highlighted:246 
• Workers unhappy with their wages or tasks threatened to leave.  
• The norm only applied to a certain period, to prevent it from being raised. Production 
rates were then increased, leading to higher wages. If the possibility of a rise in the 
norm existed, production slowed again.  
• Production rates were kept low and suddenly sped up toward the end of the period, so 
that workers were entitled to bonuses for additional work to meet the plan on time. 
                                                 
244 Bust-Bartels 1980, p. 134. 
245 The main attempt to change the composition of wages in the 1970s was labeled the Wissenschaftlich-
technische Arbeitsorganization (WAO). It was essentially the acceptance of the latest American models of work 
organization and was specifically aimed at stopping the rise in wages. Kopstein 1997, p. 158-160. 
246 From the above-mentioned Stasi reports over the situation in enterprises between 1987 and 1989; Bust-
Bartels 1980, Sander 1983, Kopstein 1997, Hürtgen 2001 c. 
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• Workers asked for “unrealistic” modes of remuneration that they felt could lead to hig-
her wages.247  
• The work might be done carelessly, thus causing overtime for necessary adjustments. 
These ways to carry out struggles over wages and norms cannot be viewed separately from 
many other practices, well known to researchers on the everyday reality of work (Betriebsall-
tag), namely workers' insubordination and manifestations of work resistance. Manifestations 
of resistance in production are key to understanding how workers could be successful in their 
disputes over wages and norms. Questioning the mechanisms for defending labor’s interests 
compels one to assess the economic impact of East German workers’ insubordination and 
expressions of work resistance:248 
• Social isolation and physical assaults on those determining the norms.  
• High rate of absenteeism.249 
• Longer pauses, shopping during working hours.  
• Discussions over work and working conditions in small, informal circles. 
• Refusal to perform overtime. 
• Minimal involvement in one’s work (Arbeitszurückhaltung), especially in industries 
with poor working conditions.  
• Redistribution of bonuses among a group of workers (Gleichmacherei). 
• Resisting orders.  
• Tool and material theft.  
• Sabotage.250 
                                                 
247 This was the case with the introduction of the piecework wage (Stücklohn, for a long time favored by the 
regime which considered it a good way to achieve greater productivity) in sectors such as machine maintenance 
and repair, for example. 
248 Some of these workers’ practices can be related to what is often designated as their Eigensinn (obstinancy) by 
historians of everyday life. This historiographical orientation, theorized by Alf Lüdtke and others before and 
after him, is more encompassing than what is at stakes here. What is of interest here is not every ways found by 
workers to gain a control of some area of their work, time and work environment, but those ways that can be 
understood as a form of defense of their interests. Needless to say that beatings on the shop floor, to take one of 
Lüdtke’s favorite example, were important in the everyday life of workers; for our purposes, physical assaults on 
norm-makers are more significant (Lüdtke 2000, esp. chapters 1 and 2). 
249 This only refers to unjustified sick leave. The total number of sick leaves grew steadily from the 1970s on-
ward. Absenteeism was high, at around 10 days a year in the 1980s. Bust-Bartels 1980, p. 161; Kopstein 1997, p. 
157. 
250 This expression belongs to the language of the Stasi and refers, as previously seen, to cases that usually had 
nothing to do with actual acts of sabotage. 
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Some authors have underlined how these practices enabled workers to score points in the dis-
putes over wages and norms.251 Yet, many others defend the opposite view. As means to de-
fend workers’ interests, these of insubordination and work resistance were deemed “indivi-
dualistic,” “passive,” and as mere signs of a “grumble society,”252 secondary-level resistance - 
as opposed to debate in assemblies, strikes, and similar actions. Historians, according to the 
argument, must refrain from “over-politicizing” (author’s expression) the meaning of these 
mechanisms for defending workers’ interests: “By equating most nonconformist acts with 
fundamental protest against the regime as such, we would misleadingly transform East Ger-
many into a society of ‘resistance fighters,’” warns Andrew Port.253 Yet, practices of work 
resistance in other contexts have been appraised in a more positive light, as an active form of 
workers' defense of interests within contexts that prevented more open forms of action.254 
2.3.2.2.1 Workplace Resistance as a Means of Defending Workers’ Interests in Industrial 
Societies 
Michael Grüttner suggests that lower regard for practices of labor resistance in many histori-
cal studies probably find their roots in Friedrich Engels’s contemporary observations of the 
English workers’ struggles (in his Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England from 1845), in 
which he distinguishes between three “phases”: 1) crime, the “rawest and most fruitless” and 
“less conscious form of protest”; 2) struggles against the introduction of machinery, the first 
form of collective action by the working class; and finally, 3) the formation of unions and the 
launching of strikes; specific forms of struggles by the working class.255 
The question at stake here concerns whether different forms of insubordination and work re-
sistance can still be considered forms of defending the interests in societies after modern 
forms of organization and action of the labor movement – trade unions, strikes, collective 
bargaining – have been implemented? In other words: Is there anything like labor action in 
industrial countries where these organizations and actions are denied to workers? 
The argument defended here is that there is a broad variety of potential forms of action by 
workers that exist in industrial societies. It is the economical and political context that deter-
                                                 
251 Bust-Bartels 1980 was among the first and most ardent defenders of this hypothesis. 
252 Kopstein 1997, Port 1999, esp. p. 793, Hürtgen 2001c. 
253 Port 1999, p. 807. 
254 See: James Scott's study of such practices by Malay paddy wage farmers (Scott 1985) and Donald Filzer's 
analysis of work resistance in the Soviet context (Filzer 1986, esp. chapter 8). 
255Engels 1983 (1845), pp. 166-69, Grüttner 1982, p. 54. Author’s translation. Before enumerating the three 
phases, Engels warns the reader that he limits himself to facts that characterize the contemporary situation of the 
English proletariat. (p. 167) 
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mines which are likely to bare results and thus prevail at a given time and place. Although 
there is a difference between setting up picket lines and shopping during working hours, both 
can be seen as expressions of the conflicting relations typical of industrial societies between 
labor buyers (management) and labor sellers (workers). Can a massive recourse to practices 
that are largely covert, individual and limited to wages/work performance relation, as was the 
case in the GDR in the 1980s, be considered as manifestations of a collective dispute? The 
author believes this to be the case. 
Edward P. Thompson in the 1960s and, more recently, Anson Rabinbach have emphasized the 
inherent violence of wage labor, which disciplines wage earners’ productive activities and 
time.256 Building on Thompson’s groundbreaking essay, Rabinbach insists on this constitutive 
feature of industrial societies based on wage labor which is the radical separation between 
work and leisure, and the need of management to exploit the labor it buys as efficiently as 
possible. Before it can be successfully implemented, the maximum exploitation of bought 
time requires coercion… much of time! A key moment for the acceptance of the industrial 
wage system and its organization of time, Thompson argues, happens when workers stop 
struggling against time and start to struggle for time (i.e. for overtime supplements or paid 
breaks). The violence of the recent industrialization in Mexico and African countries had 
convinced him that this process of self-discipline takes place every time the “industrial way of 
life” aims to replace another one; never is this process the “inevitable, neutral, result of a 
technological evolution,” he writes, but rather the product of the “implementation of a mode 
of exploitation” and of the “resistance to that exploitation.”257 
Studies on worker practices at the workplace in greatly varying contexts suggest that manifes-
tations of work resistance continue to linger after workers have acknowledged the logic of the 
wage system.258 Further more, Western systems of industrial relations can be looked as an 
implicit acknowledgement that, in order to enhance profits, the management has to exploit the 
time it buys from workers as efficiently as possible.259 And because they are not motors or 
machines, to go back to Rabinbach’s study, workers somehow have to develop ways regain 
                                                 
256 Thompson 2004 (1967) and Rabinbach 2004 (1991), among many others. Lafargue’s Droit à la paresse – 
réfutation du droit au travail de 1848 (1883, numerous reprints) needs to be recalled here as a classical critique 
of the industrial work discipline. 
257 Thompson 2004, p. 83, translated from the French. 
258 Scott 1985 on farm wage workers, Grüttner 1982 on Hamburg dock workers before World War I;  Mason 
1995 on German labor during the Third Reich; Seidman 1991 for a comparison of work resistance during the 
French Popular Front and the Spanish Civil War; Price 2001 on contemporary American workers; Levaray 2001 
on today’s French chemical industry.  
259 Hence is it revealing that introductions to industrial relations open with examples of industrial conflicts rela-
ted to pay (Hyman 1975, pp. 9-31, Müller-Jentsch 1986, 11-17, 29-39). 
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time, to earn more, to counter efforts of employers, to shape work in a way that suits them, to 
circumvent prescribed methods, rules and orders. Workers continue to resist work even after 
they have submitted to it through a work contract. This tension is also reflected in the labor 
law, which remains hopelessly  torn between the poles of the signatories’ freedom and the act 
of submission that a work contract represents.260  
These ideas deserve a more systematic development. Hopefully the reader will accept the fol-
lowing argument: manifestations of work resistance can be expressions of workers’ share in 
the industrial dispute against management. There is no reason to devalue them from the out-
set, as many labor historians of the GDR do. Hence the most relevant question relates to the 
economic and political impact of such individual worker-led practices in the stuggles over 
wages and norms in the GDR.261 In order to do this, the problem needs to be viewed over a 
longer period of time, i.e., beyond the second half of the 1980s.  
2.4 Struggles over Wages and Norms in the GDR in Historical 
Perspective 
This chapter explores the impact of the disputes over wages and norms in two periods in the 
GDR history after the 1953 upheaval and before the 1989 revolution: 1959-1962 and 1967-
1972. In both of these periods, the regime launched major offensives against the working po-
pulation in order to break its resistance. These offensives resulted in various repressive and 
“neutralizing” measures enabling the regime to quell resistance, although only for a limited 
time. Just as water always adapts to the contours of the landscape and finds the river, workers 
adapted to conditions and found ways to defend their interests. 
The literature on East German economic history cannot be covered in a systematic manner or 
be given due recognition here.262 If authors generally put economic growth at the core of 
GDR’s history until its end, and rightly so, the coverage is marked by significant divisions 
and contradictory assessments.  
                                                 
260 Supiot 2002 (1994), pp. 111-123.  
261 The social impact of individual practices have been put to light in another context in German criminal history 
literature. The most convincing articulation of this argument remains Blasius 1978. See also the critique of this 
approach by Evans, not convincing in his refusal to consider the theft of timber in the 19th century as a form of 
social protest: Evans 1988.  
262 Reflections for this chapter followed from the reading of: Damus 1986, Weinert 1995, Kopstein 1997, Kü-
chler 1999, Judt 1999, Vollmer 1999, Schroeder 2000, Klenke 2001, Dale 2004, Steiner 2004.  
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One fundamental demarcation line can be drawn along the appreciation of the particular natu-
re of Soviet-style economies. A great number of economic studies stress the “commando” 
component, the lack of initiatives, the intrinsic ineffectiveness of planned economies, and thus 
compare them negatively to market economies. As far as the 1989-1990 changes are concer-
ned, these authors usually adopt a modernizing stance as the post-1989 economic transforma-
tions are viewed as a process of catch-up.263 Some authors reject these concepts, and view the 
relation of the GDR to the world economy at all stages of its development.264 According to 
such an outlook, the evolution of Soviet-style economic policies followed, or reacted to, eco-
nomic trends and cycles, just as market-type economies do. Some economic phenomena, as 
the impact of both oil crises in the 1970s, sent ripples through Soviet-style economies similiar 
to those experienced in market economies. Hence the differences between Eastern and Wes-
tern economic policies should not blur the strong convergence supported by the fact that they 
were part of a greater world economy. Marx’s idea from 18 Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
(1852) comes to mind. To paraphrase, men and women in fact make their own history, but 
they do not choose the conditions in which they make it. The look at GDR’s economic policy 
proposed here has drawn more extensively from the work of the second group of authors than 
the first, and especially from the work of Jeffrey Kopstein.  
2.4.1 Building on Jeffrey Kopstein’s Theses 
Jeffrey Kopstein acknowledges the practices of East German workers as manifestations of 
conflicts with power-holders. In his study published in 1997, he argues that the GDR collap-
sed because of its economic policy. The failure of the East German economy, Kopstein ex-
plains, was the result of a hostile political environment conditioned by three factors: the poli-
tical and economic dependence on the USSR; the conflict between divergent interests of 
central and local bureaucracy; and the “veto power” the regime “had to give its workers” on 
wages, prices and norms.265 The first two factors played an undeniable role in the East Ger-
man economic decay. To summarize Kopstein's thesis with a metaphor taken from physics, 
these two forces – relations with USSR and worker resistance – canceled each other during 
the 1980s and produced inertia throughout the whole bureaucratic apparatus that split as to the 
best way to overcome the crisis. The tergiversations of the second half of the 1980s in the 
politburo have been presented above. 
                                                 
263 Weinert 1995, Schroeder 2000, Steiner 2004. 
264 Damus 1986, Küchler 1999, Dale 2004, Roesler 2006. 
265 Kopstein 1997, pp. 2 and 11.  
 108
The specific importance of Kopstein'sthird factor for the collapse of East Germany, manifes-
tations of resistance in labor, is developed in a short essay published in 2001.266 In a nutshell, 
Kopstein argues that if many historians played down workers’ everyday resistance as insigni-
ficant as this was done on an individual basis, the East German elite feared it nonetheless, just 
like they feared it might be the prelude to mass uprising. Hence even if we do not share the 
belief that workers’ practices threatened the regime, we still have to acknowledge the effect of 
the elite’s subjective perception of reality. 
But analysis of the ebb and flow of wage policy, piece rate policy, price policy, housing 
policy, and consumer goods policy suggests very strongly that both the Nazis and the 
SED did worry. And it is the discrepancy between the objective political capacities of 
the state and the society, and the perceived potential for conflict that is most interesting. 
It is true that the ‘hidden transcripts’ of everyday resistance may not amount to very 
much when elites are not aware of them, when they remain hidden. But the one thing 
we know about totalitarian regimes is that very little does remain hidden.267  
The following pages develop a similar argument. Labor resistance manifested itself especially 
against attempts by power-holders to increase the profit margin. The regime tried to break this 
resistance. Its successes were always relative and short-lived, as worker practices adapted and 
regained their effectiveness. The hypothesis is that struggles over wages and norms were cru-
cial components of GDR political and economic crises, in 1959-1962 and 1967-1972. 
2.4.2 The Economic and Political Crisis of 1959-1962 
The mid-1950s opened a period of downward economic cycle caused to a large extent by an 
ambitious investment program that led to severe shortages of consumer goods and to the ab-
rogation of the plan in 1959. The double digit growth rates of the 1950s fell dramatically, as 
did investment: from 25% in 1956 to 15% in 1959 and further to 1.4% in 1962. Other factors 
aggravated this far from brilliant economic backdrop. The new stage of campaign collectivi-
zation launched in 1958 and the quasi-elimination of private farming brought about the emi-
gration of thousands of farmers as well as a sharp decline in agricultural production. A pro-
blem of workforce shortages developed beginning in 1955. As a reaction to Adenauer’s 
announcement about the suspension of trade between the two Germanys in 1960, the East 
German engineering and chemical industries stocked up with essential products and destroyed 
                                                 
266 Kopstein 2001. He uses “everyday resistance” in the definition of James Scott, as “everything, from shirking, 
grumbling, work to rule, jokes, machine breaking but short of collective action.” These kinds of workers’ practi-
ces match up with the ones identified in chapter 2.3.2. on the defense of interests outside the official structures. 
267 Ibid., pp. 106 and 107. 
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their budgets.268 Low productivity rates gained the attention of East German leaders toward 
the end of the decade.  
In order to steer the workforce towards target industries, the regime had introduced great dif-
ferences in wages after 1953. The results were contrary to those expected. Since enterprises 
competed to secure their workforce, differentiated tariffs actually brought about a general 
increase of wages. Instead of stabilizing labor in target industries, workforce movements ac-
celerated. In the third quarter of 1958, according to the State Plan Commission, 5.1% of the 
workforce in the state-owned industry (81%) changed jobs.269 The inefficiency of the regi-
me’s attempts to steer the workforce through monetary incentives becomes obvious when 
comparing tariff vs. actual wages. In 1957, the light engineering industry (Leichtmaschinen-
bau) was ranked first place in terms of tariff wages and 35th place for actual wages.270 Fur-
thermore, by the late 1950s, the relation of norms to wages had become one of the growing 
system imbalances. Norms were over-fulfilled at an increasing pace: the average worker ful-
filled them at 125% in 1954 and at 164% in 1961.271 The overall percentage of over-
fulfillment of more than 200% had increased significantly in all industries.272 
Different models of piece wage (Stücklohn) were tried out throughout the 1950s as a demons-
trative attempt by the regime to improve production while restricting wage growth. The piece 
wage failed to tighten the relationship between wage and production.273 A new wage scale 
and job classification scheme (Wirtschaftszweiglohngruppenkatalog, WLG), meant to slow 
wage growthj and increase productivity, did not make its way to the shop floor. Key sectors 
like engineering and metallurgy were especially reluctant to change. Between 1950 and 1960, 
the ratio of wage increases to production rises was 1:0.84, whereas 1:0.3 had been planned. 
During the first five months of 1961, the average wage increased at 5.3% though the plan fo-
resaw only 1.6%.274 Workers were visibly able secure a minor victory in their struggle over 
wages and norms. 
                                                
There are good reasons to reject any straightforward distinction between politics and econo-
mics in the phenomenon discussed here. Workers’ economic struggles had such immediate 
 
268 Dale 2004, pp. 157-58.  
269 BAB, DE 1/671, pp. 2-13, quoted in Hoffmann 1999, p. 76. The destabilizing effects of such mandatory 
workforce movements requires greater analysis. They might help to reassess the general assumption that social 
mobility stabilized the GDR.  
270 Bust-Bartels 1980, p. 66. 
271 Dale 2004, p. 154. 
272 Bust-Bartels 1980, p. 66. In the Central German glass and porcelain industry, the norm was fulfilled at an 
average of 150% in 1956 and at 170% only four years later (Goes 1999, p. 314). 
273 Ibid, p. 72.  
274 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
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political implications that it would be misleading to set both aspects apart, especially for ana-
lytical purposes. Practices of bonus redistribution were prevalent among the East German 
workforce, which reduced the effect of bonuses on a worker’s individual input and the rela-
tion between productivity and wages, and ultimately prevented norm increase.  
This situation created tensions between workers and the people responsible for the calculation 
and distribution of bonuses in enterprises toward the end of the 1950s. Some BGL secretaries 
chose to tolerate the redistribution of bonuses among workers and to oppose norm increases. 
A press campaign launched in 1958 against those BGL secretaries announced draconian mea-
sures taken by the GDR leaders.  
In 1959, important purges were made in the FDGB. At the trade union’s Fifth Congress, the 
number of members of the Executive Committee was raised to 199 from 155 members, of 
which 95 were not re-elected (a renewal rate of 69.85%). Of the 32 presidium members, 21 
were not re-elected (a renewal rate of 65.6%). This political campaign granted the SED a 
stronger position within the FDGB and in the shop floors.275  
Growing discrepancies between productivity and wages created worker dissatisfaction. For 
one thing, it made shortages in consumer goods and everyday necessities, such as coal, felt 
more acutely.276 There were 166 strikes recorded in 1960 and 98 in the first three quarters of 
1961.277 Unhappy workers had a few cards up their sleaves: they could change their job, en-
terprise, or they could leave the country altogether.  
Of the 8,465 wage-earners in heavy engineering that left the GDR in 1955, 76% were workers 
and 58% were young. In the chemical industry, 2,603 wage-earners left in 1955; 3,001 in 
1956 and the trend was upwards. In 1960 official accounts evaluated that the number of wor-
kers in the GDR would fall by 85,000 in the following year, during a period marked by a 
shortage of workers.278 These alarming projections revealed a sense of optimism, as the un-
certainty on the settlement of the Second Berlin crisis seemed to have boosted the trend: 
350,000 persons left the GDR in 1956 and 200,000 between January and the beginning of 
August 1961.279  
                                                 
275 Out of 636,000 FDGB voluntary officials (the so-called ehrenamtlichen Funkionären)  in 1958, 464,000 were 
not SED members (Ibid, p. 90). 
276 Hübner 1999, pp. 24-25, Hoffmann 1999, p. 74.  
277 Information Nr. 48/1961, BV des FDGB, Abt. Org., „Vertraulich! Analyse der klassenfeindlichen Tätigkei-
ten“ im III. Quartal 1961, insbesondere nach dem 13. August, SAPMO Barch DY 34/20553, quoted in Hürt-
gen/Gehrke 2001, p. 186. 
278 Although aspects related to family and women are unfortunately left aside, let it be mentioned that 70% of 
women able to work were employed in 1960. Hoffmann 1999, p. 77.  
279 Hoffman 1999, p. 72, Dale 2004, p. 157. 
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Who left the country? Out of the 200,000 persons that left in 1961, 60.6% were wage-earners, 
22.2% worked in industry or trade (Handwerk), and 11.9% in trade and transportation. People 
aged between 18 and 24 years old represented 26.6% of the migrants, those between 25 and 
44 years old 23.8% and those between 45 and 65 years old 19.6%. Whereas men represented 
45% of the East German population, they represented 60% of the migrants. Young male wa-
ge-earners was truly representative of the average migrant. Peter Hübner adds that workers 
(here: Arbeiter) were, in absolute terms, the largest and, in relative terms, the second largest 
group of migrants.280  
It is not hard to estimate the impact of this migrant flow on the East German economy. Offi-
cial reports calcutated at 120 billion DM the loss in production output between 1951 and 
1961. Add to that the 16.3 billion DM in vocational training lost over the same period with 
the trainees that left the country. By 1961, labor shortages forced the GDR to replace these 
workers with foreign staff.281 
In order to prevent the worker from leaving, more resources were needed. The question was 
where to obtain them. In November 1960, Ulbricht turned to Khrushchev and stated in no 
uncertains terms that  
…the fulfillment of the main economic task is not secured… You can be sure that we 
are doing everything in our power. However, West Germany has turned out to be a 
strong economic force. In the final analysis, we cannot choose against whom we would 
like to compete. We are simply forced to square off against West Germany. However, 
the GDR does not have enough economic power to do this alone.282  
When the gentlemen met at the end of the same month, Ulbricht was even more explicit:  
To maintain a normal situation we need a yearly growth of no less than 10 percent. 
Otherwise we will not provide the necessities. If I cannot pay a worker in Berlin a hig-
her salary, he will go to West Berlin. This is the situation. We must improve the situa-
tion of the doctors and the intelligentsia and some workers, since the situation in West 
Germany is improving faster. In 1961 they already will have implemented a forty-hour 
work week; they will raise salaries, about which we cannot even think.  
                                                 
280 Hübner 1999, pp. 23-24. 
281 SAPMO, NY 4182/972, pp. 90-91, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/840, DY30/J IV 2/2/780, p. 15, quoted in Hoffmann 
1999, p. 73. 
282 Letters cited in André Steiner, “Auf dem Weg zur Mauer? Ulbricht an Chruschtschow in November 1960”, 
Utopie Kreativ 31-32 (May-June 1993), pp. 94-111, quoted in Kopstein 1997, p. 43. 
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Discrepancies have grown between us. We cannot achieve our goals with the help of 
propaganda alone.283 
To improve the situation of target groups of wage-earners, Ulbricht asked for more steel and a 
twofold increase in foreign currency reserves, demands that were rejected. 
The Berlin Wall was an obvious attempt to settle the problems of labor shortages and to keep 
workers in the GDR.284 It was a part of a major offensive to stop the disruptive effects on the 
economy of hidden struggles over wages and norms and increase productivity rates. Control 
and repression on the shop floor also increased.285 The wall and the purges in the FDGB were 
aspects of this offensive, furthered by an economic campaign.  
The aim of the Array of Production Campaign (Produktionsaufgebot) was to increase produc-
tivity and its slogan enjoined workers to “produce more in the same amount of time for the 
same pay.” In the fall of 1961, the GDR leadership’s repeated declarations that “Whoever 
does not work properly works for the Federal Republic of Germany” made clear that the qua-
lity of work and production had become highly politicized issues. 
This offensive by the regime brought some results. The flow of the workforce to the West was 
contained. The regime also scored some points in the struggles over wages, especially in the 
first steps towards replacing piece wages with new forms of remuneration, as the bonus piece 
wage (Prämienstücklohn) and the additional performance wage (Mehrleistungslohn) that in-
cluded a longer list of criteria in calculating bonuses.286 Tariff wages increased by only 0.8% 
in 1962, while productivity rose 8.2%. This greater control over tariff wage growth was main-
tained for another year or two. 
Hence repression in the workplace helped to increase productivity. Yet the overall economic 
situation remained far from rosy for most of the population. Rationing was reintroduced in 
1962 for butter, meat, and eggs. The water content of sausages was raised in order to meet 
overall demand.287 From 1962 on, SED leaders looked for models of economic reforms that 
could improve the productive output and the supply of food, consumer goods and other eve-
                                                 
283 Record of Meeting of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev with Comrade W. Ulbricht. 30 November 1960. Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Fonds 0742, Opis, Por 4, Papka 43, secret; translated and reprinted in 
Hope M. Harrisson, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East 
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961,” Working Paper 5 (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson 
Center, 1993), Appendix A, quoted in Kopstein 1997, pp. 43-44. 
284 Hoffmann 1999, p. 77, Bust-Bartels 1980, p. 71. 
285 Hübner 1999, p. 27. 
286 Bust-Bartels 1980, pp. 94-95. 
287 BAP SPK, E-1 51770, quoted in Kopstein 1997, p. 48.  
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ryday necessities. At the SED’s 6th Congress in 1963, Ulbricht announced the principles that 
would later become the New Economic System (NES).288  
The period from 1959-1962 was crucial in the history of labor coercion in the GDR. After that 
period, worker resistance did not stop but it became more secretive and started in small 
groups. Though the forms of labor resistance in the preceding chapter that can be described as 
individual and covert were already a fact of line pre-1961, they are more specific to the period 
after the construction of the Berlin Wall.289 
2.4.3 The Economic and Political Crisis of 1967-1972 
The first years of the NES saw an improvement to GDR economic performance: productivity 
increased by 7% in 1964 and by 6% the next year. The gross national product increased by 
5% in both years.290 The availability of consumer goods such as televisions, washing machi-
nes, refrigerators and automobiles grew.  
The regime wished to lower wages. Lump sum payments were tested as a replacement to bo-
nuses as a means to stem the latter's increase. Yet workers were quick to turn this new modali-
ty to their advantage: once the norm was met, productivity decreased. Bonuses decreased yet 
the norm remained low. Also, more autonomy on wage formation was allowed at the enterpri-
se level, compelled to balance profits and wages as in market economies.291 In order to facili-
tate this, management was made responsible for determining the criteria for calculating their 
enterprise bonuses. In addition, greater differentiation was introduced in the tariff system du-
ring the 1960s. The productive sector for instance had 72 different tariffs, each of them 
containing eight wage groups (Lohngruppen), including four basic wage levels (Basislohnstu-
fen). The productive sector alone tallied a total of 2,304 possible tariff wages! The flexibility 
thus gained by enterprises was reflected in the fact that a worker of a lower wage group could 
actually earn more than if he had been classified higher. 
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Table 8 : Example of tariff in the productive sector in DDR-Mark (1970) 
 I II III IV 
Wage group 4 2.10 2.30 2.50 2.75 
Wage group 5 2.40 2.60 2.85 3.10 
From: Axel Bust-Bartels 1980, p. 111 
The regime leaders hoped that this new autonomy given to enterprises in wage formation 
would result in productivity remaining higher than wage growth over the long term. The op-
posite occurred, and wages increased even more rapidly as a result of these NES measures. 
An official report for the Finance Ministry from April 1966 noted that wage growth outmat-
ched productivity growth in seven of the eight VEBs in the mining industry, in three out of 
five in metallurgy and in nine out of fourteen in machine building.292 The average bonus rose 
from 240 East German Marks in 1963 to 286 marks in 1964.293 It continued to rise in the sub-
sequent years, bringing the relation between wage and bonus close to 50%-50%, where it was 
of 61%-39% in 1961.294 
The ineffectiveness of these measures was partially the result of workers’ covert struggles. 
After the setback of 1961-1962, labor conflicts re-emerged in the 1960s. In some enterprises, 
the installation of new machinery was prevented by workers who were worried that they 
would lose qualifications and money. Tensions over the organization of work and the bonus 
criteria were recorded by the FDGB. The attempt to implement proven American models of 
technical-scientific work in the definition of norms and bonuses (the technisch-
wissenschaftliche Arbeitsnormen, TAN) was decidedly rejected by workers. For instance, the 
suggestions of managers to integrate issues of discipline and faulty products into the calcula-
tion of bonuses aroused anger.295 Workers were able to gain a reduction in number of work 
days from five to six. 
The NES spoke of the “rationalization of investments,” a process which meant closures as 
well as worker transfers. The first attempts at such a site closure (coal mines in Zwickau 
1966-67) raised such protest from the local miners that the management and party secretaries 
convinced the SED to backtrack. The third stage of price reform, announced for the beginning 
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of 1966, had to be postponed not least because of some leaders’ fear as to the popular reaction 
if the lowering of price subsidies was not followed by an increase in production output.296 
At SED’s 7th Congress in April 1967, the NES was extended and retitled the “Economic Sys-
tem of Socialism” (EES). This new name corresponded with Ulbricht’s decision to proceed 
more quickly with the reforms initiated a few years ago. After it became clear that the NES 
had not been thoroughly implemented, Ulbricht was prepared to directly confront East Ger-
man workers, as in 1953 and in 1961. 
The first measure of this new offensive against labor was taken in the second half of 1967, 
and attempted to reign in bonuses through the introduction of a yearly premium. Any time the 
annual norm was fulfilled or exceeded by an enterprise, it was rewarded with a single yearly 
bonus, whose share represented two-thirds of the enterprise’s bonus fund. The methods of 
distributing the funds were to be decided within each enterprise, according to its overall per-
formance, as well as the performance of each division and individual worker. However, the 
amount of the premium was calculated as a percentage of the tariff wage. The reform thus 
clearly benefited wage-earners with higher tariff wages, like master trademen, technical-
scientific elite (as engineers) and economists. Demands from the shop floor forced a revision 
and, by 1968, the yearly premium was calculated on the basis of real salary (wage and bonus). 
Hence this reform did not meet its objective of halting the growth in salaries. The yearly bo-
nus became a sort of a “thirteenth month” pay, that 44% of GDR’s workforce received by 
1971.297   
The second step can be said to have been the adoption of a new constitution in 1968, the first 
article stressing beyond a doubt that the SED led the country.298  
The third step was a 1968 upward revision of productivity and investment targets for the pe-
riod 1966-1970. To make ends meet, investment and accumulation rates had to be maintained 
between 22 and 30% of the gross national product for the next six years. Invesments (the so-
called “centrally approved structural projects”) were raised from 2.2 billion to approximately 
10 billion marks for 1970. In some regions, according to government head Willi Stoph, “The 
required investment in 1970 was therefore greater than the entire stock of industrial capaci-
ty.”299 The strategy of Ulbricht and Mittag was premised on the broad introduction of Wes-
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tern technologies and production techniques, and both men were willing to get into as deep 
debt as possible with western countries to do so. The idea was that credits could be repaid 
from production output surpluses and gains in market shares in the West. The expected boom 
would drive the GDR to outstrip the FRG, first in some key economic sectors (such as micro-
electronics) and eventually in the overall economic performance.300 The attempt to transform 
the GDR into a transit point between both economic blocs and to redirect a significant share 
of the East German production towards western markets did not meet with unanimous enthu-
siasm in the SED and the USSR, but Ulbricht and Mittag were eager to play the game.301  
The inescapable outcome of the EES reforms was a fall in the living and working conditions 
for the East German populous. Higher investment rates and the modification of state’s expen-
diture policy were to result in an increase of the costs for consumer goods, housing, energy 
and transportation. The financing of the health system was to be reduced. More intensive pro-
duction techniques would have to be implemented. Ulbricht knew that the greatest obstacle to 
these reforms was their implementation in the shop floors. He thought there would be a period 
of confrontation lasting about three years with workers, after which he hoped to have brought 
the protest under control and reap the benefits of this economic reorientation.302 In the post-
1968 context, the Ulbricht / Mittag agenda worried many GDR and Soviet leaders.  
As soon as they were undertaken, the first of the EES reforms caused shortages in consumer 
goods and in the energy sector. By the beginning of 1969, monthly reports of SED’s district 
or regional organizations indicated growing popular dissatisfaction toward the economic poli-
cy. Shortfalls in deliveries throughout 1970 forced the extra shifts (Sonderschichten), espe-
cially in the machine building, metallurgy and transportation sectors, measures that met with 
great displeasure on the part of labor. From the summer on, subsidies on consumer goods and 
health expenditures decreased and working conditions deteriorated as the pace of production 
was intensified. 
FDGB and SED functionaries feared that labor discontent might spill over into political criti-
cism. The SED First Secretary for Berlin singled out the imbalance between salaries and avai-
lable goods and the resulting devaluation of wages as a major source of concern in the popula-
tion. His Dresden counterparts noticed that the economic problems risked destabilizing the 
upcoming party elections. 303 Another party Secretary wrote: 
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Individual customers are increasingly linking their criticism of the supply situation with 
expressions of discontent with the politics of the Party and government. They say that 
shortages of goods reflect the failure of the socialist economic system.304 
Many SED leaders, Erich Honecker included, lost confidence in Ulbricht’s ability to overco-
me the impasse in which the regime seemed to be stuck. Sign of an overheating economy and 
recession were already visible, and the continued implementation of the EES required more 
work and a lowering of wages’ share in the gross national product. The GDR, according to 
Honecker’s view, was “on the brink of catastrophe.”305  
Politburo members forced Ulbricht to make some concessions to workers in December 1970. 
The minimum wage and pensions were raised and a small reduction of industrial investment 
announced. Yet Ulbricht remained determined to continue his policy at any cost. The sudden 
wave of industrial conflicts and strikes in Poland in December 1970 shook some already skep-
tical leaders to maneuvre against the head of the party, as it seems likely that the Polish 
upheaval could spread to the GDR. As Mittag’s right-hand man, Claus Krömke, recalled, the 
fear of another 1953 “was in everybody’s mind, everybody!”306 At the SED’s 14th plenary 
session in January 1971, Ulbricht’s leadership came under strong attack. The debt policy to-
ward the West was criticized and the fear that deteriorating living and working conditions 
might result into political protest expressed. To quote Willi Stoph during the meeting: 
We cannot set as a goal of 10 percent rise in labor productivity per year without having 
the real conditions for its fulfillment at hand… This leads to serious imbalances in va-
rious sectors of the economy and to political complications.307 
By May, Ulbricht was gradually removed from office through multiple intrigues and behind-
the-scenes dealings by the faction surrounding Honecker.  
Resistance to the economic policy was among the prime causes in the 1971 shift of power 
from Ulbricht to Honecker. Other factors played a part in the change as well and historians 
have rightly stressed the significance of the reluctance of a large portion of the SED apparatus 
to loosen the economic and political ties with the USSR. In that sense, this presentation fails 
to offer a thorough explanation of the shift. Nevertheless, a targeted exploration of the role of 
labor in the change from Ulbricht to Honecker reveals its sine qua non character.  
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The focus put on the impact on the living and working conditions from Ulbricht’s reforms 
reveals how the attempt to overcome labor resistance and increase productivity rates also sha-
ped Honecker’s policy. Despite differences in respective methods, both leaders shared this 
common goal. The strategy was the same, yet the means and the time scale were different. In 
1970, Ulbricht had launched a confrontation with East German workers as the requirement for 
improved economic performance. If the immediate reduction of the potential for industrial 
conflicts was Honecker’s first priority when he took the power, he was as focused on the im-
provement of productivity as his predecessor. Yet, he reversed Ulbricht's strategy and belie-
ved social appeasement to be the condition that would enhance economic performance.308 
And he was allowing this process more time to be implemented. 
Honecker’s political repression of the working population took two forms. The first was a 
stabilization of the GDR’s geopolitical situation. One aspect was the reaffirmation of strong 
ties bonding the GDR to the USSR. In fact, beyond the eastern reorientation of GDR trade, 
one could suggest that the recent upheavals in Czechoslovakia and Poland convinced Honec-
ker that good relations with the USSR would prove crucial if labor discontent ever got out of 
hand. The other aspect of this geopolitical stabilization was the new Ostpolitik put forward by 
the SPD-led coalition in Bonn which brought about the international diplomatic recognition of 
the SED state. There are vast historical debates over the meaning of Brandt’s Ostpolitk for the 
stability of the East German regime. A prudent answer to this question should consider both 
the apparent short-term stabilization and long-term destabilization.309 The Ostpolitik also 
meant the strengthening of the repressive power of the SED state. Tackled from the perspecti-
ve of the relationship between labor and the regime, Ostpolitik could be said to have streng-
thened the regime’s position. The pacification on the borders enabled SED leaders to deploy 
repression within the borders, if necessary, without interference from outside. 
The second form of political repression was the increasing surveillance activities, notably of 
the Stasi, in enterprises from 1971 on.310 The Stasi had been active in enterprises before, trac-
king sabotages and causes of disruption in the production. Yet, it was after 1971 that it syste-
matized its repressive activities in labor and attempted to transform the shop floor into a “lo-
cation of political disciplining.”311 
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In additions to the improvement of political repression, the 1971 shift also introduced a long-
term global scheme for the reorganization of production. The ‘Scientific-Technological Orga-
nization of Labor’ (Wissenschaftlich-technische Arbeitsorganization, WAO) was initiated at 
the SED’s 8th Congress in 1971, but would only be implemented a few years later. The 
WAO’s main tasks were to reduce employment, introduce the three-shift system and improve 
productivity through better work organization. In the minds of leaders, the renewal of voca-
tional training programs paved the way for new job classification scales, a necessary step in 
regaining control over the wage growth. The WAO agenda required from the management at 
enterprises that they significantly improve productivity through better organization of labor. 
Norms were to be restructured to take quality and quantity of production into account. This 
amounted to, in short, more production, more rapidly and for less money.  
Company directors were given until 1974 to develop WAO scheme for their enterprise. The 
latest ‘Fordistic’ American literature was widely used: different tests were made, workers 
were filmed and timed, methods of organization of labor were introduced with their original 
English names, as the Method Times Measurement, Motion-Time-Analysis, Work-Factor 
System, etc.312 The success or failure of the WAO relied on real norm increases and wage 
decreases. SED leaders did not attempt any central designs but rather left it to each enterprise 
and ultimately to the master in each brigade to develop and implement the WAO. He or she 
often set up a WAO-collective of four to six workers responsible for making suggestions on 
how increase productivity. By the mid-1970s the introduction of WAO had brought its first 
results. 
Partiell hat das durchaus zum ‘von oben’ gewünschten Erfolg geführt. Über die Einbe-
ziehung der WAO-Kennzahl ‘Niveau’ und ‘Qualität’ der Arbeitsnormen in den Wett-
bewerb wurde der Anteil der technischen begründeten Arbeitsnormen erhöht und die 
Arbeit nach Zeit normativen verstärkt.313  
In order to dismiss workers without protest, a large portion of the surpluses from lay-offs was 
to be redistributed among workers and managers. In one VEB in Dessau, 70% of the money 
thus saved remained in the collective, 20% was paid directly to the director and 10% went 
into the director’s personal fund. Yet, very little jobs were eliminated as a result of the WAO: 
a total of 1,645 in 10 VEBs in 1973, for instance.314  
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Other ways to control the wage growth were also attempted at the time. The nationalization of 
the remaining private and parastatal enterprises in 1971, though it was not its sole cause, was 
one such attempt. The private and semi-private sector employed 470,000 people and was ac-
countable for 11,3% of GDR’s production. These small enterprises produced mainly machine-
ry and consumer goods on short order for VEBs and the West. They usually paid higher wa-
ges for overtime and extra shifts, and acted to put an upward pressure on wages in all 
sectors.315 By 1975 the SED announced its williness to raise basic wages (Grundlöhne), a 
formula masking new attempts to bring the wage/bonus rate to 70/30, from the current roug-
hly 50/50 relationship. It aimed at raising tariff wages slightly but decreasing bonuses more so 
that the overall workers’ share of the national wealth would fall. The fruit and vegetable in-
dustry (obst- und gemüseverarbeitende Industrie) was one of the very few examples where the 
70/30 rate was nearly achieved.316 
Hence, beside some divisions in certain enterprises, whose examples were blown up out of 
proportion, the WAO campaign was a relative failure. Many enterprises reported strong resis-
tance to the introduction of new forms of remuneration. In enterprises, divisions or brigades 
where WAO methods were introduced with the workforce’s approval, they usually resulted in 
a lowering of the physical requirements of the work and not in a upward revision of norms. 
By the second half of the 1970s, norms were still met by an average of 120% and could not be 
increased, while wages and bonuses counted respectively for a rough 50% of a worker’s wa-
ge.317 In 1981, Honecker was still calling for a complete implementation of the WAO in all 
enterprises, for productivity increases and a lowering of labor costs.318 
2.4.4 Conclusion: Struggles over Wages and Norms as Reoccurring Motif in 
GDR History 
Until the 1980s, the most permanent and fundamental conflicts between power-holders and 
the working population occurred around the relationship between wages and norms, and, to a 
lesser extent, on working conditions. Two main reasons explain why most disputes centered 
on wages and norms when it comes to studying top-down conflicts in the world of labor. Both 
points have been introduced above. 
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Firstly, the relationship between wages and work performance is a core part of any industrial 
economy, and Soviet-style economies were industrial economies like Western market econo-
mies. It is this relationship which determined to a large extent the standard of living of people: 
budget and consumption, division of working time and rest time, housing, and also health, 
leisure activities, access to services, even social relations. Yet, the ways in which these 
conflicts express themselves changed according to the prevailing conditions. 
Secondly, East German workers were especially effective in developing ways to increase wa-
ges and maintain low norms, while limiting the risks of falling into the clutches of repressive 
structures. There is something exceptional about this. The possibility to oppose leadership 
decisions, in any sphere, was basically non-existent, while the types of conflicts that could be 
ruled out through official channels were very limited in scope. As the relationship between 
wages and norms is concerned, however, workers found tricks to turn it to their advantage. 
The widespread use of these tricks gave them an unusual power that appeared destabilizing 
enough for the leadership to develop major campaigns against it.  
This is not to say that workers manipulated this relationship along their good will, nor that 
they did not run any risk doing it. We have seen that the regime’s campaigns were partly ef-
fective and countered workers’ resistance for a while. Yet strategies to increase wages and 
lower the norms altered and influenced the overall economic performance again – and brought 
about the regime to react decisively in turn. 
This is not to say that as years progressed workers developed ever-greater number of tactics to 
undermine the plan until there were so many of them that the economy collapsed. Top-down 
struggles over wages and norms should not be understood as one linear, straightforward, de-
velopment. They were processes: conflicts emerged, were repressed, re-emerged in another 
form. Repressive measures and means to neutralize dissatisfaction overcame resistance and 
workers suffered many defeats. Still, new manifestations of disputes over wages and norms 
appeared within a new context with time. 
Nor is this to say that East German workers were one homogeneous group. Different groups 
of workers had divergent and incompatible interests. Hence, not only top-down but also hori-
zontal conflictual dynamics were present in East German enteprises.319 The emphasis on indi-
vidual strategies in the struggles over wages and norms does not reject this dimension, al-
though it is not further developed in these pages. 
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The author does not argue that every unwarranted sick day or refusal to do overtime was 
meant as an act of conscious political resistance. It appears, however, that in the GDR the 
widespread recourse to practices that increased wages and lower work output had a strong 
political impact. The impact of workers’ practices was probably greater than intended by ma-
ny of their initiators. 
Finally, the working population’s interests were never limited to wages, norms and working 
conditions. An important fact is that, in the GDR more than in any state in German industrial 
history, living conditions were deeped interlinked with the workplace. The enterprise-based 
family policy is a good example, as the extent of services depended on the size of the enter-
prise. We have seen how the deterioration of living and housing conditions was often addres-
sed in labor in the 1980s, because this was where the bulk of services in these matters were 
provided. 
Yet, beside these covert struggles over wages and norms, the East German shop floors seemed 
for decades mostly free of any open top-down conflicts. Until the second half of the 1980s, 
the regime appeared successful in its repressive policy, as potential open conflicts with wor-
kers were contained. The regime was also successful in externalizing the working people's 
dissatisfaction outside the shopfloors, a situation which also played its role in the 1989 "revo-
lution after closing hours", as previously indicated. Struggles over wages and norms indicate 
that there was a serious rumblings behind this seemingly calm facade.  
In his 1983 study on the East German vocational training system, Theodor Sander observed 
an spread of conflicts between the regime and the population into several spheres of people’s 
life outside the workplaces: state administrations, education, media, culture, and housing.320 
Sander considered, however, that the focal point of these developments laid in the attempts at 
increasing production, shortages, shop floor repression, poor working conditions, and failures 
in the industrial social policy. In other words, workshop realities – that determined the covert 
struggles over wages and norms, and for better working conditions - were responsible for the 
gradual emergence of conflicts outside the factory gates – inside was impossible due to the 
repressive structures - and a subsequent radicalization of many people’s stances towards the 
regime. ‘Niches,’ apathy, grumbling, withdrawing from the norms defined by the regime: 
these were also manifestations of frustration and conflicts produced in the world of labor and 
exacerbated by their impact (i.e. wage devaluation) in other spheres of life. Prophetic, Sander 
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expected these trends, which he understands as an “ideological conflict” between leaders and 
the population, to intensify in the following years: 
Gleichzeitig bedeutet die weitere Steigerung der Arbeitsproduktivität aber auch das Sin-
ken des relativen Lohnes, die Verschlechterung der Arbeitsbedingungen gerade im Be-
reich der Tätigkeit von Fach- und Hochschulkadern und im produktionsvorbereitenden 
Bereich und den relativen Qualifikationsverlust, die den Übergang der Arbeiterklasse 
von der arbeitsbezogenen, partikularistischen Kritik des Systems zur Systembezogenen, 
universalistischen Kritik forcieren. Damit ist unvermeidlich die Vertiefung des ideolo-
gischen gegensatzes von Führenden und Arbeiterklasse verbunden. Die Vertiefung des 
ideologischen gegensatzes in der Entwicklung der sozialen Auseinandersetzungen, die 
die Gruppe der Führenden vergeblich mit der Bildungsexpansion zu kompensieren ver-
sucht, ist vor allem daran abzulesen, dass die Vermittlung der Lehre des ‘Marxismus-
Leninismus’ als einer typischen Systemrechtfertigungslehre auf wachsende Schwierig-
keiten stösst und in grossen Teilen der Arbeiterklasse schon zu einer Unmöglichkeit 
geworden ist.321  
The depiction of the late 1970s and 1980s as a period where conflicts inside and outside the 
workplace mutually reinforced each other is a hypothesis that deserves further consideration. 
It is therefore unfortunate that Theodor Sander's work has not received its due attention.  
The historical roundabout has shown how struggles over wages and norms have been an en-
during conflict between the working population and the leaders: workers resisted to measures 
aiming at boosting productivity rates while leaders attempted to neutralize resistance with 
various measures. They were crucial in the economic and political crises of 1958-1962 and 
1967-1972. This antagonism adapted to changing economic, political and social conditions, 
re-emerged, and was the basis for all of the country's crises, perhaps never sufficient in its 
own right, but nevertheless a necessary catalyst. 
It would be incomprehensible that this ongoing conflict of interests no longer played any role 
in 1989. This work now turns to the year 1989 and tries to assess labor’s role in the events of 
those months. 
2.5 East German Labor and the Fall of the GDR 
The story of workers in the 1989 revolution has not been written yet. Many reasons are res-
ponsible for this fact. A first wave of works on the 1989 revolution has underlined the role of 
the opposition groups, whose demands and modes of action were assumed to have given the 
population its agenda and strategy during those months. The most in-depth and influential 
work in that respect remains the monograph by Erhart Neubert (1997). Despite the emphasis 
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on opposition groups, and hence on people that were not power-holders in the GDR, the prio-
rity given to the agendas and actions of those groups ends up in a history viewed “from the 
top” if little effort is made to understand if, how and why opposition groups influenced the 
popular mobilization and how the groups’ various discourses reflected people’s experien-
ces.322 For example, none of these groups’ public figures were involved in low-level wage 
labor performed by the majority: Ehrhart Neubert (Democratic Awakening) was theologian, 
Gerd Poppe (Initiative for peace and human rights), physician, Angelika Barbe (Social-
Democratic Party), biologist, Bärbel Bohley (Women for Peace, New Forum), painter; many 
were doctors, journalists, scholars. Following this perspective, the push for revolution came 
from members of the intelligentsia and professional classes from academic backgrounds. The 
absence of workers within the highest circle of opposition leaders could be seen as evidence 
that they (the workers) were not actors in the revolution.  
It seems, however, that in Neubert’s view not all opposition groups equally lent support to or 
were  involved in the opposition. His interest lays in opposition groups that addressed topics 
such as equality between men and women, peace, environment, human rights and parliamen-
tary democracy. Groups rooted in the world of labor, like sections of the New Forum, the 
United Left and the Initiative for Independent Trade Unions are, at best, denied a role in 1989, 
and are often depicted as having actually hindered democratic reforms. These last two groups 
are depicted as small groups of individuals obsessed with theoretical problems and playing a 
“clear role of the outsider” within the opposition.323  
Die Initiative [für unabhängige Gewerkschaften] blockierte eine demokratische Ge-
werkschaftsreform mehr, als dass sie ihr diente. Die Verbindung zur Opposition blieb 
minimal, da sie nur der Vereinigten Linke nahestand.324  
Former members of the United Left now criticize the time spent on theoretical discussions in 
their organization.325 Yet the portrayal of some groups as outsiders resulted in the overestima-
tion of the internal coherence of the groups accepted as the “opposition” – and eventually into 
a false estimation of its role in the revolution. The oppostion activist Neubert seemed challen-
ged by the limits of the influence of the opposition groups when,  discussing with the West 
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German union magazine Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte in the heat of the events in mid-
December 1989, he stressed the importance of “politicizing” the people – a rather puzzling 
affirmation, given the extraordinary political developments of the moment. What Neubert 
would seem to imply was the desire to bring the people to act in accordance with the priorities 
and agenda of his Democratic Awakening. The difficulties of pushing through this agenda, 
and the fear of what would happen if it were to fail, were stated a few times during the inter-
view, as in the following excerpt. 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte – Gibt es konkrete Schritte, die in den nächsten Wo-
chen notwendig sind, um etwa den ‘Ausverkauf’ von Grund und Boden oder Kapitalbe-
teiligung zu kontrollieren und in kontrollierte Bahnen zu lenken?  
Ehrhart Neubert – Wir versuchen es. Wir haben einen Forderungskataklog aufgestellt 
und an die Regierung gegeben und werden das auch am ‘runden Tisch’ fordern. Wie-
weit wir uns durchsetzen können, wissen wir nicht, aber wir hoffen, dass wir zusamen 
mit anderen oppositionellen Gruppen oder Parteien ein Stück weiterkommen. Wir haben 
aber auch die Bürger und die Arbeiterschaft aufgerufen, so schnell wie möglich zu Ge-
werkschaftsbildungen zu kommen. Ich sehe da zwar in mancher Hinsicht schwarz, aber 
wenn die Menschen in dieser Hinsicht schnell genug politisiert werden, könnte viel-
leicht noch das Schlimmste verhütet werden. Davon hängt auch ein Stückchen die Zu-
kunft der DDR ab. Wenn es uns nicht gelingt, hier politisch Fuss zu fassen, so dass wir 
Mithandelnde werden, dann wird das System der DDR tatsächlich vollständig zerfal-
len.326 
As historical research moved from the study of the opposition groups to that of the popular 
mobilization, it became clear that people’s role in the revolution could not be simply limited 
to that of vehicles for conveying opposition ideas and demands. In his prize-winning disserta-
tion published in 2000, Karsten Timmer studies the slogans and posters used in the demons-
trations of fall 1989.327 The convergence between the opposition’s agenda and the popular 
protest that Timmer dates from the demonstration in Leipzig on October 9, 1989, gave the 
movement its distinctive characteristic as well as its strength.328 Yet this convergence lasted 
roughly until the first weeks of December, until the reforms of the GDR became increasingly 
jeopardized by the perspective of reunification. Thereafter, the social movement split precise-
ly on the question of whether or not the GDR should be unified with the Federal Republic. 
This split, according to Timmer, signaled the start of the East German revolution. 
The weight Timmer attributes to the convergence between the opposition and popular mobili-
zation highlight the fact that the history of political formations is not the history of popular 
                                                 
326 “Demokratischer Aufbruch (Erhart [sic]Neubert)”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 12/89, pp. 762-68, quote 
pp. 763-64. 
327 Timmer 2000, chapters 5 and 6. 
328 Ibid, p. 191. 
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movements – a remark classic in social history, but one which ultimately drives us apart from 
Neubert and Timmer.329 Timmer is correct in stating that unification changed the conditions 
under which the social protest evolved in the GDR. But he seems to forget that, despite the 
importance of the changes occurring at the end of 1990, the popular mobilization remained in 
many respects a continuation of the movement of the previous months.  
Though in very different ways, both Neubert and Timmer overstress the convergence between 
popular mobilization and opposition groups.  This might blur how other common experiences 
could be play a determining role in popular mobilization.  
One of the strongest continuity lines during the popular mobilization of 1989-1990 in the 
GDR is the will of the working population to reverse the downward trend in living and wor-
king conditions. Let us consider some figures and facts. The majority of people who left the 
GDR were workers. Between August 1989 and April 1990, 3,115 political activities were 
recorded, of which 2,129 were demonstrations in 522 cities and municipalities. Figures on the 
number of people that participated to these gatherings and activities range between a mini-
mum of 1.2 and five million, although this figure appear unrealistic.330 Evaluations of the 
proportion of opposition group members at these gatherings are about 2%. As a pun on the 
slogans used at the demonstrations of the time, Bernd Gehrke roguishly asks: who was the 
people? The answer is of course that the great majority of them were workers. Signs of the 
upheaval to come had been reported within labor for several years. Contentious BGL elec-
tions in March 1989 were forerunners to the popular scrutiny during the municipal elections 
in May. The popular protest that was to bring down the GDR began in September 1989, as 
people reported back to work and realized that many of their colleagues had fled. Their wor-
ries about the future fell upon the deaf ears of leaders.331 Between September 1989 and Fe-
bruary 1990, about 200 strikes were recorded in the GDR. Just like the demonstrations, the 
majority of these strikes occurred in the southern regions.332 Another indication of the inter-
weaving of labor and political developments is of course the disintegration of the FDGB 
structures as representing the SED state structure.333  
                                                 
329 The problems induced by the identification of a movement with its forefront organizations have aroused many 
debates between specialists of the working class. Former theories, dominant in the 1970s and the 1980s, which 
considered labor organizations as “reflections” of the class have been proven short-sighted in many respects and 
severely criticized in the 1990s. See: Buhle/Buhle 1994, especially p. 135.   
330 Dale 2005, pp. 177-85. I thank Gareth Dale for allowing me to read his study prior to publication. 
331 Timmer 2000, pp. 90-112. 
332 Gehrke 2001 b. 
333 For several assessments of FDGB's disintegration, which is not systematically reviewed in this work, see: 
Pirker 1990; Gill 1991; Weinert/Gilles 1999. 
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Hence, many elements suggest the importance of questions relating to living and working 
conditions of wage earners in 1989-1990, and the participation of workers in the events. A 
look at the development leading up to the mobilization in Erfurt indicates how the situation 
inside and outside the workplace overlapped during the months of October and November 
1989. 
2.5.1 Erfurt Enterprises in Stasi Reports, October-November 1989 
To understand the revolution, one must study the situation in GDR shop floors. While the 
head of the FDGB changed three times between the beginning of October and the beginning 
of December, many BGL leaders were forced to resign and were replaced by activists accep-
table to the workforce.334 Managers were also voted out of office and had to leave. In fact, the 
disintegration of state power during those months concentrated more autonomy and power in 
workplaces for managers and workers.335 
The examination of the role of workers in the revolution starts with a new examination of 
Stasi archives - to observations made in the workplaces in the Erfurt district by the highly 
developed Stasi network between mid-October and mid-November 1989. What these reports 
tell us about the situation in the enterprises in this district during the critical weeks as the  
protest movement unfolded and the wall fell is in certain respects fascinating. During the five 
weeks from October 13 and November 16, the heads of the Stasi's Erfurt division XVIII pro-
duced close to 20 reports for their superiors in the MfS. All but one of these reports was a 
journal of information gathered by IM and other informants in different workplaces (between 
2 and 12 enterprises quoted in each report).336 The other was an Immediate Report (Sofortbe-
richt) written after “politically irresponsible remarks” had been made in front of all party, 
union and state secretaries at one VEB by its general director.337  
Observations made in Erfurt in October-November 1989 document the link between what 
happened inside and outside the workplace. One obvious characteristic of these reports is the 
alarming (for the Stasi) situation depicted. They indicate a high degree of discontent within 
                                                 
334 Hertle 1990, p. 5; Wilkens-Friedrich 1994, p. 31; Roesler 2002, p. 763. 
335 Roesler 2002, p. 763. 
336 BStU AS Erfurt, Abt. XVIII, 41, “Reaktionen der Bevölkerung”, October 17-24, 1989, pp. 01-15; BStU AS 
Erfurt Abt. XVIII, 79, n.t., n.d. (October 16, 1989 indicated), pp. 01-14; BStU AS Erfurt, Abt. XVIII, 112, Bd. 1, 
“Tagesbericht zur Lage im verantwortungsbereich der Abteilung XVIII”, October 13-31, 1989, pp. 001-124; 
BStU AS Erfurt, Abt. XVIII, 113 Bd. 2, “Tagesbericht zur Lage im verantwortungsbereich der Abteilung 
XVIII”, November 1-16, 1989, pp. 001-100. 
337 BStU AS Erfurt, Abt. XVIII 113, Bd. 2, “Sofortbericht zu Versammlung im VEB Kombinat Umformtechnik 
‘Herbert Warnke’ Erfurt”, November 1, 1989, pp. 101-102. 
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labor and urged the state apparatus to come up with answers to workers’ grievances. A prime 
example is this report from November 8: 
Im gesamten Verantwortungsbereich ist unter den Werktätigen eine explosive Stim-
mung vorhanden. Charakteristisch für die gegenwärtige Situation ist, daβ derzeitig jede, 
von den Werktätigen schon längst erwartete Maβnahme von vornherein einer starken 
Abwertung bis Verneinung unterworfen ist. Es kommt immer wieder zum Ausdruck, 
daβ der Funke zur Entzündung der prekären Situation schon in der Luft liegt und es nur 
noch eine Frage der Zeit ist, bis es “knallt”. 
Reports show hamstrung state secretaries paying only lip service to the government’s com-
mitment to dialogue and reforms: 
Nach wie vor wird die Hilflosigkeit der örtlichen Parteifunktionäre in den Betrieben und 
Einrichtungen des Verkehrs- und Nachrichtenwesens als unverständlich aufgenommen. 
Im Direktorat F+T des KME wird von Angehörigen der wissenschaftlich-technischen 
Intelligenz ausgesagt, daβ ein geschlossenes offensives Auftreten der Bezirksparteior-
ganization bis heute nicht erkennbar ist. Sporadische Ansätze gehen nur bis zu Stand-
punktpapieren und nicht weiter. Gleiche Ratlosigkeit herrsche bei der ZPL. 
Diese Linie setzt sich offenbar vom Generaldirektor über Betriebsdirektoren und Fach-
direktoren fort. Alle sind für den Dialog (übrigens keine Erfindung des Jahres 1989), 
aber keiner möchte ihn so richtig im Betrieb, denn dann müβten ja auch  unsere Leiter 
die Arbeit ihrer letzten Jahre analysieren. Und es ist doch viel einfacher, auf  etwas “von 
oben” zu warten.338 
Guidelines for action at the enterprise level were required from the reporters. Major-general 
Schwarz wrote, quoting a worker, on October 16: “Geredet wurde schon zu lange und zu viel, 
jetzt muβ etwas getan werden und zwar sehr schnell.” Lieutenant Budan reported on Novem-
ber 1 that Erfurt BPO members insisted that “Das Stadium des ‘Nur Redens’ muβ umgehend 
beedent werden (keine Pallawerveranstaltungen mehr) (…) Dialog ersetzt nicht Leistung.” 
Two days later, he wrote that a widespread belief among workers was that “Jetzt sind keine 
Reden, sondern Taten erforderlich.”  
A strong imbalance between the discontent on the shop floors and the absence of leadership 
from above fills the reports. Cases of corruption, the deplorable state of the economy, the ab-
sence of constructive dialogue between population and its leaders, the announcement of only 
minor reforms and incendiary declarations by local officials left an air of incertitude over the 
                                                 
338 N.t., October 16, 1989, Abt. XVIII, 79, p. 4; “Tagesbericht zur Lage im verantwortungsbereich der Abteilung 
XVIII”, November 10, p. 41 and November 1, p. 95. The last excerpt which paraphrases what is presented as a 
dominant opinion among workers, refers to a strategy which consists of announcing insufficient, “short-sighted 
measures” only to “say something”.  
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workplaces in the district. The heads of the Erfurt division XVIII described the situation like a 
powder keg which might be sparked by any incident:  
Auch wenn die allgemeine Stimmungslage relativ ruhig erscheint, sollte dies nicht täu-
schen. In der gegenwärtigen Zeit kann auch ein ‘Ausrutscher’ in der Dialogführung z.B. 
des Gen. Müller zur Freisetzung ungewollter emotionen führen.339 
Only strike threats seemed to bring about the reforms workers were asking for,340 a problema-
tic situation encouraging the radicalization of goals: “Success breeds courage – which de-
mands will be made next?”341 As they had been doing for years, MfS informants listed causes 
for dissatisfaction of the workforce. They described them as “concrete measures, quickly no-
ticeable for everyone” that should be implemented, if the regime wished to gain the initiative 
over events.342 Here is a list of those demands: 
Claims made by workers in Erfurt enterprises, taken from Stasi reports from October 
16 to November 16, 1989. 
Table 9 : Wages and working conditions (9 occurrences)   
1- Improvement of working conditions 3 occurrences 
2- Wages more closely linked to performance and/or 
the formation. 
2 occurrences 
3- Improvement of the supply of consumer goods (wi-
thin the enterprise). 
2 occurrences 
4- Improvement of social and hygienic conditions at 
the workplace. 
1 occurrence 
 
5- Disciplinary measures against shirkers. 1 occurrence 
 
                                                 
339 “Tagesbericht zur Lage im verantwortungsbereich der Abteilung XVIII”, November 1, 1989, p. 95. This 
refers to the first secretary of the district SED who publicly refused to launch any debate on the privileges of the 
elite with the local population during a meeting. 
340 “Reaktion der Bevölkerung”, October 17, 1989, pp. 1-15. 
341 “Tagesbericht zur Lage im verantwortungsbereich der Abteilung XVIII”, November 1, 1989, p. 92. 
342 Abt. XVIII, 79, n.t., n.d. (October 16, 1989), p. 01. 
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Table 10 : SED, FDGB and enterprise leaders (34 occurrences) 
6- Investigation of cases of corruption and embezzle-
ment, resignation of culprits  
8 occurrences 
7- Resignation of party, union and enterprise officials  7 occurrences 
8- Reduction of the state, party, union and enterprise 
apparatus 
3 occurrences 
9- Introduction of a real and concrete dialogue between 
workers and leaders  
3 occurrences 
10- FDGB should defend workers’ interests and be 
independent of the SED 
3 occurrences 
11- Creation of structures for the defense of workers’ 
interests outside the FDGB 
3 occurrences 
12- Free and close-ballot elections of all FDGB and 
BGL officials 
2 occurrences 
13- FDGB accounts should be made public 2 occurrences 
14- Neither the FDGB nor the SED should have any 
role in the economy 
2 occurrences 
15- The SED and the FDGB should acknowledge their 
mistakes 
1 occurrence 
 
Table 11 : Political, economic and social topics (17 occurrences)  
16- Implementation of concrete reforms 3 occurrences 
17- Reduction of travel restrictions 2 occurrences 
18- Freedom to strike 2 occurrences 
19- Implementation of measures for the protection of 
the environment 
2 occurrences 
20- Co-determination rights for workers  1 occurrence 
21- The SED should renounce to its leading role in 
politics 
1 occurrence 
22- Restriction of the number of years an official can 
spend in a specific post   
1 occurrence 
23- Improvement of living conditions 1 occurrence 
24- Better conditions for the use of leisure time 1 occurrence 
25- Legalization of the New Forum 1 occurrence 
26- Measures to stop New Forum's rise 1 occurrence 
27- Less welfare state provisions for “asocial” citizens  1 occurrence 
 
These claims do not need to be systematically compared with the previous table documenting 
the demands made between November 1986 and August 1989, as they undeniably converge. 
The range of demands expressed in the workplace between October and November is even 
larger and more political in nature, an obvious effect of the revolutionary events taking pla-
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ce.343 An obvious transition was occuring, from the focus on wages and working conditions 
of the previous years to the overthrow of the regime leaders; from individual and covert action 
to collective and open action. 
The main contribution of the Stasi reports is the evidences they provide of the interrelations 
between the world of labor and others areas of political activity more widely identified with 
the East German revolution, such as churches or the streets. Relating to the weeks of October 
and November 1989, four different aspects of these interrelations between developments out-
side and inside the workplace appear in those reports.  
Firstly, political topics that shook the country did not stop at the factory gates and thus made 
their way into the workplace. These political topics were intensely discussed among the work-
force. The appraisal of workers’ response to some leadership declarations and decisions by 
the Politburo or the FDGB form the framework of the Stasi reports. The first paragraphs al-
ways summarize these reactions, which are detailed afterwards for each enterprise mentioned. 
The rejection of the SED and the FDGB by workers is unmistakable. Many drew comparisons 
with the 1953 strikes. 
Im Mittelpunkt des Stimmungs- und Reaktionsbildes unter den Werktätigen aller Berei-
che und Leitungsebenen unseres Verantwortungsbereiches stehen nach wie vor Diskus-
sionen und Gespräche über die 11. Tagung der Volkskammer, dabei insbesondere der 
Auftritt des Gen. Mielke sowie zur politischen Lage im Bezirk bzw. im eigenen Betrieb. 
Mit groβem Interesse und Aufmerksamekeit wurde die 11. Volkskammertagung von 
den HF-Kadern und Produktionsarbeitern des Investabes ESO III/IV verfolgt, das live 
und zu einem Groβteil während der Arbeitszeit. 
Hinsichtlich der Wahl von Maleuda und Modrow gibt es zum gröβten Teil positive 
Standpunkte. Eine Ablehnung dieser Personen ist nicht erkennbar. (…)  
Mit absolut groβer Bestürzung wurden die Diskussionsreden führender Politiker (Stoph, 
Sindermann, Schürer, Höfner) und ihre quasi Offenbarung aufgenommen. Bestürzung, 
verbunden mit Unverständnis und Verzweiflung, daβ über Jahre hinweg, eigentlich seit 
dem VIII. Parteitag gelogen wurde, der Volkskammer als höchstem Machtorgan bewuβt 
nie die Rolle zukam (zukommen sollte!), die ihr gehört. (…) Die Ursachen dafür wer-
den nicht allein bei Honecker und Mittag gesehen, sondern hier wird die Partei als Gan-
zes in die Verantwortung gezwungen. (…)  
                                                 
343 Some of the claims listed may come as a surprise, such as the calls to stop the New Forum's rise and to reduce 
the welfare state provisions for so-called asocial persons, and perhaps maybe to take disciplinary action against 
shirkers. All of them were mentioned only once, in General Schwarz’s report of October 16, 1989. The first 
came from a school. The origin of the other two is not mentioned. It might be that General Schwarz understood 
some of workers’ aspirations in the regime’s own terms, that he ‘translated’ them into measures acceptable for 
the regime, or that he included what he himself considered the necessary urgent steps. 
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Das in den letzten Tagen mühsam wiedergewonnene Vertrauen bei einigen Genossen 
und Nichtgenossen wurde im ergebnis dieser Tagung vollständig neutralisiert, da diese 
Enthüllungen die Erwartungen weit überstiegen.    
Ältere Genossen bezeichnen die Situation ‘kritischer als vor dem 17. Juni 1953’. Als 
Grund nennen sie, daβ damals nur in den Zentren der Städte solche Kontroversen wa-
ren. Heute ist das ganze Land eine ‘unkontrollierte Situation’.344 
Secondly, the shop floor could serve as a base for political mobilization outside the workpla-
ce. A report from November 1 began with the warning that, had FDGB president Harry Tisch 
not announced his plans to resign, workers were ready to “go it their own way,” which meant 
forming independent trade unions and “organizing demonstrations in enterprises and on the 
streets.” On November 10, Lieutenant Budan reported that the New Forum and the Democra-
tic Awakening used some enterprisenewspapers to display “their demands, caustic remarks 
and commentaries as well as calls to demonstrations.”345 This second kind of link between 
political action inside and outside the workplace is connected to the first kind, by the fact that 
political topics were discussed in the workplace.  
It can also be connected to the third kind of link, by the fact that the democratization process 
going on outside labor, had immediate consequences in the workplace. The Stasi reports sug-
gest that workers did not choose “politics” over “economics,” if this implies that one area was 
more crucial to them than the other. Many of their political claims meant fundamental chan-
ges for the organization of work and the defense of interests as well: “The FDGB should de-
fend worker interests and be independent from the SED,” “Creation of structures for the de-
fense of worker interests outside the FDGB” and “Neither the FDGB nor the SED should 
have any role in the economy,” are obvious examples of such interrelated consequences. None 
of the demands listed in the “SED, FDGB and enterprise leaders” section differentiates bet-
ween political or economic leaders, between party, union or enterprise secretaries. If there 
was a certain focus of workers on the top of the GDR pyramid, local leaders were also targe-
ted for their misconduct or reluctance to implement changes.346 
Fourthly, the street could serve as a location for action on unmet demands at the enterprise 
level. The concentration of political and economic decision-making in the hands of the SED 
makes it unsurprising that workers took part in demonstrations after experiencing the hesita-
tion of the leadership at enterprises to implement reforms. One worker in the mechanical for-
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ming enterprise Herbert Warnke is reported to have explained his participation to demonstra-
tions as follows: 
Ich selbst war schon in der Kirche und habe mitdemonstriert. Ich tue es, weil ich denke, 
daβ dadurch sich doch einiges ändert. Wir haben in unserem Betrieb so viel geredet, 
Hinweise gegeben – aber die “Kaste der Nehmer” macht weiter. Wir werden gezwun-
gen, weiter auf die Straβe zu gehen. Erst durch unseren Aufbruch hat sich was getan.347 
The Stasi reports shed light on the interrelations between developments outside and inside 
enterprises during the revolution. This relationship was not one-sided: in a city like Erfurt, 
they could be linked in at least four different ways. The important point here is that develop-
ments within the workplace could lead workers to act outside its walls, just as political deve-
lopments had an immediate impact inside these walls. 
Of course, workers were not alone in acting in line with the links between developments insi-
de and outside the workplace. Leaders also did this, for their own reasons. By the end of Oc-
tober, some BGL secretaries pushed for the rapid organization of new trade union elections. 
Such a step, in their opinion, would let the “steam out” and enable one to move the political 
processes from the streets and into the walls of enterprises:   
Neuwahlen im FDGB könnten insgesamt viel Dampf herauslassen” und konstruktive 
Diskussionen von der Straβe weg in die Betrieb ziehen.348  
Beside the interrelations between developments inside and outside the workplace, the Stasi 
reports in Erfurt document the erosion of power structures at the enterprise level, which took 
many forms. One was leaders losing their cool. The general director of Herbert Warnke lost 
his temper during a meeting of all enterprise officials. He insulted and accused them of plot-
ting against him, continued to ridicule the party’s politics, which he termed “Bananenpolitik,” 
expressed his wish for a war to break out, so authority could finally be restored, and vehemen-
tly denounced the New Forum. Lieutenant Budan expressed his concerns about the effect the-
se words might have on workers. He proposed that all the participants meet again in order to 
“limit the political damages” of the meeting.349  
Another form of power erosion could be seen in the doubts now clearly expressed by IMs 
about the reaction to the political crisis by the heads of state. On November 1, Budan deemed 
it necessary to read at length from a report by an endured IM: 
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Durch einen langjährigen IM in Leitungsfunktion im VEB EnergieKombinat wird wört-
lich die Meinung vertreten (stellvertretend für viele andere Kader): 
“Die gegenwärtig im FDGB aufgebrochenen Probleme habe ich bisher nicht gekannt. 
Sie erschienen mir jedoch sehr massiv und was noch hinzu kommt, mit Fakten belegbar. 
In bekannt gewordenen Gesprächen mit Arbeitern mag auch persönliches Überwiegen. 
Mit einem unguten Gefühl nahm ich gestern zur Kenntnis wie die Diskussion auf der 
10. Tagung des FDGB verlaufen ist und wie massive die Angriffe auf den genossen 
Tisch vorgebracht wurden.  
Umso unverständlicher ist mir die Reaktion des Vorstandes zur Verlegung der Tagung 
bzw. Fortsetzung der Tagung auf den 17. November 1989. Für mich sind das 18 Tage 
Verlust.(…) 
Ich schätze ein, daβ diese Zeit durch staatsfeindliche Kräfte genutzt werden kann, um 
eine neue Gewerkschaft herauszubilden, die eventuell dem Charakter der ‘Solidarnosc’ 
in Polen entspricht.”350 
The heads of the division XVIII in Berlin could read on November 14 that disappointment 
and discontent spread amongst long-time “admirers of Honecker” and “antifascist resistance 
fighters” in Erfurt. They learned how IMs “…who have worked faithfully and loyally with 
our organization for more than 20 years have resigned and question any further collabora-
tion.” Other IMs questioned the purpose of their work during all those years. Didn’t they see 
these problems coming years earlier? Low and mid-ranking officials pointed an accusing fin-
ger at their superiors for the problems now being faced: 
IM stellen immer stärker die Frage, was ist denn mit unseren Berichten gemacht wor-
den, wer hat denn auf uns gehört. Heute muβ man zu der erkenntnis gelangen, daβ alles 
für umsonst war, daβ es lediglich Zeitvertreib darstellte. Die IM meinen, groβes Ver-
trauen in das MfS gesetzt zu haben, was das MfS nicht gerechtfertigt hat. Es treten Be-
hauptungen auf, daβ das Schwert der Partei mehr als stumpf war, bezogen auf die In-
nenpolitik – alles war nur Agitation. (…) Es drängt sich bei vielen die Frage auf: 
Hatte das MfS nun die richtigen Informationen zu Ursachen und notwendigen Verände-
reungen oder nicht? 
Wurde damit verantwortungsbewuβt umgegangen? 
Wurde an die richtigen Stellen weiterinformiert? 
Hätte nicht auch ein Minister des MfS die Aufgabe gehabt, mit Konsequenze im PB 
aufzutreten und auf Veränderungen einzuwirken?351 
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A third manifestation of the erosion of power in the workplace was the new refusal of some 
worker organizations to comply with orders. For example, between 60% and 80% of workers’ 
Task Forces (Kampfgruppen) in Erfurt refused to follow special instructions on closing streets 
and public places. In one Task Force of the train company Deutsche Reichsbahn, the training 
was cancelled after workers threatened the instructors with clubs. Only 30 of the 120 workers 
in the communication engineering VEB in Arnstadt were ready to follow the instructions. 
Workers in Eisenach explained their refusal of the instructions by stated they feared they 
would have to intervene against popular gatherings, wrote General Major Schwarz.352  
A fourth manifestation of the erosion of power took the form of specific claims by some of 
the regime's structures in the workplace. For instance, members of the Free German Youth 
(Freie Deutsche Jugend, FDJ) in the VEB KUTE made the following demands: the indepen-
dence of the FDJ from the SED, more places in vocational training centers, quicker imple-
mentation of technological innovations, more participation of young workers in planning dis-
cussions, better sanitary conditions at work, better supply of food and consumer goods at the 
enterprise.353 
It seems very likely that the informants from the Erfurt division XVIII, Lieutenant Colonel 
Budan in particular, made wide use of some standardized type of persons that the regime saw 
as its friends or enemies. They helped to stress some information, to give them more weight 
and eventually influence leadership decisions. The resorting to individuals like old and loyal 
IM or pro-Honecker antifascist resister when describing some criticisms seemed to belong to 
a specific art d’écrire, which leads to wondering to what extent it was not Budan himself 
speaking behind these masks. Such a literary strategy could mobilize negative figures as well, 
whose existence would prompt the regime to protect itself. At the end of his report from No-
vember 16 for instance, Budan warned that the lack of reforms incited workers to leave the 
country or to seek reunification. He underscored his point by calling attention to the many 
“non-party-affiliated workers” who stayed in the GDR only “to experience its collapse.”  
Hence, the Stasi reports from Erfurt workplaces between mid-October and mid-November 
1989 highlight some important features of the role of workers and labor-related topics in the 
revolution. First, the MfS reports depicted the prevailing state of mind among workers as very 
worrisome for the regime. Their rejection of representatives of state power and their resolute-
ness in demanding fundamental changes brought the informants from Erfurt division XVIII to 
                                                 
352 Abt. XVIII, 79, n.t., n.d. (October 16, 1989), pp. 13-14. 
353 “Tagesbericht zur Lage im verantwortungsbereich der Abteilung XVIII”, November 8, 1989, pp.59-60. 
 136
turn to their superiors for guidelines and to call for the implementation of reforms. The enu-
meration of demands formulated on the shop floors was supposed to show the kind of reforms 
that could help neutralize the protest. Secondly, the reports do not distinguish between the 
world of labor and others areas of political action and depict them as interconnected. At least 
four different kinds of interrelations between actions outside and inside the enterprises’ walls 
were represented in these reports. They show how developments within the workplace could 
lead workers to act outside its walls, and how political developments (‘outside’) had a direct 
impact on the organization of work and the defense of worker interests (‘inside’). Finally, the 
reports show different manifestations of the erosion of power structures within the enterprise. 
All of these observations attempt, in their own way, to introduce labor as a catalyst in explai-
ning the East German revolution. 
2.5.2 The Revolution in GDR Workplaces 
The author now proposes to further the analysis of the part played by labor in the EastGerman 
revolution based on a study of the situation at 51 enterprises. This approach is justified by the 
need to go beyond many idées reçues over the role of labor in 1989-1990 and thus to overco-
me the lack of information on what actually happened in enterprises at the time. To do so we 
intend to examine 85 of the 120 sources published by Renate Hürtgen and Bernd Gehrke 
(2001) documenting the situation in 50 enterprises, as well as the 7 sources on the situation in 
the Cabel Plant Oberspree, published by Hans-Hermann Hertle (1990). This period lasts from 
September 1989 to February 1990, but concentrates on the months of November-January and 
February. All of those sources were worker-based.  
There are two main sets of questions in that exploration. The first concerns the initiatives ta-
ken by workers to defend their interests. The second concerns the motivations and objectives 
that drove workers to act between September 1989 and February1990, and the results of their 
action. The author aims at showing the existence of a dynamic of reshaping the mechanisms 
for the defense of workers’ interests. 
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2.5.2.1 A Study of 51 Cases 
A look at a synoptic table summarizes the initiatives by workers in 51 enterprises and the mo-
tivations behind them. Many of these initiatives specified whether they wanted to work outsi-
de the official structures for the defense of workers’ interests (the FDGB-BGL) or if their aim 
was to replace them. Some of them also made explicit references to foreign systems of worker 
representation or to Round Tables, either as good or bad models. These elements are also pre-
sent in the table. These sources make it possible to enter the gates of many enterprises and 
allow an insight into what was happening behind the walls. The picture is one of both diverse 
and complex phenomena.  
The major disadvantage of these sources is that they do not document any workplace where 
the work of the BGL remained unchallenged, either because its members gained legitimacy 
through the rapid implementation of reforms or simply because none came into being. Given 
the difficulty in estimating the number of workplaces where no worker initiatives were started 
in 1989-1990, as well as the state of the defense of worker interests in them, a dynamic of 
restructuring the mechanisms for this is described in these pages. To only consider enterprises 
where workers challenged the work of the BGL would encourage less cautious formulations 
(such as “process of restructuring” instead of “dynamic of restructuring”). “Dynamic” refers 
as well to this situation where workers had only a latent power to block unpopular manage-
ment decisions. 
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Table 12 : Initiatives taken by workers in East German enterprises; motivations; relation to other struc-
tures for the defense of interests; reference to models; September 1989 – February 1990 
Enterprise or 
institution 
Initiative taken Month Motivations 
to act* 
Relation to other 
structures for the 
defense of worker 
interests  
Positive or 
negative refe-
rence to mo-
dels  
1- Deutsches 
Theater 
Petition to the 
SED head 
September 9   
2- VEB Berg-
mann-Borsig 
Petition to the 
FDGB head  
September 9   
 Formation of a 
works council 
January 1, 2, 5, 6    
3- VEB Elgawa Formation of a 
group of wor-
kers 
October 9   
4- ITP Dresden Formation of a 
new trade union 
October 1, 9 Outside the BGL, but 
calls for the resigna-
tion of its members 
 
5- VEB Kabel-
werk Oberspree 
Reform of the 
BGL 
October  1, 3   
6- VEB Stahl- 
und Walzwerk 
Hennigsdorf 
Petition to the 
FDGB head 
October 9   
7- VEB Geräte- 
und Reglerwerk 
Teltow 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
October 1, 3, 5 Outside the FDGB-
BGL 
Alternative to 
the West Ger-
man system  
 Formation of a 
provisory works 
council 
November 1, 2, 3, 5, 6    
8- SGB Schuh- 
und Lederwaren 
Radebeul 
Formation of a 
group of wor-
kers 
October 1, 9   
 Formation of a 
works council 
February 5   
9- VEB Was-
ser- u. Abwas-
serwerke Berlin 
Petition to the 
management 
October 1   
10- VEB Mine-
ralstoff Bad 
Berka 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
October    
11- VEB Ener-
gie Kombinat 
Erfurt 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
October 1   
12- VEB Repa-
raturwerk Clara 
Zetkin Erfurt 
Formation of a 
group of wor-
kers 
October 1, 9   
*Motivations to act: 1) To force reforms upon a reluctant union or management; 2) To protect workers from the 
impact of reforms at the enterpise; 3) Loss of confidence in the FDGB; 4) Workers are still members of the 
FDGB; 5) To practice all of workers’ co-determination rights; 6) To represent all workers to management; 7) 
To represent workers not in the FDGB; 8) West German workscouncils have no legal foundation in the GDR; 
9) To call upon political reforms; 10) To define workers’ rights 
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Suite 
Enterprise or 
institution 
Initiative taken Month Motivations 
to act* 
Relation to other 
structures for the 
defense of workers’ 
interests  
Positive or 
negative refe-
rence to mo-
dels  
13- VEB 
Schraubenwerk 
Betriebsteil 
Petition to the 
district adminis-
tration 
October 9   
 Formation of a 
new trade union  
November 1, 5  The structure is less 
important than the 
exercise of rights; 
calls for the dissolu-
tion of the FDGB  
 
14- Brauereien 
Bürgerbräu 
Formation of a 
works council 
November  5, 6 To replace the FDGB-
BGL  
 
15- VEB Glas-
werk Stralau 
Formation of a 
group of wor-
kers 
November 9   
16- Regiewerk. 
d. Kraftverkehrs 
Bergen 
Call to strike November 1   
17- KOM-
Fahrer  Kraft-
verkehrsb. 
Meissen 
Call to strike November 1   
18- VEB Strö-
mungmaschi-
nenbau Pirna 
Petition to the 
BPO by a group 
of engineers 
November 1, 9   
19- VEB Han-
dels-Invest. 
Berlin 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
November 5, 7 Outside the FDGB-
BGL 
 
20- Busfahrer 
Meisterb. 35 
Petition to 
FDGB head 
November 1, 5   
21- VEB Bau-
kema 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
November 3 Outside the FDGB-
BGL 
 
22- Unnamed 
enterprise in 
Plauen 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
November 1 Took over the FDGB-
BGL 
 
23- VEB Elekt-
romontage 
Oranienburg 
Petition to the 
management  
November 1, 5   
24- Postamt 
Erfurt – 
Gispersleben 
Speech at a 
demonstration 
November  1, 5   
 Formation of a 
new East Ger-
man post trade 
union 
December 1, 3, 5, 9 FDGB should reim-
burse the dues of the 
last ten years   
 
25- VEB Hoch-
vakuum Dres-
den 
Formation of a 
works council 
December  1, 5  Will define its relation 
with the FDGB-BGL 
 
26-VEB Berli-
ner Aufzugs- u. 
Fahrzeugbau 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
December 1, 3, 5, 9 Step towards the mer-
ger of all enterprise-
based trade unions 
 
*Motivations to act: 1) To force reforms upon a reluctant union or management; 2) To protect workers from the 
impact of reforms at the enterpise; 3) Loss of confidence in the FDGB; 4) Workers are still members of the 
FDGB; 5) To practice all of workers’ co-determination rights; 6) To represent all workers to management; 7) 
To represent workers not in the FDGB; 8) West German workscouncils have no legal foundation in the GDR; 
9) To call upon political reforms; 10) To define workers’ rights 
. 
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Suite 
Enterprise or 
institution 
Initiative taken Month Motivations 
to act* 
Relation to other 
structures for the 
defense of workers’ 
interests  
Positive or 
negative refe-
rence to mo-
dels  
27- Zentrum für 
Wissenschaftl. 
Gerätebau 
Formation of a 
works council 
December 5 Outside BGL and 
other trade unions 
 
28- Kommunale 
Wohnungsverw. 
Berlin-Mitte 
Petition to 
FDGB head 
December 1, 9 Calls for the dissolu-
tion of the FDGB 
 
29- VEB für 
Fernsehelektr. 
Berlin 
Formation of a 
supervisory 
board 
December  5 Outside the BGL and 
a works council, still 
to be formed  
 
 Formation of a 
new trade union 
December 1 Outside the BGL  
 Formation of a 
works council 
January 1  The West Ger-
man model is 
inappropriate in 
a  country whe-
re workers 
possess the 
enterprises 
30- Staatlicher 
Forstbetrieb 
Stralsund 
Formation of a 
new trade union  
December 3, 5 Outside the BGL  
31- Rat der 
Werktätigen in 
Karl-Marx-
Stadt 
Reform of the 
BGLs 
December 5, 6, 8 Outside the FDGB, 
still present in some of 
the city’s enterprises 
The West Ger-
man model is 
inappropriate 
where workers 
possess the 
enterprises 
32- Schwer-
transport Leip-
zig 
Formation of a 
works council 
December 1, 5, 6 Outside the BGL  
33- VEB Che-
mie- u. Tankan-
lagenbau Fürs-
tenwalde 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
December 5 Outside the BGL  
34- Heizkraftw. 
Gera  
Formation of a 
works council 
December 1  Outside the BGL  
35- VEB Verei-
nigte Zellstoff-
werke Pirna 
Formation of a 
works council 
December 10   
36- VEB Mö-
belk. Berlin 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
January 1, 5 To replace the FDGB-
BGL 
 
37- Gross-
wäsch. Geiz-
hain 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
January    
38- VEB 
Schiffselektron. 
Wildau 
Formation of a 
new trade union 
January 1, 3, 5 To replace the FDGB-
BGL 
 
39- Handelsorg. Formation of a 
new trade union 
January 1 Outside the BGL  
*Motivations to act: 1) To force reforms upon a reluctant union or management; 2) To protect workers from the 
impact of reforms at the enterpise; 3) Loss of confidence in the FDGB; 4) Workers are still members of the 
FDGB; 5) To practice all of workers’ co-determination rights; 6) To represent all workers to management; 7) 
To represent workers not in the FDGB; 8) West German workscouncils have no legal foundation in the GDR; 
9) To call upon political reforms; 10) To define workers’ rights 
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Suite 
Enterprise or 
institution 
Initiative taken Month Motivations 
to act* 
Relation to other 
structures for the 
defense of workers’ 
interests  
Positive or 
negative refe-
rence to mo-
dels  
40- VEB Sach-
senbräu Leipzig 
Formation of a 
works council 
January 1, 2, 5, 6 Outside the BGL Mentions the 
West German 
dual system 
41- Lössnitzer 
Arbeiterrat 
Formation of a 
new trade 
unions and 
works councils 
January 3, 7 To replace the FDGB-
BGL 
 
42- VEB Kraft-
werk Eisenhüt-
tenstadt 
Formation of a  
works council 
January 5, 6 Together with the 
formation of  new 
trade unions 
Favorable to the 
Swedish model, 
but with more 
rights for wor-
kers 
43- AEB Formation of a 
works council 
January 3, 5, 6 Outside the BGL, to 
force its reform 
 
44- VEB Elmo 
Oranienburg 
Formation of a 
works council 
January 1, 2, 6  An enterprise  
Round Table  
45- VEB Funk-
werk Köpenick, 
Betriebsteil 
Dabendorf 
Formation of a 
works council 
January 5, 6   
46- Konsum 
Backwaren 
Görlitz 
Warning strike January 1, 2   
47- Görlitzer 
Maschinenbau 
Formation of a 
group of wor-
kers 
January 1, 5 Outside the BGL  
48- VEB Geo-
physik  
Formation of 
works council 
February 10 Outside the BGL The West Ger-
man model does 
not grant wor-
kers with 
enough rights 
49- Generaldi-
rektion in der 
Deutschen 
Reichsbahn 
Reform the 
BGL 
February 4, 8, 10 The actual structure 
counts less than the 
exercise of rights 
The West Ger-
man model 
would be a 
setback  
50- VEB 
Schaltelektronik 
Oppach 
Formation of a 
works council 
February 1, 2, 3, 6 Outside the BGL  
51- VEB WAB 
Görlitz 
Formation of a 
works council 
February 2, 5, 6, 8 Outside the BGL and 
to replace it if reforms 
are not implemented  
 
*Motivations to act: 1) To force reforms upon a reluctant union or management; 2) To protect workers from the 
impact of reforms at the enterpise; 3) Loss of confidence in the FDGB; 4) Workers are still members of the 
FDGB; 5) To practice all of workers’ co-determination rights; 6) To represent all workers to management; 7) 
To represent workers not in the FDGB; 8) West German workscouncils have no legal foundation in the GDR; 
9) To call upon political reforms; 10) To define workers’ rights 
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2.5.2.2 On West German Words to Describe East German Realities  
Some remarks are necessary. First, every initiative listed here as “formation of a works coun-
cil” refers to a structure representing the entire workforce of an enterprise, in contrast to trade 
unions, which are membership organizations. Many were named “works council” (Betrieb-
srat) by their initiators, but other designations were also used.354 
When they tried, almost on the spot, to assess recent trends in the reconfiguration of the struc-
tures for the defense of worker interests in the GDR, West German analysts referred to every 
worker initiative taken in the workplace as a “works council,” which they distinguished from 
initiatives taken by reformers within FDGB unions, including reforms of the local BGL.355 
Their binomial taxonomy – works council/trade unions - was used by other West German and 
American analysts356, and it is used here too. 
Yet some comments are necessary to prevent a West German perspective from distorting the 
East German reality. The use of “works council” for East German initiatives has often become 
a performative category, in the sense that conclusions were disguised as empirical reviews 
although they were the result of the terminology in use. Hence two arguments first made by 
Pirker and his colleagues remained dominant in literature since and have a lot to do with their 
semantic choices. The first consisted in the observation of the settlement of two structures of 
worker representation in the GDR in line with the changes of 1989-1990, trade unions and 
works councils. The use of West German ‘works council’ for different initiatives made a 
complex process look like an almost natural reproduction of West German dual structures. 
The second was to depict the reform of the FDGB unions as attempts by defenders of the re-
gime to save their heads. As a (logical?) consequence, the dual terminology initiators closed 
their analysis in 1990 with calls to the West German trade unions to support the East German 
“works councils” in what they suggested was their democratic fight against undemocratic 
trade unions. Such an argumentation agrees with the mood in West German trade unions at 
the same time and in literature since. 
The problem with this transposition of West German terminology to an East German context 
is not that many works councils did not formulate the encompassing character of their structu-
res (cases 8, 25, 27, 29, 34, 35, 48 do not refer to the will to bring together all workers under 
the same organization of defense of interests). Experience with works councils during the 
                                                 
354 Institutsrat in the Zentrum für wissenschaftlichen Gerätebau (case 27), Unabhängige Interessenvertretung 
Werktätiger in the AEB (case 43) or Kollektiv Prokjektierung in the VEB Elmo (case 44). 
355 Pirker 1990; Kädtler/Kollwitz 1990. 
356 Seideneck 1991and Fuller 1999, for instance. 
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Weimar years, in the immediate post-war Soviet zone and in West Germany made it quite 
clear to East German workers that any corresponding initiative, however named, was meant to 
unite all of an enterprise’s workers under a single umbrella. The main problem is rather that 
the East German trade unions were also enterprise-based and united nearly 100% of the work-
force. Hence "works council" initiatives challenged the established practices of trade unions 
in a way that the reference to the West German dual system muddled instead of cleared up. 
The relationship between East German works councils and trade unions were not one-sided. 
In case 14, the formation of a works council was meant to replace the BGL altogether. In case 
25, initiators stated that they were to clarify the relationship between works council and trade 
union "later on". In another, the "works council" was rather implemented in order to accelera-
te trade union reform (case 43); a fourth one saw itself as a potential replacement if the BGL 
did not continue with reform (case 51). Many works councils were initiated as a structure 
“outside the BGL,” as a complementary workplace-based structure representing all workers 
(cases 25, 27, 32, 34, 40, 42, 43, 48, 50, 51). The relationships between BGL and other enter-
prise-based initiatives related to the conditions prevailing in all enterprises, not with the re-
production of the West German dual structures of workers’ representation.   
On an analytical level, there is no difference between the formation of ‘works councils’ and 
that of alternative trade unions beside – or replacing - the existing BGL (cases 4, 13, 22, 26, 
36, 38). In both cases the initiative taken was aimed at renewing the defense of interests in the 
workplace (as pointed at, differently, in cases 13 and 26 and in two municipal initiatives, ca-
ses 31 and 41).  
2.5.2.3 Search for Effective Structures for the Defense of Interests 
The formation of works councils and new trade unions indicat a search in many workplaces 
for the most adequate structures for the defense of worker interests. The different initiatives 
listed suggest a proven dynamic with the aim of creating effective structures. 
Three cases from the above table (13, 29 and 49) point in a more constructive direction, as 
they downplay the name of the structure name while emphasizing the effectiveness of the 
defense of worker interests in the enterprise. These cases show how the number of structures 
(trade unions, works council, supervisory board, groups of workers) in a single enterprise res-
ponded more to the internal state of the defense of worker interests and less to inherent cha-
racteristics of one structure or another. The more examples compared, the more obvious it 
becomes that it was the specific setting of local conditions – previous experiences of defense 
of worker interests, degree of functionality of the BGL in fall 1989, reaction of management 
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and BGL officials to the workforce, success or failure of initial reforms, effectiveness of wor-
kers’ influence over decision-making processes in the enterprise, presence of militant acti-
vists, etc. - which brought workers to launch different initiatives. The contingency of local 
conditions determined the emergence of one or more structures for the defense of worker inte-
rests. And with this contingency, indecision and uncertainty are a mark of this period. 
The dynamic of experimenting and the quest for an effective defense of worker interests are 
also shown in the explicit reference to the strengths and weaknesses of other systems of wor-
ker representation. In the 51 cases displayed in this work, the West German and the Swedish 
systems are referred to.357  
2.5.2.4 Studying workers’ motivations for action 
Let us turn to the motivations. Again, the context explains that a same motivation was found 
in different workplaces in different initiatives. Consider, for example, the motivation to action 
#1, “To force reforms upon a reluctant union or management.” Workers reacted differently to 
the refusal by the BGL or the management to implement the reforms they demanded (cases 2, 
4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 44, 46, 
50). Various actions inside and outside the factory gates were undertaken. Some petitioned the 
party, the FDGB, or the management (cases 9, 18, 20, 23, 28). Some formed a new trade 
union either outside the BGL (cases 4, 7, 26, 29, 39), or to replace it (cases 5, 22, 36, 38). 
Others formed a "works council" (cases 2, 25, 29, 32, 34, 40, 44, 50), a "supervisory council" 
(case 29) or a "group of workers" (cases 8, 12). Some called their colleagues to strike (cases 
16 and 17) or launched a warning strike (case 46). In one case, workers participated to a local 
political gathering and initiated a sectoral trade union (case 24). Sometimes, more than one 
such initiative was undertaken (cases 2, 7, 8, 13, 24, 24). To go deeper in the study of the mo-
tivations for action, here is a graph displaying how the motivations are distributed throughout 
this period. 
                                                 
357 Former Environmental Library activist Christian Halbrock informed the author of at least one meeting bet-
ween East Berlin workers, opposition activists, and two French journalists (probably at the beginning of 1990,) 
on the structures of representation and rights of workers in France. 
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 Table 13 : Frequency of occurrences of motivations*, by month 
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Number of 
workplaces 
concerned 
September          2  2 
October 7  2  1    6  11 
November 9 1 2  7 2 1  2  12 
December 8  3  9 3  1 3 1 13 
January 9 4 3  8 6 1    13 
February 1 2 1 1 2 2  2  1 5 
Total / 
column  
34 7 11 1 27 13 2 3 13 2 59 
 *Motivations to act: 1) To force reforms upon a reluctant union or management; 2) To protect workers from the 
impact of reforms at the enterpise; 3) Loss of confidence in the FDGB; 4) Workers are still members of the 
FDGB; 5) To practice all of workers’ co-determination rights; 6) To represent all workers to management; 7) To 
represent workers not in the FDGB; 8) West German workscouncils have no legal foundation in the GDR; 9) To 
call upon political reforms; 10) To define workers’ rights. 
The only objective of this table is to identify general trends in time. The picture produced is as 
follows. 
In September, worker initiatives (two petitions) participated in the launch of the movement 
for political reforms in the country (motivation 9). This basically corresponds to a period of 
“politicization” of workers’ demands in some workplaces. It is also in line with the fact that 
the protest began when people reported back to work in September and realized that thou-
sands of their colleagues had fled. 
In October, workers continued to bolster the movement for political reforms in the country 
(motivation 9) with actions at the workplace. Given, for instance, the significance of the de-
monstration of 70,000 people on October 9 in Leipzig where no intervention occurred and the 
fact that Honecker was finally forced to resign 11 days later, this month marked the beginning 
of changes in the GDR. Many initiatives of that month attempted to force reforms within en-
terprises upon reluctant BGL leaders or the management. This is another demonstration of the 
relationship between developments inside and outside the workplace. Common trends were 
prevalent between November and January in a way that justifies considering these months as 
a single period. Firstly, complementary and overlapping initiatives multiplied during those 
months. Although some of these were launched against others (independent trade union 
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against the former BGL, for instance), the dominant assumption was that, during the initial 
period, different structures of worker representation were not mutually exclusive.358  
A second trend was the central role of the workplace in the initiatives. Attempts at reforming 
the FDGB from the top were less significant.359 
A third trend was the desire to exercise workers’ rights as formally defined in the East Ger-
man labor law and in the constitution - in legal terms, rightful claims rather than demands. 
This trend emerges in view of the predominance of motivations 1 (to implement reforms 
against reluctant union or management) and 5 (to practice all of workers’ rights within the 
enterprise), which appear in 34 of 38 cases of those months. It suggests that many initiatives 
sought to develop mechanisms to enable workers to exercise what was considered legitimate 
rights. Hence, it is striking that "the will to determinate worker rights" (motivation 10) is men-
tioned only once during these three months – it suggests an agreement among workers as to 
the nature of their rights. The most common basis for the initiatives launched between No-
vember and January were the rights of workers as defined by GDR labor law. 
It would be ridiculous, however, to state that every initiative was driven by the unanimous 
will to implement the East German labor law and no thing else. A fourth trend, though less 
dominant than the former, was a review of foreign models of worker representation and labor 
laws. These references show attempts at weighing the pros and cons of the international expe-
riences. The envisaged union pluralism is reminiscent, i.e. of the French system, and a clear 
rejection of the unitary model of the FRG. The West German dual model and labor laws were 
sometime explicitly condemned as inadequate for the GDR, proof that this model was also 
discussed and preferred by some workers.360 Reasons mentioned for negative opinions of the 
West German model underscored the East German workplace unionism (as opposed to West 
German sector-based unionism), more extensive worker rights in the GDR, and the will to 
produce a blend of different models. 
                                                 
358 The interviews published in the December 1989 issue of the Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte (12/89) contain 
many corresponding indications by opposition activists that all initiatives taken in the world of labor would re-
sult in a better defense of worker interests. See “Demokratischer Aufbruch (Ehrhart Neubert)”, p. 764 and “Ver-
einigte Linke (Wolfgang Wolff)”, p. 788.  
359 Hürtgen 2005 rejects any role for them in the East German "workplace revolution". 
360 Discussions in September 2003 with works councilors from four former Deutsche Reichsbahn (now Bombar-
dier) plants showed that in Görlitz, the West German dual model was preferred by workers from December 1989 
on. In the three other plants, different initiatives were taken beside the reform of the BGL.  
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Plurality, workplace initiatives, exercise of worker rights defined in the East German labor 
law and a review of international experiences: these are the dominant trends observed in the 
author’s sample of 51 East German workplaces between November and January. The first 
three directly reflect different worker experiences in the GDR, the fourth, a need for a recepti-
veness to other models. All of them amount to a dynamic for restructuring the mechanisms for 
the defense of worker interests in the GDR. Though not driven by a mass of active workers, 
initiatives could potentially emerge in every enterprise and change many aspects of everyday 
life at work.  
 The motivations for worker action were different in February. At first glance, these changes 
appear somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the motivations changed and multiplied. 
This new combination points towards a new situation and, as the context changed, a motiva-
tion could garner new meaning. On the other hand, the number of initiatives fell in February, 
an unlikely indication of a growing incentive to act. Is this a paradox?  
Significantly in February, the desire to implement reforms within the enterprise (motivation 
1) which had been dominant until then, fell in stature to the attempt to protect workers from 
the impact of the introduction of the market economy (motivation 2), the exercise of workers’ 
co-determination rights (motivation 5), the unification of all workers under one organization 
(motivation 6) and lack of any legal foundation for works councils (motivation 8). This chan-
ge indicates concerns resulting from upcoming economic reforms. Without stopping, the dy-
namic of reshaping the structures for the defense of worker interests became strongly deter-
mined by the shift towards the Monetary and Economic Union and the discussion on the 
transfer of the West German labor law in the GDR. Helmut Kohl’s proposition for a quick 
unification through a rapid economic union had been made at the beginning of the month. The 
East German Ordinance on joint ventures from the end of January opened the door to the in-
flow of western capital. East German managers were not only discussing economic collabora-
tion but also the selling parts of East German enterprises to West German entrepreneurs. 
Workers were frequently not informed of the progress of talks.  
The new contextestablished in February further intensified the question of the future of em-
ployment, worker rights and the mechanisms for the defense of worker interests in the GDR. 
The claim that West German works councils had no legal foundation in the GDR (motivations 
8) shows that many workplace activists rejected a pure and simple transfer of West German 
labor law and structures of worker representation into the GDR. 
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The study of motivations produces an insight into some changes in February. Other criteria 
facilitate a better grasp of the nature of those changes. 
2.5.3 The February Shift: How to Implement Effective Mechanisms for the 
Defense of Worker Interests 
According to the economic historian Jörg Roesler, one of the effects of the new context of 
January-February 1990 was that workers began to raise the question of property after having 
previously concentrated on the “re-organization of worker representation”.361 Joint venture 
with West German companies sometimes “whipped” the workforce and into action, as they 
wished to see their property rights respected. They wrote letters to managers in which they 
demanded a role in all talks which could effect their job security, they set up structures inten-
ded to ensure their active participation, and some went on strike.362  
The balance of power was not especially unfavorable to workers in February, explains Roe-
sler. In many workplaces, they forced through agreements granting them wide-ranging co-
determination rights on any modification of ownership. Clauses to these agreements usually 
envisioned that they could be preserved in a joint venture with a West German firm. Such 
agreements were rejected by Western managers used to less requirements on access to infor-
mation. Former West German Minister of the Economy, Hans Apel, commented on his expe-
rience as president of the supervisory board of the East German ESPAG:  
Die Macht liegt in diesen Monaten der Wende (bei der ESPAG und) auch im Kombinat 
Senftenberg bei den Vertretern der Arbeitnehmer.363 
In the office machinery plant in Sömmerda, the participation of workers led to a specific form 
of worker ownership. Known as the Sömmerda Model, the agreement foresaw that a 75% 
stake in the enterprise would belong to the workforce and the rest to the East German trust 
agency Treuhandanstalt. Similar solutions to the property question were discussed and enac-
ted in other workplaces as well.  
Not surprisingly, the Sömmerda Model met with little enthusiasm from the West German 
FDP and the economic press. Fritz Heinz Himmelreich from the Confederation of German 
                                                 
361 Roesler 2002.  
362 Ibid, p. 764. 
363 Hans Apel, 2000, Zerstörte Illusionen. Meine ostdeutschen Jahre (Munich), p. 51, cited in: Ibid, p. 765. 
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employers' Associations (BDA) rejected it as a “syndicalist economic order ” and projected, if 
it were to take hold, a “complete disempowerment of owners”364  
Hence, Jörg Roesler demonstrates that the context of February brought workers to address 
property issues, something they had not done before. The sample of 51 workplaces studied in 
this work produces a slighty different observation. These differences show how difficult it is 
to put a finger on actual trends common to all East German workplaces. One significant chan-
ge suggested by our sample lies in the comparison of the objectives put forward before and 
during February 1990. The period November–January had topics relating to the defense of 
worker interests but also political issues being addressed in the workplaces. The month of 
February saw a focus on the topics relating to internal structures and worker rights. 
Comparison of objectives put forward in initiatives, October 1989-January 
1990/February 1990 
Table 14 : I) Internal functioning of the initiated structure for the defense of worker interests 
October –January (initiatives taken in 12 enterprises) 
Be based on a down-to-top construction and modes of action 10 
Be independent from party control / no mandatory party membership  4 
Working out of a new constitution for the FDGB 3 
Independence from the direction / accountable only to members 3 
Hold regular general assemblies 3 
Represent all workers within the enterprise 3 
Let BGL pay their president 2 
Improve trade union officials’ behavior toward workers 1 
Establish permanent or ad hoc commissions 1 
Requires no additional fees beside membership dues 1 
Elect its officials through secret and free elections 1 
More active in representing workers’ interests 1 
Not represented in parliaments 1 
Structure of workers’ representation also at the regional level 1 
Has regular consultation hours for members 1 
Recall procedures for all elected officials 1 
Minimum length of service in the enterprise required to become union official 1 
Dual structure of workers’ representation 1 
 
                                                 
364 Quoted in Annegret Schüle, 1995, BWS Sömmerda. Die wechselvolle Geschichte eines Industriestandortes in 
Thüringen 1816-1995 (Erfurt), p. 343, cited in: Ibid, pp. 765-66.  
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February (initiative taken in 1 enterprise) 
Based on a bottom-to-top construction and modes of action 1 
Be independent from party control 1 
Temporary dual structure of workers’ representation 1 
 
Table 15 : II) Wages, working time and working conditions 
November-January (initiatives taken in 12 enterprises) 
Force reform of the remuneration system 11 
Force a reduction in working hours 3 
Improve safety and working conditions 3 
More holidays 2 
Force reorganization of production within enterprise 2 
Ensure that time spent at work is productive 1 
 
February - none 
 
Table 16 : III) Workers’ rights and duties in the enterprise 
October – January (initiatives taken in 31 enterprises) 
Ensure co-determination rights and accurate implementation of collective agree-
ments 
22 
Protection of the enterprise’s independence and secrecy 4 
Co-determination in the nominations / control over management 4 
Participation to the implementation of reforms in the enterprise 3 
Job security 3 
Co-determination over the enterprise’s funds and profits 2 
Better worker rights than included in the AGB 2 
Protection of the freedom of speech  1 
Right to information 1 
Right to the development of one’s individuality at the workplace 1 
  
February (initiatives taken in 5 enterprises)  
Ensure co-determination and rights of workers and accurate implementation of 
collective agreements 
3 
Co-determination rights on all changes in the enterprise 2 
Better workers’ rights than allotted for in the East German labor law 2 
Working out of a GDR version of the Works Constitution Act 1 
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 Table 17 : IV) Social policy, economic and political issues 
October-January (initiatives taken in 10 enterprises) 
Reshaping of the Plan / investment policy 4 
Participation of workers in the reshaping of the economic system 2 
Investigation of all corruption cases in the GDR 2 
Develop better social policy programs 1 
Better trade union trips and holidays resorts 1 
Ending all privileges 1 
Ensuring that workers are not victims of the economic changes 1 
  
February (none)   
 
The concentration on topics relating to the internal functioning of trade unions and workers’ 
rights indicates new contingencies and a will to attend to the most urgent matters first, namely 
the organization of an efficient structure for the defense of workers’ interests, which will en-
sure the respect of worker rights. Because of their former significance for trade union action, 
the withdrawal in February of objectives concerning social policy issues was especially signi-
ficant in that respect. After all, East Germans were still in charge of the social policy and 
workers continued to go to their local union to receive services. 
The situation in February can be defined as volatile and transitional. Where and when they 
launched initiatives, workers were sometimes strong enough to ratify advantageous workplace 
agreements securing their rights - yet they never knew how long those agreements would re-
main valid. This uncertainty about undergoing economic reforms and the future legal frame-
work for the defense of worker interests was also reflected in the focus on goals and the re-
duction in the number of initiatives. These contradictory phenomena were manifestations of 
the difficulties faced by workers in their attempts to develop effective structures for the defen-
se of their rights and interests in a changing context. 
The kind of complex situation produced by such contradictory phenomena is described below 
in an interview of Bergmann-Borsig BGL members. It took place in April 1990, at a moment 
where the local union found itself torn in the process of the judical transition from the East 
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German to the West German labor law.365 Yet the transitional problems described by the head 
of the BGL had started in February.   
Ein groβes Handikap ist die bisherige Aufgabenverteilung der Gewerkschaften bei uns. 
Historisch gesehen waren wir für die Verwaltung von Engpässen zuständig. Gab es frü-
her beispielsweise Bananen, hat sie die Gewerkschaft im Betrieb verteilt, damit jeder 
einmal Bananen bekam. So war das bei uns in den sechziger Jahren. (…)Wir sind jetzt 
in der schwierigen Phase, wo wir das eine [the different tasks of the industrial social po-
licy] nicht mehr sollen und das andere, zum Beispiel Tarifpolitik noch nicht können. 
Um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen: Wir haben zur zeit zweihundert Wohnungssuchende auf 
der Liste. Wir können in einer solchen Situation diese Aufgabe doch nicht einfach ein-
stellen. Es sind schwierige Fragen, vor denen wir jetzt inder Übergangszeit stehen.366 
A similar situation, added other BGL members participating to the interview, was prevalent 
within the enterprise’s kindergarten and health resorts. At the same time, the management 
acted unlawfully, bypassed the union and fixed wages without consultation.  
Returning to the table "Comparison of objectives put forward in initiatives, October 1989-
January 1990/February 1990", it is interesting to note that the East German labor law remai-
ned the main point of reference, also in February. Even where workers called for the drafting 
an East German version of the West German Works Constitution Act, the formulation explici-
tly involved labor regulations more advantageous to workers than those of the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany, hence a symbiosis rather than a transfer. It may be more than anecdotal that 
during the years spent on this research, the author did not find one single written East German 
source calling for the transfer of West German legal institutions in the GDR. They were un-
deniably discussed at East German workplaces. Still, one clear expression of this reflection is 
the statement over their inadequacies. 
This was to change, as we shall see. Yet, the analysis of initiatives taken in 51 workplaces 
suggests that legal extension of the West German labor law in the GDR cannot be seen as an 
explicit choice made by East German workers resulting from the dynamic involved in restruc-
turing the mechanisms for the defense of their interests. Outside, West German, influences 
were necessary in the process. This is the object of the next section. How and why the East 
German labor could provide fertile grounds for such influence can be examined by looking at 
the poor results of the different initiatives taken in the 51 workplaces considered in this sec-
tion.  
                                                 
365 This process is described in the next part. 
366 “Die Unsicherheit wächst”, pp. 399-400.  
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Even after making due allowances for the type of sources considered and the fact that they 
might not adequately document their entire impact, the scarcity of concrete effects of the nu-
merous initiatives taken is obvious. 
In November  
7- A ‘collective agreement’ has been signed with management. The BGL has agreed to consi-
der the dissolution of the Task Forces and political organizations. 
14- The management has agreed to all claims and demands, but since they don’t go far 
enough, new ones have to be drafted 
 
In December 
32- An enterprise agreement was signed with the management, establishing the mechanisms of 
the works council, as well as worker co-determination rights. It will remain in force until an 
East German version of the Works Constitution Act is promulgated 
 
In January 
38- The BGL president was forced to resign 
 
In February 
48- A collaboration agreement was signed with the management, laying down the functioning 
of the works council, as well as workers co-determination rights. It will remain in force until an 
East German version of the Works Constitution Act is promulgated.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The central question guiding us throughout the second part of this work concerns the role of 
workers in the collapse of the GDR. To perform a proper assessment of the situation within 
the labor movement during the second half of the 1980s, a two-pronged approach was requi-
red, one that considered the vantage point of the regime and the workers. With respect to 
workers, the regime uses both surveillance and repression at the workplace, plus policies ai-
med at neutralizing potential conflicts. During these years the Stasi and FDGB officials in 
workplaces registered growing discontent stemming from various issues affecting workers’ 
lives, inside and outside the workplace. These included: working conditions, the organization 
of labor, management, trade union, production planning, the availability of consumer goods, 
housing, vacation, services, culture, the media, mass organizations, political leadership and 
the political system. Their reports recorded claims of workers in detail and consistently stated 
how worrisome the situation was becoming. They also listed the kinds of measures that would 
meet with the approval of the workers. The warning signals conveyed to higher-level officials 
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in Stasi and FDGB reports reached a leadership which was no longer able to quell discontent 
as it once had. Previously, the favored tools in the neutralization policy of the regime had in-
cluded improvements to the living conditions of the population through employment and in-
dustrial social policy, as well as an array of (nominal) worker rights. The economic situation 
in the second half of the 1980s made it impossible for the regime to continue to neutralize 
potential conflicts by enacting such policies. They were rather concentrating on ways to fur-
ther drive down wages and on social policy provisions. 
A review of the mechanisms for defending their interests examined the situation of workers at 
the end of the 1980s. The official structures was very limited in that respect. BGL, brigades, 
arbitration commissions and petitions to the FDGB only allowed individuals to voice opinions 
on issues related to wages/norms, classification and some management decisions. One key 
area where worker interests could be defended related to the correlation of wages to norms. 
Various individual and covert practices enabled them to influence the pace of production and 
to raise wages. Lowering wages and raising productivity had become the main priority of the 
SED leadership in the late 1980s, with worker resistance to these goals serving as the main 
obstacle. 
Hence, the juxtaposition of the regime’s and workers’ perspectives on labor in the 1980s hig-
hlights the struggles over wages and norms: the desire to increase productivity, the resistance 
to this, attempts at repressing and neutralizing this resistance. The enlargement of the period 
under review shows that struggles over wages and norms were a permanent cause of friction 
between the power-holders and the working population. Two periods of political crisis, 1959-
1962 and 1967-1972, are especially revealing in that respect. During those years, the regime 
conducted wide-ranging campaigns against labor, with the goal of significantly increasing 
productivity and lowering wages. These campaigns included a restructuring of payment 
schemes and the organization of labor, as well as increased surveillance and repression and 
certain measures set to neutralize conflicts (i.e. boosting the availability of consumer goods 
and new social policy provisions). During the second half of the 1980s, the government lea-
dership tried to build on a new strategy of repressive and neutralizing policies, yet the econo-
mic difficulties and labor resistance made this impossible.  
Struggles over wages and norms were an enduring conflict between the population and its 
leadership. The antagonism took new forms as economic, political and social conditions 
changed. It re-emerged and would ultimately determine the political crises confronting the 
nation, although never in itself the key catalyst, but always a necessary one in setting these 
off. Interaction between workers and the regime was never limited to these struggles, nor we-
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re the social conflicts in the GDR limited to them. They are, however, the most visible mark 
of how conflicting interests of the workers and the leadership immediately shaped the history 
of the country. Toward the end of the 1980s, many early signs of popular protest were recor-
ded in the labor movement, precursoring events to come. Analysis of the situation at enterpri-
ses is thus crucial in understanding the build up of tensions leading to the 1989 revolution, 
both long-term in nature and forming in the months leading to upheaval. 
Were workers also actors in the revolution? Many indications would suggest yes. Those who 
left the GDR during that summer were workers; the protest began as people reported back to 
work in September and realized that thousands of their colleagues had fled. The majority of 
the 5 million persons that participated in the 2,600 demonstrations were workers, and 200 
strikes were recorded. Stasi reports from Erfurt between October and November are valuable 
in understanding the correlations between what was happening inside and outside the factory 
gates during the revolution. In a city like Erfurt, no fewer than four kinds of correlation can be 
inferred from Stasi documents: political developments at the state and regional level were 
strongly debated among workers on the shop floor; the workplace was used to mobilize wor-
kers for political action outside the factory gates; the regime’s collapse had immediate reper-
cussions on the power structures at the workplace; and discontent at working conditions cau-
sed workers to engage in activities outside the factory gates. These correlations show that the 
workplace requires due consideration when attempting to understand the dynamics at play 
during the revolution. 
The Stasi reports from Erfurt enterprises are also full of examples of the dramatic erosion of 
power structures within labor during the revolution. This gradual loss of control over labor 
deprived the regime of its bases of operation precisely where much of its surveillance and 
intervention capacities were centered. This illustrates another aspect of how political deve-
lopments and the situation on shop floors were deeply interrelated. 
By the first half of November 1989, individuals associated with the state domination, in the 
party or the FDGB at a national, regional and enterprise level, had been forced to resign. 
When the Wall fell, the political agenda changed and opened the road to wide-ranging re-
forms in all areas. A review of sources documenting worker initiatives in 51 enterprises bet-
ween November and January shows how this reform process came into being within the labor 
movement. Concerns expressed by workers related directly to the defense of their interests. 
Many initiatives were launched under various names. What united these initiatives was the 
common search to find the most effective structures to defend worker interests. The great 
number of complementary and overlapping worker initiatives to defend their interests was one 
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important trend in these months. Another trend was the dominant role the workplace was 
playing in every initiative. A third one was the widespread reference to the worker rights as 
defined under the East German labor law and constitution. These initiatives often focused on 
effectively exercising these rights that existed only on paper in the GDR. A fourth trend in-
volved evaluating foreign models of worker representation and labor laws as guidance in the 
process of supplementing and amending the East German laws. Together, these trends form to 
a dynamic of potential restructuring of the structures for defending workers' interests. Al-
though not driven by a mass of active workers, such initiatives could nevertheless emerge in 
every enterprise. 
There are two major advantages to refer to a dynamic: 1) it indicates that local conditions help 
explain why initiatives did or did not emerge, and 2) it underscores the instability and unpre-
dictability of this period. A decision of the management or the BGL, for instance, could be the 
catalyst for worker initiatives in workplaces where tensions had not previously existed. Un-
less more case studies close it, the gap between the proliferation of initiatives identified in 
some studies (as in this one) and the persistent inclination of the literature to consider all of 
them exceptional might have to be bridged in a way similar to that by which composers invi-
ted unreceptive audiences to listen to minimalist music in the 1950s. First-time listeners com-
plained that “nothing” happened in these pieces. In response, composers did not reply that “a 
lot” was going on in minimalist music, but rather that its richness derived from the fact that 
“anything” could happen. It is up to the listener to hear how unpredictable minimalist music 
actually is, and it is up to the historian to interpret how unstable the East German workplaces 
were in 1989. 
The burgeoning of this reshaping dynamic produced only a few flowers to show for it. There 
was no overall consensus on what mechanisms for defending worker interests should be set 
up. In February, the restructuring of these mechanisms grew in urgency with the opening of 
the GDR to the market economy and international competition. This brought about greater 
concentration on the topics relating to internal structures and worker rights (in comparison to 
November-January) and a growing need to unite all of the workers at one enterprise under one 
blanket organization. Wherever such initiatives were launched, workers could ratify favorable 
agreements, however without knowing how long such agreements would remain valid. The 
overall number of initiatives fell in February. Hence, the situation in February appears uncer-
tain and volatile. The next section demonstrate how the decision to transfer the West German 
labor law was made in those weeks. This transposition cannot be seen as resulting from the 
East German dynamics involved in reshaping the mechanisms for defending worker interests, 
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although in the difficult context of February, many East German workers may have become 
more receptive to such a solution. 
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Part 3: West German trade unions, the fall of the GDR 
and the reunification: for this system, all our men, 
all our money! 
3.1 Trade unions in the Federal Republic of Germany toward the 
end of the 1980s 
This chapter introduces the situation of trade unions in the Federal Republic at the eve of the 
unification. It portrays an ambivalent situation, characterized by a certain stability (3.1.1) of 
Capital/Labor relationships but also by numerous economic, political and internal challenges 
to trade union politics (3.1.2). This ambivalent situation resulted in core discussions as to the 
future of trade unions’ program, organization and action (3.1.3). This chapter introduces as 
well the four DGB trade unions studied in this work (3.1.4). 
3.1.1 Works councils and the stability of the West German industrial rela-
tions 
At the end of the 1980s many specialists of the West German industrial relations underscored 
the stability of labor organizations in West Germany. Whereas in many industrialized coun-
tries changing economic and political conditions during the previous decade had brought in 
their wake severe setbacks for trade unions, in West Germany, they appeared in a better 
shape. This stability was surprising, as the country had gone through the same kind of conser-
vative political shift (with the Christian-Democratic Union replacing the Social-Democratic 
Party as major partner of the governmental coalition in 1982) and industrial adjustments that 
caused the weakening of their counterparts in other countries as Britain, the United States and 
Canada.367 Yet throughout the decade they suffered smaller loss of membership, less indus-
trial conflicts and obtained better gains in collective bargaining than their counterparts from 
these countries. 
Among different works exploring the causes of the stability of West German trade unions, 
Kathleen A. Thelen’s Union of Parts – Labor Politics in Postwar Germany (1991) deserves 
                                                 
367 Katzenstein 1989. 
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special credits.368 Published just after the unification, this important study digs into the 
sources of the West German trade unions’ stability until 1989. Some of Thelen’s main hy-
potheses and findings are precious to understand the DGB unions’ strategies during the unifi-
cation. 
In a nutshell, Thelen’s argument highlights the meaning West Germany's institutions of indus-
trial relations when it comes to understand trade unions' stability. The “institutional arrange-
ment within which conflicts between labor and capital are resolved have contributed to stable, 
collaborative adjustments”, she explains.369 She credits the works councils, in charge of 
worker representation at the plant level, for the resiliency of the sectoral trade unions’ strength 
throughout the economic turmoil and political changes. Despite legal disconnection between 
unions and works councils, the latter was the main cause behind the former's capacity to hold 
up their central power as their political and market strength decreased. The new economic 
conditions have induced the partial substitution of quantitative issues (wage) with qualitative 
issues in collective bargaining. This shift involved a partial decentralization of collective bar-
gaining, “because such qualitative issues are often plant-specific and thus difficult to resolve 
in the context of uniform centralized negotiations.”370 Yet works councils’ important legal 
rights at the plant level permitted that this decentralization could be accomplished without 
weakening the trade unions. Thelen even argues that the stability of labor-capital relations 
throughout this decentralization process confirmed labor’s strength in the FRG. 
A long evolution had transformed works councils into vehicles of trade unions’ strength in 
West Germany. This path was determined by three turning points. The first was the adoption 
of the Works Constitution Act in 1950-52. The introduction of the dual structure of labor rep-
resentation, with the works councils in charge of the representation of workers’ rights at the 
plant level, corresponded to a defeat of the trade unions. Their attempts to prevent the discon-
nection between both structures of worker representation, and to ensure unions’ domination 
over the works councils, were in vain. Contrary to the situation in vigour during the Weimar 
Republic, works councils in the Federal Republic of Germany were not introduced as an ex-
tension of the union at workplace but as a structure of the company. Clear limits were thus set 
to the defense of workers’ interests at the plant level, as no action detrimental to the normal 
functioning of the company (like strikes) can be attempted by the works council.371 
                                                 
368 Himmelmann 1987 develops similar arguments.  
369 Thelen 1991, p. 2. 
370 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
371 Ibid., p. 67. On DGB unions’ positions during the discussions surrounding the adoption of the Works Consti-
tution Act, see: Otto 1975.  
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The DGB unions found ways to overcome this defeat and to limit the negative outcomes of 
their banning from the workplace. IG Metall's action was especially determinant in finding 
legal obstacles could be circumscribed. On the one hand, this union initiated the election of 
shop stewards (Vertrauensleute), in order to maintain the contact between the union and the 
rank and file. On the other hand, IG Metall initated the setting up of trade union lists of candi-
dates to the works council elections. With a majority of works councilors acting in conformity 
with the union's policies, the risks that works councils accept poor work conditions and wages 
conditions were made smaller. 
Union dominated works councils ensured the predominance of trade unions over the works 
councils within the dual structure of worker representation. This predominance was confirmed 
with the modifications of the Works Constitution Act of 1969 and 1972. These revisions build 
the second turning point in the history of the relationship between the two west German struc-
tures of worker representation. They represented a victory of the trade unions, as the im-
provement of works councils’ prerogatives was not detrimental to trade unions. In Thelen’s 
words, the meaning of the second turning point can be summarized as follows:  
[T]he union redirected demands for increased influence for plant representatives within 
the union into a battle to enhance their powers in the plant. The revised Works Constitu-
tion Act of 1972, passed with the support of the Social Democratic government, 
strengthened the rights of works councils vis-à-vis management, even as it explicitly re-
inforced their subordination to the central union. (…) In sum, the maturing of the rela-
tionship between central unions and works councils since World War II was accom-
plished in two phases. The first, a political defeat for labor in 1952, emphasized the 
independence of works councils from the unions. The second, a political victory two 
decades later, reemphasized their subordination to the unions, while also bolstering their 
powers in the plants.372 
The third turning point occurred between the years 1984 and 1989. It was illustrated by the 
decentralization of collective bargaining, and the increasing import of works councils for 
trade unions' strategies. The collective bargaining rounds of 1984, 1987 and 1989 in the metal 
industry exemplify this decentralization, believes Thelen.373 After a long strike in 1984, IG 
Metall achieved to bring the employers’ association to accept a gradual implementation of the 
35-hour workweek. However, adjustments in the metal industry prevented the union to im-
prove its central position toward employers, despite this important victory. Inversely, after 
this long conflict employers refrained from confronting the union again. The 1987 and 1990 
bargaining rounds confirmed the gradual pasage to the 35-hour workweek whilst introducing 
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more flexibility in the shaping of the work schedules at the plant level. In this process, the 
meaning of works council increased. Kathleen Thelen believes that union control over works 
councils allowed the decentralization of collective bargaining without weakening the position 
of trade unions.374 She is aware that this evolution did not go without a certain ambiguity. 
Firstly, the decentralization of collective bargaining induced the individualization of the exer-
cise of workers’ rights, a process detrimental to union and works council power. For instance, 
the 1987 framework for a gradual working time reduction in the metal industry allowed 18% 
of the workforce to continue to work 40 hours a week, on a voluntary basis. Works councils’ 
possible control is limited to the verification of the share of the workforce concerned. 
Secondly, in order to guarantee that collective bargaining decentalization does not threatened 
union power, two conditions need to be met. One is that unions continue to control the works 
councils, and the other, that employers remain member of their employers associations (so 
that a significant share of an industry is bound to the collective agreements ratified).375 When 
she published her book in 1991, Kathleen A. Thelen was confident that the West German 
trade unions had successfully gone through the turbulent decade of the 1980s and that the sta-
bility of industrial relations in Germany allowed them to contemplate the future with confi-
dence. 
3.1.2 New challenges to trade union action 
The stability and flexibility underlined by Kathleen A. Thelen is indubitable, yet it covers 
only one aspect of West German unions' reality in the 1980s. The inclination of political sci-
entists and specialists of industrial relations to condense the stability of Capital-Labor rela-
tions in the FRG into a symbol of union power was not shared by the unions themselves, who 
did not equate little industrial conflicts with little concerns. Although labor appeared protected 
from too frontal attacks, peaceful industrial relations did not indicate a status quo in Capital-
Labor relationships. Despite the stability, the strength of trade unions was eroding. The 1981 
DGB program offered little help in identifying a way out of this critical situation.  
3.1.2.1 The 1981 DGB Program 
At the origin of the 1981 DGB progrm, there was a reflection initiated by IG Metall in 1972 
on th emeasures that the trade unions could take in reaction to the end of the “reform eupho-
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ria” and the reduction of labor victories. Different forums and action programs throughout the 
second half of the 1970s prepared the ground for the final adoption of a new program by the 
DGB. Beside classic trade unions' demands (e.g. the right to work, improvement of working 
conditions, increasing of wages, fairer wealth redistribution, better vocational training), the 
attainment of full employment was made unions’ top priority. The 1981 program conducted a 
strategic reorientation on the defense of established worker rights. The program’s preamble 
insisted on the recognition by the West German Basic Law of a legal basis to trade union poli-
tics.376 But the adoption of a new program did not prevent the DGB unions from difficulties. 
Economic, political and internal developments challenged them to the point where the pro-
gram supposed to take them out of their stagnation and revitalize their action soon appeared in 
need of important corrections. Which were those challenges? 
3.1.2.2 New economic realities 
It would be a foolhardy enterprise to present the economic phenomena challenging trade un-
ions’ politics during the 1980s. Yet, as most of these phenomena continue to shape Germany's 
economic and social reality today, this presentation can be limited to naming them without 
going into the details of their development and implications. 
Among those economic challenges to union politics, the “various forms of flexibilization [of 
production], decentralization [of decision-making] and forms of individualization [of work 
conditions]” deserve the first mention.377 Globalization of markets (the term made its appari-
tion by the mid-1980s) and greater international competition affected German exportations 
severely and intensified the developments just mentioned.378 More than I previous decades, 
the introduction of new technologies was responsible for the “decline of workers' social con-
dition” (layoffs, poorer working conditions, and downgradings).379 
These economic developments resulted in an increase of unemployment. Whereas unem-
ployment had remained stable at around 4,5% during the second half of the 1970s, it was 
twice as high a decade later.380 The new, structural character of unemployment had not in-
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duced a severe decline in unions’ membership, which oscillated between 7,471,000 (1977) 
and 7,958,000 (1981), to reach 7,757,000 (1987), although the share organized workers de-
creased slightly over the period, from 34.2% (1978) to 32,9% (1985). Yet, labor’s capacity to 
enter into industrial conflict was affected.381 By the mid-1980s, unemployment was singled 
out as the mother of all evils by the DGB. The West German trade unions develped numerous 
working time reduction proposals and initiatives to generate full employment again.382 
Beside growing unemployment, changes in the structures of employment were also disadvan-
tageous for trade unions. Traditional union strongholds such as coal, steel, and docks, were 
declining rapidly, while the growing service sectors remained less receptive to unions.383 
White-collar, female and young workers were in consequence insufficiently represented 
among the membership. Whereas whiter-collar workers (Angestellten) represented more than 
50% of the workforce in 1987, they counted for about 23% of DGB members. Female work-
ers counted also for 23% of DGB members.384 
The vocational training system faced major difficulties as well. The surplus of 27,300 training 
places in 1980 (694,600 places for 667,300 requests) had melted to a deficit of close to 37,000 
training places five years later (719,100 places for 756,000 requests). Specialists forecast that 
this shortfall was to worsen in upcoming years.385 
These are the main economic challenges faced by West german trade unions by the end of the 
1980s. This unfavorable economic context was supplemented by a political environment un-
receptive to unions’ program. 
3.1.2.3 Erosion of unions' political strength 
The political climate was unfavorable to unions. The difficulties in sustaining the welfare 
state programs was poblematic for organizations who considered high West German standards 
of social protection as one of their main achievements.386 By the mid-1980s, these programs 
suffered from various illnesses: an enduring decline in the birthrate, unemployment and the 
development of the black economy had induced short and middle term financing problems of 
the retirement pension and the health systems in particular. As incomes diminished, expendi-
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tures, especially in the health sector, grew. The result was a continuous rise of workers’ con-
tributions and a diminution of retirement pensions and health services covered.387 
Reflections over possible reforms of the welfare state systems generated options rejected by 
the trade unions, such as the privatization of whole areas of social protection (which meant 
either poorer protection or higher contributions for workers) or the exclusion of certain cate-
gories of persons covered (foreigners, for instance) form the public programs.388 
The erosion of unions’ power had been reinforced by the election of the conservative-liberal 
coalition in 1983. Different programmatic papers published by the Christian Union 
(CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP) made no doubt that the new government contemplated 
important revisions of the labor laws.389 Explicit was their goal to reduce “unions' bosses' 
power over the free development of each individual worker along his or her own perform-
ance”.390 For the first time in FRG's history, the cabinet counted no union official.391 
The most crucial reform introduced by the new government concerned the rewriting of  article 
116 of the Labor Promoting Law (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz) in 1986. This revision stopped 
unemployment benefits for workers forced to inactivity because of a strike in another prov-
ince (e.g. for lack of pieces). This cut unions' capacity to interrupt production with a limited 
number of actual strikers – a strategy proved determinant during the 1984 conflict.392  
Yet, the conservative-liberal government showed interest for centralized tripartite negotia-
tions. This may have been an opportunity for trade unions to gain anew some influence on 
policy-making in Bonn. In 1985 and again in 1987, chancellor Kohl organized tripartite dis-
cussions, but they id not result into corporatist agreements. These atempts show, however, 
that the federal government was not following an anti-union agenda similar to that of other 
state leaders at the same time.393 Nevertheless, during the 1980s relationships between the 
DGB and the CDU had been carried out to the detriment of the trade unions.394 
The erosion of unions’ political strength was also perceptible in a certain loosening of its his-
torical bonds with the social-democratic party. Between 1975 and 1982, the DGB criticized 
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the lack of reforms put forward by the SPD. The 1983 federal elections saw an important de-
crease of SPD support among union members. The union watchword “Confidence in our own 
strength” synthesized this distanciation, although observers believed it to be a momentary 
phenomenon.395 
Detrimental relationahips with the CDU and loosened bonds with the social-democracy were 
completed by an ambivalent relation to the Greens. Although the DGB had greeted Greens' 
bill proposal on the banning of lockouts in 1984, the friction between environmental protec-
tion and preservation of employment in some industries, different organizational conceptions 
and diverse goals made a sustained collaboration unlikely.396  
3.1.2.4 Internal challenges 
Toward the end of the 1980s, many authors insisted that internal challenges enhanced DGB's 
difficulties to adapt to these economic and political conditions. Rank and file members com-
plained about strongly centralized organizations which left them little chance to influence 
their course. Also, membership recruiting was unsatisfactory in many developing industries 
and regions.397 DGB unions' solutions to get round this last problem were various. Some had 
recourse to administrative means and made the process of membership resiliation more com-
plicated.398 Others, usually among the smaller trade unions, called for a redistribution of in-
dustries within the DGB organizations in order to reduce the ascendancy of IG Metall and the 
Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union (which counted over 50% of the delegates to 
DGB congresses).399 
The competition between DGB's accomodationnist and radical wings intensified, e.g. on the 
issue of working time reduction, IG Metall’s fight for industry-wide working time reduction 
without lost of pay was not supported by the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Un-
ionwho privileged so-called “flexible models” of working time reduction (i.e. longer holidays 
or earlier retirement).400 Of course, various conceptions or different wings were not a new 
phenomenon for the German trade union movement, yet it is significant that internal tensions 
remained on the increase throughout the 1980s. All in all, the DGB faced great difficulties to 
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adapt structures and politics in a way that enabled its organizations to respond to the new 
challenges.401 This combination of external and internal challenges brought about a vast theo-
retical reflection as to how the 1981 DGB program could be revised in order to permit suc-
cessful adaptation of trade union politics to the new realities. This debate was in full swing 
toward the end of the decade. 
3.1.3 Reflections as to the future of trade union politics 
The 1988 DGB action program was a first attempt to discern possible avenues for a strategic 
reorientation. That same year IG Metall initiated a huge reflection of the entire West German 
labor movement to which hundreds of activists and intellectuals, from Germany and other 
countries took part. The Debate over the future of trade union politics (Zukunftsdebatte) was 
aiming at identifying solutions to problems face by trade unions in West germany and in other 
countries.402 Other DGB unions initiated their own, more modest, critical reflection on the 
future of union politics in specific industries. Vast research projects were thus subsidized by 
the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union (“Future through public services” - Zukunft 
durch öffentliche Dienste), the Construction Industrial Union (“Constructing and Living 
2000” - Bauen und Wohnen 2000), the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Union, the 
Trade, Banks and Insurances Union and the union foundation Hans-Böckler-Stiftung.403 
Reflections as to the future of trade union politics was the main topic a vast selection of books 
published at the end of the 1980s – and also after. It is impossible to propose an overlook of 
this literature here. Yet, in order to give an outlook on the state of these reflections toward the 
end of the 1980s, the author proposes to turn to five books and articles published between 
1987 and 1989 in which historians and specialists tackle the topic of the future of trade union 
politics in West Germany.404 These five contributions circumscribe the outlines of the overall 
reflections on the topic at the end of the 1980s. 
3.1.3.1 Orientation crisis of the West German trade unions 
One observation, common to the five contributions, concerns the risk that trade unions no 
longer be able to fulfill their social functions. 
                                                 
401 Grebing 1988, p. 27. 
402 Schneider 1989, p. 392. The contributions to the debate were published in seven volumes by IG Metall in 
1988 and 1989: Die andere Zukunft: Solidarität und Freiheit (Cologne: Bund-Verlag). 
403 Hemmer/Milert/Schmitz 1989, pp. 446-447. 
404 Grebing 1988, Hemmert/Milert/Schmitz 1989, Hoffmann 1988, Schneider 1989, Schönhoven 1987. 
 167
[Die Gewerkschaften] sind weit entfernt von der beanspruchten Aufgabe, Gegenmacht 
mit gesellschaftsverändernden Perspektiven zu sein; am besten können sie sich noch 
selbst darstellen als Versicherungsverein für Privilegierte. Vor allem fehlen ihnen mit 
den italienischen Gewerkschaften vergleichbare Anstöße zu einer organisatorischen und 
inhaltlichen Neuorientierung als Antwort auf den Strukturwandel des modernen Kapita-
lismus. Wie die SPD haben auch die Gewerkschaften kein Konzept für die effiziente 
Kontrolle multinational verstärkter ökonomischer Macht.405 
Die Gewerkschaften müssen sich, ihre Programmatik und ihre Praxis – wie so häufig in 
ihrer langen Geschichte – zusammen mit der durch ihre eigene Politik veränderten Welt 
wandeln. Orientierungspunkte für diesen Wandlungsprozess bieten die bei der Schilde-
rung der aktuellen gewerkschaftlichen Programmdebatte näher beleuchteten Problem-
felder der Gewerkschaftspolitik, deren Berücksichtigung zugleich Möglichkeiten einer 
Zusammenarbeit mit den neuen sozialen Bewegungen eröffnet. Dabei haben die Ge-
werkschaften wahrlich keinen Anlass, ihre Grundprinzipien aufzugeben: Soziale Ge-
rechtigkeit, menschliche Solidarität, freiheitliche Demokratie und internationale Zu-
sammenarbeit sind Eckpunkte der Gewerkschaftspolitik, die angesichts weltweiter Not, 
Ausbeutung, politischer Manipulation und Unterdrückung, angesichts von Umweltzers-
törung und Kriegsgefahren nichts an Aktualität eingebüßt haben. Die Gewerkschaften 
sind im Umbruch – vermutlich tiefergreifend als je zuvor in ihrer Geschichte. Aber am 
Ende sind sie nicht.406 
One of the main grey zones concerned the goals of trade union politics. What are they fighting 
for? Given the detrimental economic and political condtions, some authors suggested a defen-
sive tactic, i.e. dedicated to the preservation of labor’s positions and established worker right. 
Such a defensive approach was made necessary, these authors believe, by the slowdown in 
economic activity. Unions could no longer assume that profits can grow indefinitely.407 Oth-
ers did not share this stanpoint. They considered that changing economic conditions should 
change union politics. The persistence of established practices, based on established legisla-
tions could not be an option. Any claim on wage or working time, they argued, needs to take 
place within a strategy determined by broader objectives. Preserving what unions had  was 
insufficient. West German unions were no longer successful with their policy of small-scale 
reforms for a loss of long-term objectives.408 Some authors hence suggested a broad expan-
sion of unions' goals, including greater control on production.409 
That unions come to expand their action in order to intervene in more spheres of activity was 
doubtful. Many were in fact recommending the narrowing of unions' tasks and the abandon-
ment of some traditional goals.  
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They looked at any claim that could open the way to a new law, as dangerous. It was the case 
e.g. of the banning of lockouts, a year-long top priority for the DGB. Some considered prefer-
able to abandon such fights, instead of risking to see the government propose new measures, 
which would more than likely result in a further weakening of worker rights. They regarded 
any new legislation as a Pandora’s Box, more detrimental than beneficial to trade unions.410 
They accepted to bury traditional union demands in order to prevent intrusions in the collec-
tive bargaining autonomy. A similar skepticism was manifested on the issue of working time 
reduction. This demand of trade unions had been the core of some of the biggest industrial 
fights of the rpevious years. Yet the fear that working time reduction could only be achieved 
at the price of massive lay-offs was on the rise.411 
3.1.3.2 Ways out of the orientation crisis 
Internal reforms stood high on the priority list. They should look at facilitating the recruiting 
of female and young white-collar workers. Union publications and the cultural policy, ne-
glected in recent years, should be revitalized. Authors making these suggestions did not fail to 
mention that budget restraints pushed unions toward further centralization and cutbacks in 
press and cultural activities. And they stressed that, even if they were implemented, these 
measures would not suffice to resolve unions' orientation crisis.412 
Alongside internal reforms, many insisted on giving environmental protection and interna-
tional union strategies a greater weih in DGB politics. Concrete proposals on these two 
apsects were few. As protection of the environment was concerned, authors usualy limited 
themselves to better worker protection against the use of dangerous products.413 
On the whole, economic, political and internal challenges were giving already existing legal 
tools a more significant role in unions’ politics.414 Collective agreements on wages 
(Lohnrahmentarifvertrag), agreements on the protection against rationalization (Rationalis-
ierungsschutzabkommen), advisory boards on innovation (Innovationsberatungsstellen) and 
co-determination (Mitbestimmungsformen) appeared the surest defense of workers’ interests. 
It was a strategic withdrawal on well-proven instruments, hardly compatible with any broad-
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ening of unions’ action as some were calling for. Could these very legal instruments at least 
be used for broader purposes than had been the case so far? Some seemed to believe it.415 
Attempts at sketching the state of the union movement toward the end of the 1980s are torn 
between these two trends: a need for programmatic redefinition in order to face new realities, 
and a strategic withdrawal on established legal instruments. Most specialists were articulating 
both trends, yet the scales usully tipped in favor of one or the other. Some inclined toward a 
broadening of unions’ interventions, productive issues (Jürgen Hoffmann), all spheres of 
workers’ lives (Oskar Negt), or international action (Michael Schneider).416 Others insisted on 
the preservation of labor’s established position. They remained skeptical toward any challeng-
ing of the core labor-capital compromise in West Germany (Klaus Schönhoven)417, or 
prompted unions to focus on what they do best (Wolfgang Streeck).418 All authors looked at 
the undergoing period as transitory and believed that only time could determine the kind of 
changes union politics would have to go through. 
3.1.3.3 A period in between  
This rapid survey of challenges and reflections shaking the West German union movement 
toward the end of the 1980s shows an open and ambivalent situation. Most specialists at-
tempted to connect more or less conciliable tendencies: protection of worker rights, focusing 
on a few core spheres of activity, internal reforms and programmatic re-orientations. Most of 
these contributions accorded a crucial role to time for the determination of the changes neces-
sary. Hence, even authors with different insight on the state of the West German unions con-
cluded on the importance to win time, i.e. to preserve unions' positions until the outlines of 
necessary reforms were more visible. Some were confident, others worried. 
“Tickt eine Zeitbombe… an den Fundamenten der Gewerkschaftsbewegung“ (Alvin 
Toffler)? Jedenfalls sind sich Gewerkschaftsanalytiker weitgehend darin einig, dass “ei-
ne neue Definition von Gewerkschaften und von Gewerkschaftspolitik” (Martin 
Baethge) notwendig ist. Die Gewerkschaften der Bundesrepublik sind für diese Jahr-
hundertaufgabe mit ihrer bisherigen Organisationsstruktur – Einheitsgewerkschaft, In-
dustrieverbandsprinzip – mir ihrer tarifpolitischen Durchsetzungs- und ihrer politischen 
Kompromissfähigkeit vielleicht besser gerüstet als viele ihrer Bruderorganisationen. 
Diese wertvollen Bestände zu bewahren und weiterzuentwickeln, dabei gleichzeitig vie-
le neue Elemente in Organisation und Politik aufzunehmen, wird die Aufgabe der Zu-
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kunft sein. Zu bleiben wie man ist und dabei doch auch gründlich anders zu werden – 
das ist eine große Herausforderung und eine schwer zu lösende praktische Aufgabe.419 
Es muss auch hervorgehoben werden, dass sich solche neue Formen nur auf Basis einer 
defensiven Politik entwickeln können, die die Aufgabe hat, kurzfristig die Folgen der 
Krise abzuwehren und Zeit für die Entwicklung eigener Formen gewerkschaftlicher Po-
litik der Beeinflussung des Restrukturierungsprozesses zu gewinnen.420 
3.1.4 The four trade unions at the end of the 1980s 
The following pages summon up core information on the four trade unions considered in this 
work and complete the portray of the West German union movement at the end of the 1980s. 
3.1.4.1 IG Metall 
With its 2.7 million members (1987) in the steel, shipbuilding, electrical, mechanical enginee-
ring and automobile industries, IG Metall was West Germany's largest single trade union. It 
represented about 35% of all DGB members and as such, accounted for one third of all union 
members in the FRG. IG Metall  maintained an unmistakable worker profile, with 85% of its 
memberships made of blue-collar workers.421 The former head of the union's Stuttgart chapter 
Franz Steinkühler had been elected president in 1986. 
The cycle of collective bargaining rounds in West Germany opened traditionally with the me-
tal industry. The results achieved in the metal and steel industry oriented the negotiations in 
other sectors. Hence the impact of the collective agreements ratified by IG Metall was great 
and some estimated that they had a immediate influence on the wages and working time of 
about one third of the country's workforce.422 
IG Metall was DGB's main "activist union".423 Its main fight during the 1980s concerned the 
35-hour workweek. The outcomes of its 1984 strike (introduced above) were appraised va-
riously: Kathleen Thelen (1991) insists on the ground-breaking meaning of the diminution to 
38.5 hours and believed the trend set irreversible, while Hajo Weber (1987) looked skeptically 
at the flexibility introduced by the agreement, allowing important variations from one entepr-
rise to the other. IG Metall's activist posture was again confirmed with the initiation of the 
debate over the future of trade union politics, in 1988. 
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3.1.4.2 Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Union (IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik) 
With 665,000 members, the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Union was DGB's third 
largest union in 1987. The union was made at 80,5% of blue-collar workers.424 The severe 
crisis undergone by the chemical industry had induced a moderate wage policy from this un-
ion. Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Union had become West Germany's main ad-
vocate of social partnership unionism and the leader of DGB's “accomodationist” wing in the 
1980s. This new profile resulted from an internal fight of the late 1970s closed by the exclu-
sion of the union's “activist wing” by the leaders of the main chemical corporations' works 
councils.425 The union was headed since 1982 by SPD MP Hermann Rappe. 
3.1.4.3 Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union (Öffentlicher Dienste, Transport 
und Verkehr) 
DGB’s second largest union, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union counted over 
1,2 million members throughout the 1980s. It was West Germany's first white-collar workers' 
organization, and they represented 46,3% of the union's members (with 46% of blue-collar 
workers and 6,7% of civil servants).426 Monika-Wulf-Mathies headed the union since 1982. 
The union was in charge of a vast range of public service areas, which granted it for wages 
and working time conditions in the public sector a role comparable to that of IG Metall in the 
industral sector. By the mid-1980s, the public service union had initiated discussions with 
other DGB ad independent trade unions in order to intensify the organization of white-collar 
workers in West Germany. This ultimately lead to a vast merger and the creation on one uni-
tary Germn union for the service sector, ver.di, in 1999.427 
3.1.4.4 Media Industrial Union (Media Industrial Union). 
The Media Industrial Union was created in April 1989, after the merger of three DGB unions 
of the printing and communication industries. The new organization counted 180,000 mem-
bers. It conserved the activist profile of its main constituent, the Printing and Paper Industrial 
Union (IG Druck und Papier), a 145,000-member organization (75% of blue-collar workers), 
which had been “West Germany’s most outspoken representative on matters of radical social 
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change”. Since the 1970s, a dramatic wave of dismissals caused by the computerization in the 
printing industry resulted in hard industrial fights, e.g. in 1977. If the beginning of the 1980s 
had been more peaceful, the printing and paper union went on strike in 1984 for the 35-hour 
workweek, and obtained, like IG Metall, a 90-minute reduction.428 Media Industrial Union’s 
first president was Erwin Ferlemann, head of the printing and paper union since 1983. 
3.2 From Ostpolitik to support and collaboration: the DGB un-
ions and the East German Revolution (May 1989 – February 
1990)  
This chapter depicts how the DGB unions reacted to the East German revolution until Febru-
ary 1990. After a few weeks of wait-and-see policy, the DGB unions implemented a strategy 
of support and collaboration that benefited the East German trade unions of the FDGB in their 
attempts to reform into genuine organizations for the defense of workers’ interests. Although 
the implementation of this strategy by all DGB unions varied in the detail, it remained shaped 
by common boundaries and objectives, so that these differences appear as variations on one 
common theme. 
3.2.1 The first weeks: Wait and See 
The literature has highlighted how the West German trade unions were caught unawares by 
the East German revolution. Many observers and West German trade union leaders have in-
sisted on the absence of public stances by the DGB union leaders during the first weeks of the 
revolution. The burden represented by the Ostpolitik is given as  crucial factor for the alleged 
incapacity of the West German trade unions to either shape the developments in 1989 or at 
least go along with them.429  
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These hesitations and this reluctance to reconsider their relationship with the FDGB have 
been widely depicted in the literature as a serious mistake by the DGB unions, a mistake 
which forced them to “catch up with history” (my expression) a few months later and left 
them unable to exert influence over the developments that led to the unification of Germany 
by October 1990. 
Different elements corroborate this interpretation. In October 1989, the course of  meetings 
between the heads of trade unions from both Germanies states pleased the East German State 
Security (Stasi), whose reporters greeted the “offen[e] von gegenseitigem Vertrauen und Dia-
logbereitschaft gekennzeichnet[e] Atmosphäre.”430 If the Stasi reports are anything to go by, 
it would seem that neither the visits in the GDR of the Saarland DGB by January, the Mines 
and Energy Union (IG Bergbau und Energie) by May, the Public Service and Transport Union 
(Öffentlicher Dienst, Transport und Verkehr, ÖTV) by August431, or the Media Union (IG 
Medien) by October432, gave the GDR officials any reason to complain.  
By August, as the first waves of East German departures had already attracted the public's 
attention in the Federal Republic and elsewhere, a delegation of the DGB Trade, Banks and 
Insurances Union (Handel, Banken und Versicherungen, HBV) met with FDGB functionaries. 
The press declaration published by HBV after the meeting confined itself to the usual lingo, 
an implicit confirmation that the union had no intention to tackle topics that could be unpleas-
ant to their East German hosts.  
Die Delegation wurde vom Vorsitzenden des Bundesvorstandes des Freien Deutschen 
Gewerkschaftsbundes, Harry Tisch, zu einem freimütigen Informations- und Meinung-
                                                 
430 Information der Zentralvorstände der IG-Druck und Papier und der Gewerkschaft Kunst des FDGB über die 
Ergebnisse des Besuchs einer Leitungsdelegation der IG Medien im DGB vom 4. bis 6. Oktober[1989] in der 
DDR, BStU, HA XX 1178, p. 2. 
431 N.T., BStU, HA XX Nr. 34. “Es gab Übereinstimmung darüber, dass die Gewerkschaften sich weiterhin en-
gagieren müssen, um ihren Beitrag zur Sicherung des Friedens und zur Abrüstung. (...) Als besonders angenehm 
hätten sie [die ÖTV-Delegierten] die offene Atmosphäre bei allen Begegnungen empfunden, zumal sie doch mit 
vielen Vorurteilen in die DDR gekommen seien. Ihre Bilder von der DDR seien geprägt von den Medien in der 
BRD“ (p.282). The topic of the meeting concerned the role of the trade unions in the communal policy. Appar-
ently the West German unionists did not raise any questions on the changes occurring in the USSR, Poland and 
Hungary (p. 283).  
432 “Beide Seiten waren sich einig, dass sich die Beziehungen zwischen dem FDGB und dem DGB auf der 
Grundlage der jüngsten Verhandlungen der Kollegen [Harry] Tisch und [Ernst] Breit [Vorsitzenden des FDGB 
bzw. des DGB] in der BRD auch in Zukunft positiv entwickeln müssen und einen stabilisierenden Faktor in der 
bewegten ideologischen Auseinandersetzung unserer Zeit darstellen. (...) Die Delegation [der IG Medien] brach-
te ihren Unmut über die Hetzkampagne der Medien in der BRD im Zusammenhang mit der illegalen Ausreise 
von DDR-Bürgern zum Ausdruck“. Information der Zentralvorstände der IG-Druck und Papier un der Gewerk-
schaft Kunst des FDGB über die Ergebnisse des Besuchs einer Leitungsdelegation der IG Medien im DGB vom 
4. bis 6. Oktober[1989] in der DDR, p. 2. 
 174
saustausch empfangen. Das wirken der Gewerkschaften für den Frieden und die Tätig-
keit in den unterschiedlichen Wirtschaftsordnungen standen dabei im Mittelpunkt.433 
As a matter of fact, during the first eight months of 1989, the DGB unions members thought it 
preferable not to change an iota of the basic principles sustaining their Ostpolitik. After a 
meeting with his counterpart in the DGB in April, FDGB head Harry Tisch wrote to SED's 
Secretary General Erich Honecker:  
Im Gegensatz zur BRD-Regierung und auch zur SPD hat sich der Bundesvorstand des 
DGB bislang nicht in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DDR einzumischen versucht 
bzw. Forderungen nach Veränderungen an die Gewerkschaften der DDR erhoben. Breit 
erweckte den Eindruck, dass wir auch weiterhin von dieser Position des DGB ausgehen 
können.434 
Until September 1989, there were but very few breaches of the non-interference principle by 
the DGB union leaders. One of those few examples was the wish formulated by IG Metall 
head Franz Steinkühler in June that the FDGB take the lead of the social changes in the GDR. 
He also expressed the hope that the East German workers be granted the right to strike as soon 
as possible.435 
Hence the attitude of the DGB unions during the months preceding the outburst of the East 
German revolution can be described as a "wait and see" policy. This characterization is in 
accordance with the dominant trend of the literature on the subject. Contrary to the argument 
developed here, however, authors like Manfred Wilke, Hans-Peter Müller and Peter Sei-
deneck among others consider that the DGB unions continued to trail behind the develop-
ments during the whole duration of the revolution and the unification process. Although the 
depiction of the DGB unions’ approach of the East German pre-revolutionary weeks (until 
September) as a “wait and see policy” is partially in accordance with their analysis, I would 
like to take issues with their condemnation of this policy.  
                                                 
433 Pressedienst, Gewerkschaft Handel, Banken und Versicherungen im DGB, Nr. 129/89, August 7, 1989, quo-
ted in Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 175. 
434 FDGB-Vorsitzender an SED-Generalsekretär am 4. April 1989: DGB-Interesse an Fortsetzung des FDGB-
Dialogues, ArchGew A 200.12869, reproduced in: Wilke/Hertle 1992, Document 8. 
435 “Gespräch mit Franz Steinkühler”, Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung, June 20, 1989, and “Steinkühler verlangt 
Streikrecht für Gewerkschaften in der DDR”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 22, 1989. There was a criti-
cal tradition within the IG Metall as regard to the GDR. In the 1970s, this union was perceived by the East Ger-
man regime as an organisation strongly influenced by leftist groups hostile to the GDR, like left-wing social-
democrats and Trotskyists. According to FDGB reports, the solidarity campaign with Wolf Biermann by the 
union and its youth wing (headed by Franz Steinkühler), for instance, had shown how these groups’ hatred of the 
GDR had passed over all bounds. See: “Fakten zur Rolle der IG Metall im DGB in Zusammenhang mit dem 
Auftritt Wolf Biermanns in der BRD und Reaktionene zu seiner Ausbürgerung – Vergleiche zum Prager rüh-
ling”, January 1977, ZGA FDGB 10672, reproduced in: Eckelmann/Hertle/Weinert 1990, pp. 212-14.   
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“Wait and see”: the preservation of the Ostpolitik until further notice 
It would be foolhardy to refuse to consider that the inertia characteristic of any huge organiza-
tion like a trade union has played a part the preservation of the contact policy and the non-
interference principle by the DGB unions until September 1989. It certainly did. My point 
here is that bureaucratic inertia alone does not account for this preservation. I consider that, 
from the perspective of the DGB unions, at least two elements substantiate the “wait and see” 
policy, until September 1989. 
First of all, one has to keep in mind the USSR when tackling any issue concerning the GDR. 
The Perestroika and the Glasnost, the keywords behind the reforms that the new Secretary 
General of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, wanted to implement, 
gave rise to tremendous hopes, both in eastern and western countries. Launched by 1985, 
these state-led processes of “peace-keeping” through demilitarization, of extensive abrogation 
of the “Brejnev Doctrine” (as the post-1968 sword of Damocles of a Soviet military interven-
tion in any satellite country had been called), of careful loosening up of the political life and 
of gradual widening of the authorised freedom of speech, seemed to have entered a second 
phase in 1989. By April Mikhail Gorbachev had announced a radical program of personnel 
reduction within the direction structures of the Communist Party. Was he going to succeed? 
Was some sector of the state or military apparatus going to attempt a coup? Who could tell? 
These topics were developed in the previous part. From 1985 to 1989, the changes introduced 
by Gorbachev met a rather cold reception from the GDR leaders, who appeared more than 
reluctant to follow his “New Thinking”. If the East German opposition did not result from the 
Perestroika, it nevertheless benefited from it. Many opposition activists hid their activities 
behind the Perestroika program and Gorbachev’s declarations.436 These years saw the birth 
and rapid radicalization of the East German opposition, a process which the former opposition 
activist and historian Erhart Neubert describes as the development from its “formation” to its 
constitution as a “counter-power”.  
During those years, the bulk of West German political, economic and social actors observing 
the changes in the eastern bloc, made no attempt to help the East German opposition. The 
West German Greens were the single major exception to this rule, after 1987. The rest of the 
political parties and organizations in the Federal Republic restricted their contacts, if any, to 
                                                 
436 Neubert 1998, pp. 635-637. 
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their official East German counterparts.437 This was an undisputed approach, based on the 
claim that the East German leaders would never hesitate to repress the people and suppress 
these new-found spaces of relative freedom as soon as they would feel threatened.  
Coming back to the trade unions, it even seems that, at the very beginning of the 1989 East 
German crisis, the respect of the Ostpolitik principles could appear legitimized by the events. 
As the regime started to face an open resistance from its population, the preservation of con-
tacts between both countries did not lose their rationale, quite on the contrary. As a matter of 
fact West German trade unions, like the DGB Chemistry-Paper-Ceramics (IG Chemie Papier 
und Keramik, IG CPK) and the German Civil Servants Union (Deutsche Angestellten-
Gewerkschaft, DAG), started to have official contacts with the East German FDGB by May 
1989. In other words, it was in the tumultuous context of the months and weeks preceding the 
revolution that these two trade unions decided to participate to the Ostpolitik.438 
The second element that I would like to invoke against the a posteriori condemnation of the 
wait and see stance by the DGB unions can be formulated as an adage: May is not September 
and September is not December. As the previously quoted study by Karsten Timmer shows, 
the vision according to which what happened between May and September 1989 in the GDR - 
the first important wave of departures and the proof of distortions of electoral results – her-
alded the uprising and the forthcoming fall of the state, is misleading.439 During those months, 
the repressive power of the state remained at its height. The dialectics of the East German 
“niche society” still set the mark quite high for large segments of the population to undertake 
political action. The turning point was attained as the workers came back from holiday by the 
beginning of September. People started to summon information from the political officials on 
the conditions of their colleagues’ escape. They started to require reforms, so that people 
would stop to leave the country by the thousands. These topics are reintroduced in greater 
details in the second part of this work. For now, the argument that I want to make is that the 
sequence of events of the 1989 revolution started in September.The first opposition group, the 
Neues Forum, was formed toward the end of September. Therefore, I suggest that, unless one 
refuses any legitimacy to the Ostpolitik – the case of many authors but certainly not that of the 
DGB unions -, there was little reason to reconsider the policy of contacts with the East Ger-
                                                 
437 There are numerous examples, ranging from the meetings of leaders from both states, to the relations between 
the CDU’s Junge Union with the East German FDJ, to the SPD with the SED, to the DGB with the FDGB, to the 
Churches. Ibid., pp. 637-642 and 660-670. 
438 IG CPK 1993, p.3. The meeting between the IG CPK and the IG Chemie-Glass und Keramik im FDGB took 
place on May 21. Youth sections of both unions had nevertheless met several times before. “FDGB und DAG 
nehmen offizielle Gespräche auf”, Tribüne, May 10, 1989, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 33. 
439 Timmer 2000, p. 80. 
 177
man trade unions before September. From September onwards, the DGB unions abandoned 
their “wait and see” policy for a strategy of support of and collaboration with East German 
unionists.  
3.2.2 A First Strategy: Towards Support and Collaboration (September 
1989-February 1990) 
From September 1989 onward the DGB unions developed a common strategy dedicated to 
support the efforts made by East German unionists to reshape the mechanisms for the defense 
of workers’ interest in their country. As the word “development” suggests, this strategy was 
not static during this time and has evolved over the period and along the different trade un-
ions. The DGB unions have implemented it to various degrees. Still, I argue that all the initia-
tives taken by the DGB unions between September 1989 and February 1990 can be condensed 
under a few characteristics. These characteristics allow to talk of one common strategy. We 
will see how the four DGB unions under scrutiny in this work implemented this strategy.  
One comment is required before introducing the four components of the DGB unions’ first 
strategy. I would certainly be misunderstood if one was led to understand that the contours of 
this common strategy had been delineated by the DGB trade union leaders sometimes in Sep-
tember 1989 and implemented afterwards. These components were never explicited, at least 
not all of them. Only through the distance can these four components be suggested as the con-
tours circumscribing the reaction of the DGB unions toward the East German revolution.  
The first component was the will of the DGB unions to analyze for themselves and by their 
own means how the situation was evolving in the GDR. The DGB unions made unistakable 
efforts to develop their own picture of the actors, causes and consequences of the popular out-
burst, independent from that produced by West German mass media. The trade union press 
for instance gave numerous accounts of the evolution of the reshaping process of the defense 
of workers’ interests in the GDR. The second part of this work has benefited a great deal from 
the amount of articles on this topic.  
The second component of the DGB unions’ strategy concerned the identification of ways to 
assist and support these evolutions in the East German trade unions and shop floors. Contacts 
from DGB unions with East German opposition groups or initiatives for independent trade 
unions remained comparatively modest. Without breaking with it, the support of reforms of 
the trade unions and on the shop floors and the collaboration with their actors were no longer 
the former Ostpolitik. Support and collaboration were seen within the DGB as the most ap-
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propriate and respectful answer to the political developments and the difficult reshaping of the 
mechanisms for the defence of workers’ interests in the GDR.  
The third component was the insistence that all forms of concrete support and cooperation by 
the DGB unions fulfil requests explicitly articulated by East German unionists and workers. 
This resolve to react to the needs expressed by East German actors pulled along in his wake 
the unwillingness of the DGB unions to address the topic of the unification until the turn of 
1990. If the reluctance of West German left-wing activists toward the unification had its part 
in this blackout on the unification, the refusal to adress the issue was primarily substantially 
justified with the argument that the impulse toward the unification had to come from the East 
German population itself. As we are about to see, some DGB union leaders presented the 
West German unions as a democratic barrier against attempts made by the pro-unification 
elites in the Federal Republic. They also called upon the democratic spirit of the East German 
revolution to spread out in the Federal Republic and bring about reforms there too.  
The fourth and last component introduces an element of comparison with the second strategy 
by the DGB unions, implemented afer February 1990. It consists in the greater differentiation 
in the implementation of the first strategy by the various DGB unions. Whereas the second 
strategy was fully implemented by all DGB unions, the first was developed with more or less 
conviction, along the cases. As a consequence, the resources set off to implement the second 
strategy were also incommensurably higher than those devoted to the first. Despite different 
degrees of implementation, the contours of the first strategy remained unchallenged by the 
DGB unions that were more reluctant to implement it thoroughly.  
3.2.2.1 The initiator: IG Metall 
The first strategy implemented by all  DGB unions was heavily influenced by the course of 
the IG Metall between the months of September 1989 and February 1990. In June 1989 IG 
Metall’s head, Franz Steinkühler, had counted among the very few DGB union leaders to 
comment on the evolution of the political situation in the GDR. In September, he reacted 
more thoroughly, as the wave of exits from the GDR was plunging the country into a political 
crisis. His reaction was articulated around two key ideas. On the one hand, Franz Steinkühler 
felt it necessary to stand up for the Ostpolitik and affirmed that it would be furthered.440 
                                                 
440 There was not going to be any contact between IG Metall and East German trade unions in 1989, until the 
meeting with the head of the newly-founded IG Metall (DDR), by December 7. 
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Auch die IG Metall unterhält Kontakte zu den Staatsgewerkschaften im Osten nicht 
deshalb, weil wir deren Politik für richtig halten oder weil sie uns besonders nahestehen. 
Unser Ziel ist, politische  Gegensätze nicht zu zwischenstaatlichen Gegensätzen werden 
zu lassen, für menschliche Erleichterungen einzutreten, Erfahrungen zu vermitteln, die 
den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern den Alltag erleichtern. (...) [D]er Abbruch 
von Kontakten würde niemanden nützen. Den Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmern 
in den Ländern des Ostens wäre nicht geholfen. Es ist ein Irrtum zu glauben, dass durch 
Kontaktsperren die Machthaber im Osten reformfreudiger werden würden. Durch Isola-
tion würde die Starre und Bewegungslosigkeit noch zunehmen. 
On the other hand, the wave of departures manifested the deep popular dissatisfaction towards 
the regime and its growing rejection among the population. Steinkühler depicted the East 
German system as a perversion of socialism and stressed the urgency of reforms.441  
Die zutiefst humanistische Idee des Sozialismus wird durch staatsbürokratische Systeme 
pervertiert. Die Machthaber in Ost-Berlin müssen endlich begreifen, dass sie nicht wei-
ter die Menschen von der Teilhabe am politischen Leben ausschliessen können. (...) Al-
lerdings wird die IG Metall es sich nicht nehmen lassen, öffentlich und vor allem in Ge-
sprächen unmissverständlich deutlich zu machen, dass wir Reformen erwarten. Die 
Gewerkschaften im Osten müssen endlich zu Interessenvertretern der Arbeitnehmer 
werden und dürfen nicht Transmissionsriemen staatsbürokratischer Parteien bleiben.442 
During the five weeks separating this editorial and the IG Metall’s 16th Congress (held from 
October 22 to 28), the union’s head made few public comments on the East German issue. It 
did not reconsider its contact policy. In that time, however, the political instability had 
evolved toward a revolutionary situation. Articles published in the union’s press had followed 
this evolution from the perspective of workers of the metal industry.443 During the congress, 
held two weeks before the opening of the Wall, Franz Steinkühler used stronger words against 
the East German government and trade unions. It was their arrogance and despise of funda-
mental democratic rights by the regime, he accused, that was responsible of the revolution. 
The refusal of the FDGB to gain its independence from the state and obtain the right to strike 
had its part in the popular dissatisfaction. Steinkühler greeted the East German upheaval, 
which he linked to the historical struggles of the German labor movement. 
Wir, die vor 100 Jahren mit dem Gesang „Brüder zur Sonne, zur Freiheit“ angetreten 
sind; wir wissen nur zu gut, was dem arbeitenden Menschen Freiheit und soziale Ge-
rechtigkeit bedeuten. Es ist nicht Hunger und Not, es ist nicht Elend und materieller 
Mangel allein, die Verzweiflung erzeugen. Es ist die Arroganz eines Obrigkeitsregimes, 
das die elementarsten demokratischen Rechte mit Füssen tritt und über die Köpfe hin-
weg selbstherrlich alles zu reglementieren sucht. Damit muss Schluss sein! Ich habe 
                                                 
441 In August a special two-page feature of the union’s magazine Metall (17/89, pp. 8-9) had also called for re-
forms, particularly in the FDGB, in order to stop the stream of departures.   
442 Franz Steinkühler, “Wir erwarten Reformen”, Metall, 19/89 (September 22), p. 3. 
443 Robert Fuss, “Freiheit mit Fallen”, Metall, 19/89 (September 22), pp. 16-17; Klaus Klöppel, “Es gärt im 
VEB”, Ibid., p. 17; Klaus Klöppel, “Von unten nach oben regnet es nicht”, Metall, 20/89 (October 6), pp. 22-23. 
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mehrfach an den FDGB appelliert, sich aus der Umklammerung von Staat und Partei zu 
lösen und Unabhängigkeit und Streikrecht zu reklamieren.  
For Steinkühler, the living conditions of the populations in the south-eastern parts of the 
world, the trade unions struggles in north-western countries and the ecological concerns eve-
rywhere, imposed that a new economic system be developed that goes beyond the western 
capitalist model. Against the “eastern state-bureaucratic communism” and the “western inhu-
man capitalism”, Steinkühler reaffirmed the relevance of the “democratic socialist” program 
put forward by his union.  
Die Idee eines humanen und demokratischen Sozialismus steht noch immer deutlich ge-
gen den staatsbürokratischer Kommunismus östlicher Prägung und den inhumanen Ka-
pitalismus westlicher Prägung. Der Zusammenbruch des sogennanten Sozialismus ist 
keinesfalls eine Niederlage des Sozialismus. Und er ist schon gar kein Sieg des Kapita-
lismus. (...) Kapitalismus ist eben nicht nur mit der Demokratie der Bundesrepublik, 
Frankreichs oder der USA verbunden, sondern ebenso mit den Diktaturen Chiles und 
Südafrikas. Und auch die fürchterliche Nazi-Diktatur war ein kapitalistisches System. 
Es würde ein Stück gemeinsamer Zukunft verspielt werden, wenn Perestroika letztlich 
nur darauf hinausliefe, unser Zivilisationsmodell zu kopieren, auf unser Produktions- 
und Lebenstempo zu beschleunigen. (...) Die Konsequenz kann nur lauten, dass wir, die 
industriell hoch entwickelten Länder, vorangehen müssen mit der ökologischen Umges-
taltung unserer Industriegesellschaft, und dass die weniger entwickelten Länder parallel 
zum industriellen Fortschritt den ökologischen Fortschritt planen.444 
These strong words had little concrete outcomes. Despite its greeting, IG Metall looked at the 
East German revolution from the outside. The opening of the wall a few days later changed 
this perspective. In an article, Steinkühler referred to the developments taking place in the 
GDR as a political and economic self-determination process led by the people. He insisted on 
the protection of the autonomy of the process but offered the assistance of the West German 
unions. If this help was welcomed, IG Metall could support East German unionists in the de-
velopment of structures for the defense of their interests, as well as political activists.  
Die IG Metall steht gemeinsam mit den DGB-Gewerkschaften den Arbeitnehmerinnen 
und Arbeitnehmern in der DDR mit Rat und Tat zur Seite. Welche Organisationsform 
sie jedoch wählen, bleibt ihnen überlassen. Ich kann ihnen nur raten, sich die histori-
schen Erfahrungen der Einheitgewerkschaft in der Bundesrepublik anzuschauen. Staats-
ferne, parteipolitische Unabhängigkeit und einheitliche Interessenvertretung sind tra-
gende Prinzipien einer starken und unabhängigen Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Wir 
mischen uns nicht ein. Wir geben aber gerne Erfahrungen an alle Parteien und Gruppie-
rungen in der DDR weiter, wenn dies gewünscht wird.445 
                                                 
444 Franz Steinkühler, “Fieberstunde der Geschichte”, Metall, 22/89 (November 3), pp. 20-21. 
445 Franz Steinkühler, “Was jetzt zu tun ist”, Metall, 23/89 (November 17), pp. 8-9, quote p. 9. 
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Hence the IG Metall was strongly opposed to what it considered pressures exerted by the Fed-
eral government in favor of the unification and the western market economy: “Eine Wied-
ervereingungsdebatte jetzt würde darüber hinaus die Reformentwicklung in der DDR eher 
behindern als fördern.” “Auch die Wahl des Wirtschaftssystems muss eine Entscheidung der 
Menschen in der DDR bleiben und darf nicht von der Bundesregierung oder der bundesdeut-
schen Wirtschaft entschieden werden.”446 
Because of the insistence by IG Metall on the autonomy of the self-determination process, it 
is not surprising that Chancellor Kohl’s plan for a medium-term unification, the so-called 10-
point plan made public by November 28, has been criticised in the union’s press. The vague-
ness of the plan on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border was condemned. The require-
ment of market economy as a pre-condition to a program of economic assistance was depicted 
as “economic blackmail”. The unification envisioned in the plan aim at implementing “a so-
cial system, that fits into a conservative, outdated idea of the world (konservatives Weltbild 
von vorgestern).”447  
 
IG Metall’s press and the changes in the GDR 
The IG Metall’s press in November and December documents the attention paid by this union 
to the changes taking place in the GDR. It also gives the details of the assistance to East Ger-
man unionists developed from that moment on.  
Three topics stand out from the articles published in IG Metall’s press in November 1989. 
Furthermore one aspect misses in these articles. One of these topics was the reform process of 
the East German metal union. The articles covering that question allow to appreciate the vari-
ety but also the uneven progress of this process. Among these, one analyzed how the “pres-
sure of the streets” had made its way into the world of labor and, from there, rapidly shaken 
the entire FDGB structures.448 It recalled how the rank and file protests had forced the FDGB 
direction to resign, by November 2. Another article questioned the capacity of the FDGB, 
now more or less similar to an empty shell, to reform itself into a democratic confederation of 
independent unions dedicated to the defense of workers’ interests. “Everything is still 
opened”, concluded the journalist, who showed himself rather suspicious as to the likelihood 
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447 Dieter Staadt, “Nach dem Rausch der Kater”, Metall, 25-26/89 (December 13), p. 4. 
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of decided steps intop that direction before the FDGB congress, to be held at the end of Janu-
ary 1990.449  
The re-foundation of IG Metall (DDR), on November 27, as the first independent FDGB un-
ion member, was greeted. An enthuisiastic and extensive report of the debates and reforms 
undertaken during this congress was published in Metall.450 With regards to the relations be-
tween both German metal unions, the new head of the East German metal union had declared: 
“[Ich glaube] von der IG Metall der BRD viel lernen können, ohne alles übernehmen zu 
müssen.” He had also called for the organization of forums of discussions for unionists from 
both orgnizations in the next future.451 These declarations, reproduced in IG Metall’s press, 
seemed to confirm the strategy implemented by the union’s head. The re-founding of IG Met-
all (DDR) as an independent FDGB union member, its new democratic structures, the interest 
for a collaboration with IG Metall that would not deprive East German unionists of their 
power of determination over the reforms implemented: all these elements highlighted by the 
articles in IG Metall’s press founded the strategy of the union so far. Only the reservations 
toward the right to strike expressed by some members of IG Metal (DDR) were in contradic-
tion with this strategy. The conquest of the right to strike had been repeatedly counted among 
the first priorities of the reform process, by IG Metall’s head. Many articles echoed these res-
ervations toward the right to strike, usually together with disapproving comments.452 
The second topic highlighted by the IG Metall press concerns a process closely connected to 
the reform of the East German metal union. Many articles portrayed the turbulent situation on 
the shop floors of the metal plants and workshops of the GDR. On the one hand, the East 
German metal industry, the first industrial sector of the country, was in a bad shape. In 1988, 
this sector counted 1.5 million workers and 44% of all East German enterprises. Its predomi-
nance was also reflected in the fact that five out of eleven ministers were responsible for it. 
The productivity of the metal industry, estimated to reach 56% of its West German counter-
part in 1988, had fell to 30%, by November 1989.453 On the other hand, in different metal 
plants, workers had started to transform the state of internal relationships. IG Metall’s journal-
ists sent to the GDR portrayed the plants and workshops of the East German metal industry as 
the scene of far-reaching debates among workers and the location of fundamental transforma-
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tion of the production process, the organization of work and the representation of workers. In 
many of these plants and workshops, as one journalist put it, workers were taking “their future 
in their own hands”.454  
These articles in IG Metall’s press also showed how the IG Metall (DDR) was continuously 
challenged by groups of workers in plants and workshops, unconvinced by its renewal proc-
ess. These workers directed unequivocal calls to the IG Metall for support and assistance:  
Eigentlich sind wir mit unserer Arbeit wieder am Nullpunkt. (...) Wir brauchen jetzt den 
möglichst schnellen und praktischen Erfahrungsaustausch mit den westlichen Gewerk-
schaften, wie man Tarife und Vereinbarungen wirklich macht. Wir müssen ja nicht alles 
übernehmen, aber kennen wollen wir es wenigstens. 455  
The third aspect highlighted by IG Metall’s press between November and December was 
about the outcomes of the opening of the borders for the workers and the trade unions in the 
Federal Republic. Concerns were articulated as to the downward spiral effect on incomes ex-
erted by illegal or underpaid East Germans working in the Federal Republic.456 As this aspect 
was to count among the causes that brought a shift in the strategy of the West German, it is 
analyzed in the following chapters. Let us just notice that these concerns appeared in IG Met-
all’s press in November.  
A fourth aspect of the coverage of the changes occurring in the GDR by IG Metall’s press has 
to be formulated negatively. It is missing beside the previous three. There has been no men-
tion of the activity of the East German opposition or the initiatives for independent trade un-
ions (IUG) in the plants and workshops of the metal industry. The numerous and detailed de-
scriptions of the turbulent situation on the shop floors have however forgot this piece, which 
would have completed the puzzle. The result was a portray of the East German labor into 
which, although contested by its rank and file, IG Metall (DDR) appeared as the only organ-
ized force of defense of workers’ interests above the representation in the shop floor. This is 
also how IG Metall’s head understood the situation, as the treaty of cooperation with IG Met-
all (DDR) ratified by the beginning of December shows.   
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The cooperation with IG Metall (DDR) 
The analysis of the situation in East German labor developed by IG Metall's press seemed to 
find an echo in the clauses of the Cooperation Agreement between IG Metall and IG Metall 
(DDR), recently (re)founded as independent FDGB union member.457 
Six articles built the substance of this agreement signed by December 6. The first was the 
creation of a twinning program (Partnerschaften) between workers of enterprises from compa-
rable size from both Germanies. Twenty-five "partnerships" were hence initiated. This type of 
cooperation at the shop floor level aimed at supplying East German unionists on shop floors 
with material and information. The second article announced the organization of seminars by 
IG Metall on issues relating to the defense of workers' interests on the shop floor, to which 
East and West German unionists were to participate. Furthermore IG Metall pledged to open 
its seminars to GDR's shop floor delegates of the metal industry, and to develop new seminars 
on topics of specific consequence for East German unionists. The third article concerned the 
formation of East German union functionaries to issues relating to the internal organization, 
finances, membership and recruiting. The launching of collective bargaining rounds in the 
next future justified a special attention. Article four heralded a conference on this topic. The 
fifth article was about the development of formation programs for all categories of union 
functionaries of the East German metal industry. The sixth and last article announced that the 
seminars held in the IG Metall school of Spandau/West-Berlin were now going to include 
visits in metal plants and workshops of the GDR. These six initiatives built the "first steps" of 
a cooperation between both German metal unions which was to develop.   
One obvious goal of IG Metall with this agreement was to sustain the reform process of its 
East German homologous. The strong emphasis on the shop floors in articles 1,2,6, is impor-
tant. It were the East German structures of workers' representation, and their renewal, that had 
presided over the initiatives announced in the agreement. East German unions were enter-
prise-based, West German were not. The attention to meeting the specific needs of East Ger-
man unionists on the shop floors and to define the cooperation initiated as a mutual assistance, 
despite the evidence of a one-sided process of support, echoed the strategy that IG Metall de-
veloped since a few months. It was in accordance with Steinkühler’s repeated pledge to an 
active assistance that would not interfere into the decision-making processes but simply offer 
help where it was required.  
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On the following day (December 7), Franz Steinkühler and IG Metall (DDR)'s head Hartwig 
Bugiel, who were meeting for the first time, announced the creation of a GDR Working 
Group (DDR-Arbeitsgruppe) in every IG Metall regional divisions. The GDR Working Group 
was put under the direct supervision of Franz Steinkühler's cabinet. According to Jochen 
Kletzin, member of the GDR Working Group, both initiatives were regarded within IG Metall 
as resolute support of and collaboration to the East German self-determination movement.458 
The agreement between both metal unions became a model for comparable agreements be-
tween trade unions of both Germanies. Between December 1989 and February 1990, the fol-
lowing agreements were ratified between DGB unions and independent FDGB union mem-
bers:  
• Between the Construction Industrial Union (IG Bau-Steine-Erden) and the East German 
Construction and Wood Union (IG Bau-Holz (DDR)), by December 16, 1989;  
• Between the Education and Science Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissen-
schaft), the East German Education and Teachers Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und 
Unterricht (DDR)) and the East German Science Union (Gewerkschaft Wissenschaft 
(DDR)), by the beginning of January 1990; 
• Between the Mines and Energy Industrial Union (IG Bergbau und Energie), the East 
German Mines, Energy and Water Economy Union (IG Bergbau-Energie und Wasser-
wirtschaft (DDR)) and the East German Wismut Industrial Union (IG Wismut (DDR)), 
by January 25, 1990; 
• Between the Horticulture, Agriculture and Forestry Union (Gewerkschaft Gartenbau, 
Land- und Forstwirtschaft) and the East German Agriculture, Forestry and Alimentation 
Union (Gewerkschaft Land-, Forst- und Nahrungsgüterwirtschaft (DDR)), by January 
26, 1990. 
These agreements were not identical. All of them, however, intended to further the coopera-
tion with their East German homologous through common meetings and seminars specifically 
dedicated to the problems met in the democratization of the former FDGB. All of them also 
put a strong emphasis on supporting East German unionists in the shop floors. 
These cooperation agreements thus reflected the predilection of the DGB unions for a two-
pronged collaboration with East German unionists. On the one hand, collaboration at the sec-
tor level, with the newly (re-)founded trade unions. Here the goal was to support the reform of 
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the former FDGB into a confederation of efficient workers organizations, independent from 
the state and political parties.459 On the other hand, collaboration with unionists in shops and 
workshops. There, the goal was to support the renewal of the structures for the defense of 
workers' interests at the workplace. The mediation of the support by many DGB unions 
through agreements with the East German sectoral trade unions marked a certain continuity 
with the former Ostpolitik. It left close to no place for collaboration with independent initia-
tives (turned against the reform of the unions coming from the FDGB). The abandonment of 
the strategy of support and collaboration was not going to mean a turn toward these independ-
ent initiatives. Support and collaboration remained directed toward the sectoral organizations.   
Coming back to IG Metall, the assistance to its East German homologous was furthered by a 
collaboration agreement, this time between the Berlin offices of both metal unions. This new 
agreement, made public by January 18, 1990, consolidated the course formerly initiated. It 
foresaw new twinnings between plants and workshops  from the eastern and western parts of 
the city, continuous contacts and exchanges of information between both Berlin offices, and 
the setting up of formation on topics crucial to East German unionists. Hecen, the focal point 
of the support and collaboration stratzegy of IG Metall was the twinnings. By February 1990, 
35 such partnerships had been concluded. Unionists from the twinned plants and workshops 
held common meetings, but I could not find information on the discussions and activities held 
on these occasions. According to the president of IG Metall (DDR), Hartwig Bugiel: 
Die 35 Betriebs-Partnerschaften haben eine grosse Ausstrahlungskraft gewonnen auf 
andere Betriebe. Und auf dieser Basis, dass Betriebe zusammenarbeiten, ist auch ein 
Zusammenwachsen für uns als Gewerkschaften möglich. Das ist nach meiner Meinung 
eines der wichtigsten Themen überhaupt. Wo wir mit unseren Kollegen reden, ist Part-
nerschaft.460 
3.2.2.2 With an eye on the unification: Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union 
A literature of the dichotomy 
Andrei S. Markovits depicts in detail the inner DGB opposition between the "activist" and 
"accomodationist" tarde unions. This conflict took on different configurations throughout the 
history of the DGB. It had crystallised since the second half of the 1970s as a controversy 
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between the “activism” of the IG Metall and the orientation of “social partnership” of the 
Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union.461  
The differences between these two unions have been continuously highlighted in the litera-
ture. It is thus not a surprise to find this dichotomy in analyses of DGB unions' strategy in 
1990. The political scientist Klaus von Beyme, for instance, defines IG Metall's strategy as a 
"policy of the third way", that is a policy dedicated to assist the GDR in its evolution toward a 
new economic system "between western market economies and eastern socialist economies". 
He opposes this strategy to the more pragmatic one developed by the Chemistry, Paper, Ce-
ramics Industrial Union and oriented towards the objective of the unification.462 Translated in 
the concepts used here, the argument made is that the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial 
Union did not change its former strategy in February 1990. From November 1989 on, argues 
von Beyme, this union has remained loyal to the same strategy, turned toward the accom-
plishment of the unification. For this understanding, the rapid completion of the unification 
corroborated the "historical rightness" (the expression is mine) of the strategy by the Chemis-
try, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union.  
The argument that the strategy by the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union diverged 
from that by IG Metall, and was somehow proven right by the events, underlies mutatis mu-
tandis the quasi totality of the studies published on the subject.463  
This interpretation is misleading. Unquestionably, the “anti-communist” creed of the Chemis-
try, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union seemed confirmed by the ongoing fall of the eastern 
bloc. It is also correct to notice the stances made by the union's head in favor of a social mar-
ket economic system in the GDR and for the unification of both German states.464 None of 
these elements were present in IG Metall's discourse at the moment. Yet, differences in dis-
course should not be overrated for they did not materialize into different strategies. Until Feb-
ruary 1990, just like IG Metall and the other DGB unions, the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics 
Industrial Union examined the situation in East German trade unions and workplaces. The 
union developed different means aiming at supporting the reshaping of the structures of work-
ers' representation.  
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This assistance took the form of seminars on topics of a specific interest for East German un-
ionists and a twinning program between comparable chemical companies in both lands. The 
West German chemistry union actively supported the reform of the East German Chemistry, 
Glass, Ceramics Industrial Union (FDGB), through material aid and specific programs of 
formation. The criteria characterising the first period are thus all met. The main difference 
with IG Metall lies in a more partial implementation of the same strategy. 
The story 
Contacts between the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union and the East German  
Chemistry, Glass, Ceramics Industrial Union (FDGB) had been launched by May 1989, with 
a meeting in Hanover. A timid policy of contact had been launched, and if Chemistry, Paper, 
Ceramics Industrial Union's head had refused to publish a declaration in common with its East 
German homologous after the meeting, it had accepted the invitation to meet again in Halle 
by June 1990.   
Public stances on the East German revolution by the DGB chemistry union remained sporadic 
until November. The first important declaration by Hermann Rappe, head of the Chemistry, 
Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union and SPD MP, was made by the second-half of this month. 
Rappe declared himself favorable to a proposition made by CDU MP Kurt Biedenkopf and 
SPD politician Georg Leber. Following this proposition, West German workers should work 
for free on June 17, for a period of five years. Ten billions DM per year could thus be spared 
and used for the improvement of the East German enterprises. Hermann Rappe greeted this 
measure as workers’ share in the construction of a better future in the GDR. He also called for 
supplementary solidarity means, to be financed through the renunciation by the federal gov-
ernment of the announced income-tax decrease and the cancellation of the purchase of mili-
tary planes Jäger 90, a contract of almost one hundred billions DM.465 
It was a month later, that the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union outlined its course 
as to the events in the GDR, with a long paper by Hermann Rappe entitled "For a free and 
democratic Germany". At that time, the calls in favor of the unification in the East German 
demonstrations had replaced those for reform. That concern was addressed by the DGB union, 
which evoked the unification, as a far away perspective. How the union conceived this proc-
ess had been influenced by the first unification plan proposed by the Kohl governement, the 
so-called "ten-point plan" (presented in chapter 3.5), published a few days before. In confor-
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mity with this plan, Hermann Rappe mentioned a rather long process, with a loose "confederal 
agreement" (Staatenbundregelung) between both states as first step.  
The declaration by the union also stressed the urgency of improving the East German infra-
structures, especially in sectors like transportation, post, communications and the protection 
of the environment, a task which supposed the introduction of private investments and the 
active involvement of the Federal Republic and private investments. The introduction of the 
market economy in the GDR supposed in return the development of a free trade union move-
ment there. In that respect, the DGB chemistry union reiterated its willingness to support the 
reform of the Chemistry, Glass, Ceramics Industrial Union (FDGB). The collaboration with 
this union was going to evolve along the needs expressed by the East German unionists. 
Hermann Rappe finasllx expressed the hope that the achievement of the unification between 
both states was to be accompanied by the unification of both German chemistry unions.  
Jeder Wandel der Wirtschaftsordnung in der DDR in Richtung auf marktwirtschaftliche 
Strukturen und Konzepten muss unter sozialen Vorzeichen und sozialer Absicherung er-
folgen. Dafür – wir für den Aufbau und die Sicherung eines freiheitlichen demokrati-
schen Rechtsstaates überhaupt – sind freie Gewerkschaften eine Grundvoraussetzung. 
Zur Marktwirtschaft, soll sie auch sozial sein, gehört systemimmanent eine freie und 
kraftvolle Gewerkschaftbewegung. Ob es den bisherigen DDR-Gewerkschaften im 
FDGB, der sich hauptsächlich als der klassische Transmissionsriemen zur kommunisti-
schen Einheitspartei verstand und auch so wirkte, gelingt, aus sich selbst von innen her-
aus einen Wandlungsprozess zu bewältigen, bleibt abzuwarten. Wir – die IG Chemie-
Papier-Keramik – werden jede Art von Kooperation und praktischer Hilfe anbieten, 
wenn, wann und wie unsere Kolleginnen und Kollegen drüben das wollen. Wenn ich 
unsere Solidarität und Hilfe beim Aufbau freier und kraftvoller Gewerkschaften in der 
DDR anbiete, dann denke ich dabei auch ein paar Jahre weiter. Ich möchte helfen, eine 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung in der DDR vorzubereiten, die auch einmal eine Vereinigung 
mit Gewerkschaften unseres Charakters und Selbstverständnisses vollziehen kann. Ich 
gehe dabei aus von der Vereingung der beiden Länder am Ende eines Prozesses, also 
auch von einer Vereinigung der Gewerkschaften. 
Hermann Rappe made no secret of his preference for the introduction of the market economy 
and the unification. And he believed that these steps, were they to be taken, would lead to the 
merger of the tarde unions. But he denied that pointing up these preferences summed up to an 
inteference into the self-determination process of East Germans. On the contrary, Rappe saw 
these perspectives as preserving the freedom of self-determination. He condemned those per-
sons and organizations, in the Federal Republic and the GDR, who insisted on the importance 
of preserving “socialist” features in eastern Germany. He obviously meant IG Metall among 
others. This kind of stances was a perversion of the respect of self-detzermination, he conclu-
ded. He depicted them as cynical, considering that the "socialist ideology" had been responsi-
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ble for the oppression of the populations of eastern Europe and for the 70-year split of the 
labor movement.  
All das ist keine Bevormundung und Einmischung. Im Gegenteil, es ist der einzige ge-
rade Weg in freier Selbstbestimmung hüben und drüben zu Demokratie und Rechts-
staatlichkeit. Um so unverständlicher sind mir manche Reaktionen in der Bundesrepu-
blik und in der DDR, die da meinen, in der DDR nun nch manches „Sozialistische“ 
retten zu können und zu müssen. In der DDR und in Osteuropa sind nicht nur Ideolo-
gien zu Bruch gegangen, mit denen diese Völker seit dem Kriegsende unterdrückt wur-
den, sondern die der Arbeiterbewegung seit 70 Jahren Spaltung brachten. Ausgerechnet 
die DDR jetzt zu neuen Experimenten missbrauchen zu wollen, das betrachte ich als 
Einmischung und Bevormundung, ja als Zynismus gegenüber den Menschen in der 
DDR.466 
It is interesting to see how each DGB union depicted its own position as protecting the right 
to a free self-determination by the East German population, even if it did not match with that 
of other DGB members. The divergence between how IG metal understood the course of the 
self-determination process – as a search for a "third way" – and how the Chemistry, Paper, 
Ceramics Industrial Union understood it – as leading to a free market economy and the Ger-
man unification – echoed the programmatic differences between both unions. Each of them 
interpreted the fall of the GDR as a justification of its own orientations. 
In a way, the two unions were right. Their positions, although divergent, respected the self-
determination movement. They were focusing on different trends of the movement. Until De-
cember 1989, the will for reforms had remained dominant in the demonstrations and the refer-
ence to a "third way" explicitely made by many speakers. Since December, however, when 
Hermann Rappe made his declaration, the calls for unification had won the upper hand in the 
demonstrations.467 This divergence between both unions was significant. Ultimately, it repro-
duced the historical division between the "accomodationist" and the radical unions among the 
DGB. It echoed very different conceptions of the goals of trade union politics. I would thus be 
misunderstood if I gave the impression that the verbal denounciations of the support to the 
"third way" were just a routine pointed remark by Hermann Rappe, without much conse-
quence. As we shall see in an ulterior chapter, the fall of the GDR did raise many crucial 
questions as the objectives of trade union politics in a free market economy. These program-
matic questions were not peripheral but central in the strategies developed by the DGB unions 
in 1989-90. If divergent programmatic conceptions did not materialize into different strate-
gies, their common strategy had, in turn, critical programmatic consequences. The Chemistry, 
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Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union implemented an assistance program that shared a lot with 
that of IG Metall, not only the claim that it was developed in order to support the process of 
free self-determination. 
A program of collaboration between the two chemistry unions was announced, by December 
18, shortly after Rappe's declaration, on the occasion of the meeting between both heads. 
Hartmut Löschner, former vice-president of the East German Chemistry, Glass, Ceramics 
Industrial Union (FDGB), had become president, after Edith Weber had resigned during the 
union’s 13th Central Session of the Executive Committee (Zentralvorstandssitzung), by No-
vember 22. The core of this collaboration was a teinning program between comparable chem-
istry enterprises to be developed in the next months as well as training sessions on organiza-
tional issues and collective bargaining for the East German functionaries.468 
The acceleration of the exodus following the opening of the wall brought the Chemistry, Pa-
per, Ceramics Industrial Union to offer accommodation in one of its schools to more than 150 
recent East German migrants in need of a shelter, for close to three weeks, from December 18 
until January 6.469 As far as I could tell, the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union was 
the only West German trade union to undertake a solidarity action of that nature. Hermann 
Rappe, who ate and discussed with the guests on December 27, explained that his union had 
not in mind to choose whether it was preferable to leave the GDR or to stay there, since re-
forms were now implemented. His union, he stated, was going to help the Chemistry, Glass, 
Ceramics Industrial Union (FDGB) as well as the people who had left their country. “Man 
muss dies jedem einzelnen selbst überlassen, sich zu entscheiden, ob er geht oder bleibt. Auf 
jeden Fall gilt es für alle, die jetzt hier sind, die eigene Familie und Substanz wiederzufinden. 
Dabei möchten wir helfen.” When Rappe restated his personal preference for the unification, 
he was applauded enthusiastically by his guests. Under unification, he understood, as almost 
everybody at the time, a rather long process at the end of which the "social market economy" 
would be introduced in eastern Germany.470 
The first twinnings were rapidly developed. By the beginning of January, new directions for 
the development of collaboration with the East German trade union were considered in the 
West German union's headquarters. According to multiple requests by the East German chem-
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istry union and the company-based trade unions, the most urgent task appeared to be informa-
tion on the work, tasks and goals of West German trade unions. The important amount of re-
quests for information, meetings and training sessions addressed to the Chemistry, Paper, Ce-
ramics Industrial Union convinced this union's head of opening an Information and 
Counselling Office in Leipzig (Informations- und Beratungsbüro). This Office was to bemade 
responsible to coordinate the union's information activity in the GDR. Topics like collective 
bargaining, the protection of the environment and the defence of workers’ interests at the 
workplace were targeted. The Office was also made responsible of developing new partner-
ships between unionists of comparable chemistry companies in both countries. Hence the 
opening of an office in Leipzig was an important furthering of the collaboration strategy. This 
collaboration concerned primarily the East german Chemistry, Glass, Ceramics Industrial 
Union (FDGB), but the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union stressed that its support 
was available to any force acting at the development of new structures of representation of 
interests in the GDR. 
Das Beratungsbüro ist offen für alle Interessenten aus den Betrieben. Dies gilt auch für 
die Oppositionsparteien in der DDR wie die SPD und das Neue Forum. Eine Zusam-
menarbeit mit der DDR-Gewerkschaft IG Chemie-Glas-Keramik ist für den geschäfts-
führenden Hauptvorstand der IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik selbstverständlich. Diese 
Zusammenarbeit wird auch in der Frage ‚Beratungsbüro’ erfolgen“.471 
A circular letter sent one week later to the members of the Direction (Hauptvorstand) and Ad-
visory Committee (Beirat) expressed some reservation as to the course of collaboration bet-
ween both unions. In this letter, Hermann Rappe questioned the nature of the changes occur-
ring in the representation of workers' interests and in the East German Chemistry union.  For 
the first time in a more or les public document, he showed himself dubious as to the reform 
process of the East German Chemistry, Glass, Ceramics Industrial Union (FDGB).  But despi-
te these reservations, the strategy of the union remained motivated by the impulse coming 
from East German actors. The letter certainly called upon the attention how timid and hesitant 
the reform of the East German structures of worker representation were evolving. But it made 
it also unambiguous that the West German union had no other intention than to wait and ob-
serve how East German unionists were going to develop new union structures and political 
stances. 
Dabei ist bisher offen, wie sich die neuen Strukturen, insbesondere innerhalb der betrie-
blichen Gewerkschaftsvertretung, gestalten werden. In vielen Betrieben sind die Be-
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triebsgewerkschaftsleitungen abgewählt worden und die Belegschaften haben Betriebs-
räte gewählt. Wir hoffen, erste Aufschlüsse über die weitere Entwicklung der Gewerk-
schaften über den am 31.1/1.2.1990 stattfindenden FDGB-Kongress zu erhalten. Es 
wird darauf ankommen, ob die Gewerkschaften in der DDR sich von der SED lossagen 
und zu Formen freier Gewerkschaften unseres Charakters und Selbstverständnisses fin-
den. Auch innerhalb der DDR-Chemiegewerkschaft sind Veränderungen zu verzeich-
nen, ohne dass wir bisher abschließend beurteilen können, wie sich die Organisations-
formen und auch politische Standpunkte entwickeln.472 
Both unions' heads met again in Hanover on January 26 and 27, 1990. The first congress of 
the East German Chemistry, Glass, Ceramics Industrial Union (FDGB) was announced for 
April 27 and 28. The purpose of the congress were to further the internal reform of the union 
and identify new paths of collaboration with the DGB homologous. Both unions also declared 
that they were in favor of the country's unification.473 
The Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union  was the earliest advocate of the German 
unification among DGB union members. It was also among the first to plead for the introduc-
tion of works councils in the GDR.474 Until February, however, its strategy remained un-
changed. It laid on a twinning program, specific seminars on issues crucial to east German 
uinionsts, on the material and logistic support of the reform of its East german homologous.  
Nach entsprechender Klärung im FDGB muss die IG Chemie, Glas und Keramik ihre 
Organisationsform finden. Mit Delegiertenwahlen in den Betrieben muss sie ihren Kon-
gress Ende April vorbereiten. (...) Wir, die Industriegewerkschaft Chemie-Papier-
Keramik, wollen unseren Kolleginnen und Kollegen in der DDR mit Rat und Tat zur 
Seite stehen. Für die tägliche Arbeit wollen wir ihnen die technischen Hilfsmittel zur 
verfügung stellen. Wir suchen einen breiten Kontakt durch Betriebspartnerschaften. Wir 
laden zu Fachlehrgängen in der Bundesrepublik ein und werden auch durch andere Ver-
anstaltungen und Entsendung von Fachreferenten bei der Lösung beiderseitiger Proble-
me helfen. (...) Wir wollen beraten und helfen, und nicht bevormunden, aber das Ziel ist 
klar: Bei allen Schritten auf die Vereinigung beider bisheriger Staaten hin auch die Ver-
einigung beider Gewerkschaftsorganisationen zu verwirklichen. Vorrangig geht es nun, 
wie man so sagt, ums Ganze, auch aus Sicht der Gewerkschaften, und, wie ich hoffe, 
beider Organisationsbereiche: um gegenseitige Solidarität.475 
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3.2.2.3 Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union (Öffentlicher Dienst, Transport 
und Verkehr, ÖTV) 
A 'centrist' trade union 
In 1989, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union was Germany’s largest public sec-
tor union and DGB’s second largest union, after IG Metall. Blue and white-collar employees 
of a great variety of public activities, such as public administration, hospitals and univerisites 
were grouped together under its umbrella. Transport and traffic represented the union's largest 
sector. Its broad range of sectors had made the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union 
the “least homogeneous union in Germany”, a reality reflected in the union's decentralized 
functioning.476 The positions put forward by this union were more than often the result of 
hard-negotiated compromises between a variety of stances defended by different sectors and 
regions. This inner diversity was not only a burden but also a guarantee of influence among 
the DGB. The compromises developed by the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union 
were occasionally adopted by the DGB. The Confederation is often confronted with situations 
where it has to come up with compromises acceptable to its different union members. The 
deals found in the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union were often taken over by the 
DGB.   
The unity of action of all DGB unions in 1989-90 made such an arbiter between them unnec-
essary. However, the fourth characteristic of the support and collaboration strategy – the vari-
able degree of implementation – is revealed without ambiguity by the few action undertaken 
by the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union. In fact, the 'centrist' function of this un-
ion within the DGB makes this moderation instructive. Until February 1990, it was possible 
for a trade union as important as the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union to limit its 
involvement in the GDR. After February, this option was to have vanished.    
The analysis of the action and the public discourse of the Public Services, Transport and Traf-
fic Union reveals three elements.  
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The first element concerns the multiplicity of articles on the situation within the East German 
labor published by the union's press. Reports on the East German opposition groups were also 
published by Das Magazin (the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union's monthly), an 
interest shared among the West German union press only by the Gewerkschaftliche 
Monatshefte.477  
The second element concerns the absence of contact between the head of the Public Services, 
Transport and Traffic Union and any East German union of the numerous public and the 
transport sectors. Until February, the collaboration implemented between the Public Services, 
Transport and Traffic Union and its East German homologous remained small-scale initiatives 
taken by regional sections of the DGB union.  
The third element concerns the worries expressed within the Public Services, Transport and 
Traffic Union as to the outcomes of the migration opf thousands of East German workers to 
the Federal Republic. coming from the GDR. 
The story 
A meeting of the executive direction (Hauptvorstand) of the Public Services, Transport and 
Traffic Union by October 10 and 11, 1989, was the occasion for the union head,  Monika 
Wulf-Mathies, to report on the situation in the eastern Bloc. She insisted on the non-
involvement of trade unions into the changes going on in most of the eastern countries, and 
blamed the East German and Hungarian trade unions in particular. She heralded her intent to 
support the reform of the eastern trade unions, the development of systems of labor contracts 
and freedom to strike in these countries.  
Aufgabe aller Gewerkschaften des DGB, so Monika Wulf-Mathies, müsse sein „den 
demokratischer Prozess in den osteuropäischen Ländern zu unterstützen und den Ge-
werkschaften dabei zu helfen, eigenständige Strukturen aufzubauen und Instrumente zu 
entwickeln, mit denen gewerkschaftliche Forderungen durchegesetzt werden.“ Dazu ge-
hörten vor allem ein Tarifvertragssystem und das Streikrecht.478 
                                                 
477 The Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte published a long introduction to the East German opposition - who they 
were, what they wanted, their program for labor -, with interviews of representqtives from the Demokratischer 
Aufbruch, Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte, Neues Forum, Sozialdemokratische Partei and Vereinigte 
Linke, as well as with SPD thinker Erhard Eppler and GDR specialists Wolfgang Leonhard and Renate Damus: 
“Forum: Deutsch-deutsche Fragen”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 12/89, pp. 740-788. 
478 “Hauptvorstand diskutiert in Stuttgart aktuelle Themen. Im Osten viel Neues, in Bonn alter Ärger”, ÖTV-
Magazin, 11/89, pp. 3-4, quote: p. 4.  
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Soon after, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union published a declaration calling 
for thorough reforms of the East German FDGB. If it underlined that effective reforms in the 
GDR could only be made by East Germans, it remained silent as to the kind of collaboration 
considered. On the integration of the East German immigrants, the declaration was more ex-
plicit. The Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union's members were encouraged to en-
deavour the integration of East German workers at the workplace and in the union. The West 
German union refused any positive discrimination for East German immigrant workers.  
Alle Gewerkschaftsmitglieder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seien aufgefordert, 
sich die betriebliche und gewerkschaftliche Integration der Flüchtlinge zu bemühen. Die 
ehemalign Bürger der DDR müβten „eine faire Chance zum Neuanfang erhalten“. Das 
setzte allerdings auch – um Resentiments vorzubeugen – Gleichbehandlung mit Bun-
desbürgern bei der Wohnungsversorgung und beim Wettbewerb um Arbeitsplätze vor-
aus.479 
If the head of the three other unions presented here attempted to characterize the nature of the 
East German revolution, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union remained parsimo-
nious on the historical and sociological signification of the popular upheaval in the GDR. This 
can be linked to this union's lower ideological profile within the West German trade union 
movement. In fact, it can be seen as another manifestation of the Public Services, Transport 
and Traffic Union's middle position among the DGB unions that Monika Wulf-Mathies held 
out one hand to the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union and the other to the IG Met-
all in her declarations. She borrowed from the first her reference to the “dramatic decay of 
socialist utopias” and to the second the comment that “the failure of a system of one-party 
state-capitalism does not correspond to the beatification of private capitalism.” She concluded 
that “there is no exhibit to the assertion that the future in the West can only be built on the 
heap of rubble of the welfare state”, a statement which promised to meet broad acceptance 
within the trade unions.480  
The Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union's press published many articles on the East 
German opposition and the situation at the workplace.  
                                                 
479 “Betroffenheit und Hoffnung. Reaktionen auf das Geschehen in der DDR”, ÖTV-Magazin, 11/89, p. 2. Earlier 
in September, Ulrike Peretzki-Leid, member of the executive direction of the Public Services, Transport and 
Traffic Union wrote to the West German Ministry of Health. She insisted that the East German vocational train-
ing for nurses be acknowledged by the Federal Republic. “Auf keinen Fall dürfen wir zulassen, dass Neuan-
kömmlinge, die vielfach auf eine lange Berufserfahrung im Pflegebereich zurückblicken können, in der BRD mit 
einer Bezahlung als Hilfskraft abgespeist werden.” See: “Ist anzuerkennen. Krankenpflegeexamen der DDR”, 
ÖTV-Magazin, 10/89, p. 19. 
480 “Hauptvorstand diskutiert in Stuttgart”, p. 3. 
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One essay by the well-known East German activist Wolfgang Templin recounted the history 
of the opposition on the East German opposition since 1987. At least two elements of Tem-
plin's analysis might have drawn the attention of West German unionists interested by the 
connections between labor and the East German revolution. First of all, Templin did not op-
pose the different groups of the opposition but juxtaposed them as complementary forces, 
within different spheres of action. Second of all, he presented the United Left as the only op-
position group present in the workplaces putting forward claims for labor.481 
The articles published in the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union's press on the situa-
tion in East German labor focused on the changes occurring at the workplace and within the 
FDGB. In a way, the emphasis on these two levels, to the detriment of the intermediary eche-
lon of the sectoral trade unions, was an adequate representation of the changes occurring. The 
dynamics at stake within the East German labor shook primarily the structures of worker rep-
resentation at the workplace482 and the FDGB.483 However, this evacuation of the changes 
occurring in the East German trade unions of the public and transport sectors was also consis-
tant with the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union's policy. The DGB union put a 
hold on the contacts maintained with its East German homologous over the last years. A letter 
of mid-December by the union's head to the circle and district administrations made that as-
pect clear. Only contacts between district or local administrations remained allowed, while 
contact between the higher hierarchies of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union 
and of East German trade unions of the public and transport sectors were abandoned.484 
Two reasons explain the reluctance of the DGB union to develop a broad policy of collabora-
tion with its East German homologous. One concerned the fact that the East German public 
and transport sectors counted at least 8 different trade unions. This multiplicity made any cen-
tralized policy of collaboration a difficult endeavor.485  
                                                 
481 Wolfgang Templin, “Wir sind das Volk. Aufbruch in der DDR fördert Oppositionsgruppen”, ÖTV-Magazin, 
11/89, pp. 35-36, quote: p. 36. 
482 As noticed in: Klaus Klöppel, “Nicht katzbuckeln. Mitglieder setzen Funktionäre unter Druck”, ÖTV-
Magazin, 1/90, p. 39. 
483 Especially the articles on the FDGB Congress of January 1990: Klaus Klöppel, “Abschied vom Sozialismus. 
Auch Gewerkschaften in der DDR sind für radikale Reformen”, ÖTV-Magazin, 2/90, pp. 35-36 and the dossier 
“Kongreβ des FDGB: Auβerordentlich. Moment mal wir verzetteln uns”, ÖTV-Magazin, 3/90, pp. 31-34. Also: 
Klaus Klöppel, “SED verliert die führende Rolle. Gewerkschaften der DDR auf Suche nach neuem Profil” and 
Ingolf Kern, “Aufräumen, neu beginnen”, both: ÖTV-Magazin, 1/90, p. 40. 
484 Fichter and Kurbjuhn (1993), entry “December 20, 1989”.  
485 Monika Wulf-Mathies, president of ÖTV, called “a problem” the fact that her organisation faced 8 different 
unions. See: “ÖTV schickt Beraterstab in die DDR”, Der Tagesspiegel, February 17, 1990, p. 2, quoted in: Wil-
ke/Müller 1991, p. 226. 
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The other concerned the strong imbrication of the state apparatus within the structures of the 
East German regime of domination. It was difficult to consider that the collaboration with the 
East German Ministries, State's Organs and Municipalities Union (Gewerkschaft Ministerien, 
Staatsorgane, Kommunalwirtschaft) for instance, could further the reform of trade unions in 
the GDR. 
The Rhineland-Palatinate administration was one of the Länder administration of the Public 
Services, Transport and Traffic Union that developed small-scale initiatives of collaboration 
with their East German counterparts. Meetings and seminars for East and West German un-
ionists were organized.486 “After decades during which we had to satisfy ourselves with meet-
ings with high-rank union officials”, the time had come, explained Ulrich Galle, head of the 
Rhineland-Palatinate administration of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union, that 
nursing personnel, bus drivers and civil employees of both Germanies met and discussed.487 
On January 8, 1990, he addressed the round 100.000 participants to a demonstration for “trade 
unions and the right to strike” in Karl-Marx-Stadt. His speech highlighted what he considered 
where utmost priorities: a thorough reform of the FDGB, “from the basis to the summit”, the 
implementation of a collective bargaining system in the GDR and the recognition of workers' 
right to strike. It was important, he maintained, that the FDGB be preserved as unitary con-
federation of trade unions in the GDR. The good working conditions of the West German 
workers was the result of unitary trade uinionism. 
“Wie ist es bei uns?” fragte Ulrich Galle. Nur die Einheit der Gewerkschaften, nur sie 
als starke Gegenkraft hätten im Kapitalismus den Unternahmern bessere Arbeitsbedin-
gungen abtrotzen können. “Gäbe es bei uns eine Vielzahl unterschiedlicher Gewerk-
schaftsbewegungen – wir müβten heute auf viele verzichten”.488 
These small-scale initiatives corresponded to the logic of the first period, although they re-
mained scarce. They built the core of the collaboration policy of the Public Services, Trans-
port and Traffic Union until the mid-February 1990. By then, the union's head was to identify 
new strategy guidelines that followed a different goal.   
                                                 
486 On January 18, 1990, secretaries and workplace representatives of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic 
Union  officials from Nord-Rhine-Westfalia met with officials of the East German Health System Union 
(Gewerkschaft Gesundheitswesen (FDGB)) in Schwerin. The discussions enlightened how the massive depar-
tures had undermined the East German public health services. East German participants questioned their West 
German colleagues about the health system in the Federal Republic.“Radikaler Bruch”, ÖTV-Magazin, 2/90, p. 
36. 
487 “Deutsch-deutsches Seminar”, ÖTV-Magazin, 1/90, p. 31. 
488 “Streikrecht”, ÖTV-Magazin, 2/90, p. 36. 
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3.2.2.4 Media Industrial Union 
In 1989, IG Medien counted amongst the active promoters of the support and collaboration 
policy with the East German trade unions.  
The politics of the Media Industrial Union toward the East German revolution policy can be 
summarised in in three points. First of all, the radical character of the changes going on in the 
GDR was emphasised by this union's leaders. They understood these changes as connected 
with other historical struggles in favor of democracy and socialism. Second of all, the com-
plexity of the renewal process of the East German trade unions made the identification of the 
kind of support and collaboration wished for by the East German actors difficult. This proba-
bly explain the relatively low number of actual collaboration initiatives implemented, despite 
favorable inclinations manifested by the Media Industrial Union's head. Third of all, the Me-
dia Industrial Union leaders made no secret of their preference for the upholding of the East 
German state and criticised repeatedly chancellor Kohl’s pro-unification stances.  
The story  
The first echoes of the events in the eastern bloc appeared in the Media Industrial Union press 
by mid-September 1989. The union's vice-president Detlef Hensche wondered if the massive 
departures from the GDR, the economic and political reforms in Poland and Hungary, as well 
as the strikes in the USSR meant the "death of socialism" and the confirmation of the "superi-
ority of the capitalist economic order". His answer highlighted the failure of “the attempt to 
resolve economic, social, ecological and other problems from the top, on the basis of a cen-
tralised administration.” In that respect, the capitalist market economy was more flexible and 
efficient, he wrote. However, a socialist alternative aiming at redistributing the economic and 
political power of decision among several levels of political action and the workplace was 
everything but dead, believed Detlef Hensche. He was convinced that the people of Poland 
and Hungary favored it. In consequence, he invited his and other western trade unions to as-
sist the reforms undertaken in these countries. In the case of the GDR this supposed to refuse 
to distort the self-determination process with “reunification slogans”.489 
The Media Industrial Union maintained its Ostpolitik unchanged until the first half of Octo-
ber. During a meeting with FDGB union leaders of the media held from October 4 to 6, in 
East-Berlin, the head of the Media Industrial Union criticized how the West German media 
covered the East German crisis, a way, they affirmed, to divert from key problems at home, 
                                                 
489 Detlef Hensche, “Siegt der Kapitalismus?”, Kontrapunkt, 19/1989, p. 5. 
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like unemployment. The head of the Media Industrial Union, Erwin Ferlemann, affirmed that 
the relationships between East and West German trade unions were strong enough to resist 
these hard times. They were to be carried on, despite the fact that some DGB union members 
had started to question them - meant was the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Un-
ion. Following a report to the East German Stasi by the heads of the East German Paper and 
Printing Industrial Union and the Art Trade Union, Werner Peplowski and Herbert Bischoff: 
Ferlemann informierte über sein Gespräch mit [DGB president] Breit vor der Abreise in 
die DDR zur Weiterführung des bewährten Dialogs und darüber, daβ manche Gewerk-
schaften im DGB „in dieser Zeit“ kein Verständnis hätten, daβ eine Leitungsdelegation 
die DDR besucht. Ferlemann betonte, daβ die Beziehungen zwischen beiden Vorstän-
den und den internationalen organisationen (Internationale Grafische Föderation und 
Ständiges Komitee der Gewerkschaften der Grafischen Industrie) stark genug seien, um 
Belastungen auch in politisch schwierigen Zeiten standzuhalten. (...) Beide Seiten beto-
nen die Nützlichkeit des konstruktiven Dialogs zwischen den zentralen Vorständen als 
ein gutes Mittel für ein besseres Verständnis über die Gewerkschaftsarbeit in unter-
schiedlichen Gesellschaftsordnungen.490 
By that time, however, the popular mobilization in the GDR was weakening the state's struc-
tures. By October 18, Erich Honecker was forced to resign as secretary general of the SED. A 
new column y Detlef Hensche in the Media Industrial Union's bi-weekly greeted the perspec-
tive of fundamental reforms in the GDR, while disparaging “CDU/CSU politicians dreaming 
of the borders of 1937”. He depicted the spectre of Germany's unification as an inexorable 
threat to peace in Europe. The future of democracy and socialism in Germany, he wrote, sup-
posed the upholding of the GDR as a state.  
Endlich deutet sich eine Chance an, daβ auch in der DDR eine Öffnung für mehr De-
mokratie möglich ist. Wird sie nicht genutzt, dürften der Sozialismus und seine Ideale 
auf deutschem Boden für lange Zeit abgedankt haben. Die Debatte über die Wiederver-
einigung kann dabei nur stören. Sie stellt die Eigenstaatlichkeit und Existenzberechtigug 
der DDR in Frage. Wiedervereinigungsparolen sind daher dazu angetan, den Prozeβ ei-
ner demokratischen Erneuerung in der DDR von vorneherein zu ersticken. (...) Die 
deutsche Frage kann nur bedeuten, endlich zu einem nationalen Selbstverständnis der 
Friedensfähigkeit, der Demokratie, der Toleranz und Freiheit zu gelangen. Das setzt 
Anerkennung der bestehenden Grenzen und Staaten voraus und bedeutet demokratische 
Reformen in beiden deutschen Staaten, auch bei uns.491 
The opening of the wall by November 9, marked a sharpening of the critique against the fede-
ral government and other West German politicians accused of harming the unfolding of the 
free self-determination process in the GDR by stimulating the “nationalist frenzy”. In this 
                                                 
490 Information der Zentralvorstände der IG Druck und Papier und der Gewerkschaft Kunst des FDGB über die 
Ergebnisse des Besuchs einer Leitungsdelegation der IG Medien im DGB vom 4. bis 6. Oktober[1989] in der 
DDR, BStU, HA XX 1178. 
491 Detlef Hensche, “Die deutsche Frage”, Kontrapunkt, 21/1989, p. 5. 
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context, Hensche wrote in a new column, the role of the DGB unions was to support the sove-
reign search for its own "way" by the East German population, without interfering in the pro-
cess.492 
The comprehension of the East German revolution and of the issues at stake  developed by 
Detlef Hensche in the union's press was endorsed as official positions of the Media Industrial 
Union in a declaration by the Union Council (Gewerkschaftsrat) published by December 1. Its 
argument was built on two ideas. First of all, the East German “peaceful revolution” had bro-
ken up with the “Stalinist structures” of the East German state and headed toward the instau-
ration of a “socialism with a human face”, in the spirit of the Spring of Prague and the reforms 
initiated by Mikhail Gorbatchev. It was not a victory of the capitalist market economy over 
“socialism”. Second of all, the pro-unification declarations and the vagueness on the question 
of the Polish borders of the federal government favored a further destabilization of the GDR 
and were intolerable interferences in the East German self-determination movement. Such 
interferences needed to be opposed by the West German trade union movement.493 The decla-
ration also heralded the intention of the Media Industrial Union to develop support initiatives 
for the reform of the East German trade unions of the media sector. This, however, revealed to 
be easier said than done. 
Despite the enthusiasm displayed by the Media Industrial Union's head for the East German 
revolution, the union's press was not free from worries as to the state of the East German labor 
and trade unions. One journalist depicted this situation as “alarming”: the production was dis-
organised by the departures, overtime rose, the East German trade unions and their confedera-
tion FDGB implemented close to no reform, and workers were leaving them by the thousands. 
The condition of the East German Paper and Printing Industrial Union (FDGB) was portrayed 
in comparable terms. This union appeared considerably weakened by the departures for the 
Federal Republic and the low level of confidence of the round 150,000 members in front of 
the timid reforms undertaken.494 
Representatives of the Media Industrial Union and the East German Paper and Printing Indus-
trial Union (FDGB) met in East-Berlin on January 3, 1990. The goal of this three-day meeting 
                                                 
492 Detlef Hensche, “DDR: Demokratie statt Bevormundung”, Kontrapunkt, 23/1989, p. 5. 
493 “Der Gewerkschaftsrat der IG Medien zur Lage in der DDR: Alleingänge der Bundesregierung gefährden den 
Frieden”, Kontrapunkt, 25-26/1989, p. 4.  
494 Klaus Klöppel, “Weltmeister im Demonstrieren”, Kontrapunkt, 24/1989, pp. 23-26. In the same issue, also: 
Hans Dieter Baroth, “Heftiger Streit um die 40-Stunden-Woche”, pp. 22-23. The number of members who had 
left the East German trade unions in 1989 was evaluated at 800,000. Several tens of thousands had also ceased to 
pay their contributions, a traditional way of leaving the : Norbert Hüsson, “Interview mit Werner Peplowski über 
die Zukunft des FDGB und der DDR-Gewerkschaften”, Kontrapunkt, 2/1990, pp. 10-11. 
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was to develop the collaboration between both unions. The ratification of two collaboration 
agreements was decided. The development of collaboration at the shop floor level between 
workers and unionists from both lands, and the offer of particular training sessions for East 
German unionists by the Media Industrial Union were more specifically targeted. These 
agreements were presented as measures to develop the collaboration between two equal part-
ners, that were to share and disucss over mutual suggestions, objectives and strategies.495 A 
few days later, IG Medien printed 100,000 copies of a IG Druck und Papier flyer calling for 
independent trade unions in the GDR.  
Yet the development of an active collaboration turned out to be difficult. One cause for these 
difficulties was the ambiguities of the East German media unions’ reform. Whereas a minimal 
convergence with the orientations of the Media Industrial Union made collaboration possible, 
certain hesitations made its  materialization difficult. Two interviews with the East German 
Paper and Printing Industrial Union’s head Werner Peplowski, published by the Media Indus-
trial Union press, attempted to determine the nature of the reform undertaken and the scope of 
the convergence between both trade unions. One objective of such questions was was to fig-
ure how collaboration could materialize. 
In one interview published in December 1989, Peplowski recalled the points that made con-
sensus among East German workers: independence from the FDGB; proclamation of a Law 
on trade unions granting worker associations wide-ranging co-determination rights; introduc-
tion of the collective bargaining autonomy; identification of the protection of the environment 
as a priority in the GDR. He also identified unsettled issues which provoked debates among 
members and union officials. For instance, if the “strike taboo” had been breached in 1989, he 
explained, many workers and unionists still considered the strike as an inadequate expression 
of industrial conflict in a country were workers possessed the means of production. Whether 
Peplowski shared this opinion, shaped by decades of anti-strike propaganda in the GDR, and 
counted himself among those East German unionists “still searching for alternatives” to the 
strike was not clear. Another issue that divided the union members was the claim for the im-
mediate instauration of the 40-hour work week at equal pay in the paper and printing industry. 
Workers and union officials, opposed to this claim, riposted that the miserable state of the 
East German economy made longer work week inescapable.496 Such reluctances toward an 
                                                 
495 Detlef Hensche, “Gespräche mit der IG Druck und Papier im FDGB – Kooperation geplant”, Kontrapunkt, 
2/1990, pp. 8-9. 
496 Werner Peplowski, “Die IG Druck und Papier im FDGB der DDR will eigene eingefahrene Gleise rigoros 
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autonomous comprehension of workers’ interests made the collaboration with the Media In-
dustrial Union difficult.  
When Peplowski was asked how the collaboration with the Media Industrial Union could be 
developed, he identified two topics. The first concerned the development of stances and pro-
posals for the introduction of a Collective Bargaining Law in the GDR. He explicitly refered 
to the West German law of 1949 as a model in that respect. The second concerned the reform 
of the East German Paper and Printing Industrial Union (FDGB) and the Arts and Culture 
Union (FDGB), as well as their eventual merger into an East German Media Industrial Union. 
Again the West German Media Industrial Union was seen as a model.497  
The hesitations of the East German Paper and Printing Industrial Union’s reform were tackled 
again in a second interview published a month later. In the following excerpt, an IG Medien 
journalist is trying to drive Peplowski in the corner by challenging his views on the improve-
ment of the defence of workers’ interests in the GDR. He also tries to identify the kind of col-
laboration that the Media Industrial Union could develop. 
Die DGB-Satzung ist zur begehrten Lektüre geworden. Wollt ihr den DGB kopieren? 
WP: Das wäre schlimm! Der DGB hat Jahre gebraucht, um sein Profil zu finden. Und 
im Kopieren besteht die Gefahr, daβ man sich keine eigene Identität schafft, sondern 
sich nur anpaβt. (...). 
Was könnte übernommen werden? 
WP: Eine Reihe von Grundsätzen, zum Beispiel in der Frage des Schutzes der Werktä-
tigen bzw. der Arbeitnehmer (...). Übernehmen können wir auch den Grundsatz der Ta-
rifautonomie – aber unter den Bedingungen einer sozialistischen Wirtschaft. 
Wie ist bei Euch Tarifautonomie möglich? 
WP: Die Voraussetzung ist, daβ der Minister, dein Tarifpartner, tatsächlich alle Zahlen 
offen auf den Tisch legt. (...). 
Wie ist sicherzustellen, daβ der Minister wirklich alles offenlegt? 
WP: In der Verfassung muβ eine Rechenschaftspflicht der staatlichen Organe gegen-
über den Gewerkschaften verankert werden. Andererseits gehören zur Tarifautonomie 
auch Kenntnisse über Tarifpolitik, die uns noch fehlen. Hier wäre für uns die Hilfe des 
DGB und seiner Gewerkschaften wichtig. Wir brauchen sie sogar. 
Für uns ist Tarifautonomie ohne Streikrecht nicht denkbar. 
                                                 
497 A meeting between both East German media unions by December 10 and 11, had stressed the need for one 
strong media trade union in the GDR. Ibid., pp. 27 and 29. 
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WP: Für uns inzwischen auch nicht mehr. 
Wie ist Streiken denn möglich, wo doch die Werktätigen gleichzeitig Besitzer der Pro-
duktionsmittel sind? 
WP: Das ist der Casus knacktus. Die Werktätigen so zu definieren, bedeutet eine über-
zogene und uns einschränkende Rechtsposition. Damit konnte jede Forderung abge-
schmettert werden, eine Konfliktlösung war so unmöglich. 
Ich sehe meine Frage noch nicht beantwortet. 
WP: Da muβ man erst einmal klären, wogegen man streikt. Ich könnte mir vorstellen, 
daβ man dann streikt, wenn vernünftige und sorgfältig abgewogene Forderungen der 
Gewerkschaften von den Betriebsleitern in alter Manier abgeschmettert werden. Ich 
könnte mir auch vorstellen, daβ man – wenn das Lohngefügen insgesamt nicht stimmt – 
Lohnstreiks gegen den zuständigen Minister führt; vorausgesetzt, daβ lange Verhand-
lungen zu keinem Ergebnis geführt haben. Das ist aber sehr viel Theorie und Illusion, 
wir haben es ja alle noch nicht gemacht. 
Arbeitsniederlegungen hat’s aber schon gegeben. 
WP: Ja, aber die Streikenden haben weiter Lohn bekommen und sich verpflichtet, nach-
zuarbeiten.498 
In another passage, Werner Peplowski says he is grateful that the Media Industrial Union re-
fuses to join its voice to the calls for the unification. 
Was hälst du von den Rufen nach Wiedervereingung? 
WP: Nichts. Und ich bin dankbar dafür, daβ die IG Medien diese Meinung teilt. Erstens 
sind die DDR und die Bundesrepublik unter ganz anderen Voraussetzungen entstanden; 
und zweitens it bei uns eine demokratische Bewegung entstanden, auf die wir stolz sein 
dürfen, und die nicht kaputtgehen darf.499 
The unification was not as far from the considerations of the West German trade union as 
Peplowski affirmed. Since the beginning of December, the Media Industrial Union’s leaders 
considered the unification likely. They believed that the unification made common goals for 
East and West German trade unions inescapable. The ambiguities of the reform of their East 
German union partners appeared to be a greater problem than thought at first. The evolution 
towards the determination of a “trade union agenda” for the unification comes out from three 
consecutive columns by the Media Industrial Union’s vice-president Detlef Hensche. In the 
first of these, published by the beginning of December 1989, he insisted on the general goals 
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of trade union politics, thus common to East and West German trade unions. If these goals 
could be forced onto the political agenda, he wrote, the unification was not going to be a nigh-
tmare for German workers.  
So verständlich die Forderung des Neuen Forums und anderer Oppositionsgruppen ist, 
eine eigenständige DDR zu erhalten – sie könnte von der Entwicklung überrollt werden. 
Mindestens ebenso wichtig ist es daher für uns, die eigene Sprachlosigkeit zu überwin-
den und unsere Ziele und Inhalte zu benennen. (...) Unsere Themen lauten zum Beispiel 
hüben wie drüben: Für Demokratie in Betrieb und Unternehmen einzutreten; freie Be-
richterstattung in Presse und Funk zu verwirklichen, die die gesellschaftliche Wirklich-
keit widerspiegelt und den Bürger umfassend informiert; eine gesunde Umwelt wieder-
herzustellen, die auch unseren Kindern ein Überleben möglich macht; das Recht auf 
Arbeit und Bildung zu verwirklichen; eine demokratische Gesellschaft zu gestalten, die 
für alle vielfältige Entwicklungschancen öffnet und alle in gleicher Weise am gesell-
schaftlichen Reichtum teilhaben läβt; und schlieβlich: An einer Welt des Friedens und 
des Ausgleichs zwischen Nord und Süd mitzuwirken. Unter diesen Zielen müβte die na-
tionale Einheit kein Schreckgespenst sein. Das heiβt aber auch, daβ wir unsere Themen 
auf die Tagesordnung setzen müssen, gemeinsam mit der demokratischen Bewegung in 
der DDR, statt daβ wir die inhaltliche Zielsetzung allein dem Bundeskanzler, der Wirt-
schaft und der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung überlassen.500 
The second piece marked the acknowledgement that the economic reforms of the GDR was to 
be pursued on the basis of the free market economy. The rapid liberalization of the Polish 
economy, and its 500% inflation, was given as a model of what was going to happen in the 
GDR. This “first act” was to be followed by a “second”, predicted Hensche, in which the In-
ternational Monetary Fund was to force enterprises to close and subventions to end, thus pro-
voking dismissals, price and rents increase, wage reduction, lower living standards and pover-
ty. The “democratic shaping” of the eastern European societies was now delayed to the “third 
act”. Hence the “socialism with a human face”, depicted as the genuine character of the revo-
lutionary movements observed in those countries only a few weeks earlier, was now concei-
ved as a possible reaction to the contradictions of capitalism, in an unpredictable future. 
Der Kampf um eine demokratische Gestaltung der Gesellschaft könnte in Polen, Un-
garn, oder in der DDR den dritten Akt bestimmen; und der wird demokratische Betrie-
be, Streikrecht, demokratische Medien und manches andere mehr einschlieβen. Wir 
sollten dabei Hilfe leisten. Und hierzulande? Im goldenen Westen? Die heute triumphie-
ren, könnten bald von ihren eigenen Widersprüchen eingeholt werden. (...) Der Re-
formdruck wird folglich auch im Westen zunemhmen.501 
                                                 
500 Detlef Hensche, “Nationale Einheit – für wen?”, Kontrapunkt, 25-26/1989, p. 5. 
501 Detlef Hensche, “Fürs Paradies teure Eintrittskarten”, Kontrapunkt, 1/1990, p. 5. 
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In the third column, Detlef Hensche defined what he thought could be a common strategy for 
German trade unions in the perspective unification and implacable economic reforms. He 
proposed that East and West german trade unions fought together for the setting up of far-
reaching social and labor laws in unified Germany.  The most imminent danger for German 
workers was to let GDR become the Federal republic’s “colony of low wages”.  
[Es] wäre ein idealistischer Trugschluβ, man müβte die Arbeiter von Leipzig nur über 
das wahre Gesicht von Kapitalismus und Konsumdenken aufklären, damit sie den Sozi-
alismus vervollkommnen. Die Geschichte wird anders verlaufen. „Das Kapital geht 
dorthin, wo es sich wohlfühlt“, erklärte Unternehmerpräsident Necker dieser Tage und 
nannte die Bedingungen, unter denen es sich in der DDR wohlfühlt: Rendite und Vor-
herrschaft. „Das Kapital“ hat derzeit auch die Macht, die Bedingungen fürs eigene 
Wohlbefinden weitgehend durchzusetzen. Bis zur Grenze gewerkschaftlicher Gegen-
wehr, die noch zu entwickeln ist. Nebenbei, wäre unter solchen Aussichten nicht für die 
Menschen in der DDR die Einheit samt einheitlichem Sozialsystem letztlich die bessere 
Alternative, als die einer Niedriglohn-Kolonie der BRD?502 
This call for a common fight of East and West German unions for social and labor laws, for-
mulated here for the first time by the Media Industrial Union’s vice-president, became the 
strategy of all DGB unions a few weeks later.  
3.2.3 Why so little contacts with the East German opposition and independ-
ent initiatives? 
This chapter cannot be closed without addressing the question as to why the support and col-
laboration strategy of the DGB unions benfited almost exclusively to the East German trade 
unions and not to the East German opposition or the initiatives in favor of the creation of in-
dependent trade unions. The continuity with the Ostpolitik was an one important factor that 
facilitated the support of East German unions' efforts to reform and take their independence 
from the FDGB.503 Yet one could look at this continuity (in short: contacts with the East 
German trade unions) as being largely formal. Whereas the Ostpolitik materialized into dip-
lomatic contacts with high-ranking union representatives, the support and collaboration strat-
egy aimed at supporting the development of new structures for the defense of workers' inter-
ests. It focused on the workplace and on contacts between unionists from the rank and file in 
both lands. The question can thus be so reformulated: why did the inevitable adjustment of the 
                                                 
502 Detlef Hensche, “DDR: Welche Zukunft?”, Kontrapunkt, 2/1990, p. 5. 
503 The IG Metall was the first East German trade  union to declare its independence from the FDGB, on No-
vember 27-28, 1989. Formally, this independence meant that the organization had become a federated union 
member of the FDGB. The East German Police Trade Union (Gewerkschaft der Volkspolizei) became the 18th  
and last East German independent union member of the FDGB, by January 20, 1990. 
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DGB unions' politics during the fall 1989 not bring about a closer collaboration with the East 
German opposition groups or the initiatives for new trade unions?  
East German opposition activists or initiators of independent union initiatives complained 
about the lack of support from the West German trade unions. Some New Forum's activists 
for instance, have pointed the finger at the IG Metall504and the Education and Science Trade 
Union.505 The same sort of criticisms came from workplace unionists – often not linked to 
any group – who tried to set up new structures of worker representation in the East German 
public sector and who were unable to benefit from the support of the Public Services, Trans-
port and Traffic Union.506 These activists explained the support of the East German unions as 
the outcome of a mistaken belief that such “Stalinist” structures could be reformed into genu-
ine structures for the defense of workers' interes
 
ts. 
                                                
Criticisms against the DGB unions' collaboration with the East German trade unions was not 
heard only in the GDR. Some West German observers looked at the opposition groups and the 
independent initiatives, such as the Initiative for independent trade unions (IUG), as the vec-
tors of a genuine reshaping of the structures for the defense of workers’ interests. They in-
versely depicted the East German trade unions as little more than structures of the regime, 
whose so-called reforms had more to do with attempts of defenders of the regime to save their 
head. 
This argument was developed in the very first study on the reform of the East German trade 
unions published in the Federal Republic by March 1990. The authors, a group of social sci-
entists of Berlin's Free University, distinguished between the reforms of workers' structures of 
representation lead at the workplace, considered legitimate and democratic, and those within 
the FDGB, looked at suspectively. In consequence, they urged the DGB and its union mem-
bers to end their contacts with the FDGB unions to the benefice of a collaboration with the 
initiatives working at the setting up of new trade unions in the GDR.507 This analysis, pro-
posed in the midst of the events, is often referred to as a justification for the end of contacts 
with the East German trade unions and the organizational expansion of the DGB unions in 
eastern Germany. Yet despite what has been suggested by some authors, the organizational 
expansion of the DGB unions did not result from a collaboration with the opposition groups 
 
504 Wilkens-Friedrich 1994. 
505 Petra Berkert, “Verunsicherung und der Versuch zur Neuorientierung”, Erziehung und Wissenschaft, 3/90, p. 
2, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 153. 
506 The details can be traced back in: Fichter/Lutz 1991. 
507 Pirker, Hertle, Kädtler and Weinert 1990. 
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or the initiatives for independent trade unions.508 It was, as we will see in the following chap-
ters, a process entirely lead by the DGB unions.  
One motive for the distance of the DGB unions from the East German opposition groups and 
the independent initiatives has to do with the latter’s small-scale format and dispersal.509 In 
many workplaces, independent initiatives remained the project of a minority group510, in oth-
ers they were rejected altogether by workers.511 The few opposition groups present in the 
workplaces never found a widespread basis of support there.512 Some of these groups tried to 
develop more comprehensive conceptions on labor-related issues but were unsuccessful in 
reversing the tendency.513 
Another aspect concerns the absence of common claims and conceptions by these several ini-
tiatives. As we saw in the second part of this work, their programs covered a broad spectrum 
of conceptions reaching from a “company union”-kind of unionism to “syndicalist” tenden-
cies. The West German trade unions, used to consider these two extremes as inevitable 
“flaws” of company-based unionism, must have understood their spontanous emergence in 
the GDR as a confirmation of the superiority of industry-based unionism. 
I would like to stress a third and last factor which, combined to the first two, may enlighten 
the DGB unions’ conduct. I argue that the question as to why the DGB unions did not support 
the opposition groups and independent initiatives instead of the East German trade unions is, 
to a certain extent, misleading. Of course, the individual record of Werner Peplowski, who 
had headed the East German Printing and Paper Industrial Union since the beginning of the 
1980s, and of Renate Hürtgen, founder of the “syndicalist” Initiative for Independent Trade 
Unions, made the political resonance of the collaboration with one different from collabora-
tion with the other. Yet it has become apparent in the second part of this work that clear-cut 
distinctions between the different components of the reshaping of the East German union 
landscape are deceiving. The bulk of the East German actors conceived the reform of the 
trade unions, the presence of opposition groups in workplaces and the setting-up of new com-
pany-based trade unions as various sides of one movement. The main line of demarcation did 
                                                 
508 Seideneck 1991, pp. 4-5, among others. 
509 Kädtler/Kottwitz 1990, p. II. 
510 See the interview of Peter Pischner, head of the Betriebsgewerkschaftsrat in VEB Kabelwerk Oberspree Wil-
helm Pieck in: Hertle 1990, p. 13. 
511 See for instance the interviews with Betriebsräten of Walzwerk Finow: “Wir sind in den Kapitalismus 
gestoβen worden”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 12/91, p. 759. Also: Fuller 1999, p. 117. 
512 Fuller 1999, chapter 1. 
513 See for instance: “Demokratischer Aufbruch. Gespräch mit Erhart Neubert”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 
12/89, p. 764. 
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not seem to have ran between illegitimate and legitimate programs of reform – as many West 
Germans understood the relationship between the reform of the FDGB unions and the inde-
pendent initiatives - but between activists granted with workers’ confidence and those with-
out. 
Hence, the East German opposition groups never asked the DGB unions to stop their contacts 
with the FDGB unions. Here is an excerpt of an interview given to the DGB's monthly 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshfete by Erhart Neubert of the Democratic Awakening, in which he 
states that his group supports the reform of FDGB unions and the setting up of new trade un-
ions beside them.  
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte: Zielen die Vorstellungen [of the Democratic Awake-
ning on labor issues] mehr auf eine Reformierung der bisherigen Gewerkschaften oder 
auf die Gründung neuer, unabhängiger Gewerkschaften, die sich dann möglicherweise 
wieder auf gesamtstaatlicher Ebene der DDR zusammenschlieβen? 
Erhart Neubert: Es wird auf beides hinauslaufen. Einerseits wird die alte Gewerkschaft, 
der FDGB, versuchen, sich zu reformieren. Dieser Prozeβ, der mit personellen Fragen 
beginnt und mit Strukturfragen endet, hat bereits eingesetzt. Andererseits bilden sich 
auch von unten Gewerkschaften. Es gibt interessante Prozesse. Sogar in der Polizei – 
das ist eine der wichtigsten politischen Gewerkschaftsentwicklungen – beginnt sich jetzt 
eine Gruppe zu konstituieren, die eine Gewerkschaft aufbauen und die aktiv an der Ent-
politisierung der Volkspolizei mitarbeiten will. Das ist natürlich keine Fortsetzung der 
Arbeit des FDGB, das hat eine vollkommen neue Qualität.514 
In the same issue, Wolfgang Wolff of United Left developed a similar approach. 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte: Auf einem Gewerkschaftstag Ende Januar soll auch 
der bisher eng an die SED gebundene FDGB reformiert werden. Welche Rolle werden 
in Zukunft die Gewerkschaften in der DDR spielen? 
Wolfgang Wolff: Unser Hauptinteresse gilt dem Engagement in den Betrieben. Wir tre-
ten für die Bildung unabhängiger Körperschaften der Werktätigen ein, die die jeweili-
gen betrieblichen Interessen wahrnehmen und allen Betriebsangehörigen, unabhängig 
von gewerkschaftlicher oder parteilicher Organisierung, offenstehen. Neben solchen 
Körperschaften sollten Gewerkschaften tätig sein, die sich für die Verbesserung der Ar-
beits- und Lohnverhältnisse einsetzen? Unter engagierten Werktätigen gibt es drei Posi-
tionen zur Gewerkschaftsfrage: Erstens: den FDGB demokratisieren und reformieren, so 
daβ er zu einer wirklichen Interessenvertretung der Werktätigen wird; zweitens: neben 
dem FDGB eine unabhängige Einheitsgewerkschaft aufbauen; drittens: neben dem 
FDGB verschiedene unabhängige Gewerkschaften aufbauen. Wir unterstützen alle drei 
Positionen.515 
                                                 
514 Idem. 
515 “Vereinigte Linke. Gespräch mit Wolfgang Wolff”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 12/89, p. 788.  
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When asked whether West German experiences of co-determination and autonomous collec-
tive bargaining could inspire the reshaping of the East German union labor law and practices 
of industrial relations, Ingrid Brandenburg of the New Forum answered only from the per-
spective of the collaboration between the FDGB and the DGB unions. 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte: Könnten in diesem Zusammenhang Erfahrungen  bun-
desdeutscher Arbeitnehmer hilfreich sein? Der DGB und die Gewerkschaften verfügen 
zum Beispiel über eine lange Erfahrung in der Mitbestimmung und in der Tarifpolitik; 
sie hben Einblick in die Ökonomie. Könnten diese Erfahrungen für die DDR nutzbar 
gemacht werden? 
Ingrid Brandenburg: Das ist ohne Zweifel möglich. Der FDGB – die bisherige Vertre-
tung der Werktätigen in unserem Land – hat keine derartigen Aufgaben zu erfüllen ge-
habt. (...) In diesem Zusammenhang wäre es von sehr groβem Nutzen, wenn ein neuges-
talteter Gewerkschaftsbund unseres Landes mit entsprechenden Vertretern des DGB in 
Form von Schulungen, Diskussionen, Materialstudien sich derartige Kenntnisse aneig-
nen könnte.516 
In conclusion, the weak presence of the East German opposition and independent initiatives in 
the workplaces, the legacies of the Ostpolitik and partial illusions as to the strength of FDGB 
reformers help explain that the support and collaboration strategy of the DGB unions bene-
fited almost exclusively to the FDGB unions. If East German activists have criticized this 
situation, they never expected the DGB unions to end their contacts with the FDGB unions. 
The partial rupture with between East and West German trade unions came later on, as a con-
sequence of the organizational expansion of the DGB unions. The consequence of the strategy 
reorientation of the DGB unions doid not materialize into a greater collaboration with the East 
German opposition and independent initiatives. 
                                                 
516 “Neues Forum. Gespräch mit Ingrid Brandenburg und Bernd Schneider”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 
12/89, p. 777. 
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3.3 The road to the unification and the worries of the DGB unions 
(January-February 1990) 
3.3.1 Calls for unification and the reaction of DGB unions 
Hartmut Zwahr among others has emphasised the leading role of Leipzig in the events that 
brought the GDR down.517 The Leipzig model of demonstrations, weekly pacific massive 
demonstrations following a prayer for peace, was reproduced in Dresden, Berlin, Jena, Karl-
Marx-Stadt, and in smaller towns. The slogans chanted in Leipzig also set the tone for claims 
heard in other East German cities. “We are the people”, the cry for radical reforms of the sta-
te, dominant until December 1989, came from Leipzig. It was also in Leipzig that “We are 
one people” was first heard. By mid-December, unification had become the main lighthouse 
on the road followed by the popular movement not only in Leipzig, but in the GDR.  
Many historians have described the twist from a “democratic revolution for a better GDR and 
a better socialism” to a “national democratic revolution” favorable to unification.518 But they 
have differently appraised the meaning of this twist. Karsten Timmer calls it a “rupture”. 
From September to mid-December, he explains, the East German upheaval could be characte-
rised as a “social movement”, a massive symbiosis between the wills of large popular mobili-
sations (especially in Leipzig) and the reforms proposed by emerging opposition groups 
(mainly in Berlin). This symbiosis explains the strength and the achievements of the move-
ment. As the enthusiasm for unification became dominant, explains Timmer, this symbiosis 
ruptured. Demonstrations split up between partisans and opponents of unification. The debate 
over unification brought about a split in the “social movement” and brought about its end.519 
Focusing on Leipzig, Hartmut Zwahr offers another analysis of this turn.520 He considers that 
two movements acted simultaneously within the East German revolution. The first, the “esca-
pe” (Aufbruch), concerns the stream of departures to the Federal Republic in 1989 and the 
will of many East Germans to “dispose of the GDR” (die DDR aufzugeben). Eventually, this 
movement focused on the objective of the unification, explains Zwahr. From December 1989 
on, it dominated all the demonstrations. The second movement, the “outburst” (Ausbruch), 
                                                 
517 Zwahr 1993. 
518 According to Zwahr 1994, p.433, the expression was developed by Sigrid Meuschel in Legitimation und Par-
teiherrschaft in der DDR. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und Revolution in der DDR, Frankfurt a/Main, 1992.  
519 Timmer 2000, chapter 6, esp. pp. 335, 344-49. 
520 Zwahr 1994. 
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had to do with a “collective transition to a democratic revolution”, in other words the demo-
cratic reform of the GDR. This movement spread slowly from Leipzig to the rest of the GDR. 
If it never was able to catch up with the rapidity of the first, Zwahr does not conclude that the 
former won and the latter lost. The East German revolution was produced by the interaction 
of both.521 
These two explanations of the gradual prevalence of the unification over the reform of the 
GDR in demonstrations can be regarded as incompatible. Both agree, however, to date this 
prevalence to mid-December 1989. They were recalled in order to show the evolution of the 
DGB unions on the unification, between December 1989 and February 1990. This evolution 
followed the chronology observed in the GDR. From December onward, the DGB unions 
integrated the perspective of the unification into their strategy. The first signs of this evolution 
appeared in our discussion of the implementation of the support and collaboration strategy by 
the Chemistry, Paper and Ceramics Industrial Union and the Media Industrial Union. A sub-
sequent chapter will show that this evolution among the DGB unions was to be completed by 
the beginning of March.  
By mid-December Chemistry union’s head Hermann Rappe made his preference for a unified 
Germany umistakeable. As other declarations of the same period prove (see 3.2.1.2), he 
contemplated, as most East and West German political actors, the accomplishment of the uni-
fication as a slow process. 
Wir wollen und müssen festahlten am Verfassungssauftrag unseres  Grundgesetzes, in 
dessen Präambel festgeschrieben ist: „Das gesamte Deutsche Volk bleibt aufgefordert, 
in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands zu vollenden.“ Das 
heisst, wir wollen ein freies und demokratisches Deutschland, worüber in beiden bishe-
rigen deutschen Staaten frei abgestimmt werden muss. Ich glaube nicht an die Bildung 
eines Bundesstaates in kurzer Zeit, aber realistisch ist es, zunächst schrittweise einen 
Staatenbundregelung ins Auge zu fassen.522 
At the beginning of January 1990, IG Metall’s Advisory Committee (Beirat) made a first step 
toward the unification, as the union declared itself in favor of the ratification of a Community 
Agreement (Vertragsgemeinschaft) between both German states.523 A few days before this 
declaration by IG Metall, Chancellor Kohl had published his “10-point-plan” for the unifica-
tion. Kohl’s plan identified the Community Agreement as the first of the three stages toward 
the achievement of the unification. Whereas IG Metall had condemned the pro-unification 
                                                 
521 Ibid., p. 455. Neubert 1998, pp. 900-03 comes to a similar conclusion. 
522 Hermann Rappe, “Für ein freies und demokratisches Deutschland ”, Presse-Dienst IG CPK, December 14, 
1989, reproduced in: IG CPK 1993, document 4. 
523 “Kampf um Köpfe geht jetzt los – Sitzung des Beirats der IG Metall”, metall, 1/90, p. 16. 
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declarations by the cabinet members, its new position marked a partial convergence with the 
federal government’s positions.  
Of the four trade unions studied here, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union was 
the only one who did not state a certain openness to the unification in December 1989 and 
January 1990. This union did not address the topic of the unification at all, neither to state its 
support or opposition – and did not do so before the mid-February, as we will see in the last 
chapter of this work. Within the DGB, this silence on the unification was shared by the Mines 
and Energy Industrial Union (IG Bergbau und Energie).524 The small Horticulture, Agricultu-
re and Forestry Union (Gewerkschaft Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft) for its part refu-
sed explicitly to make any step toward the acceptance of the unification until February.  
As the unification started to profile itself, the continuous migration of East Germans in the 
Federal Republic arose the worries of the DGB unions. 
3.3.2 The outcomes of the East German migration on trade union activity in 
the Federal Republic 
The crisis of the GDR in 1989 was initiated by the stream of departures for the Federal Repu-
blic, via the Hungarian, Polish and Austrian borders. Such an uncontrolled exodus as the one 
that shook the GDR in the second half of 1989 can be only partially reconstructed. The known 
statistics nonetheless offer a clear picture: in 1989, a minimum of 343,854 East Germans flew 
to the Federal Republic, out of which only 36,484 had been allotted an official exit visa (Au-
sreise) by East German authorities between January and the end of June.525 
By the mid-October activists of the United Left raised the alarm: they estimated that up to 
100,000 refugees had already fled and the numbers were not diminishing.526 On October 23, 
Chancellor Kohl revealed to US President George Bush his expectation of about 150,000 
young East German migrants (under 30 years old) until Christmas.527 Kohl believed that only 
radical reforms in the GDR could stop the flow. However, every announces and reforms by 
                                                 
524 Wilke / Müller (1991), pp. 115-16. 
525 By means of comparison, between 1985 and 1988, an average of 27,470 East Germans left for the FRG 
yearly, including refugees, migrants and political prisoners, whose freedom had been ‘bought’ by the Federal 
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Wien, 1990, p. 170, quoted in: Zwahr 1994, note 87, p. 461). 
526 “Erklärung von Teilnehmern am Treffen der ‘Vereingten Linken’ in Böhlen bei Leipzig”, reproduced in 
Charles Schüddekopf and Lutw Niethammer (eds.), „Wir sind das Volk!“ Flugschriften, Aufrufe und Texte einer 
deutschen Revolution, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1990, p. 127, quoted in: Ibid., p. 434. 
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the East German government resulted in new departures by the tens of thousands. On that 
respect, the opening of the wall by November 9 only speeded things up, as the risks of repri-
sals vanished.528 In the first 25 days of 1990 only, the Federal Republic had already recorded 
42,500 new East German migrants.529  
Such an exodus exerted devastating effects on the East German economy. A significant share 
of the those who left the country in 1989 were workers aged between 28 and 39 years old.530 
From the 343,854 registered East Germans arrived in Federal Republic in 1989, 225,000 were 
full-time workers. Out of a total number of 9,5 million workers, it represented a rough 2,4 
percent of the East German workforce. Medical services, manufacturing and construction sec-
tors were especially hit by the labor haemorrhage. In Leipzig for instance, then a city of 
500,000, more than 10,000 jobs stood vacant in the first half of January.531 
Just as much as the GDR could not afford to lose hundreds of thousands of workers, the West 
German labor market was not in a condition to absorb such a sudden arrival of workforce. As 
showed in chapter 3.1, unemployment had become a central concern of West German trade 
unions during the 1980s, as it remained above 9% from 1985 onward. This situation threate-
ned trade unions, through an enduring decrease of membership and a diminished power of 
resistance in case of industrial conflicts. Obviously, the arrival of hundreds of thousands of 
East Germans migrants, form which a significant share were young and well-trained workers, 
also meant a renewed pressure on the West German labor markets and wages. The phenomena 
just described promised to intensify. 
The financing of the Federal Republic’s wefare state systems depends on the levels of em-
ployment and wages. Hundreds of thousands of new citizens entitled to social benefits within 
a lapse of a few months could only deepen the financial crisis of the Federal Republic’s wel-
fare systems and make voices for privatisation and exclusionist measures louder (see chapter 
3.1). The DGB unions had always opposed such measures, but they had been aware that ‘too 
less’ people financed ‘too many’ beneficiaries. 
                                                 
 
527 Bundesministerium des Innern 1998, document 64 “Telegongespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Präsident 
Bush, 23. Oktober 1989”, pp. 459-60. 
528 Winters 1999, p. 477.  
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530 Zwahr (1994), pp. 451-52, 454. 
531 Zatlin 1994, p. 67. 
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After the opening of the Wall, the newly elected Saarland Minister-President and social-
democrat chancellor-candidate Oskar Lafontaine severely denounced the perpetuation of the 
guaranteed social protection for East German migrants. Given the scope of the West German 
welfare state provisions, affirmed Lafontaine, the preservation of this policy by the Kohl go-
vernment after the opening of the Wall was nothing but an incentive to the East German po-
pulation to leave the GDR.  
Lafontaine himself was favorable to the imposition of a control over the migration from the 
GDR. He made the stabilization of the economy and of the political situation in the GDR de-
pend on the stabilization of its population. In a political context determined by an intensifica-
tion of the calls for unification in both East and West Germany, Lafontaine insisted on the 
stabilization of the GDR as a precondition to a unified Germany. It should be recalled howe-
ver that his views and hard stances were not hegemonic within the SPD in 1989-90. The par-
ty’s leader, Hans-Jochen Vogel, for instance, remained more compassionate toward East 
German migrants and put less emphasis on preconditions to unification.532 
No DGB union leader openly echoed Lafontaine’s worries that the stream of East German 
migrants endangered the financing of the welfare state, and, in so doing, menaced the future 
of social protection in the Federal Republic. From the late summer 1989 on, the DGB union 
members have tried to favor the integration of East German migrants in their organisations 
and thus in the Federal Republic. But the development of the collaboration between East and 
West German trade unions saw the multiplication of their joint calls to people to stay in the 
GDR. 
By early September 1989, Ulrike Peretzki-Leid of the direction of the Public Services, Trans-
port and Traffic Union insisted that the East German nursing training and exams be reognized 
in the Federal Republic, in order to facilitate the social integration of East German newco-
mers. In her letter to the Federal Health Ministry of Health, she wrote:  
Auf keinen Fall dürfen wir zulassen, dass Neuankömmlinge, die vielfach auf eine lange 
Berufserfahrung im Pflegebereich zurückblicken können, in der BRD mit einer Bezah-
lung als Hilfskraft abgespeist werden.533 
                                                 
532 All that precedes is taken from Louise Kouteynikoff’s unpublished Masters thesis from 1997, Die SPD und 
die Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, directed by Professor Henri Ménudier, Université Paris III (Asnières). 
533 “Ist anzuerkennen. Krankenpflegeexamen der DDR”, ÖTV-Magazin, 10/89, p. 19.  
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The topic was tackled again a month later. It could be read in a declaration by the Public Ser-
vice, Transport and Traffic Union that it was the task of all West German unionists to facilita-
te the integration of East Germans at the workplace and in the unions. However, the declara-
tion did not detail how this integration could be encouraged but stressed that it should not take 
the form of positive discrimination measures.  
Alle Gewerkschaftsmitglieder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seien aufgefordert, 
sich die betriebliche und gewerkschaftliche Integration der Flüchtlinge zu bemühen. Die 
ehemaligen Bürger der DDR müβten „eine faire Chance zum Neuanfang erhalten“. Das 
setzte allerdings auch – um Resentiments vorzubeugen – Gleichbehandlung mit Bun-
desbürgern bei der Wohnungsversorgung und beim Wettbewerb um Arbeitsplätze vor-
aus.534 
Many companies had promptly presented as “positive discrimination” measures that were 
rejected by West German unions and associations for unemployed workers. When the metal 
company Hoesch announced that it was to hire and accommodate a certain amount of East 
Germans, the Dortmund organisation of unemployed workers Aldio vehemently denounced 
this initiative:  
Wir fragen uns, warum diese Arbeitspätze uns nicht angeboten wurden. Über 5000 Be-
werbungen sind in den letzten Jahren aus unseren Reihen bei Hoesch eingegangen. Ver-
gebens! (...) So wie Hoesch darf man nicht handeln. Wir sind nicht gegen Aussiedler 
und gegen DDR-Übersiedler. Aber was hier praktiziert wird, erzeugt Neid, Hass und 
Fremdfeindlichkeit.535 
The head of the Media Industrial Union, Erwin Ferlemann, also stressed the importance for 
unions not to turn their back to East German migrants. The integration of East Germans, both 
employed and unemployed, in the trade unions was a good way to limit the intensification of 
the “social problems” and the growth of far right forces.  
Denn, wir haben eben auch genug Probleme im eigenen Land. Neben den Wohnungs- 
nun auch die verstärkten Probleme auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Vielleicht gehen ja viele in 
die DDR unter den veränderten Verhältnissen zurück. Die anderen aber, die hierbleiben 
wollen, die haben wir, auch im eigenen, unserem eigenen Interesse, zu integrieren. Wir 
müssen sie eingliedern, damit wir selbst hier nicht noch gröβere soziale Probleme be-
kommen. Die würden nur einer Gruppe nützen, den Radikalen von der rechten äuβeren 
Seite.536 
                                                 
534 “Betroffenheit und Hoffnung. Reaktionen auf das Geschehen in der DDR”, ÖTV-Magazin, 11/89, p. 2. The 
Education and Science Union was also opposed to measures of positive discrimination for East Germans. See: 
Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 152.   
535 Waltraud Bierwirth, “So geht’s nicht! Hoesch bevorzugt DDR-Übersiedler”, Metall, 23/89 (November 17), p. 
20. 
536 Erwin Ferlemann, “Hoffentlich werden noch viele den Weg zu uns finden”, Kontrapunkt, 1/1990, pp. 10-11, 
quote: p. 10. 
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If the situation in West-Berlin offered a foretaste of what was coming, than the DGB unions 
had reasons to worry. The West-Berlin office of the DGB rang the alarm against the growing 
number of West German employers hiring East Germans (and East Europeans) illegally. Ma-
ny East German workers were willing to work ‘on the side’ in the Federal Republic for lower 
wages or on week-ends. By the mid-November, the DGB estimated at 16,000 the number of 
East Germans and East Europeans working illegally in West-Berlin, although the city counted 
more than 80,000 unemployed workers. According to the DGB West-Berlin office, this prac-
tice was rapidly spreading from sectors like hotels and restaurants to many others. The diffe-
rent levels of government were asked to eliminate all legal loopholes enabling employers to 
hire East German citizens without paying social contributions.537  
Two declarations by DGB unions published by the first weeks of February show the deve-
lopment of the reflections of West German unions on these issues. They are of a special inte-
rest because of their transitory character, from the support and collboration strategy to the 
strategy of legal extension. The first object of these declarations was the announcement of 
new measures of collaboration. Yet in comparison with comparable declarations, these two 
contained a novelty. For the first time, the West German union “asked” something in return 
for their help, namely that East German workers stay in the GDR. The new connection bet-
ween collaboration and pleas to East German workers to stay in the GDR indicate how pro-
blematic the unsettled situation between both Germanies was becoming.  
Herman Rappe, head of the chemistry union, expressed clearly his worries as to the outcomes 
of the migration from eastern to western Germany. In a text written by the end of January and 
publishd a few weeks later, he presented for the first time the relationship between the two 
German chemistry unions as fair’s fair. The West German unions were to help improve the 
reshaping of the East German unions in return for what East German workers had to stay in 
the GDR.  
Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der DDR bedarf unserer Hilfe gerade auch zur Si-
cherung, zum Erhalt und zum Ausbau der neugewonnenen politischen Rechte und Frei-
heiten. (...) Die Zeit drängt. (...) Unsere Solidarität in der Bundesrepublik besteht darin, 
in breiter Form Wirtschaftshilfe zu leisten und dabei auch deutlich zu sagen, dass das 
Opfer kostet. Eure Solidarität in der DDR besteht darin, mitzuhelfen, dass die Menschen 
dort bleiben, um an den Aufgaben der Zeit [Germany’s unification], die vor uns liegt, 
                                                 
537 For example, if someone worked less than 15 hours a week and earned less than 450 DM a month, quite hon-
orable earnings for the East at that time, his or her employer also spared the social contributions. Klaus Klöppel, 
“Sozialdumping von gewissenlosen Unternehmern”, Metall, 24/89 (December 1), pp. 8-9. 
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mitzuarbeiten. Gelingt dies nicht, bleibt unsere Hilfe wenig wirksam. Beide Teile der 
Gewerkschaft haben jetzt vor allem diese grosse Aufgabe.538 
The IG Metall used words no less explicit. A joint declaration with its East German homolo-
gous heralding the opening of eight IG Metall information offices in the GDR contained a 
clear plea to East German workers to stay in the GDR. The high level of material and social 
security reached in the Federal Republic, stated the declaration, resulted from 40 years of de-
cided trade union action. In order to reach comparable standards of living and working condi-
tions, East German Workers had to participate activiely to the reconstruction of the trade 
union movement in the GDR. 
Wir bitten die Menschen in der DDR ihr Land nicht zu verlassen, sondern am demokra-
tischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Aufbau der DDR mitzuwirken. Der materielle 
Wohlstand und das Niveau der sozialen Sicherheit in der Bundesrepublik ist nicht das 
automatische Ergebnis einer nach marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzipien funktionierenden 
Ökonomie. Es ist vor allem das Resultat einer seit über 40 Jahren währenden Auseinan-
dersetzung starker Gewerkschaften um sozialen Fortschritt, um Mitbestimmung, Ar-
beitszeitverkürzung und Einkommenserhöhung. Marktwirtschaft ist nur dann sozial, 
wenn sie durch den Sozialstaat und durch freie, unabhängige und starke Gewerkschaften 
begrenzt und ausgestaltet wird. Wir fordern die Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer 
in der DDR auf, den Gewerkschaften nicht den Rücken zu kehren, sondern sich aktiv 
am demokratischen Neuaufbau der Gewerkschaftsbewegung in der DDR zu beteili-
gen.539 
Such calls indicated the growing worries of the West German trade unions as to the economic 
and social outcomes in the Federal Republic of the weekly arrival of thousands of East Ger-
mans. The necessity to react to this challenge, as well as a thorough integration of unification 
were crucial in bringing about a shift in the strategy of the DGB unions. Beside these conside-
rations, linked to the conditions of trade union politics and the likeliness of the unification, an 
explanation of the strategy shift has to tale into consideration the state of theoretical debates 
within the West German trade union movement.  
                                                 
538 Rappe, “Freie und starke Gewerkschaften sind nötig! Wir wollen dabei helfen!”, in: IG CPK 1993, document 
11. 
539 “Gemeinsame Erklärung vom 27. Februar 1990, reproduced in: Fichter/Lutz 1991, document 5. 
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3.4 The Debate over socialism in the West German trade unions: 
Where do we go now (but nowhere)?  
The sudden outbreak of the Debate over socialism was one of the most symptomatic and yet 
underestimated outcome of the fall of the eastern Bloc regimes on the DGB unions. The De-
bate was an encompassing reflection on the relationship of West German trade unions to so-
cialist goals and to the historical experiences of the USSR and the eastern Bloc. The first arti-
cles appeared in the union press in the midst of the fall of the GDR, in October/November 
1989. Contributions to the Debate were regularly published until 1991. An article attempting 
preliminary conclusions of the Debate was published in 1993 – it turned out to be the last. 
During those years, the Debate over socialism was fed by about 60 contributions by union’s 
heads, secretaries and members, politicians, historians of the labour movement, specialists of 
industrial relations and intellectuals. It was echoed in the employers’ press as well.540  
Not only the trade unions but also West German political parties, socialist circles, religious 
organizations and left-wing intellectuals felt forced to re-evaluate their socialist ambitions 
with the fall of the GDR. The number of contributions to this global Debate over socialism in 
these organisations’ press and by these intellectuals during those years can be evaluated as 
several hundreds. It was a significant episode of the history of the German left in the 20th Cen-
tury, one to which, hopefully, historians will grant more consideration in the future than has 
been the case so far.   
The Debate over socialism was especially strong within the union press. In this chapter, only 
articles published in a union magazine or an independent journal with a dominant trade union 
profile are considered. The bulk of these were explicitly published as contributions to the De-
bate or with titles that made it clear that this is what they were about. Included are the articles 
published during this period which discuss the program and goals of trade union politics after 
the fall of the eastern Bloc, as well as the historical conceptions underlying it (for instance 
three contributions on “What is progress today?”). Also included are the readers’ replies to 
these articles. Not considered are the articles on the collapse of the eastern Bloc’s regimes that 
leave untouched the question of the implications on the West German unions’ goals and pro-
grams. Our listing includes articles taken from Der Gewerkschafter, Kontrapunkt, Gewerk-
                                                 
540 The contributions to the Sozialismus-Debatte are assembled in a specific section of the bibliography. 
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schaftliche Monatshefte, Die Mitbestimmung, Sozialismus and Express. A systematic survey 
of the West German trade union press would obviously result in more articles. 
3.4.1 The inadequacies of the literature 
The Debate over socialism is inescapable for the analysis of DGB unions’ strategy in 1989-
1990. The numerous topics tackled along its unfolding indicate how exceptional it was: what 
is socialism? What is the union movement’s socialism? Is socialism to be accomplished 
within or beyond capitalism? What is the relationship of trade unions to capitalism? What are 
the goals and ends of trade union politics? What does the fall of the eastern Bloc change for 
western trade unions? What was the nature of the eastern political regimes and economies? 
What were the convergences and divergences between the West German left and these coun-
tries’ regimes? Why were so many in the West fascinated for so long with the USSR? What 
are the historical roots of Stalinism? It is rare to see theoretical, programmatic and historical 
topics receive such a broad coverage during a long period of time in the german union press. 
If they do, they would usually capture scholars’ attention – an obvious example is the vast 
literature on the mass strike debate of 1904-06. The Debate over socialism did not. Why is it 
so? 
A few hints can already be given. The references to contributions to the Debate, be it in the 
trade union press or elsewhere, are usually strongly incomplete. Most unionists and observers 
are just not aware of the number of articles published. More than often, debaters referred only 
to articles published in the Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte and rarely to more than two or 
three of them. Hence it would seem as if much of the participants themselves were not fully 
aware of the extent of the Debate to which they contributed. The comment applies to the pub-
lishers of the Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte as well. When I wrote and asked them if all the 
contributions had been collected or whether the Debate over socialism had been the object of 
a specific publication, they answered by sending three articles. Even the publishers of a good 
share of the papers do not realize how many of their columns the Debate actually mobilised. 
A second aspect is that the people interested in the Debate, the observers who tried to draw it 
up, usually miss its importance. The problem in their case is the very narrow view they take of 
it, as they understand the Debate as a quarrel between those trade unionists who wanted to 
maintain ‘socialism’ as an element of the trade union self-perception, and those who refused 
the term any role in western trade union politics. Of all the facets of the Debate this was, of 
course, the easiest to grasp. It was by no mean the most significant. Following this demarca-
tion line – pro or contra ‘socialism’, however defined -, the story of the Debate goes as fol-
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lows: in December 1989, Dieter Wunder, head of the Education and Science Union, formu-
lated the belief that, in the face of the collapse of the eastern Bloc, the DGB unions should 
stop referring to “socialism” and accept the capitalist economy once and for all. 
Für die Gewerkschaften gibt es keinen Grund mehr, ihren Beschlüssen die Vorstellung 
einer alternativen Gesellschaftsordnung zugrunde zu legen – es gibt derzeit keine realis-
tische Vorstellung einer wünschenswerten Alternative. Es gibt nur die kapitalistische 
Gesellschaft mit ihren Stärken und Schwächen sowie die Kritik an ihr und gewisse Leit-
ideen, in welcher Richtung sich eine kapitalistische Gesellschaft verändern sollte.541     
Among other contributions sharing this view, the position of Norbert Römer, speaker of the 
Mine and Energy Industrial Union, can be quoted.542 On the opposite side, there were contri-
butions by heads and secretaries of unions like IG Metall and the Media Industrial Union 
who, unsurprisingly, given these unions’ left-wing profile, defended the preservation of the 
“democratic socialist” conceptions and the references to a “third way” in the trade unions’ 
program. 
Mitbestimmung, Demokratisierung der Wirtschaft, Ausbau des Sozialstaats, gewerk-
schaftliche Gegenmacht mit Tarifautonomie und Streikrecht sowie die Verwirklichung 
der Grundwerte Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität in allen Lebensbereichen sind die 
Eckpunkte des dritten Weges, eines Weges zwischen dem Manchester-Kapitalismus zu 
Beginn der Industrialisierung, wie er heute noch in vielen Ländern herrscht, und einer 
staatsbürokratischen, zentralen Planwirtschaft, die nicht nur ökonomisch ineffizient ist, 
sondern auch zur Einschränkung der demokratischen Freiheitsrechte des Einzelnen 
führt.543  
Formulated that way, the Debate over socialism does not tell us much about the DGB unions 
and the period: some unions were more on the right, others more on the left. The left-wing 
unions usually saw their action in a democratic socialist light, while the right-wing unions 
considered references to socialism unnecessary at best, dangerous at worst. This demarcation 
line between DGB unions, the metal and media unions on the left side, the chemistry and 
mines unions on the right side, is familiar to any regular reader of the newspapers of those 
years. Had the Debate over socialism been just another name for the debate between “conflict-
ing” and “cooperative” approaches of trade union politics? A narrow view of it brings one to 
such a false impression. In fact, reading the Debate that way makes it almost impossible to 
                                                 
541 Dieter Wunder, “Der Zusammenbruch des ‘realen Sozialismus’ und das Selbstverständnis der Gewerkschaf-
ten”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 12/1989, pp. 714-718, p. 715. 
542 Norbert Römer, “Politik sozialer Partnerschaft. Stellungnahme zur gewerkschaftlichen Sozialismus-Debatte”, 
in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 4/1990, pp. 217-226. 
543 Karlheinz Blessing, “Die Wirklichkeit drängt zum demokratischen Sozialismus – eine Replik auf Dieter 
Wunder”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 1/1990, pp. 2-9. 
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draw any conclusion at all. Should we settle it by counting the nays and yeas for socialism?544 
Should we expect one side to surrender to the arguments of the other? In fact, when they did 
not choose one side against the other545, most observers could not do more than suggest that 
the questions raised during the Debate over socialism would continue to stir the reflections 
over the future of trade union politics in Germany, the Zukunftsdebatte.546 
3.4.2 Vast problems, no clear solutions 
Of all the topics present in the Debate, three are of importance to us: 
1) What repercussions does the collapse of the eastern Bloc have on the DGB unions? 
How should the DGB unions act in regard of the fall of the GDR? 
2) What are the fundaments of the DGB unions’ program? What are the purposes of their 
action? 
3) What is socialism for those who want to maintain it as a trade union concept? 
 
Read along these lines, the Debate over socialism reveals all its signification. It gives the 
measure of the strong impact on the DGB unions of the economic changes that were occurring 
since at least a decade. The interrogations of the previous years as to the future of trade union 
politics suddenly reached their peak in 1989-90. As a matter of fact, the Debate was a con-
densed re-formulation of these interrogations into a fundamental questioning over the scope, 
meaning and ends of trade union politics in free-market economies. The fall of the GDR, the 
arrival of East German migrants in the Federal Republic, the reshaping of the trade union 
landscape in the GDR, the perspective of a unification: the political context of 1989-90 sud-
denly made answers to these questions more inescapable than before for the DGB unions. The 
response of the DGB unions to this context was also to be an answer to interrogations over the 
scope and ends of trade union action; any intervention of DGB unions in the East German 
reform process supposed that they knew what they supported and what they rejected.  The 
outbreak of the Debate over socialism was like the point d’orgue at the end of a musical 
                                                 
544 By the way, according to our reading, 26 contributions out of 50 were favourable to ‘socialism’, variously 
defined.  
545 Wilke/Hertle 1991, pp. 37-39. 
546 For example: Heinz Werner Meyer, “Die gewerkschaftliche Zukunftsdebatte – eine Zwischenbilanz”, in: 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 9/1991, p. 538-548; Rudolph, Karsten, “Die Zukunft des Sozialismus im Epo-
chenwechsel. Eine Zwischenbemerkung”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 12/1993, p. 757-766; Loe-
ding/Rosenthal 1998, pp. 161-167. 
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phrase, a sudden concentration of the tension developed before, a moment which marks both 
the apogee of a long phrase and the announcement of a new one. 
I do not propose answers to the three sets of questions just mentioned, but try to enlighten the 
Debate over socialism with their light. The first feature thus revealed is the acknowledgement 
of the urgency of a revision of orientations and ends of trade union politics, in the face of the 
collapse of the eastern Bloc. This belief is shared by all contributors and constitutes the com-
mon ground on which the Debate unfolded. For some contributors, it was the “failure of so-
cialism”, the fall of regimes that called themselves socialist, which imposed this revision. So-
cialism, so their claim, did not have anything to propose against the problems of the day. 
Aber welche Idee des Sozialismus meinen wir denn? Was können wir den heutigen in 
Leipzig Demonstrierenden, den Kollegen in den DDR-Betrieben sagen, die ihren 
Wunsch nach einem besseren Leben nur durch einen Vereinigung mit der kapitalisti-
schen Bundesrepublik für erfüllbar halten? Die gefällige Eigenversicherung, daβ der 
Stalinismus ja nur die pervertierte Form des Sozialismus gewesen sein, ist mittlerweile 
zu billig und bringt vor allem in der wirklichkeit niemand weiter. Theologisch wirkende 
Vertröstungen auf eine bessere sozialistische Zukunft ebensowenig. 
Die Revolution in Osteuropa hat die Welt so grundlegend verändert, daβ wir uns um ei-
ne aufrichtige Diskussion bisheriger Orientierungen nicht drücken können. Eine genau 
Bilanz ist erforderlich, neue Orientierungen wohl unvermeidlich.547  
For many, however, the urgency of a programmatic revision by the trade unions did not result 
from the fall of the eastern Bloc but from supranational developments of the recent years, 
specific to western economies: loss of legal and political rights of workers, a decrease in the 
GDP share of wages, massive unemployment, the externalisation of poverty in third-world 
countries and the destruction of the environment, as well as the need for more positive action 
toward women and the youth.548  
                                                 
547 “DKP am Ende – der Sozialismus auch? Eine Ideologie tritt ab?”, in: express 1/1990, p. 1. Also: Edgar 
Weick, “Die DDR und wir. Chancen für einen Neuanfang”, in: express 12/1989, p. 7; Hinrich Oetjen, “Vom 
perfekten Gegenentwurf haben alle die Schnauze voll”, in: Die Mitbestimmung 3/1990, pp. 229-230; in a lesser 
measure, Manfred Scharrer, “Das leztze Wort der Geschichte”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 12/1990, pp. 
777-785. 
548 Karlheinz Blessing, “Die Wirklichkeit drängt zum demokratischen Sozialismus – eine Replik auf Dieter 
Wunder”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 1/1990, pp. 2-9; Christian Götz, “Für eine neue Streitkultur”, in: 
Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 5-6/1990, pp. 410-415; Karlheinz Hiesinger, “Wider die Politik persönlicher 
Denunziation”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 7/1990, pp. 455-462; Heinz Bierbaum and Michael Wendl, 
“Abschied von der Einheitsgewerkschaft?”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 8/1990, p. 535-544; Michael 
Schneider, “Die säkulare Verwechslung – Welche Ideologien und Mystifikationen haben den linken Blick nach 
Osten getrübt?”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 9/1990, pp. 545-555; Werner Post, “Nachruf auf den Sozia-
lismus?”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 9/1990, pp. 555-564; Heinz Werner Meyer, “Die gewerkschaftliche 
Zukunftsdebatte – eine Zwischenbilanz”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 9/1991, p. 538-548. 
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The decisive point here is not whether people considered programmatic revisions necessary as 
a result of developments in the capitalist economy, of the collapse of the eastern regimes, or 
of both. The crucial point is that all agreed that such revisions were now imperative. No 
contributors to the Debate would have denied that the pressure toward some re-evaluation of 
the means and goals of trade union politics was strong before the opening of the wall. The 
collapse of the eastern regimes came within this context. The fall of the GDR intensified the 
need for a redefinition of the aims and goals of trade union politics: its outcomes in the Fede-
ral Republic increased the pressure on the labor market and on the welfare state. The laun-
ching of the Debate over socialism in the fall of 1989 marked less a new interest for pro-
grammatic revisions as a sudden urgency to define their nature. 
In order to revise the orientations and ends of trade union politics, a return to the fundaments 
was necessary. The attempt at defining these fundaments is a second feature of the Debate. 
The aim of trade union politics, so the dominant assumption, was to confer its social quality to 
the capitalist society. Whether someone pleaded in favor of socialism or not seems of little 
consequence in that respect. Defined as non-socialist, trade union politics was understood, in 
Dieter Wunder’s words quoted before, as the continuous critique of the capitalist society and 
the attempts to change it. Defined as socialist, trade union politics was also seen as the at-
tempt to reinforce the social component of capitalism. The first of the two following quotes is 
taken from an article favorable to the “democratic socialism”, the second, opposes the preser-
vatio of reference to socialism.   
Die Frage nach dem dritten Weg ist damit auch ein Stück weit beantwortet. Es ist der 
von [Eduard] Heimann beschriebene Einbau des sozialen Gegenprinzips in die Archi-
tektur des Kapitalismus.549 
Daher werden alle Bemühungen ein alternatives Wirtschaftssystem zu konzipieren, nur 
immer wieder das Scheitern des Sozialismus veranschaulichen. Gescheitert ist aber kei-
neswegs das reformsozialistische Projekt, durch zielstrebige reformpolitik eine andere, 
bessere und gerechtere Gesellschaft zu verwirklichen. Trotz beachtlicher Erfolge in den 
wenigen Ländern der Erde mit einer starken reformistischen Arbeiterbewegung hat die-
ses Projekt noch groβe Aufgaben vor sich, die aber nur auf der Grundlage eines effi-
zienten Wirtschaftssystems zu erfüllen sind.  
                                                 
549 Blessing, “Die Wirklichkeit drängt zum demokratischen Sozialismus – eine Replik auf Dieter Wunder”, p. 5. 
Reference is made to Eduard Heimann’s book of 1929, Soziale Theorie des Kapitalismus. 
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Hierbei gibt es schlechtere, aber keine besseren Alternativen zum System der kapitalis-
tischen Marktwirtschaft.550 
The divergence over the qualification (socialist or non-socialist) of trade union politics seems 
of no consequence in these two excerpts. There is however an unmistakable convergence as to 
the end of this action: to shape capitalism with a more social face. This convergence reflects 
decades of trade union practice in the Federal Republic and a belief in the model of the uni-
tary, non-partisan trade unions. Insisting too much on the “socialist/non-socialist” component 
of the Debate comes down to blurring the historical weight of the post-war compromises in 
favour of unitary unions, which impregnated the great bulk of the contributions.551 
How can trade unions determine the kind of social corrections they want to enforce? A very 
broad answer was: through the reference to great values and principles. On the non-socialist 
side, trade union politics was depicted as the materialization of principles like freedom, equal-
ity, equity, solidarity, human rights, democracy, participation and the protection of the envi-
ronment.552 
Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund und seine Gewekschaften engagieren sich für eine 
Gesellschaft, in der Menschenwürde und Menschenrechte Grundwerte sind; sie fordern 
einen Staat, der als soziale Demokratie organisisert ist. Es geht um eine Gesellschaft, in 
der die Spannung zwischen den groβen Ideen der französischen Revolution ‘Freiheit – 
Gleichheit – Brüderlichkeit’ auf die beste (den Menschen mögliche) Weise gelöst wird, 
in der individuelle Freiheitsrechte mit dem Verlangen nach sozialer Gerechtigkeit zum 
Ausgleichgebracht werden. Und es muβ eine Gesellschaft sein, der es gelingt, Natur und 
Umwelt so zu schützen, daβ die natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen der gegenwärtigen und 
der künftigen Generationen nicht weiter zerstört, sondern gesichert werden kann. (…) 
Wir brauchen also keine neuen gesellschaftlichen Visionen, keine alternativen Gesell-
schaftsmodelle, keine ‘Dritten Wege’.553 
                                                 
550 Horst Heimann, “Aussprache: Der Sieg des Reformsozialismus”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 4/1990, 
p. 250-252, p. 252. Also: Wunder “Der Zusammenbruch des ‘realen Sozialismus’ und das Selbstverständnis der 
Gewerkschaften”; Harry Pross, “Der Sozialismus wird überleben”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 8/1990, 
pp. 526-534; Detlev Albers, “1989-1917”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 12/1990, pp. 766-777. 
551 Manfred Wilke has published many studies denouncing the influence of socialist and communist unions’ 
heads and functionaries in the DGB. This is probably the most criticised and the less convincing aspect of his 
work. Despite the fact that many unionists outed by Wilke were members of the SPD, we believed the frequent 
argument that the political preferences of left-socialist or communist unionists never prejudiced their action in 
the Einheitsgewerkschaft, to be fully convincing.   
552 Wunder “Der Zusammenbruch des ‘realen Sozialismus’ und das Selbstverständnis der Gewerkschaften”; 
Oetjen, “Vom perfekten Gegenentwurf haben alle die Schnauze voll”; Meyer, “Die gewerkschaftliche Zukunfts-
debatte – eine Zwischenbilanz”, p. 540; Müller-Jentsch, Walther, “Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Staatssozia-
lismus – Politische Lehren und Perspektiven”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 9/1991, pp. 548-554, p. 553. 
553 Günter Pehl, “Gewerkschaftliche Grundwerte: Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit für alle – Solidarität – soziale De-
mokratie”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 3/1990, pp. 133-140, p. 134-135.  
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On the other side, trade union politics were depicted as part of the “democratic socialist task”, 
namely… the realization of freedom, equality, equity, solidarity, human rights, democracy, 
participation, protection of the environment, protection of peace and tolerance. 
Das Bad Godesberger Program verstand demokratischen Sozialismus als die Aufgabe, 
Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität durch Demokratisierung der Gesellschaft, durch 
soziale und wirtschaftliche Reformen zu verwirklichen. Das Berliner Programm der 
SPD von 1989 bestätigt diesen dynamischen und prozeβhaften Charakter des demokra-
tischen Sozialismus ausdrücklich: ‘Diese Grundwerte zu verwirklichen und die Demo-
kratie zu vollenden, ist die dauernde Aufgabe des demokratischen Sozialismus’.554 
Beside the adjunction of the protection of peace and tolerance in the socialist basket, the si-
militude of the references made to great principles in both ‘camps’ is hard to miss. One has 
less the impression of looking at two opposite sides as at the reflection of the same image in a 
mirror. As a matter of fact, nobody can be against virtue – especially not in the trade union 
movement. To call in such principles certainly fitted into the Debate’s need for orientations 
but it did not provide them. What did unions’ struggle for democracy, solidarity, equality and 
the likes meant concretely in 1989/1990? How should unions act in this specific context? 
What should they fight for? Those questions, underlying the outbreak of the Debate over so-
cialism, found very little response. In fact, this is a third feature, the Debate is mainly charac-
terized by its scarcity of concrete answers to its central question: what is to be done now? 
Some contributors knew at least what could no longer be done. The DGB unions, they insis-
ted, had to abandon or redefine some historical components of their catalogue of demands and 
goals. On that subject, few lines were as explicit as the ones quoted hereafter and, given the 
function of their authors, they have particular implications. They clearly attempt at pulling the 
curtain on an epoch of the history of the trade union movement in Germany, that of macro-
economic interventions within the march of the free-market capitalist economy. Here are ex-
cerpts from the contributions by the head of the DGB formation service and the DGB presi-
dent of the time: 
Das schlieβt nach dem Zusammenbruch des realen Sozialismus auch Inhalte wie Pla-
nung, Vergesellschaftung, Mitbestimmung und Gemeinwirtschaft als globales Konzept 
aus, die immer noch Bestand unserer Ideologie bilden. Jedenfalls muβ darüber sehr viel 
                                                 
554 Blessing, “Die Wirklichkeit drängt zum demokratischen Sozialismus – eine Replik auf Dieter Wunder”, p. 4. 
See also: Christoph Georgi, “Aussprache: Ein Gegenvorschlag zur Neubesinnung”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Mo-
natshefte 3/1990, p.192; Heimann, “Aussprache: Der Sieg des Reformsozialismus”, p. 252; Götz, “Für eine neue 
Streitkultur”; Dieter Staad, “Kapitalismus ohne Alternative?”, in: Der Gewerkschafter 8/1990, pp. 17-20; Post, 
“Nachruf auf den Sozialismus?”; Detlef Hensche, “Wie weiter? Fragen am Sterbebett des realen Sozialismus”, 
in: Kontrapunkt 21/1990, p. 12; Scharrer, “Das leztze Wort der Geschichte”, p. 785. 
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differenzierter nachgedacht werden und solches nicht leichtfertig immer als letztes Mit-
tel gefordert werden, wenn wir mit unserem Latein ansonsten am Ende sind.555 
Der Zusammenbruch des real existierenden Sozialismus hat endgültig klar gemacht, daβ 
Fortschritt nicht mit der schematischen Änderung von Eigentumsverhältnissen zu be-
wirken ist. Die Vergesellschaftung der Produktionsmittel sowie die zentrale ökonomi-
sche Planung und Lenkung gehören nun in das Museum der Arbeiterbewegung.556 
For some contributors, the trade unions’ fight was nothing more than the realization of the 
West German constitution. At the beginning and at the end of trade union politics, there is the 
Grundgesetz. The thorough implementation of the Grundgesetz could be seen as ‘socialist’ or 
‘non-socialist’, along the preferences of their authors. 
Wir brauchen also keine neuen gesellschaftlichen Visionen, keine alternativen Gesell-
schaftsmodelle, keine ‘dritten Wege’. Vielmehr ist es notwendig, alle Kraft dafür auf-
zuwenden, daβ die Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland auf der Spur bleibt, 
die das Grundgesetz vorgezeichnet hat. Es geht darum, dafür einzutreten, daβ der Ver-
fassungsauftrag, zur sozialen Demokratie tatsächlich erfüllt wird. Starke gesellschaftli-
che Kräfte sind am Werk, um die Bundesrepublik von diesem Weg abzudrängen, min-
destens soweit es das Gebot des Sozialstaatlichkeit anbelangt.557 
Der Kapitalismus der Bundesrepublik – Marktwirtschaft plus Sozialstaat – ist nicht 
(zumindest noch nicht) mit der westdeutschen Gesellschaftsordnung identisch. Deren 
Rahmen wird in der Regel eine ‘freiheitlich-demokratische Grundordnung’ genannt, die 
deutlich benennbar ist und – auch nach oberster Rechtssprechung – die hier zur Zeit 
‘herrschende’ Wirtschaftsordnung zwar als Möglichkeit einräumt, jedoch nicht zwin-
gend vorschreibt. Es gibt also nicht nur Gründe, sondern auch Rechte, in der Bundesre-
publik auch weiterhin – trotz DDR-Konkurs und nicht nur mangels DKP-Verbot – sozi-
alistische Konzepte zu vertreten.558 
As will become clear in the next chapter, it is significant that these professions of faith in the 
West German constitution were published in March 1990. They were written in the weeks 
where the DGB unions chose to act in favor of the extension of the West German legal order 
in the GDR. Such a reductionist comprehension of the trade unions’ goals, a reduction to what 
the legal order framing their action, in the context of a debate over the deepest meaning and 
furthest ends of trade unions, reaches beyond constitutional patriotism: after all, the DGB 
unions were favorable to revisions of the constitution, as the inclusion of a right to work, for 
                                                 
555 Oetjen, “Vom perfekten Gegenentwurf haben alle die Schnauze voll”, p. 230. 
556 Meyer, “Die gewerkschaftliche Zukunftsdebatte – eine Zwischenbilanz”, p. 540. 
557 Günter, “Gewerkschaftliche Grundwerte: Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit für alle – Solidarität – soziale Demokra-
tie”, p. 135. Otto Sundt argues in a similar way, though he refers to the Tarifvertragsgesetz and not specifically 
to the constitution: “Aussprache: Gewerkschaften brauchen keine Sozialistische Tradition”, in: Gewerkschaftli-
che Monatshefte 3/1990, pp. 188-190.  
558 Georgi, “Aussprache: Ein Gegenvorschlag zur Neubesinnung”, p. 191.  
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instance. Such a reduction rather indicates that many West German unionists no longer con-
sider changes of the legal framework in which they acted likely, nor desirable.  
Finally, contributions insisted on the necessity for trade unions to develop a new “internal 
culture”, in which more openness would be made to new members, new ideas, debates, toler-
ance and critique.559  
In all the contributions considered here, there is only a handful of concrete indications of how 
trade unions’ politics should change. A step from collective to individual rights is proposed 
by some authors, at least the individualization of the practice of workers’ rights. Discussions 
over labor processes in management circles that include workers (Qualitätszirkel) is presented 
as an avenue for the development of workers’ participation and co-determination.560 In his 
synthesis published in 1991, DGB head Heinz-Werner Meyer urges trade unions to use em-
ployers’ need for more flexibility to the benefice of (individual) workers. Meyer greeted the 
new opportunities opened by the 35-hour workweek in the metal and printing industries, but 
concluded that, in the future, working time reductions would be more individual in nature 
(rather than imposed to a whole sector).  
Mehr Selbstbestimmung der Individuen durch neue Formen der Gestaltung von Arbeit, 
Zeit und neue Beteiligungsformen bildet den Grundriβ jenes Porträts zukünftiger Ar-
beitspolitik der Gewerkschaften, das in ersten Umrissen bereits heute verwirklicht ist.561 
Another proposition made by Heinz-Werner Meyer was to abandon the work-based financial 
contribution and service provision of the welfare state in favor of a universal common basic 
social security. Although Meyer did not go into the details of his proposition, models of "ba-
sic social protection" (Grundsicherung) usually suppose that they can be supplemented with 
individual private insurance programs.  
One contribution stressed that the DGB unions should use the opportunity given by the nego-
tiations on the unification to try to keep some of the East German social rights in unified 
Germany, especially those compatible with their program: public kindergarten, free abortion, 
a constitutional right to work, the interdiction of lock-outs.562 This contribution was the only 
one in the whole Debate which proposed a strategy leading to gaining new social rights for 
the West German working population. All of these were classic goals of trade unions, re-
                                                 
559 Detlef Hensche, “Der Sozialismus geht – was kommt? Lehren aus dem Niedergang”, in: Gewerkschaftliche 
Monatshefte 5-6/1990, pp. 403-410; Götz, “Für eine neue Streitkultur”.  
560 Sundt, “Aussprache: Gewerkschaften brauchen keine Sozialistische Tradition”, p. 190. 
561 Meyer, “Die gewerkschaftliche Zukunftsdebatte – eine Zwischenbilanz”, p. 543. 
562 Jürgen Hoffmann, “Verordnete Emanzipation zerstört Emanzipation und Solidarität”, Die Mitbestimmung 
5/1990, pp. 354-358. 
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peated dozens of times in congress resolutions and public declarations by union officials over 
the years. They had become part of the unions’ creed. Yet they came up only once in the De-
bate over socialism, a symptom that the Debate was also drawing the line on some of the 
never met historical demands of the trade union movement, which had guided its daily action 
until then. 
Finally, two authors suggested that the DGB unions develope a coordinated tariff policy for 
both Germanies, as well as programs for the development of employment and social security 
in the GDR. The DGB unions had to prevent that the current developments in the GDR bring 
about negative outcomes in the Federal Republic. They were prompted to act as a quarantine 
line against developments that could threaten labor’s positions and rights in the Federal Re-
public. At the moment where they were made, in August 1990, these precepts for action al-
ready defined all of the DGB unions’ strategy toward the GDR. 
Wenn es zu der zu befürchtende Segmentierung der Arbeitsmarkt- und Lohnstrukturen 
in der DDR mit einer spürbaren Rückwirkung auf den bereits segmentierten bundes-
deutschen Arbeitsmarkt in Richtung Lohnreduzierung für alle Formen gering qualifi-
zierter Arbeit kommt, enthält ein koordiniertes tarifpolitisches Handeln der Gewerk-
schaften zentrale Bedeutung. Ebenso notwendig weren staatliche Maβnahmen der 
Arbeitsmarkt- und sozialpolitischen Regulierung, um die zu erwartende ‘Schmutzkon-
kurrenz’ unterhalb der tariflichen Mindestnormen einzudämmen.563 
3.4.3 The programmatic exhaustion of the trade unions 
The Debate over socialism is an état des lieux of trade unions’ program and politics in the 
Federal Republic at the end of the 1980s. The dichotomy between the Debate’s origin, the 
perception of the urgency of a programmatic reorientation, and its very modest contribution in 
providing concrete elements of what this reorientation could look like, is striking. References 
to the strengthening of the "social dimension" within the capitalist economy or to great prin-
ciples were of a limited help, if they were not supplemented with concrete indications as to 
how these principles could be conjugated in the present times. The few concrete perspectives 
that emerged in the midst of the Debate usually meant an unambiguous narrowing of trade 
unions’ role and pretensions: the rejection of interventions at the macro-economic level, al-
though developments at that level were said to shake labor politics and conceptions; the aban-
donment of year-long claims for the improvement of the legal order of the Federal Republic; 
the preference for individualized forms of defence of workers’ interests, hence to hand over 
more responsibility to the works councils, in a dual system of representation that limits the 
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scope of works councils’ action more than that of unions. The Debate over socialism has 
enlightened the exhaustion of the perspectives of post-war trade union politics in the Federal 
Republic.  
In his prize-winning essay, Serge Denis (2003) analyses what he terms the “programmatic 
exhaustion” of the international social democracy. Within international social democracy, the 
economic developments known as globalization (internationalization of productive processes 
and of financial circuits, as well as the corollary need for more autonomy for each individual 
enterprise) have been unilaterally understood as marking a point of no return for the social 
democratic project. Important theoreticians of European social democracy, Rudolf Meidner 
and Fritz Scharpf among others, appear rather helpless as to the future of this project in the 
globalized economy. For Meidner, the socialist ends (which he limits to full employment and 
equity) remain valid, but the ways to achieve them, have to be modernised, an assertion which 
he does not detail. Scharpf is more explicit. Social democracy has no theory as to how it can 
handle its “inevitable adaptation” to the developments within the capitalist economy, he wri-
tes, since Keynesian policies are impossible at the international or the European level. Besides 
diverse micro-level strategies aiming at creating/preserving jobs, Scharpf resolves himself to 
do the promotion of what he calls “socialism in one class”: tax increases for the working po-
pulation, in order to help those penalized by the economic transformations, without corres-
ponding increases of the social contributions of employers.564  
Can such conceptions, for instance the promotion of a sharing out of the social risks within 
the sole working population, be considered part of the history of socialism, asks Denis?565 He 
answers negatively. These proposals rather illustrate the programmatic exhaustion of the so-
cial democratic project. This exhaustion shows through reflections still grounded in an obso-
lete framework – the one that had determined, until then, the short and medium-term goals, 
strategies and punctual interventions -, which cannot be transcended.  
« Epuisement programmatique », parce que les difficultés d’orientation, voire les im-
passes, se nourrissent précisément de la caducité du cadre ayant défini les objectifs à 
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court et à moyen termes depuis 1945, les façons de faire et les plate-formes plus ponc-
tuelles aussi. Les problèmes ne sauraient être vus comme conjoncturels.566  
The dilemma is not of a temporary nature, believes Denis. In a provocative hypothesis, he 
suggests that it marks the opening of a period of decomposition of the social democracy and 
re-composition of the political action modalities by workers. It is this double process that he 
attempts to analyse in his book.  
As economic organisations of workers, closely linked to social democratic parties, western 
trade unions are touched by the programmatic exhaustion of the social democratic project just 
as much as political parties. As the term exhaustion suggests, we are dealing with a process 
whose development varied in the different countries, although its basic format is the same 
everywhere. The launching of the Debate over socialism in 1989 allows to date the ackno-
wledgement by the West German unions of the exhaustion of their programmatic orientations. 
After at least a decade of growing unemployment and dismantling of the welfare state, and in 
the context of the fall of ‘socialism’, the launching of the Debate indicated a sudden intensifi-
cation of the quest for new orientations - and its failure.567  
Hence, the programmatic exhaustion of trade unions appears in the Debate’s dichotomy bet-
ween the necessity of programmatic re-orientations and the scarcity of concrete indications. It 
is not symbolized by the fact that some unionists urged their colleagues to accept the narro-
wing conditions allowed for by the capitalist free-market economy, and to limit, for instance, 
trade union politics to interventions at the micro-economic level. Such accomodationist orien-
tations were always present in the trade union movement.568 It is rather symbolized by the 
fact that no contribution to the Debate could take the opposite view of proposing anything 
else than the abandonment of core demands of trade unions. The programmatic exhaustion of 
trade unions is patent through the incapacity to define the margins and goals of trade union 
politics within the new economic conditions, beyond vague calls to take advantage, for the 
benefit of workers, of employers’ readiness to listen to workers' suggestions.  
                                                 
566 Ibid., p. 23. 
567 In my opinion the consequences of the programmatic exhaustion cannot be the same for trade unions as for 
social democratic parties, given that one shares Denis’ clear-cut argument on the latter. Trade unions cannot 
change their nature as workers’ organisations.  
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It is often transcribed in the reduction of goals and ends to a strict acceptation of what unions 
already had. Authors defending socialist perspectives presented the West German social mar-
ket economy as one form of realization of socialism,569 others, socialism, the unions’ program 
as identical with the West German constitution and labor laws. This, to stress the point one 
more time, in a period where mutations within the economy and of the legal order compelled 
trade unions to programmatic re-orientations.  
It is doubtful that theoretical debates within a movement can be settled in the columns of its 
press alone. For sure, the Debate over socialism was not. It is the practice of the DGB unions 
that solved the Debate’s interrogations. It is in a strategy entirely devoted to the eastward ex-
tension of the West German labor laws and the organizational expansion that the Debate over 
socialism found its conclusion. The unanimity of the DGB unions for the extension of an ero-
ding model was an almost logical outcome of the programmatic exhaustion diagnosed in the 
Debate over socialism. In any case the implementation of this strategy marked the actual end 
of the Debate. It is not the fact that some DGB unions’ heads pleaded for the legal extension 
and refused “any experiments” that is historically significant in 1990. What is crucial is that 
nobody within the West German union movement could envisage any other positive perspec-
tive than the legal extension. Bluntly put, it is significant that it was the left-wing Media In-
dustrial Union, whose secretaries voiced their fidelity to the democratic socialist tradition in 
the Debate, which, the first, pleaded for the legal extension in 1989 (see 3.2).  
The strategic shift of DGB unions toward the legal extension was made in February 1990, a 
few weeks only after the launching of the Debate. That the Debate found its conclusion in this 
strategy, although contributions continued to be published, cannot be seen if the Debate is 
understood as a theoretical quarrel between the partisans and opponents of ‘socialism’ within 
the DGB unions. This explains, together with incomplete listings of the contributions and nar-
row analyses of its significance, why the Debate over socialism has not received all due atten-
tion in the literature.  
Launched as a reflection over the scope, goals and means of trade union politics in the end of 
the 1980s and in the context of the fall of the GDR, the Debate over socialism bears witness 
of the historical implications of the programmatic exhaustion of trade unions. ‘Historical’ 
refers here to the fact that, as natural and obvious the alignment behind the West German eco-
nomic and legal order without ands, ifs or buts might have been for the DGB unions by the 
beginning of 1990, it marked a breach in their history. Some West German historians of the 
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labor movement were particularly aware of the historical implications of a strategy dedictaed 
to the legal extension. They have expressed their worries in January 1990, in a discussion pu-
blished along the Debate over socialism. It was the lack of historical knowledge, so a shared 
opinion among the discussants, that prevented the DGB unions to define an ‘historically cor-
rect’ (my expression) strategy and which prompted them to fqvor the extension of “obsolete 
structures” and practices in the GDR. Yet, their greater historical sensibility did not allow 
these scholars to rise above the dilemma faced by unions and propose any alternative – but 
this, one should rightly argue, was not their role.  
It is interesting to see how, in the following excerpt, veterans of social history, especially sen-
sible to the weight of the period for West German unions, have it hard to go beyond calls to a 
"return" to unions’ "fundamental values" – like the bulk of other contributions to the Debate. 
One historian (Steinberg) makes a proposition similar to the legal extension, another suggests 
that the DGB unions limit the scope of their intervention in the GDR (Hartwich). Klaus Ten-
felde makes an interesting reference to the years of illegality under Bismarck’s antisocialist 
Laws which forced trade unions to reorganise their politics differently but which turned out to 
their advantage. In his view, but Tenfelde does not explicit the implications for the DGB 
unions of this lesson from the past, an unfavorable context does not necessarily come out on a 
weakening of trade unions. But they need to know what it is that they want, one should add. 
This discussion, summarizes the contours and implications of the exhaustion of the historical 
perspectives of western trade union movements better than any other contribution to the De-
bate over socialism, and counts therefore among the most interesting ones. 
BORSDORF: [Das] Industriegewerkschaftssystem ist in der Bundesrepublik schon kein 
den Produktionsverhältnissen adäquates Organisationsprinzip mehr. Es beruht auf einer 
Vorstellung der Produktionsverhältnisse, die den Werkstoff (Holz, Metall und so wei-
ter) zum Organisationsschnittpunkt der Arbeitnehmer macht. Eine solche sozusagen 
überholte Struktur in der DDR zu installieren, ist höchstens in dem Sinne richtig, daβ 
das Indsutriegewerkschaftsprinzip demokratischer ist als eine zentralistische Einheits-
gewerkschaft. 
STEINBERG: Ich glaube, die Frage der Organisationsstruktur ist zweitrangig. Was die 
bundesrepublkikanischen Gewerkschaften sich überlegen müssen ist, welche Sozialstra-
tegien sie hinsichtlich der Lebenslage der arbeitenden Menschen in der heutigen DDR 
entwickeln wollen – auch unter dem Aspekt einer nach ökonomischen Gesichtspunkten 
gar nicht aufzuhaltenden Vereinigung. Das scheint mir das zentrale Problem der Ge-
werkschaften zu sein, bei dem es um ei Instrumentarium geht, das verhindert, daβ in-
nerhalb der Werktätigen eine Zweiklassengesellschaft unter einem politischen Dach 
entsteht. 
HARTWICH: Die Gewerkschaften sind überfordert, wenn sie die Lage der Arbeiter in der 
DDR tatsächlich verbessern wollten. In der Bundesrepublik steht den Gewerkschaften 
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nach meiner Beobachtung das Wasser bis zum Halse, weil sie, entsprechend ihren 
Funktionen als Arbeitnehmer-Organisationen, schwierige Auseinandersetzungen vor 
sich haben. Nach meinem Verständnis sind die anstehenden Tarifauseinandersetzungen 
auch ihre vordringlichste Aufgabe. Deshalb kann man auch nicht sagen, die Gewerk-
schaften müβten sich in dieser Situation in erster Linie um die Entwicklung in der DDR 
kümmern. (…) 
MOMMSEN: (…) Zu erwarten und zu fordern wäre eine stärkere Ausrichtung in eigenen 
Traditionen und eine entsprechende Handlungsorientierung. In einer Situation, wie wir 
sie jetzt haben, können die Gewerkschaften nicht warten, bis Wissenschaftler ihnen ge-
sagt haben, was sie tun müssen, sondern sie müssen sich auf ihre eigenen Wertstand-
punkte beziehen, wenn sie nicht ihre moralische Glaubwürdigkeit verlieren wollen. In 
solche Situationen geht es eben nicht nur darum, politische Interessenstandpunkte zu 
berücksichtigen, sondern darum, eine grundsätzliche Position zu haben. (…) Ich bin da-
von überzeugt, daβ in einer Zeit politischer Umschichtung wie der heutigen, die Besin-
nung auf die eigene grundsätzliche Position absolut notwendig ist. Daβ der gesamte öst-
liche Sozialismus vollkommen zusammengebrochen ist, und damit ja auch die 
marxistische Tradition, stellt eine epochale Wandlung dar, auf die auch die Gewerk-
schaten reagieren müssen, weil sich die Perspektiven ändern. Der gewerkschaftliche 
Pragmatismus kann auf die Dauer nicht genügen.(…) 
BEIER: (…) Die Gewerkschaften haben auch gelegentlich versucht, Grundsätze gewerk-
schatlichen Verhaltens in Tugendkatkalogen nach dem biblischen Vorbild der zehn Ge-
bote zu formulieren. Das blieb trivial. Nirgendwo findet sich eine anspruchsvolle, sys-
tematische Ausarbeitung gewerkschaftlicher Ethik. Es fehlt auch an entsprechenden 
Instanzen im Aufbau der Verbände. (…) In der fehlenden ethischen Instanz sehe ich ei-
ne empfindliche Lücke in der bisherigen gewerkschaftlichen Theorie und Praxis. 
TENFELDE: Suchen wir jetzt nicht etwas zuviel nach gewerkschaftlicher Ethik? Daβ es 
so etwas wie eine Tugendkatalog gewerkschaftliche Handelns nicht gibt, ist ein Preis, 
der für die Gründung der Einheitsgewerkschaft gezahlt werden muβte. (…) [Ich] erinne-
re mich an die Unterdrückung der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung während des Sozia-
listengestzes. Damals hat sie die groβe Chance des 12jährigen Verbot genutzt, um sich 
an Haupt und Gliedern zu erneuern und zu neuen Organisationen zu finden. Biete nicht 
auch das Ende eines 40jährigen Verbots der Arbeiterbewegung in der DDR heute die 
Chance einer relativen neuorganisierung der Gewerkschaften? Dabei kann es nicht dar-
um gehen, DGB-Prinzipien zu übernehmen, die sich als überlebt erwiesen haben. 
3.5 West German Employers' Associations' Shift in Position to 
Favoring the Extension of the Labor Law   
This chapter is dedicated to the West German employers’ association, the Bundesvereinigung 
der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA). This is the only section to cover this topic in this 
work otherwise devoted solely to trade unions. The following pages shall demonstrate how 
the BDA analyzed the situation in the GDR and how it defined its activities within that con-
text, mainly from the dates of January to February 1990. We will see how during those weeks 
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the employers' federation began to favor the legal extension of the West German labor law to 
cover the GDR. 
The BDA press, and more specifically the editorials of the bi-weekly Der Arbeitgeber, is par-
ticularly useful in tracking these developments. The topics covered  in this magazine are also 
indicative of the sort of information that was important to West German employers’ associa-
tions and hence to their reactions to the changes observed in the GDR. This emphasis on the 
editorials and the topics covered in the employers' press corresponds to the way the press of 
the trade unions is covered in this work. 
As was the case with the union's press, considerations given to problems relating to the inte-
gration of tens of thousands of East German workers in the West German labor market domi-
nated the coverage of the East German crisis in the West German employers' press. In the first 
weeks of 1990, the positions of West German unions and management regarding the GDR 
were highly convergent. 
3.5.1 Concerns on social stability in West Germany (January 1990) 
Der Arbeitgeber did not cover the 1989 East German revolution. The only article published in 
1989 that dealt expressly with the GDR was a piece published in June  complaining about the 
decline of trade between the two countries.570 None of the topics associated with new events 
surrounding the East German uprising, not even the opening of the Berlin Wall, found their 
way into the BDA magazine until the begining of 1990. 
This silence on the issue indicates that the position taken by the BDA. if viewed in a positive 
light, may be compared to the “wait-and-see” policy adopted for a period of time by the DGB 
unions. Whereas the DGB unions only pursued this policy during the initial few weeks of the 
East German revolution, the BDA seemed to have followed this line until December 1989. 
Yet, in the case of the BDA, the organization has received little criticism for its lack of a pub-
lic stance and silence on the issue of the East German revolution. As we have seen earlier in 
this paper, the trade union press published a great number of articles on the events taking 
place in East Germany in the fall 1989, in relation to their effects on enteprises themselves for 
instance. Whilst the DGB union members supported the actors in the East German revolution 
through its strategy of support and collaboration, the same cannot be said of the BDA. None-
theless, the employers’ associations was never the object of criticism, either external or inter-
                                                 
570 “Mondernisierungsbedarf der DDR”, Der Arbeitgeber, 11/41 (June 9, 1989), pp. 403-04. 
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nal, as was the union movement ever since February 1990.571 Was there any attempt to reopen 
the issue of why the BDA only started to address the East German crisis at the turn of the year 
1990? The answer here is no.572 
The West German employers’ press began to take an interest in the East German revolution 
after it had begun to have major repercussions in West Germany itself. In an editorial entitled 
“Self-determination” (Selbstbestimmung) dated January 19, 1990, the BDA invited its readers 
to reconsider and now support the gradualist approach to reunification as defined by chancel-
lor Helmut Kohl seven weeks earlier in his so-called 10-Point Plan (“we recommend a re-
evaluation”). The editorialist wrote that organizing free elections in the GDR would be crucial 
in shaping Germany's future and stated that the BDA would support any East German indi-
vidual or organization in favor of elections. BDA's support for reunification included a rejec-
tion of any sort of hybrid model of the two economic systems. The editorialist called for the 
implementation of a “freemarket economic system” in a reunified Germany.573 
One might suspect that the BDA reconsidered its position  on the 10-point plan to one of sup-
port as an attempt to find a solution to the massive migration of East German citizens to West 
Germany. In its annual report for the year 1989, published around this time, the BDA execu-
tive secretary (Hauptgeschäftsführer), Fritz-Heinz Himmelreich, estimated  the number of 
unemployed East German workers in the Federal Republic at about 240,000.574 The West 
German constitution prevented any restriction on movement between the two Germany states. 
The risks of increasing strains on the social services budget by East German migration could 
hardly be overlooked. This particularly threatened to push up unemployment and retirement 
pensions costs. 
One member of the executive committeeof the Hessen Federation of Employers’ Associations 
called on West German employers to avoid making any public declarations that could prompt 
skilled East German workers to leave for West Germany. The stabilization of the situation on 
the border was given top priority.  
                                                 
571 Der Arbeitgeber contributed to this criticism against the trade unions, blaming the IG Metall because it did 
not address the collapse of the GDR regime during its congress of November 1989. Klaus Schneider, “Ein Kon-
gress mit drei Gesichtern”,  Der Arbeitgeber, 22/41 (November 17, 1989), pp. 842-45, esp. 845. 
572 No traces of an attempt to re-evaluate its positions are to be found either in the BDA press or in the subse-
quent analyses of the BDA strategy in 1990. See: Henneberger 1991; Thumfart 2002, pp. 319-21. 
573 Thomas Gross, “Selbstbestimmung”, Der Arbeitgeber, 2/42 (January 19, 1990), p. 48. 
574 Fritz-Heinz Himmelreich, “Europa und DDR: Themen der Sozialpolitik”, Der Arbeitgeber, 1/42 (January 5, 
1990), pp. 16-17. 
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The lack of skilled workers in West Germany should not be “artificially raised”, he con-
tended.575 Some in the BDA therefore shared (at least in part) the opinion of the DGB unions 
on the negative consequences on social stability in the FRG brought about by West German 
companies recruiting East German workers and the resulting downward pressure on wages.576 
It is essential to integrate the hundreds of thousands East German migrants into West Ger-
many’s system , wrote Fritz-Heinz Himmelreich in his 1989 report. This demanded that the 
federal government adopt wide-ranging reforms that should include deregulation, privatiza-
tion of the welfare system (especially the pension system) and new tax schemes. Himmelreich 
also called for major changes to the nature of negotiations between employers and trade un-
ions in the Federal Republic of Germany. The end of the "real-existing socialism" in East 
Germany, he claimed, also implied the demise of "democratic socialism" in the Western union 
movement and presupposed a programmatic reorientation of the latter. The role of employers 
in that context was to promote the argument that "socialist theories" had utterly and com-
pletely failed. Such remarks obviously added to a profound malaise at the DGB unions, whose 
most obvious manifestation was without doubt visible in the debate over the future of social-
ism. These can be found in other articles in Der Arbeitgeber in 1990 as well.577 
Der Untergang des ‘real-existierenden Sozialismus in Osteuropa’ nötigt den demokrati-
schen Sozialismus hier in der Bundesrepublik zu einer neuen ordnungspolitischen Orts-
bestimmung. Wir stehen vor einer neuen Systemdebatten bei der es darum geht, die de-
mokratische Gesellschaft von der Systemimmanenz des Scheiterns sozialistischer 
Theorien zu überzeugen.578 
3.5.2 Shift in position on the extension of the West German labor law (Feb-
ruary 1990) 
The Federal chancellor’s proposal for a rapid reunification of the two German states through a 
preliminary monetary and economic union met with little enthusiasm in the West German 
economic establishment when announced on February 6, 1990.579  
                                                 
575 Henning von Vieregge, “Arbeit suchen und finden bei uns”, Der Arbeitgeber, 2/42 (January 19, 1990, pp. 63-
64.  
576 For a (partial) rebuttal, see: Reiner Baumeister, “Aussiedler aus Osteuropa sind keine Kostgänger”, Der Ar-
beitgeber, 5/42 (March 9, 1990), p. 186. 
577 Norbert Reis, “Vormundschaft oder Freiheit – das ist die Frage”, Der Arbeitgeber, 5/42 (March 9, 1990), pp. 
178-80; Horst-Udo Niedenhoff and Manfred Wilke, “Krise der SED-Herrschaft, Sozialismusdisput im DGB”, 
Der Arbeitgeber, 5/42 (March 9, 1990), pp. 181-84; Klaus Schneider, “Verlorene Utopien”, Der Arbeitgeber, 11-
12/42 (June 15, 1990), p. 460. 
578 Himmelreich, “Europa und DDR”, p. 17. 
579 Grosser 1998, pp. 190-97.  
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At that time, most of West Germany’s major economic institutions, including the economic 
council of so-called ‘Five Wise Men’, the German Institute for Economic Research 
(Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) and the Bundesbank (German central bank), 
advocated a gradual transition for East German enterprises and a progressive opening of the 
GDR economy to international competition. The introduction of the German Mark in the 
GDR should, in the opinion of these analysts, only take place after a substantial narrowing of 
the production gap between the two countries to ensure that the rise in unemployment in the 
GDR can be kept to a minimum. According to an in-depth analysis, the GDR could only 
maintain its productivity levels by drastically slashing wages if deprived of sovereignty over 
its monetary policy. This would result in higher unemployment and an accelarated exodus to 
West Germany. Karl-Otto Pöhl, the Bundesbank president, who would soon be forced to re-
sign, and the bank’s vice-president publicly criticized the plan as “unrealistic”.580 
The president of the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der deutschen Indus-
trie, BDI), Tyll Necker, also expressed his reservations on Chancellor Kohl’s belief that the 
rapid monetary and economic union would lift productivity levels in the GDR.581 Yet the 
criticism from the Federation of German Industries' remained muted.  
The Confederation of German Employers' Associations did not echo the complaints of other 
West German economic institutions about the chancellor’s proposal. In fact, the employers' 
lobby group made no public stance on the proposal for monetary union.582 The BDI and BDA 
were not actively engaged in the campaign led by West German economic institutes and 
banks against Chancellor Kohl’s proposal.583  
Although it avoided any explicit endorsement of the plan, an editorial in the Confederation of 
German Employers' Associations' magazine following the announcement of the February 6 
proposal was a prudent step along the course set out by the chancellor. The editorialist, Josef 
Siegers, highlighted how central the issue of "work" was to the current German debate. Job 
creation, wage rates, unemployment: all these issues were crucial and would come to determi-
ne the future economic and political roadmap. One single labor market was already forming in 
Germany, as commuter traffic figures between the two countries (Berufs-Pendelverkehr) illus-
                                                 
580 “Währungsunion stösst auf Ablehnung”, Franfurter Rundschau, February 9, 1990; “DIW-Präsident: Die von 
Bonn gewollte Einheitswährung ist kontraproduktiv”, Frankfurter Rundschau, February 10, 1990. Also:  Zatlin 
1994, p. 69.   
581 Süddeutsche Zeitung from February 9, 1990, quoted in: Vilmar / Guittard 1999, p. 23. 
582 There is no mention of any official stance by the BDA on Chancellor Kohl’s call for a rapid monetary and 
economic union in Der Arbeitgeber, the Frankfurter Rundschau, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung or Die 
tageszeitung. 
583 Grosser 1998, p. 191. 
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trate. This situation, however, was creating alarming tensions between workers in the Federal 
Republic of Germany.584 The labor market and welfare state in West Germany were not in a 
position to assimilate a constant influx of thousands of East German workers. The East Ger-
man economy needed to be restructured and reformed (saniert) through a coordinated moneta-
ry policy from both Germany states, wrote Siegers. He went on to say that this coordinated 
policy had to be enshrined in legislation along the same basic lines of the West Germany’s 
Labor Promoting Law (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz). He finally appealed to politicians to take the 
necessary measures to ensure it was viable for East German workers to stay in the GDR: 
Alles tun, um das Verbleiben in der DDR attraktiv und sinnvoll zu gestalten! Alles ver-
meiden, was zusätzlich zum Sog des Wohlstandsgefälles Anreize für ein Übersiedeln 
schafft!585  
These arguments, the problems identified and the solutions proposed had much in common 
with the Federal government's views. Without yet publicly supporting the government's 
course of action on currency union and the adoption of the monetary policy, the Confedera-
tion of the German Employers' Associations defended similar positions in this editorial in its 
Arbeitgeber newsletter from February 23, 1990. Three days earlier, representatives from the 
West German industry, employers and trade unions had been invited to the federal chancel-
lory for discussions on the government's policy toward the GDR. The next issue of Der Ar-
beitgeber, published on March 9, announced the logical conclusion to the BDA's gradual shift 
in position. This issue's editorial contained a clear appeal for rapid monetary union as pro-
posed by Chancellor Kohl one month earlier. 
Der Traum von Freiheit und Wohlstand in Einheit hat aber gute Chancen, Wirklichkeit 
zu werden, wenn das Angebot des Bundeskanzlers zu einer Wirtschafts- und Wäh-
rungsunion jetzt zügig mit konkretem Inhalt gefüllt wird. Wirtschaftsreform und Wäh-
rungsunion sind dabei untrennbar miteinander verbunden. Das eine läuft ohen das ande-
re ins Leere. Gewerbefreiheit, Wettbewerb, freie Preisbildung, Privateingetum und 
Finanzreform sind einig Stichworte, die den Weg in die soziale Marktwirtschaft markie-
ren.  
The column, once more authored by BDA's executive secretary Himmelreich, called for re-
forming the East German labor and social laws along the lines of legislation in place in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Unified Germany's labor legislation should be modeled on the 
West German laws, i.e., based on the autonomy of the collective bargaining partners (Tari-
fautonomie) and the right to industrial strikes. This legal framework would, in the words of 
                                                 
584 See chapter 3.3. 
585 Josef Siegers, “Deuscthland einig Arbeitsmarkt”, Der Arbeitgeber, 4/42 (February 23, 1990), p. 124. 
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Himmelreich, open the door to autonomous collective bargaining, the organization of work in 
the GDR and an urgently neededreform of the East German economy. 
Es muss eine staatsfreie Aushandlung der Löhne und Arbeitsbedingungen im Rahmen 
einer Tarifautonomie verankert werden, deren institutionelleVoraussetzungen – von der 
Bildung unabhängiger Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmerorganisationen bis hin zum ga-
rantierten Recht auf Streik und Aussperrung – schleunigst zu schaffen sind. Dies bedeu-
tet nicht, dass mit Einführung der Tarifautonomie in der DDR dort sofort westdeutsche 
Löhne gezahlt werden könnten. Dazu ist der Produktivitätsrückstand der DDR-
Wirtschaft zu gross. Niveau und Zuwachs der Löhne müssen sich vielmehr an den dor-
tigen Produktivitätsverhältnissen orientieren. Grosse Produktivitätssprünge ergäben sich 
aus der Ablösung des überalterten Maschinenparks durch neueste Technik wie aus der 
vollen Nutzung der vorhandenen Kapazitäten, die bisher wegen Materialmangels oder 
permanenter Maschinendefekte allenfalls zur Hälfte ausgelastet waren.586 
This clarification of the strategy of the West German employers' associations was published 
together with an important BDA/DGB agreement.587 In this agreement, both union and man-
agement called for West Germany’s labor law to be extended to the GDR and declared their 
readiness to play an active role in reforming the East German economy in accordance with 
these laws. The March 9 agreement is the main manifestation of the tripartite consensus on 
the legal extension of West German labor laws signed by the West German government, labor 
organizations and employers' associations. The next chapters will explore in greater detail 
how the tripartite consensus was formed.Hence, the BDA took several crucial steps in realign-
ing its position closer to that of the federal government between February 20 and March 9. 
We will see that the corresponding evolution in the position of the DGB unions followed the 
same basic timeframe. 
By the end of March, the Confederation of German Employers' Associations was strongly 
criticizing any attempts made by the GDR to implement a more "labor-friendly" labor law 
than the one in place in the Federal Republic. The law on trade unions and its granting of 
wide-ranging co-determination, the prohibition of lock-outs and the obligation to pay wages 
during strikes, all measures adopted by the East German parliament, were severely attacked 
by the BDA. They were described as “acts of sabotage” and as attempts to introduce "socialist 
elements" in a unified Germany. The BDA requested that the DGB unions withhold support 
for such pro-labor measures which would only impede investment and threaten the system of 
social partnership in the Federal Republic of Germany.  
                                                 
586 Fritz-Heinz Himmelreich, “Sozialmarktwirtschft für ganz Deutschland”, Der Arbeitgeber, 5/42 (March 9, 
1990), p. 172. 
587 Both this issue of Der Arbeitgeber and the BDA/DGB agreement were released on March 9. 
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So verführerisch es auch aus der Sicht der DGB-Gewerkschaften sein mag, eine ver-
meintliche Chance zu nutzen, so sollten sie dieser Versuchung nicht erliegen, denn dann 
wäre auch unsere seit Jahrzehnten bewährte freiheitliche Wirtschaftsordnung beschä-
digt. Es ist zu hoffen, dass sich in den Gewerkschaften die Kräfte durchsetzen, die einer 
unheiligen Allianz widerstehen. Erste Äusserungen in diese Richtung liegen vor. Hierin 
läge ein Beweis für die Funktionsfähigkeit unserer partnerschaftlich verfassten sozialen 
Marktwirtschaft, mit der nicht nur der Weg zur deutschen Einigung geebnet, sondern 
auch die europäische Integration beschleuningt wird.588 
As we will see in the upcoming chapters, any concerns the BDA may have had relating to 
DGB union support for East German "input" in drafting the new labor law for a unified Ger-
many were shortlived at best. Once the contours of BDA's political support for extending the 
West German labor law to the GDR had been defined, Der Arbeitgeber assigned considerable 
column space to printing comparative statistics from East and West Germany for its readers. 
Working time, wages, productivity, levels of health and security at work were highlighted. 
This insistence on the conditions of employability in the GDRwas necessary to West German 
employers who wanted to invest there. At least five comparative articles589 and two special 
booklets590 were published by Der Arbeitgeber between January and July 1, 1990, the date on 
which the Monetary, Economic and Social Union came into effect. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
This brief examination of the Confederation of German Employers' Associations' press be-
tween January and March 1990 suggests the following conclusions. Unlike the West German 
trade unions, the employers' press had not covered the political revolution in the GDR. The 
first articles relating to these issues concerned the destabilizing effects of the massive influx 
of East German workers onto the West German labor market and into the welfare system. 
These concerns gave cause to the BDA for agreeing to the proposal on monetary union set 
forth by Chancellor Kohl. The BDA advocated extending the West German labor law and 
collective bargaining autonomy to the GDR. This position, shared by the DGB, became the 
                                                 
588 Dieter Frank Wienke, “Minenleger”, Der Arbeitgeber, 6/42 (March 23, 1990), p. 212. 
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object of an agreement between unions and employers' associations. Most of these develop-
ments took place between February 20 and March 9, 1990. 
3.6 Achieving Monetary, Economic and Social Union: It takes 
three to tango 
3.6.1 The Monetary, Economic and Social Union in literature 
The Monetary, Economic and Social Union (MESU) between the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and the German Democratic Republic, which went into effect on July 1, 1990, was the 
first and most crucial step towards achieving German unity. It marked the introduction of the 
Deutsche Mark in the GDR, the assumption of control over the country’s financial and mone-
tary policy by the West German federal government and the Bundesbank, the final transition 
to a free market economy and the opening of the market to international competition.591 It 
initiated the legal and institutional transfer from the FRG to the GDR, which led a few months 
later to the incorporation of the new Länder into the Federal Republic.  
The history of the MESU is well documented. The vast collection of  documents from the 
years 1989/1990 housed at the Federal Chancellery is vital in understanding how the East 
German crisis was perceived by the chancellor and his entourage and, likewise. how they 
came to consider the rapid introduction of the DM and economic union as the optimum solu-
tion to this problem.592 The standard work on the negotiations leading to the ratification of the 
MESU, published in a four-volume history of the German unity,593 is especially informative 
on the evolution of the positions of the East and West German governments. For our pur-
poses, an excellent source of supplementary information to Grosser’s book is the history of 
the social union published by the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs.594  
In their investigations on the top-level decision-making process, these three papers were suc-
cessful in demonstrating how the firm-handed approach of the chancellor compelled the 
Bundesbank, West German industry and the East German government to act in line with his 
plan for the rapid transfer of the West German legal and economic system to the former East 
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Germany.595 Two issues seem especially crucial in persuading Helmut Kohl to accelerate the 
pace of the MESU initiative. Firstly, the belief that, although economically risky, it was, po-
litically speaking, the only possible route to take. Secondly, the results of the March 18 elec-
tions in the GDR, in which the CDU-affiliated Alliance for Germany (Allianz für Deutsch-
land) gained 47.7% of the vote, were widely interpreted as a plebiscite in favor of his 
roadmap for reunification.596 Helmut Kohl writes in his memoirs: 
Mit diesem Votum hatte die groβe Mehrheit der Wähler in der DDR ein klares Signal 
dafür gegeben, die Wiedervereinigung nach Artikel 23 des Grundgesetzes zu vollenden. 
Das war für mich das allerwichtigste Ergebnis dieser Wahl. Und ich war ganz stolz dar-
auf.597 
 The majority of studies on the MESU attach a great deal of importance to this union of (West 
German) political resolve and positive (East German) popular response. Yet other factors 
paved the way for the MESU treaty and would determine the final form it was to take. The 
fact, for instance, that the prosperous Federal Republic of Germany clearly enjoyed a position 
of strength and was successful in imposing its views on the GDR government during the pre-
liminary talks and negotiations or as seen in the conversion of West German economic and 
social actors, including the trade unions and the employers’ associations, to the chancellor’s 
plan. In fact, many indicators would suggest that the implementation of the MESU required 
the participation of the West German social partners. This hypothesis shall be further devel-
oped in the upcoming pages. 
A recent book by historian Gerhard A. Ritter confirms the importance of social policy and 
labor law in Helmut Kohl's unification plan.598 The addition of the social component was de-
signed to prevent pauperization and secure the acceptance of the new system among the East 
German population.  
Die soziale Flankierung der Einheit betraf vor allem die Arbeitsmarktpolitik und das 
System der sozialen Sicherung. Durch eine starke Expansion der aktiven Arbeitsmarkt-
politik, die zeitweise über zwei Millionen Erwerbstätige im Osten Deutschlands erfass-
te, versuchte man den wirtschaftlichen Umbruch abzufedern, einen «Dammbruch», eine 
«beschäftigungspolitische Katastrophe», die zu einem sozialen Flächenbrand in den 
neuen Bundesländern hätte führen können, zu verhindern. Die Übertragung des relativ 
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großzügigen bundesdeutschen Systems der sozialen Sicherung sollte einer Verarmung 
der Bevölkerung entgegenwirken und die Akzeptanz der neuen Ordnung sichern.599 
Ritter shows in his study the determination of the Chancellor, the Federal Ministry for Labor 
and Social Affairs, the DGB unions, the social-democratic opposition and the totality of East 
German political parties to proceed to a one-step throrough institutional extension of the West 
German labor law in the GDR. The opposition of some economic forces, mainly in the bank-
ing and financial sectors, did not weigh much against this resolve. Granted with an extensive 
access to closed archives, also from the DGB, Ritter re-enacte how the institutional extension 
of West Germany's labor and social laws in the GDR was carried out. The process he depicts 
is highly political, in the sense that his attention is grabbed by meetings and discussions be-
tween the chancellery, the federal labor ministry, and the East german government. Yet, he 
shows that DGB unions and BDA employers' associations were also associated to the deci-
sion-making processes regarding the extension of the labor and social laws to the GDR. 
Before Ritter's book, detailed information as to the participation of other actors, e.g. the West 
German social partners, was not available. Ritter's hypotheses on the consequence of labor 
and social issues in the reunification is very similar to the one developed in these pages. Un-
fortunately, his 550-page study was published only a few weeks after this work had been 
completed, at a moment where it was no longer possible to discuss it appropriately in this 
context. The following account was thus written without recourse to this book. Gerhard A. 
Ritter would probably agree with parts of the argument developed in these pages, especially 
with the role of Chancellor Kohl behind the participation of the DGB unions and BDA em-
ployers' associations to the institutional extension of the West German labor and social sys-
tems in the GDR. However, Gerhard A. Ritter would probably object to the author of this pa-
per, that the focus on the ratification of the tripartite consensus centers too much on the 
chancellery and the West German social partners and fails to acknowledge the specific role of 
Norbert Blüm, the Federal Minsister for Labor and Social Affairs. 
3.6.2 Establishing West German tripartite consensus? 
Although they do not explicitly make such arguments, the document collections of the chan-
cellery and the labor ministry, as well as the study by Dieter Grossersuggest the West German 
government, trade unions and employers’ associations reached an agreement by consensus in 
favor of Chancellor Kohl’s plan for a MESU. This would take place before the East German 
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elections of March 18, 1990, hence notwithstanding the consultation with the East German 
population. This consensus took the form of an informal agreement for the tripartite manage-
ment of the East German economic, political and social crisis by West German actors . The 
meaning of the term agreement is in this case twofold: 1) more abstractly relating to an ex-
plicit acknowledgement by these actors of their responsibility to resolve the East German cri-
sis and 2) more concretely in reference to the official announcement, in the form of a joint 
declaration by the DGB and the BDA, stating their intended course of action.  
In a nutshell, the consensus involved the transfer of the FRG’s framework for industrial rela-
tions to the GDR, as a precondition for the immediate entry of the West German social part-
ners on the East German scene. Their role consisted of overseeing, industry by industry, en-
terprise by enterprise (by way of management and works council), the reorganization of work, 
the ratification of collective bargaining agreements, as well as the reconfiguration of wage 
structures, the technical guidelines on dismissals and redundancy packages, and programs for 
vocational training. The MESU treaty introduced a legal framework, whereby its implementa-
tion was left to the West German collective bargaining partners.600 Hence, among the many 
implications, this consensus granted West German collective bargaining organizations a key 
role in achieving economic and social union, the core issue in German reunification. 
Some political scientists have described the first collective bargaining sessions held in eastern 
Germany at the beginning of the 1990s as corporatist in nature.601 Their insistence on adopt-
ing the shared objectives and strategies of the (West) German state and collective bargaining 
organizations during the first years of the 1990s indicate that relations were, without being 
totally void of tension, largely consensual in nature. Surprisingly, questions as to why corpo-
ratist agreements were allowed to be made, and when mutual relations between West German 
actors were initially established have not always received due attention by such scholars. 
Experts in industrial relations have underlined, for their part, the key role played by West 
German labor and employers’ organizations in the process of economic transformation in 
eastern Germany during the 1990s.602 They did not however answer the question on how 
these organizations came to assume such important functions in the reunification process.  
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This chapter attempts to shed light on a little noticed episode in the history of German reunifi-
cation: consensus building between the West German government and the collectiove bar-
gaining partners on the issue of achieving MESU. It seeks to provide details on why and how 
this consensus had formed between labor and employers’ associations during the weeks of 
February 6, to March 9, 1990. It aims at highlighting the implications of this consensus for the 
DGB unions. It finally considers what the answers to these questions tell us about how Ger-
man unity was achieved. As dates are central to the discussion here, a chronology is provided 
in the appendix. 
3.6.3 Convincing people to stay in the GDR: A new strategy for unity  
The history of the MESU is examined in this chapter from a West German perspective. In 
other words, East German and international considerations are explicitly excluded from the 
following exposé, for the sake of clarity and conciseness in presentation. The addition of other 
factors and levels of political activity might further refine the argument being put forth here, 
but it is my belief that it would not significantly alter it. 
3.6.3.1 The Federal Chancellery's evolving position on the question of unity 
A report from the FRG’s Permanent Representation in East Berlin, written at the beginning of 
December 1989, concluded: “Right now the power resides in the streets in the GDR”.603 
When Helmut Kohl went to Dresden on December 19 for his first visit to the GDR since the 
beginning of the revolution, he could genuinely sense the truth in these words. What he saw 
made a very strong impression on him. The collapse of state power, the half-hearted nature of 
the reforms being implemented and the desperate state of the economy led him to the belief 
that the flow of migrants headed for West Germany was unlikely to stop. In Kohl’s opinion, 
the East German people needed reasons to stay in the GDR. They needed to believe that their 
general situation – mainly in terms of their standard of living – would improve rapidly. This, 
he thought, demanded a realignment of his government’s political and economical strategy on 
the GDR. 
This realignment was twofold. Firstly, on the political level, West Germany decided to speed 
up the timetable on reunification. According to his memoirs, Helmut Kohl told his political 
staffupon departure from Dresden airport on December 19, 
                                                 
603 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, document 114, “Fernschreiben des Staatssekretärs Bertele an Bundesminister Sei-
ters”, December 7, 1989. 
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Ich glaube wir schaffen die Einheit. Das läuft. Ich glaube, das ist nicht mehr aufzuhal-
ten, die Menschen wollen das. Das Regime ist definitiv am Ende.604  
For Helmut Kohl, there could be little doubt, in spite of the fact that rapid reunification had to 
appear to come from the streets, it had to be initiated and managed by the federal government. 
Given the high level of social upheaval in the GDR, it was quite risky to give the appearance  
of trying to channel the protest, but Helmut Kohl wanted to make sure that the East German 
revolution had as its end result the integration of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. 
Kohls Strategie beruht auf zwei Leitgedanken. Einerseits muss er alles zu tun [sic], [um] 
die Entwicklung voranzubringen. Es darf jedoch nicht der Eindruck entstehen, als sei er 
die treibende Kraft. Vielmehr muss für alle überzeugend sein, dass es nicht die Bundes-
regierung ist, die auf die Wiedervereinigung drängt. Reinen Gewissens vermag Kohl 
nur dann Druck auszuüben, wenn er sagen kann, dass dieser nicht ursächlich von ihm 
selbst, sondern von den Leuten auf der Strasse in der DDR ausgeht. Andererseits darf 
der Umwälzungsprozess erst zu einem gewissen Abschluss kommen, wenn die Wieder-
vereinigung erreicht ist. Die Bundesregierung muss also dafür sorgen, die „Revolution 
unvollendet“ zu halten und „unblütig“ dazu.605 
Secondly, on the economic level, the federal chancellery became active in its pursuit of ways 
for West German private capitals to enter and invest in the GDR. The question of “how bil-
lions of DM could flow into the GDR in a short period of time?” had become the main topic 
of discussion in Bonn.606 “I am convinced that an economic boom can only take place if the 
general conditions on the ground are right,” declared Helmut Kohl at the conference of the 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce from Low Saxony. Investors must have confidence that 
they are making good use of their investment resources and that they will be profitable.”607 In 
order to establish whether the conditions for massive private investments existed in the GDR, 
the head of the chancellery, Rudolf Seiters, met on January 9, 1990 with 14 economic experts 
from the federal chancellery, several ministries, banks and industry in order to establish whe-
ther the conditions for massive private investments were now in place.608  
The observations shared in this discussion gave the experts little reason for optimism: the 
conditions for direct investment by West German investors were not in place at the current 
                                                 
604 Kohl 2005, p. 1028. 
605 Introduction by Hanns Jürgen Küsters: Ibid, p. 77. The quotes are taken from Schäuble 1991, p. 5 [sic: p. 23: 
“Die Revolution unvollendet halten, unblutig halten, weil nur so war der Sache der Einheit zu dienen war – der 
Leitgedanke bestimmte auch mein Verhalten gegenüber der Ost-CDU”]. 
606 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, p. 71, 80. 
607 Speech held on January 12, 1990. Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung vom 18.1.1990, quo-
ted in: Von Plato 2003, p. 328. 
608 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Gespräch des Chefs des Bundeskanzleamtes Seiters mit Wirtschaftsexperten”, 
January 9, 1990, document 137. 
 248
time; reliable information on the state of the East German currency and debt was not availa-
ble; the lack of adequate instruments of monetary policy created the risk of inflation; five dif-
ferent exchange rates between the East and West German Mark existed609; the DM was likely 
to become a parallel currency and the nature of the monetary policy adopted by the East Ger-
man government was still impossible to predict; prices, and more crucially, the system of pri-
ce formation were still pending reform; the arrival of old-age pensioners by the thousands in 
the FRG was expected to continue unless retirement pensions increased.610 The common as-
sumptions were that the economic reforms were insufficient and implemented too slowly, that 
the enterprises should be granted greater autonomy and, finally, that no one seemed willing or 
able to take the necessary steps in the GDR.  
The experts remained realistic on what could be hoped for. In the opinion of State Secretary 
von Würzen, one could not expect to achieve comprehensive price reform and total freedom 
of investments in a short term. He recalled that they had not been implemented in West Ger-
many in one fell swoop in 1945 either. The head of the German Industry and Trade Conferen-
ce (DIHT) suggested that one should determine who among the East German opposition acti-
vists were the most “economically responsible”, and attempt to make them spokespersons, or 
“conveyors”, as he termed it, of a “better” economic policy. Was there any opposition group 
with a concept on introducing market economy reforms, however rudimentary, replied a skep-
tical State Secretary Tegtmeier?611  
Tegtmeier's doubts were confirmed two weeks later, when Rudolf Seiters met with the repre-
sentatives from the East German opposition groups at a round table discussion in East Ber-
lin.612 All of the parties expressed reservations about the economic programs set forth by Sei-
ters. Many participants complained that the discussions were dominated by economic issues 
and ignored the social implications.613 Studies confirm the existence of a strong social com-
ponent in all economic programs developed by the East German opposition in 1989-1990.614  
                                                 
609 Among them, 1:1 and 1:5 in the currency funds; 1:3 in the private transport sector; 1:4,4 was also used, to 
which different rates freely determined in other kinds of exchanges must be added. Ibid., p. 691.  
610 State Secretary Tegtmeier from the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs underlined that the average 
East German pension was of 400 to 500 Ostmark per month, whereas the West German average amounted to 
20,000 DM p.a.. About 100,000 new pensioners thus resulted in 2 billions DM of extra public spending. Ibid., p. 
693. 
611 “Sts Dr. Tegtmeier fragt später zu diesem Fragenkomplex, ob es überhaupt Gruppen gebe, die ein halbwegs 
geschlossenes Marktwirtschaftskonzept kennen und vertreten wollen”. Idem. 
612 The Round Table was the name given to the unelected East German government led by SED head Hans Mod-
row; this also included the participation of opposition groups. 
613 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Gespräch des Bundesministers Seiters mit Vertretern des Runden Tischs”, January 
25, 1990, document 146.  
614 Roesler 2002; Zatlin 1994. 
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Many of the reforms called for by the federal chancellery had been launched by the East 
German government during the second half of January.615 By the end of the month, however, 
the situation had not stabilized in the GDR; if anything it was worsening. In conversations 
with a group of chancellery representatives, Hans Modrow portrayed a country plagued by 
strikes, violence and loss of state control. 
MP Modrow zeichnete ein düsteres Bild von der inneren Lage der DDR. Er wies auf 
den Verfall der staatlichen Autorität, übergreifende Streikbewegungen und die Gefahr 
von Gewaltanwendung bei inneren Auseinandersetzungen hin. Er warb nachdrücklich 
um Unterstützung von unserer Seite duch positive Signale und auch durch konkrete 
wirtschaftliche/finanzielle Hilfe; hierzu übergab er eine Liste mit Wünschen. (…) 
Die Entwicklung im Lande führe in zunehmendem Maβe zu Instabilität, die sich jetzt 
auch an der Basis, auf der Kommunalebene, bemerkbar mache. Entscheidungen und 
Überlegungen müβten ständig aus der Notwendigkeit des Tages getroffen werden. (…) 
Die Kräfte am Runden Tisch hätten auf die Entwicklung im Lande keinen Einfluβ mehr. 
Das gelte für die Vorgänge vom 15. Januar sowie für die Demonstrationen in Leip-
616zig.  
617
 re-
forms than they were in making the shift to a position of openly promoting it themselves.  
3.6.3.2 The new strategy: Rapid monetary and economic union 
for post-election negotiations.618 In order to achieve this, a “proper roadmap” for achieving 
                                                
In the meantime, the East German government and the Round Table had also agreed on the 
principle of reunification and, as an attempt to stabilize the collapse of state power, agreed to 
reschedule theMay 6 elections for March 18. However, contrary to Hans Modrow’s expecta-
tions, this convergence of positions of the two states was not greeted in Bonn as an incentive 
to greater collaboration. The former uncertainties hampering the implementation of the fede-
ral government’s roadmap were now vanishing.  For one thing, Helmut Kohl and his advi-
sers were less concerned about finding East German actors to promote their program for
A note, dated January 29, prompted Chancellor Kohl to use the newfound consensus on the 
goals reached between the two German governments to take the initiative and set the agenda 
 
615 These measures were presented to the Federal State Secretaries  to a positive reception on January 24, 1990 
(Ebenda, document 142).    
616 Bundeskanzelramt 1998, “Gespräch des Bundesministers Seiters mit Ministerpräsident Modrow”, January 25, 
1990, document 147. The West-Berlin Senator Pfarr made a similar portray: Ebenda, “Deutschlandpolitisches 
Gespräch bei dem Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes Seiters”, January 24, 1990, document 142. 
617 Kohl 2005, p. 1057 and 1064; Schäuble 1991, p. 24. 
618 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Aufzeichnung des Ministerialdirigenten Hartmann”, January 29, 1990, document 
151. The author indicated that SPD MPs shared the same positions.  
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unity had to be tabled no later than the beginning of March, the note suggested.619 This plan 
should introduce a “policy of grand measures”, thus skipping certain stages of the convergen-
ce process initially envisaged in the chancellor’s ten-point plan from November 28, 1989. 
Some elements of this strategy proposed to the chancellor did not influence the course he 
would eventually take. The January 29 note is nevertheless highly informative on the objecti-
ves guiding the chancellery’s actions at the end of January 1990: setting up a plan for accele-
rated reunification; taking control over the negotiations by making this plan public before the 
election of a new government in the GDR; the priority given to monetary, economic and so-
cial issues over political unity.  
Die entscheidende Frage der nächsten Jahre wird sein, wie schnell es gelingt, mit der 
DDR eine Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion herzustellen, die den Bedingungen in bei-
den deutschen Staaten gerecht wird. Ebenso wichtig wird die schrittweise Anpassung 
der Sozialsysteme sein. Hierzu könnten grundsätzliche Aussage getroffen werden, wo-
bei es auch erforderlich sein wird, sich auf den ordnungspolitischen Rahmen festzulegen 
(“sozial verpflichtete Marktwirtschaft”). 
The note left little doubt that, from the federal government’s perspective, reunification signi-
fied the extension of its legal, political and economic systems. In order to bring pressure to 
bear on the future East German government, the note recommended that the government sign 
off with its international allies, and even the Soviet Union, on the outline of this agenda prior 
to opening negotiations. 
The “economic reconstruction of the GDR” was again indicated as the top priority in the for-
thcoming negotiations in a draft proposal presented to the chancellor three days later.620 This 
proposal contained the key points of Kohl’s roadmap for unity ("Proposal to the GDR Lea-
dership on Opening Negotiations on Monetary Union and Economic Reform") formally pre-
sented on February 6. When Helmut Kohl met Hans Modrow in Davos on February 3, he used 
the occasion to set out his government’s new strategy had been determined. With the East 
German head of state describing the political situation as catastrophic and trying to persuade 
his counterpart in Bonn to work together to reverse it, Helmut Kohl agreed that some drastic 
                                                 
619 The note specified “before the reappearance of Oskar Lafontaine” on the federal political scene. The head of 
the Saarland SPD was in all probability going to win the May elections in this Land and was critical of any plan 
for rapid reunification. 
620 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Vorlage des Regierungsdirektors Mertes an Bundeskanler Kohl”, February 2, 1990, 
document 157. 
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steps were required before the elections, but he did not go so far as to inform Modrow of the 
nature of the measures he had decided to undertake.621  
The roadmap, announced on February 6, 1990, attempted to resolve two interrelated issues: 
the collapse of state authority in the GDR and the stream of East German migrants to the Fe-
deral Republic of Germany. According to the basic principle underlining the roadmap, the 
flow could only be stemmed through private capital, but potential West German investors 
were still put off by the economic and social conditions on the ground, as well as the lack of 
sufficient economic reforms undertaken in the GDR. The roadmap had the aim of establishing 
the legal framework within which West German capital could begin flowing into eastern 
Germany immediately. For the federal government, the next step consisted of mobilizing 
West German actors to assist in implementing this roadmap. 
3.6.4 Assembling West German runners at the starting line: The course of 
the Federal Chancellery from February 6 to March 18, 1990.  
Many, even within Helmut Kohl’s government, were caught off guard by his extension of an 
invitation to the East German government on February 6 to negotiate “monetary union with 
accompanying economic reforms”. On the same day, the Federal Minister for Economic Af-
fairs, Helmut Hausmann, had published a plan drafted by his office. It envisaged a three-stage 
economic and monetary union, which was to be fully implemented by January 1993. In an 
attempt to accelerate the process and achieve monetary union at the beginning of the reform 
process rather than at the end, the government had unexpectedly reversed course on its strate-
gy, which represented an about-face even within the cabinet. The ministers nevertheless bo-
wed to the argument that even if a “gradual process within a longer timeframe would be pre-
ferable”, the continuous stream of migrants heading west and the ongoing collapse of state 
authority in the GDR made immediate resolute actions “unavoidable”. They therefore granted 
approval to the chancellor’s new course of action that same day.622 
A re-calibration of the ratio of wages to productivity in the GDR was central to achieving 
monetary and economic union. Finance Minister Theo Waigel explicitly made this point in a 
letter to the CDU’s parliamentary group on February 7. To attain this goal, productivity rates, 
estimated by experts at about 50% of their West German counterparts, needed to improve. To 
                                                 
621 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Gespräch des Bundeskanzlers Kohl mit Ministerpräsident Modrow”, February 3, 
1990, document 158. 
622 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Vermerk des Regierungsdirektors Nehring”, February 6, 1990, document 163. 
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mobilize billions of German Marks, West German private investors needed assurances on the 
legal status and economic conditions faced by East German enterprises. Among the precondi-
tions for private investments, Theo Waigel named free collective bargaining. 
4. Eine Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion setzt ein gemeinsames ordnungspolitisches 
Fundament voraus. Die Einzelheiten hierzu sind bekannt: Herstellung von Märkten, 
freie Preise, Dominanz des Privateigentums an den Produktionsmitteln, freier Auβen-
handel, Gewerbefreiheit und Rechtsschutz, freie Tarifvertragsparteien, ein leistungsfä-
higes Steuersystem.  
5. (…) [Die Mobilisierung von Privatkapital] wiederum setzt einen ausreichenden In-
vestititionsschutz und möglichst liberale Bedingungen für ein Engagement westlicher 
Investoren voraus.623 
According to government plans, the setting of wages, the establishment of minimum working 
conditions and provisions on redundancy agreements and vocational training were left to the 
collective bargaining organizations. In other words, if they were to be implemented, the mo-
netary and economic union required the participation of negotiating parties who (1) accepted 
this legal and economic framework; and (2) were able to immediately assume the duties im-
parted on them within this framework. 
3.6.4.1 The reaction of the West German economic actors to the chancellor’s plan   
To paraphrase the Frankfurter Rundschau’s front page headline from February 9, 1990: the 
vast majority of economic actors in the Federal Republic of Germany rejected monetary 
union. The head of the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen In-
dustrie), Tyll Necker, claimed that monetary union would allow East Germany to attain a le-
vel of prosperity comparable to West Germany within a short period of time.624 The Bundes-
bank’s president, Karl-Otto Pöhl, expressed grave doubt on its chances of success. The 
German Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) dee-
med Kohl’s roadmap “counterproductive” and “incapable of stemming the flow of migrants”. 
The institute felt that monetary and economic union would most probably lead to an increase 
in unemployment rates in both countries and that East German enterprises could likely not 
survive direct international competition without an initial transition period during which they 
would be afforded protection.625  
                                                 
623 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Währungsunion mit Wirtschaftsreform”, February 7, 1990, document 165B. 
624 Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 9, 1990, quoted in: Vilmar/Guittard 1999, p. 23. 
625 “DIW-Präsident: Die von Bonn gewollte Einheitswährung ist kontraproduktiv”,  Frankfurter Rundschau, 
February 10, 1990. 
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The Dresdner Bank challenged the chancellor’s rationale for monetary union and stressed that 
GDR’s debts were not unbearably high and that, although not “strong”, the Ostmark was cer-
tainly far from being the “weakest currency”.626 International financial circles had concerns 
about the stability of the DM due to the immense costs involved with monetary union and 
reforming the East German economy.627 In a letter to the chancellor, the head of the Council 
of Economic Advisors (the so-called Five Wise Men) challenged the government’s position 
on several key points: 1) monetary union prior to economic reform would not stop the flow of 
migration due to the large number of bankruptcies that would certainly result from it; 2) a 
common currency was likely to highlight the differences in wages and produce claims for pay 
rises, thereby creating the risk of wages outpacing productivity.628 The Confederation of 
German Employers' Associations did not take an official stance but left, as in many cases, it to 
the Federation of German Industries to criticize the government’s policies.629 
The DGB unions did not criticize Kohl’s proposal to the same extent that those in the indus-
trial, banking and finance sectors did. Six press statements on the GDR and the German reuni-
fication published by the DGB between February 7 and 15, instead suggest that the proposal 
compelled the West German trade unions to reconsider their strategy. The most remarkable 
feature of these six declarations is without doubt how they managed to remain silent on 
Bonn’s roadmap and did not take a stance on the issue.630 The declarations from February 7, 
8, 9 and 13, made absolutely no mention of Kohl’s proposal.631 On February 14, the DGB 
harshly criticized the federal government for it refusal to deliver immediate assistance of 15 
billions DM as requested by the 17 ministers at the round table discussions, but it did not take 
a position on the overall agenda pursued by Bonn.632 Whatever the reason may have been for 
this, whether intentional or not, it can be interpreted as a gradual and passive acceptance of 
Bonn’s agenda on the part of the DGB unions. 
These six press statements reveal the DGB’s two main priorities. One was to incorporate a 
social component into monetary and economic union. This objective was in line with Kohl’s 
                                                 
626 Leipziger Volkszeitung, February 21, 1990, quoted in: Zatlin 1994, p. 73. 
627 “Hält die D-Mark die Währungsunion aus?”, Die tageszeitung, February 14, 1990. 
628 Bundeskanzleramt 1998, “Schreiben des Sachverständigenrats zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung, Schneider, an Bundeskanzler Kohl”, February 9, 1990, document 168. 
629 The previous chapter has shown that the Confederation of German Employers' Associations rapidly evolved 
toward the government's positions after February 6. 
630 DGB unions have no further reaction to Bonn’s roadmap in those days; nor did the DGB.   
631“DGB fordert umfangreiche Soforthilfen für die DDR und Kurswechsel in der Finanzpolitik”, February 7, 
1990; “Geuenich: Es muβ einen gesamtdeutschen Tisch geben”, February 8, 1990; “Breit: Deustche Lösung nur 
im europäischen Rahmen möglich”, February 9, 1990; “Dialog DGB/ZDH fortgesetzt”, February 13, 1990. The 
DGB press statement quoted in this and the next six footnotes are from: DGB Nachrichten-Dienst 1991.  
632 “DGB: Wirtschaftliche und soziale Risiken der Währungsunion abfangen”, February 14, 1990. 
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roadmap, as it took the form of a roadmap+, in DGB's press statements. One aspect of this 
social component as identified by, the DGB was the establishment of social welfare programs 
for the unemployed, the retired and the “socially disadvantaged”; immediate aid valued at 15 
billions of DM; a public fund for modernizing the East German infrastructure and environ-
mental protection. The DGB also called for the introduction of the freedom of association, 
collective bargaining autonomy and co-determination rights in the GDR, plus the establish-
ment of a strong, free trade union movement.633 The second priority of the DGB was also 
compatible with Kohl's roadmap as it entailed the "coordinated involvement" of West German 
economic actors in stopping the flood of migrants to the Federal Republic of Germany. To 
reach this goal, the DGB called on governments, employers and trade unions to act in unison 
to find solutions to the most urgent social problems in the GDR. 
Zur Lösung dieser “auβerordentlich komplizierten Fragen” schlug Geuenich “die Ein-
richtung eines deutsch-deutschen Tisches, spätestens nach dem Wahltag in der DDR am 
18. März” vor. An einem solchen Tisch müssten die entscheidende Kräfte beider Teile 
Deutschlands gemeinsam versuchen, die Entwicklung in den Griff zu bekommen. Und 
diese entscheidende Kräfte seien die Regierungen, das Unternehmerlagen und die Ge-
werkschaften, sagte Geuenich.634  
A first step in coordinating the actions of the West German economic actors as requested by 
the DGB occurred with the publication of a declaration by the DGB and the German Confede-
ration of Skilled Crafts (Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH) on February 13. 
This declaration stated that political change in the GDR would be marked by the introduction 
of some form of a social market economy. 
Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) und der Zentralverband des Deutschen 
Handwerks (ZDH) sind sich darin einig, dass die politischen Reformen in der DDR mit 
einem wirtschaftlichen Strukturwandel hin zu einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft verbunden 
sein müssen.635 
By mid-February, the DGB was on the way to adopting the basic outline of Bonn's agenda as 
its own. At that time, however, it was still opposed to the legal extension of the West German 
labor law in its current state without improvements, although the confederation did not speci-
fy what type of improvements it wanted.636 Contrary to the federal chancellor, the DGB also 
maintained a certain degree of ambivalence on the issue of the total timeframe for the German 
                                                 
633 Idem; “DGB fordert umfangreiche Soforthilfen für die DDR und Kurswechsel in der Finanzpolitik”; “Blättel: 
Marktwirtschaft in der DDR nur mit sozialer Komponente”, February 15, 1990. 
634 “Geuenich: Es muβ eine gesamtdeutschen Tisch geben”. 
635 “Dialog DGB/ZDH fortgesetzt”. 
636 I.e., its criticism of the West German Handwerksordnung and its rejection of the ZDH transfer proposal in the 
GDR. Idem. 
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reunification process. On several occasions, Ernst Breit continued to press for a slow ap-
proach, something the federal government had rejected. 
“Auch für uns ist eine Vertragsgemeinschaft zwischen der DDR und der Bundesrepu-
blik eine politische Perspektive, die eines Tages vielleicht auch zu föderativen Struktu-
ren führen kann”, sagte Breit.637   
These were minor differences between its position and the federal government’s course. One 
Press statement published by the DGB in the weeks following the announcement of Bonn’s 
roadmap suggest the organization waspassively accepting it. A shift in position was occurring 
which would soon lead the DGB unions to act in concert with the FRG government and em-
ployers’ associations on the issue of the transfer of the institutions and practices of industrial 
relations to the GDR.  
3.6.4.2 Negotiations between German governments: Ensuring the extension of the labor 
law 
Helmut Kohl’s invitation to open negotiations on monetary and economic union was viewed 
by the East German government for exactly what it was: an attempt to seize the initiative be-
fore the March elections and to mobilize West German private capital.638 During a visit to 
Bonn on 13-14 February, Hans Modrow made an unsuccessfully bid to pressure  Helmut Kohl 
into immediately opening negotiations on the terms of the monetary union. This would provi-
de him the opportunity to acquire a degree of legitimacy for his government, with a view to-
wards the upcoming elections. The federal chancellery’s refusal to ascent to this request and 
open the negotiations with an un-elected government found its corollary in the active effort to 
persuade West Germans and other parties to support its reunification proposal.639 This effort 
was directed toward West Germany’s international allies such as the United States, France 
and Europe, as well as the Soviet Union. It was also geared towards a number of West Ger-
man institutions and organizations, e.g., trade unions and employers’ organizations.640 When 
defining the weeks from February 6 to March 18 as a period of “internal preparations” in 
                                                 
637 “Breit: Deutsche Lösung nur im europäischen Rahmen möglich”. 
638 Grosser 1998, pp. 199-202. 
639 As we will see, this public refusal to open negotiations with the Modrow government should be taken with a 
grain of salt, as the “Experts Discussions on the Implementation of Monetary Union” between the two 
 governments took place from February 20 to March 13. These meetings, which preceded the East German elec-
tions, were crucial to the process of ratifying the Monetary, Economic and Social Union. See: Grosser 1998, pp. 
209-224.  
640 On February 9, the Federal government could be certain the Länder (the majority of which were under SPD 
leadership) supported its course of action. The president of the Bundesbank, Karl Otto Pöhl, also kept his criti-
cisms to himself after February 7.   
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West Germany, Dieter Grosser is speaking of the intense activity within the West German 
state structures to pressurize the Länder to accept reunification. The meetings and talks with 
trade unions and employers’ associations, held during those weeks, can also be included as 
part of these “internal preparations”. 
Let us now consider how the “social union” was added to the initial plan for “monetary and 
economic union”. This initiative had its origins within the federal government.  
The Cabinet Committee on German Unity (Kabinettausschuβ Deutsche Einheit) held its first 
session on February 7 and was chaired by Kohl. The Federal Ministry for Labor and Social 
Affairs was party to this committee, and it was charged with the task of planning the exten-
sion of the West German welfare system to East Germany. Previous meetings between civil 
servants from this ministry and their East German counterparts had been used by the former to 
argue for the adoption of the same structures for its welfare system by the former. Their goal 
had been to preserve the West German structures.641 Now that the federal government had 
seized the initiative on reunification, exerting influence over East German decision-makers 
had become secondary in importance, while efforts to draw up plans on extension were now 
at the top of the agenda. When the Cabinet Committee met on February 14, a Working Group 
on the Labor and Social Affairs (Arbeitsgruppe Angleichung der Arbeits- und Sozialordnung) 
was created and given until March 6 to detail any problems likely to hinder the rapid exten-
sion of the West German welfare system. 
When the 17 ministers of the Round Table met the head of the chancellery, Rudolf Seiters, on 
February 13 and 14, they announced their intention of introducing a social charter in the 
GDR. This charter, listing East German citizens’ social rights, was to be basis of negotiation 
for the GDR in talks with West Germany on monetary, economic and social union.  
Intense discussions between representatives of the Round Table, opposition activists and West 
German lawyers, and specialists in labor and social law (such as Professor Stephan Leibfried 
from the Bremen University) on the first weekend in March led to the drafting of the Social 
Charter. It took the form of a list of rights (Ansprüche), as time constraints did not allow them 
to produce a more universal document.  
                                                 
641 “Es galt von vornherein, die eigene Position gegenüber möglichen Veränderungen als Folge deutsch-
deutscher Entwicklungen zu behaupten und zu sichern. Was über Jahrzehnte hingewachsen und sozialpolitisch 
immer wieder bestätigt worden war - wenn auch meistens im Streit! -, sollte auf dem Umweg über die DDR 
nicht gefährdet, ja, nicht einmal im Wortsinne „in Frage gestellt“ werden können. Diese Haltung war überwie-
gend in den bezwingenden Charme scheinbar uneigennütziger Hilfe gekleidet, entsprach aber im übrigen ledig-
lich den gegebenen Wettbewerbsbedigungen in der Bundesrepublik.” Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozia-
lordnung 1994, p. 28. 
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The charter contained numerous clauses relating to labor and made multiple references to the 
European Social Charter and ILO declarations. The East German labor code (Arbeitsgesetz-
buch) also served as template for those drafting the document. The charter’s first article, for 
instance, proclaimed the “right to work”. The right to work was intended as a universal right 
and called for an active state policy on employment, guarantees on collective bargaining au-
tonomy, as well as the right to strike, the prohibition of lock-outs, and pledges of further vo-
cational training programs. Allowances were also made for the refusal of work overtime and 
restricting the normal workweek to 40 hours. The second article advocated company-financed 
kindergartens and holiday resorts. Without specific reference to the GDR – in fact, many 
clauses echoed the DGB unions’ program, many provisions to the Social Charter were rooted 
in labor’s experience in its own country. They aimed at preserving rights deemed legitimate 
and likely to ensure better protection for workers against the negative impact of economic 
reform. 
The strong “social” aspect of the Social Charter was dismissed by the East German Chamber 
of the People, which rejected the document. During the final session on March 7, the mem-
bers of the Chamber merely approved the principle (Grundlinie) of the Social Charter and 
ratified 22 positions (Standpunkte) that should serve as a guideline in further deliberations by 
the next government. Even if some of the principles listed in the Charter would continue to be 
part of the catalogue of demands put forward by the East German government in the coming 
months (e.g., the ban on lock-outs), the Social Charter project had de facto been abandoned. 
Many East German MPs had refused to ratify claims they felt were unlikely to  the Federal 
government to cooperate with the East German government to achieve reunification.642 
These concerns were well-founded. The shelving of the Social Charter, however, would in no 
way prevent the federal government from doing just that. Aside from a few caustic remarks to 
the press, the entire West German political class remained silent on both the project and the 
diplomatic rejection of the Social Charter by the Chamber of the People.  
Wer in Bonn nach Spuren der DDR-Sozialcharta forscht, tut das vergebens. Im Bundes-
kanzleramt ist amtlich nichts erfaβt, im Deutschen Bundestag ebenfalls nichts – gar 
nicht zu reden von der Gemeinsamen Verfassungskommission.643 
                                                 
642 Gerd Poppe revealed that the East German government wondered whether the Round Table had not “lost its 
mind” after perusing the draft proposal of the Social Charter. Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 
1994, pp. 34-35. 
643 Ibid., p. 35; Grosser 1998, p. 210. 
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The refusal by the West German political class and the unions to address the issue of the So-
cial Charter was not only an attempt to drain the life out of the budding East German initiati-
ves deemed incompatible with the legal extension approved by Bonn. It also signified the 
transfer of authority, orchestrated by the chancellery, over the political developments in the 
GDR. 
A new step in this direction was taken on February 20, with the first Experts Discussions on 
Preparing for Monetary Union (Erstes Expertengespräch zur Vorbereitung der Währungsu-
nion) between the two German governments. Even if the federal government described them 
merely as preliminary talks prior to future negotiations on monetary and economic union, 
these discussions focused on nothing less than outlining the steps for implementing monetary 
and economic union. The Preliminary Report by the Commission of Experts on Preparations 
on Monetary Union (Zwischenbericht der Expertenkommission zur Vorbereitung der Wä-
hrungsunion) from March 13, adopted the principle of legal extension as the basis of negotia-
tions between both states. This was a victory for the West German delegation.644 
Therefore, a few days before the East German elections, both German states agreed that reuni-
fication would, according to the formula, start with the rapid “monetary and economic union, 
backed up by social measures”. They had also agreed on the principle of extending the West 
German welfare systems to cover the GDR; the details and transition measures still needed to 
be negotiated with the next East German government. They had finally agreed to refrain from 
any political interference or intervention in the collective bargaining process in compliance 
with the West German model of collective bargaining autonomy (Tarifautonomie). Unions 
and employers’ associations were given responsibility for preparing the technical aspects and 
addressing the social impact of the economic reform on the GDR (wage grids, labor proces-
ses, employment and dismissal, vocational training).  
With the Preliminary Report, the West German delegation had succeeded in instigating the 
reunification process along the basic contours of the February 6 roadmap prior to the March 
18 East German elections. The two delegations had not yet reached accord on all matters. The 
delays in implementation were among the contentious issues, as Berlin demanded more time 
than Bonn considered necessary. The East German delegation also refused to abandon the law 
on the trade unions and its claim for the right to work.645 Nevertheless, between February 20 
(the First Experts Discussion on Monetary and Economic Union) and March 13 (the Prelimi-
                                                 
644 Grosser 1998, p. 224. 
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nary Report), the federal government had succeeded in imposing its “extension” agenda for 
achieving reunification and, in so doing, had gained the initiative on this issue. 
3.6.4.3 Achieving consensus amongst the West German collective bargaining partners 
There was a major byline to the story of the German-German negotiations. It concerned the 
realignment of the positions held by West German unions and employers to favor the chancel-
lery’s course of action on reunification during this period. Between February 20 and March 9, 
tripartite consensus on the extension of the West German labor law, welfare system and in-
dustrial relations was achieved. 
At 10:00 am on February 20, a few hours before the first experts discussions on the monetary 
and economic union between the two German states, Chancellor Kohl met 16 representatives 
of West German employers and industrial associations, 24 heads of enterprises and banks and 
two trade union leaders at the Federal Chancellery.646 The aim of this 3-hour meeting was to 
determine the nature of the role to be played by these organizations and enterprises in the 
GDR. In his letter of invitation to the president of the BDA, Klaus Murmann, Helmut Kohl 
wrote: 
[D]ie jüngsten Entwicklungen in der DDR fordern auch von uns rasches Handeln. Nur 
so können wir unseren Teil dazu beitragen, dass unsere Landsleute in der DDR wieder 
eine begründete Zukunftsperspektive sehen und in ihrer angestammten Heimat bleiben. 
(...)  
Wir wollen gemeinsam rasch wirkende Möglichkeiten für Direkthilfen und Investitio-
nen zugunsten der DDR erörtern. Angesichts der Dramatik der Entwicklung bitte ich 
Sie um ihre persönliche Teilnahme.647 
After initial widespread rejection of Helmut Kohl’s proposal in economic, industrial and fi-
nancial circles, all parties to the February 20 meeting now stated their willingness to collabo-
rate with the federal government in achieving monetary and economic union. The president of 
the Federation of German Industries, Tyll Nekker, shared with the Kohl government the belief 
                                                 
 
645 In a milder form than the one put forward in the Social Charter, however. On all the Experts discussions and 
Preliminary Report, see: Grosser 1998, pp. 209-224. 
646 I was provided with the list of participants by the BDA archive staff, and it is included in the appendix (copy 
handled to the author by the BDA). 
647 Letter from Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the President of the BDA, Bonn, February 8, 1990 (copy 
given to the author by the BDA). 
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that the East German economy should be reformed mainly by “its own internal forces”, i.e., 
market forces, with state subsidies and financial injections kept to a minimum.648 
For the purpose of this analysis, the position defended by employers’ associations during this 
meeting is crucial. The Confederation of German Employers' Associations petitioned for the 
introduction of free wage formation (an economic mechanism) in the GDR. Its president went 
on to explain that this presupposed collective bargaining autonomy, the formation of em-
ployers’ associations, the freedom of strike and the ban of lock-outs. The employers’ associa-
tions also expressed their preference for extending West German laws on labor to East Ger-
many (employment and dismissal, co-determination, Works Constitution Act) and the 
abandonment of East German labor laws. 
Für die Angleichung der beiden Wirtschaftssystemen zu einer Wirtschafts- und Wäh-
rungsunion seien marktwirtschaftliche Bedingungen nicht nur bei der Preisbildung, 
sondern auch bei der Lohnfindung einzuführen. (...) Die Tarifautonomie sei gesetzlich 
zu verankern. Das bedeute: Unabhängige Arbeitgeber- und Arbeitnehmerorganisationen 
sowie das Recht auf Streik und Aussperrung. Dabei sei ein Gleichgewicht der Kräfte er-
forderlich. 
Niveau und Zuwachs der Löhne müssten sich an den Produktivitätsverhältnissen orien-
tieren. Auch das Recht der Arbeitgeber, Einstellungen und Entlassungen – nach 
Maβstäben des westdeutschen Kündigungsschutzes – vornehmen zu können, sei eine 
notwendige Voraussetzung für Anpassungsfähigkeit der DDR-Wirtschaft und damit für 
ihren Aufschwung. 
Die Mitbestimmung nach dem Arbeitsgesetzbuch der DDR müsse (...) durch das Be-
triebsverfassungsgesetz der Bundesrepublik ersetzt werden.649 
The Confederation of German Employers' Associations finally called for the extension of 
West Germany’s welfare system. In actual fact, the employers' associations were agreeing to 
Bonn’s roadmap in terms more explicit than those still used by the DGB.  
Aside from Ernst Breit, the head of the “white collar” German Employees Union (Deutsche 
Angestellten-Gewerkschaft, DAG), Roland Issen, was the only trade union representative 
present at the Federal Chancellery on February 20. Given the number of entrepreneurs, indus-
trialists and financiers, the absence of more DGB unions’ heads and the Federal Minister for 
Labor and Social Affairs, Norbert Blüm, is indicative of the main object of this meeting, na-
mely to convince the major West German economic actors that Bonn’s roadmap for reunifica-
tion established the necessary preconditions for private investment in the GDR. The declara-
                                                 
648 “DGB verlangt 15 Milliarden für DDR-Sofortprogramm”, Die tageszeitung, February 21, 1990. 
649 PDA [press division of the BDA], “Arbeitgeber zum Wirtschaftsgespräch beim Kanzler: Marktwirtschaftliche 
Bedingungen auch bei Löhnen in der DDR”, February 20, 1990. 
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tion by the Confederation of German Employers' Associations quoted above demonstrates, 
however, that topics relating to the labor law, industrial relations and the welfare system were 
also discussed. The positions put forward by the employers’ association may well have 
convinced union representatives that there was common ground to be found between West 
Germany’s social parties in achieving reunification. 
After the meeting, the DGB insisted on distancing itself somewhat from the federal govern-
ment’s positions. The union confederation renewed its call on the federal government to trans-
fer the payment of promised assistance of 15 billions DM. Talking to journalists, Ernst Breit 
criticized what he called “the lack of strategy” of the federal government when it came to gua-
ranteeing a rise in the quality of life for East German citizens and protection against unem-
ployment. He also criticized the fact that the positions taken by  various organizations, institu-
tions and enterprises present at the meeting had only been voiced, but that it never actually 
came to open debate between those in attendance. The introduction of the market economy 
did not mean a wholesale adoption of the entire “system from the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny” by the GDR, concluded Breit, arguably with the positions of the Confederation of Ger-
man Employers' Associations in mind.650 
Chancellor Kohl emerged from the meeting with a different understanding of the DGB’s posi-
tions than the statements made by Ernst Breit led some journalists to believe. According to 
Kohl’s close associate, Horst Teltschick, Ernst Breit had expressed “constructive ideas”, 
which were by no means in opposition to those of the government. Recalling Helmut Kohl’s 
account of the meeting with the cabinet, Teltschick’s very brief comments in his memoirs 
focus exclusively on the DGB president’s receptiveness to monetary and economic union. 
Obviously Helmut Kohl had been surprised to find the DGB leader was not opposed to his 
plan of action. 
Es sei ungewöhnlich ermutigend verlaufen. DGB-Chef Ernst Breit habe sich sehr kon-
struktiv verhalten. Alle seien überzeugt, dass Tausende von Projekten in Gang kämen, 
wenn erst die Rahmenbedingungen geschaffen seien.651 
In Kohl’s opinion, the DGB was predisposed to implementing his agenda for monetary and 
economic union. However surprised he might have been, the DGB’s press releases from the 
previous two weeks had indicated this willingness. At least two considerations must have 
compelled the chancellor to seek the support and participation of the West German trade un-
                                                 
650 “DGB verlangt 15 Milliarden für DDR-Sofortprogramm”; “Firmen stehen in Startlöchern”, Frankfurter 
Rundschau, February 21, 1990.  
651 Teltschick 1991, p. 154. 
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ions and employers’ associations for his plan. The first related to the multiple roles played by 
these organizations in the operation of the welfare state in West Germany, e.g., through their 
representatives on the boards at the social services department or due to the close connection 
between collective agreements and the financing of the social security system.652 Before the 
February 20 meeting at the chancellery, Labor Minister Norbert Blüm had already made it 
clear that monetary and economic union could only be achieved with the active participation 
of free trade unions and employers’ associations. The following excerpt from an interview can 
be interpreted as a veiled advance to DGB unions and BDA associations to participate in the 
government’s agenda on extension. Norbert Blüm was well aware that no trade unions in the 
GDR, let alone employers’ associations, which were non-existent, were in a position to launch 
and manage such highly complex and technical tasks. 
[R]ichtig ist, dass man ein Zusammenwachsen des Sozialstaates nur organisieren kann, 
wenn auch die Finanz- und Wirtschaftspolitik ordnungsgleich ist. Sie können nicht einer 
sozialistischen Ordnung ein Sozialsystem mit Selbstverwaltung, wie wir es haben, auf-
oktroieren. Da fehlen schon allein die Partner wie freie Gewerkschaften und Arbeitge-
berverbände.653 
The second consideration relates to the “incalculable social risks” associated with implemen-
ting this type of shock therapy on the East German economy.654 In order to bring the standard 
of living in the two Germanies more into line while at the same time maintaining social order, 
monetary and economic union required the participation of established collective bargaining 
partners, closely based on the mechanisms of West German industrial relations and social 
legislation.  
To put it bluntly, for the extension of West Germany’s economic and social system to the 
GDR to work, the participation of the West German unions and employers’ associations was 
absolutely imperative. It was these organizations who would determine the nature and impact 
of the economic reforms, through collective bargaining and the establishment of works coun-
cils at the workplace. 
Besides these two arguments, based on the inherent logic of the chancellery’s course, one 
important stance by DGB head Breit and two official declarations by this organization 
                                                 
652 See: Allen 1997, chapter 13, “Governance and Policy Making”, esp. p. 296. Christopher S. Allen’s explana-
tions are based on: Peter Katzenstein, 1987, Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-
Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). 
653 “Die DDR braucht Aufbau eines Sozialstaates wie in der Bundesrepublik”, Frankfurter Rundschau, February 
10, 1990. 
654 Grosser 1998, p. 199. 
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confirm the alignment of the positions of West German social partners on the agenda of the 
federal government. 
Until the second half of February, the DGB unions supported the restructuring the system for 
defending the interest of East German workers, without itself interfering in the process. The 
March 1990 issue of the DGB monthly, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, published an article 
by Ernst Breit calling for a shift in this strategy.655 All previous reservations should be aban-
doned, the DGB head wrote, in favor of resolute action to build free and independent trade 
unions in the GDR as rapidly as possible. 
Die groβe Frage, auf die es bislang nur kleine leise Antworten gibt, lautet demnach: 
Was kann die Gewerkschaftsbewegung aus eigener Kraft? In der DDR liegt die alte 
Gewerkschaft am Boden. Was an ihre Stelle treten soll, darüber herrscht, zumindest 
dem Arbeitstitel nach, flächendeckende Eintracht vom Rhein bis zur Oder/Neiβe: eine 
freie und unabhängige Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Ihr Entstehungsprozess allerdings 
wurde erstens durch die fatale Konstellation behindert, dass der DGB auf die Aktion der 
Arbeitnehmerschaft der DDR und diese auf das Tätigwerden des FDGB und seiner Ge-
werkschaften wartete. Zum anderen wurde über die Alternative gestritten, ob freie Ge-
werkschaften in der DDR am Ende eines Reformprozesses des FDGB stehen oder nur 
auf dem Wege einer Neugründung gebildet werden können. (p. 130) 
According to the strategy outlined in the excerpt, which prompted them not to make any spe-
cific claims, Ernst Breit now identified several clear objectives for the West German unions in 
the GDR. First, their activities had to acknowledge that reunification was imminent (“At pre-
sent, rejecting reunification can only be viewed as a sectarian politics,” p. 131). Secondly, the 
German union movement had to unify as fast as possible. Thirdly, trade unions had to guaran-
tee a high level of social security for the East German population to go along with economic 
reform.  
Das Rezept der wirtschaftsliberalen Wunderdoktoren, ohne Rücksicht auf soziale Ver-
luste erst einmal die Ökonomie gesunden zu lassen, führt in der Regel zu kranken Ge-
sellschaften und undemokratischen Staaten. Die Marktwirtschaft ist nicht sozial, son-
dern brutal. Marktwirtschaft ohne die Verankerung des Sozialstaates und ohne den 
Ausbau der Demokratie würde die DDR-Bevölkerung vom Regen in die Traufe geraten 
lassen; der erhofften Goldregen bliebe den Kassen der Konzerne vorbehalten. (p. 132) 
Breit justified the need for strategic reorientation on this matter using the argument that quick 
action was demanded to block the plan of the Kohl government. He presented it as economic 
reforms based solely on market forces – i.e., with no social protection, a frightening prospect 
naturally both for the DGB unions and the East German workers. One would search, however, 
                                                 
655 Ernst Breit, “Deutsche Einigung – ohne und gegen die Gewerkschaften?”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 
3/90, pp. 129-132. 
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in vain in this text for any indication of how DGB unions would oppose Bonn’s agenda while 
working, at the same time, towards reunification. This hint of verbal radicalism – DGB 
unions’ involvement was required in order to block the implementation of the “model” and 
“conservative principles” of the federal government - veiled a strategic reorientation which, in 
fact, included collaborating in the putting Helmut Kohl’s reunification plan into place. This 
was done to ensure nothing less than full extension of the West German labor and social sys-
tems. Although he continued to warn against merely extending West Germany’s legal system 
to the East, Ernst Breit nevertheless used the well-known post-war slogan of Konrad Ade-
nauer against nationalization. In this context, “No experiments!” could be interpreted as sup-
port for the extension of the West German welfare state and industrial relations to include the 
GDR.  
Verständnis dafür zu verweigern, dass der alte Adenauer-Slogan “Keine Experimente” 
in der inzwischen wieder schweigende DDR-Mehrheit grassiert, wäre fast so arrogant 
wie das Gehabe macher, die mit D-Mark gerüstet und der Gnade der westlichen Geburt 
gesegnet gen Osten aufbrechen. (p. 131) 
Ernst Breit’s article announced the publication of two declarations by the DGB, representing 
several further steps towards a new strategy. The first was the Resolution on German Unity, 
dated March 7.656 This document, produced on behalf of the West German union movement, 
clearly favored reunification, something the DGB had refrained from doing to date. The reso-
lution continued to echo the ideas of the previous months, including the need to maintain the 
ban on lock-outs in the GDR657 and to revise the West German labor law. Yet the improve-
ments sought by the DGB were used merely as a pretext for injecting another variable into the 
debate, something which had now become DGB’s top priority: obtaining a guarantee that reu-
nification would not result in fewer rights for West German workers. It was under this condi-
tion that the DGB unions were willing to take an active role in pushing for  monetary and 
economic union. 
Auch für die gegenwärtige Situation in der Bundesrepublik gilt es, die Chance des Eini-
gungsprozesses zu nutzen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass hier millionenfache Arbeitslo-
sigkeit, krasse Ungerechtigkeiten bei der Verteilung von Einkommen und Vermögen, 
kein Verbot der Aussperrung, unzueichende Mitbestimmungsrechte, Defizite bei der 
                                                 
656 “Entschlieβung zur deutschen Einheit”, March 7, 1990, in: DGB 1991. 
657 Whether one could interpret this to mean  that the ban of lock-outs should be upheld temporarily in the GDR 
or adopted permanently in a reunified Germany, is not specified in the resolution or in any other declaration by 
one of the DGB unions. It suggests that the DGB unions did not belief that the policy banning lockouts would be 
adopted in a reunified Germany. This ambiguity should temper DGB unions’ repeated contention that their per-
sistent calls for maintaining the ban on lockouts somehow signified their rejection of simple legal extension of 
the West German social welfare system. The lack of political action to support those calls for maintaining the 
ban on lockouts shall be analyzed in the next chapter. 
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Versorgung mit öffentlichen Gütern und Dienstleistungen und zahlreiche weitere Män-
gel bestehen, darf der Weg hin zur deutschen Einheit einschlieβlich der hieraus für die 
Bundesrepublik zunächst resultierenden finanziellen Belastungen nicht zu einem Still-
stand bei der Beseitigung dieser Mängel führen oder gar dazu missbraucht werden, ta-
rifpolitische Verweigerungshaltungen der Arbeitgeber zu begründen. Keinesfalls darf 
das Zusammenwachsen der unterschiedlichen wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Rege-
lungen in beiden deutschen Staaten zum Abbau von Arbeitnehmerrechte führen. 
The DGB concluded its resolution with a call for the German union movement to unify as a 
necessary counterweight to monetary and economic union.  
Der DGB setzt sich zum Ziel eine einheitliche deutsche Gewerkschaftsbewegung zu 
schaffen, um den Anforderungen entsprechen zu können, die sich durch Kooperationen 
von Unternehmen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR und durch eine Wirtschaftsgemein-
schaft und Währungsunion ergeben. 
The Joint Declaration by the DGB and the German Confederation of Employers' Associations 
for a unified economic and social welfare system was the second declaration marking this 
strategic shift. It was published only two days after the resolution, and added further details 
on at least two points.658 Firstly, the Joint Declaration left no doubt that statements by the 
DGB welcoming unification could only be understood to mean a rapid process based on mo-
netary and economic union as proposed by the federal chancellery. 
DGB und BDA begrüβen das Angebot der Bundesregierung, eine Wirtschaftseinheit 
und Währungsunion zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten zu schaffen. Sie ist ein wesent-
licher Schritt hin zur politischen Einheit und trägt zugleich dem Anliegen der Mensch 
der DDR auf Verbesserung der dortigen Lebensverhältnisse Rechnung. 
Wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Fortschritt in der DDR wird es nur auf der Basis ei-
ner Ordnungspolitik geben können, die marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzipien folgt. Sie ist 
auch Voraussetzung für die dringend notwendigen unternehmerischen Invsetitionen. 
Eine Reform der Wirstchaftsordnung schafft zugleich die Voraussetzung für ein stabiles 
währungspolitisches Fundament. Beides – Wirtschaftsreform und Währungsunion – 
muβ rasch und gleichzeitig erfolgen. 
Secondly, the Joint Declaration affirmed the necessity to bring the working and living condi-
tions throughout the reunified Germany into line, with the high standards of West Germany as 
the reference point. 
                                                 
658 “Gemeinsame Erklärung des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes und der Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände zu einer einheitlichen Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion in beiden deutschen Staaten”, March 9, 
1990, in: DGB 1991. This declaration was written during a meeting between DGB and BDA presidents, Ernst 
Breit and Klaus Murmann, on March 9. The BDA archive does not include any documentation on this meeting. 
The documents stored at the DGB archive are not open to the public. 
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Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund und die Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitge-
berverbände sind sich darin einig, dass eine wirtschaftliche Neuordnung der DDR sozial 
abgesichert werden muss. Wirtschaftliche Effizienz und soziale Gerechtigkeit gehören 
in einer sozialen Marktwirtschaft zusammen. Allerdings wird eine Angleichung an bun-
desdeutsche Sozialstandards nur in Etappen zu erreichen sein. Dafür sind die Unter-
schiede in den vorhandenen Strukturen zu groβ. Im Interesse einer organischen Gesamt-
entwicklung kann es nur um die allmähliche und schrittweise Schaffung einer 
einheitlichen Sozialordnung gehen. 
These goals common to the DGB and the BDA – economic reforms and gradual leveling of 
the social standards – left little room for future improvements to the federal labor and social 
laws, something the DGB unions still presented as their goal in the resolution published two 
days earlier. One half of the two-page Joint Declaration consisted of a list of policy tools that 
should be introduced in the GDR for preparing the groundwork for leveling the social stan-
dards in unified Germany: collective bargaining autonomy for trade unions and employers’ 
associations, unemployment benefits, the merging of welfare programs on the basis of the 
West German method of financing and payment, co-determination rules corresponding to 
those in place at West German enterprises and, finally, vocational training programs based on 
the West German dual model. The mechanisms identified by the DGB and BDA were the key 
pillars of their program in West Germany. They were in other words, the measures they inten-
ded to introduce in the former East Germany. 
The Joint Declaration ended where Helmut Kohl’s roadmap started off, namely with the at-
tempt to convince East German workers to stay in the GDR. 
Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund und die Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitge-
berverbände appellieren an die Menschen in der DDR, dort zu bleiben und damit die 
Voraussetzungen für eine Gesundung und Stabilisierung von Wirtschaft und Gesell-
schaft zu verbessern. Hinzu kommt, dass die Kapazitäten in der Bundesrepublik für die 
Aufnahme weiterer Übersiedler erschöpft sind. 
The Joint Declaration from March 9 marked the alignment of the West German collective 
bargaining partners on the program promoted by the federal chancellery.659 A working group 
consisting of representative from the Federal Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs, the DGB, 
the BDA and the German Employees Union (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft) was for-
med on March 12, one day before the ratification of the Preliminary Report by both German 
delegations, announcing the extension of the West German labor law and welfare system in 
East Germany. The working group met a second time on June 26, only a few days before the 
                                                 
659 The March editorial of BDA’s Der Arbeitgeber (published on March 9), stressed the importance of maintain-
ing the principles of the West German “social market economy for the whole Germany”. Der Arbeitgeber, 5/42, 
p. 172. 
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MESU came into force, and again a few weeks later on August 7. The formation of this wor-
king group only three days after the DGB/BDA Joint Declaration is a further indication that, 
aside from preparations for legal extension, the weeks from February 20 to March 13 were 
used to set up a crisis-management alliance, which included a team of West German actors to 
manage the economic reforms and its social impact. Yet without access to the DGB archives, 
it is still impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy the exact nature of the meetings 
of this working group. 
It is not possible at this time to confirm with any certainty the author’s suspicions that infor-
mal tripartite meetings were held some time between the chancellery meeting of February 20 
and the first meeting of the Working Group on March 12. But  many elements suggest coor-
dinated action on the part of the three parties. Why did the DGB and the BDA unexpectedly 
begin promoting a policy that they had up to now refused to support, only a few short days 
before March elections in East Germany? Why did the DGB and the BDA request that key 
pillars of industrial relations in West Germany be introduced in the GDR, specifically in the 
days where the federal government was pressurizing its East German counterparts to ackno-
wledge general institutional transfer as the guiding principle of reunification? Finally, what is 
the likelihood that the DGB and the BDA were preparing to assume crucial roles in the drive 
to achieve MESU without any sort of coordination with the federal government – in negotia-
tions on this issue? 
The closest the author came to receiving confirmation of his belief that informal tripartite 
meetings had indeed occurred took the form of several nods of acknowledgement by one IG 
Metall secretary, a member of the union’s GDR Working Group. I have explained in chapter 
1.4.3 how all attempts to obtain a definite answer as to the content of these informal meetings 
during an interview with this secretary came to naught. 
As explained in the review of the literature, the analysts studying the institutional transfer 
develop a slightly different argument. Helmut Wiesenthal and others believe that the 
DGB/BDA Joint Declaration of March 9 aimed at forcing the federal government to openly 
acknowledge that the West German social partners played a specific role in achieving reunifi-
cation.660 This argument is lacking in two respects. Firstly, it does not take into account the 
chronology of events. The Cabinet Committee had begun deliberations on how to organize the 
institutional transfer of West German labor and social laws at its first meeting on February 7, 
whereas the DGB unions and the BDA associations did not react to the chancellor’s proposal 
                                                 
660 Wiesenthal 1995b. See 1.2.4. 
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for several weeks. Secondly, it fails to take full account for the fact that, without the participa-
tion of West German collective bargaining partners, the federal government’s roadmap for 
reunification could not have been achieved. The Joint Declaration cannot itself be viewed as 
separate and distinct from the positions advocated by the federal government relating to the 
transfer of the labor laws and welfare system during its negotiations with its East German 
counterparts. There is nothing in the DGB/BDA Joint Declaration that countered these posi-
tions. Itt rather compleented them by incorporating collective bargaining autonomy. 
It is therefore likely that the chronological parallels between the imposition of the West Ger-
man labor laws and welfare system on the East German government and the decision of the 
West German collective bargaining partners to promote the extension indicates that a West 
German tripartite consensus did indeed exist. The blend of formal and informal tripartite poli-
cy-making typical to certain periods in West German political life661 - and Helmut Kohl had 
made some attempts to revive such practices662 - adds to the likelihood that tripartite consen-
sus on Monetary, Economic and Social Union was achieved in this manner. As it was not pos-
sible to access the DGB archives, the author is unable to shed any more light on the  process 
leading up to the drafting and publication of the Joint Declaration. The archives will be ope-
ned to the public and for research purposes in four years’ time. 
3.6.5 The new logic behind DGB unions’ activities: Achieving social union 
Any confirmation that the definition of a new course by the DGB unions had been facilitated 
by informal tripartite meetings would shed more light on the road to Germany’s unification. 
Yet, even if this hypothesis is disproved, it would not change the fact that a West German 
tripartite consensus on the extension of the labor laws and the welfare system did de facto 
exist prior to the East German elections of March 18, 1990. 
3.6.5.1 A key moment in the reunification process 
The significance of this consensus, symbolized by the DGB/BDA Joint Declaration, in re-
gards to the reunification process is to this day not given its proper weight.663 Even publica-
tions on the MESU, like Dieter Grosser’s study or a book on the topic from the Federal Minis-
                                                 
661 Markovits 1986; Allen 1997. Thelen 1991 argues however that the Federal Republic cannot be considered a 
typical “corporatist country”.   
662 See chapter 3.1.2.3.  
663 Once again this sentence was written before Gerhard A. Ritter's book on the topic (Ritter 2006). Although I 
leave my point of view untouched, it has been made irrelevant with this publication. 
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try for Labor and Social Affairs, left the issue untouched. Aside from the support lent by the 
West German collective bargaining partners to MESU, two other points would seem to con-
firm the key role the tripartite consensus played in the reunification process. 
Firstly, the Joint Declaration is crucial in explaining why the social component was incorpo-
rated into Kohl’s initial proposal on monetary and economic union. If one carefully reads the 
press reports and articles from March and April 1990, it will become abundantly clear that the 
two German delegations began referring to the Monetary, Economic and Social Union as the 
core issue in their negotiations. The reasons for the sudden addition of the social union into 
the economic reform plan initially drawn up in Bonn has failed to spark the interest of resear-
chers, who use both expressions interchangeably. Sources at the Federal Ministry for Labor 
and Social Affairs simply indicate that the social component was incorporated into the pro-
gram in the weeks immediately following the initial proposal, as it became increasingly im-
portant to define the framework for managing the social risks associated with economic 
union. 
Je mehr in den folgenden Wochen deutlich wurde, welche Brüche und Verwerfungen 
die Währungs- und Wirtschaftsunion auslösen würden, desto mehr rückte freilich die 
Notwendigkeit in den Vordergrund, als wesentliches drittes Element die Sozialunion 
hinzuzufügen.664  
Secondly, the Joint Declaration put the West German social partners into crisis management 
mode to tackle issues relating to East German labor. With the Joint Declaration, the DGB 
unions and the BDA associations volunteered for front line duty in a reform process that was 
to strike a strong blow to the world of labor. The next chapters shall demonstrate how the ex-
periences on the front forced them to consolidate their activities in eastern Germany, much to 
the detriment of local actors. This pattern – assumption of West German institutional control 
over these activities in the new Länder –, indeed so  characteristic of the reunification pro-
cess,665 was exemplified and initiated, by the crisis management performed by the West Ger-
man collective bargaining partners in relation to the East German labor.666 
3.6.5.2 The three sources of the tripartite consensus  
The previous chapters have introduced various concerns held by the federal government, the 
DGB unions and the BDA associations in regards to the changing situation in the GDR. Three 
                                                 
664 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung 1994, p. 19. 
665 Thumfart 2002. 
666 Ettl/Wiesenthal 1994. See 1.2.4. 
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in particular were shared by these West German actors and opened the way for this consensus 
to take shape. Let us summarize them in brief. 
The first source was the decision that the stream of migration from East to West Germany had 
to stop. The arrival of tens of thousands of East Germans each month threatened to undermine 
the financial stability of the social security programs, such as retirement pensions, health care 
and the unemployment schemes.667 The DGB unions also worried about the concomitant 
downward pressure exerted on wages and working conditions in West Germany.  
The second source of the tripartite consensus involved the necessity to define the legal fra-
mework for the process of economic reform in the GDR. This required that the legal condi-
tions for the protection of private property and lifting of the prohibition on profit were first 
put in place. Its goal also included specifying the limits to employers’ and workers’ power 
within an enterprise and the duties of each party. In some East German enterprises, workers 
were quickly growing accustomed to discussing management decisions and, on some occa-
sions, even voted out managers who made unpopular decisions. Potential West German inves-
tors were turned off by this legal uncertainty, and so were the DGB unions. They, however, 
feared that West German employers could use the legal ambiguities existing in the GDR to 
establish zones where workers were given less protection and rights, a situation which would 
necessarily have repercussions on West Germany and on a reunified Germany. 
The third source of the tripartite consensus was the desire to incorporate provisions on social 
security within the framework of these economic reforms. This became an absolute necessity 
in the face of the dual goal of rapid economic reforms and a rapid improvement in the stan-
dard of living. High levels of social protection had to be provided in the GDR in order to stop 
its citizens from leaving. 
These sources paved the way for the tripartite consensus and the intense involvement of the 
West German collective bargaining partners in the reunification process. This consensus was 
a success of Kohl in his attempts to forge new alliances between his government and various 
institutional actors in West Germany on the issue of reunification.668 For the DGB member 
                                                 
667 The Federal Republic would have to allocate 1.8 billion DM for every 100,000 East German unemployed 
workers in the country. According to Labor Minister Blüm, twice as many unemployed workers could receive 
benefits if they were to stay in the GDR. “Arbeitslosenkasse für die DDR?”, Die tageszeitung, March 6, 1990. 
668 Patton 1994. While Patton is mistaken in regards to the position of DGB unions takes on the economic union, 
which he depicts as rejectionist, the argument he develops in this article is similar to the perspective adopted in 
this work. Patton shows that Kohl’s choice of West German allies in the quest for reunification was made before 
the East German elections of March 18, 1990.  
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unions, this entailed the adoption of a new course of action, which in turn was to form the 
basis for a new strategy.  
3.6.5.3 The new logic of DGB unions’ action 
Despite the emphasis placed in this chapter on exploring the theory of informal tripartite mee-
tings between February 20 and March 9, it is important not to characterize the unions’ course 
of action after those meetings as some sort of secret pact. In truth, few West German union 
leaders were involved in talks with the chancellor during those days. When discussing my 
theory with the Media Industrial Union's former president Detlef Hensche (1990: vice-
president), he refused to entertain the notion that such meetings actually took place (see chap-
ter 1.4). The IG Metall secretary who confirmed the existence thereof was not surprised by 
Detlef Hensche’s reaction since “he [Hensche] was not present and had probably never heard 
anything about them”. Yet, as most West German union leaders did not meet with Helmut 
Kohl in those days, all DGB unions strictly followed the new course of action at this time. In 
fact, it was Detlef Hensche himself who was the first official from the DGB unions to press 
for the extension of the labor law.669 Hence, the true factors behind the strategic shift relate to 
concerns expressed on the repercussions of a collapse of the GDR (East German migration, 
fewer worker rights in the GDR, et al.). Yet, if the tripartite consensus cannot be attributed to 
some sort of secret pact that West German actors would simply implement afterwards, what is 
it that was actually agreed upon? What issues did this consensus leave unresolved? 
The consensus represented first and foremost a common voice in favor of extending West 
Germany’s welfare state, labor laws and industrial relations to cover the GDR. In doing so, it 
aided in undermining the GDR government’s position in favor of merging the two respective 
concepts on the welfare state and labor laws during the negotiations. However, the question 
on whether or not to supplement the extension of the West German labor law with stopgap 
measures, was, by all appearances, not addressed by the three West German actors at this ti-
me. 
The tripartite consensus also involved extending West German wage agreements to include 
East Germany. This entailed a colossal organizational effort on their part, which in turn nee-
ded to be achieved within a short period of time, namely before or immediately after the 
MESU entered into law on July 1st. The main tasks for the trade unions demanding immediate 
action included: the establishment of union structures in the new Länder; the organization of 
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works councils at enterprises; legal advice to East German member unions and training for 
East German trade unionists on issues of West German labor law; the ratification of collective 
wage agreements; and the ratification of redundancy, employability and vocational training 
programs. 
This consensus provided solutions to the questions left unanswered the restructuring of the 
defense of workers’ interests in the GDR. The role assigned to East German actors as part of 
the duties enumerated above was to be settled once the actual process had begun.  
In other words, the tripartite consensus in itself did not represent the new strategy of the West 
German trade unions. It rather marked the introduction of a new logic to their core policy to-
ward Eastern Germany, from which the new strategy would be derived. This new course of 
action had the target of preserving West German labor laws and maintaining the levels of so-
cial protection in a unified Germany. It established three criteria for assessing any strategic 
option: the effectiveness, predictability and speed of implementation. It finally stated its pre-
ference for solutions produced during top-level negotiations with the federal government and 
employers' associations. 
How this new logic evolved into a new strategy shall form the core topic of the two final 
chapters of this study. The tripartite consensus and the DGB/BDA declaration had not provi-
ded solutions to all the questions raised by the East German crisis, but certainly did change 
the nature of DGB unions’ responses by changing the way they were posed. 
3.7 DGB Unions and the Institutional Extension of West German 
Industrial Relations I: Establishing the Framework for Ex-
pansion  
This chapter analyzes the role played by the DGB unions in the eastward extension of West 
Germany’s labor laws and industrial relations. This extension might also be termed an “insti-
tutional transfer” - and perhaps this standard concept taken from social sciences should have 
been used here in this case. The reason why the rather unusual term “institutional extension” 
is preferable to transfer is due to the distinct West German perspective this expression offers, 
i.e., the export of specific institutions, whereas transfer would rather suggest an East German 
                                                 
 
669 See 3.2.2.4. 
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perspective, i.e., the import of institutions. Institutional transfers are usually initiated by the 
states where the institutions are established, in this case the GDR. To speak of an institutional 
transfer of West German industrial relations in the GDR might create the impression that the 
main impetus behind the transfer came from East German actors. My argument runs counter 
to this claim, namely that the institutional expansion of industrial relations was shaped by 
West German actors. 
The present chapter opens with an analysis of the part played by the DGB in the disbanding of 
the FDGB. It then goes on to consider how the DGB acted in order to guarantee the full ex-
tension of West German labor laws - in other words, with no improvement to or reduction of 
worker rights. Some West German unionists were wary of this “no give, no gain” strategy, 
dedicated to the establishment of institutions that West German trade unions had long criti-
cized as insufficient and whose reform was at the core of their program. Despite, or because 
of this uneasiness voiced by various parties, the lack of any alternative proposition among the 
DGB unions in those months, the strongly held belief that no alternative strategy was practi-
cal, would strongly indicate a programmatic exhaustion of the West German trade union 
movement. 
3.7.1 The role of the DGB in the disbanding of the FDGB  
The reactions to the FDGB congress, held on January 31 and February 1, 1990, were rather 
muted at the DGB headquarters in Düsseldorf. The chaotic course of the congress and unre-
solved questions, one of which concerned the nature of the ties between the trade unions and 
their confederation, raised doubts as to FDGB’s capacity for internal reform.670 The delegates 
had ratified a resolution calling for a law on trade unions with co-determination rights from 
the workplace level (the right to veto all decisions and appointments, up to and including the 
director) to the state level (the right to propose and challenge legislation effecting workers). 
The resolution also included the ban on lockouts and a right to strike (i.e., general or “politi-
cal” strikes).671 
Very few officials from the West German unions considered such legislation on trade unions 
to be a realist legal framework for the future of East German trade unions. Among the East 
German workforce, the opinions on the course and the resolutions of the FDGB congress ran 
                                                 
670 “Nach nur zehn Minuten brach das Miβtrauen auf”, Frankfurter Rundschau, February 1, 1990; “FDGB droht 
mit Generalstreik” and “Eklat auf FDGB-Kongreβ” Frankfurter Rundschau, February 2, 1990. 
671 “Entwurf des gewerkschaftlichen Dachverbandes FDGB für eine Änderung der DDR-Verfassung”, February 
1, 1990, reproduced in: Gill 1991, document 20. On the FDGB congress, see: Weinert/Gilles 1999, pp. 91-102. 
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the full spectrum, ranging from positions supporting the immediate disbanding of the 
FDGB672 to the belief that the congress had set in motion a genuine renewal of trade union 
activities in the country.673 
Immediately after the FDGB congress, the head of the German Post Union (Deutsche Post-
gewerkschaft), Kurt van Haaren, persuaded the DGB to increase presence of West German 
unions in the GDR and expand its collaboration with the FDGB. This measure was necessary, 
he explained, in order to strengthen the inadequate reforms initiated. DGB’s executive board 
agreed on a motion to open a Berlin office responsible for liaising with the FDGB and its un-
ions.674 
The support and collaboration strategy appeared to receive further support, after DGB vice-
president Werner Milert had severely criticized the control of FDGB’s apparatus by former 
SED officials during a meeting of the confederation’s national executive board The DGB un-
ion heads, also present, expressed varying degrees of support for Milert's point of view. As a 
result the DGB executive board decided to leave it up to each member union to individually 
assess the extent of reforms conducted within the sister organization(s) and determine the ex-
act nature of their collaboration with them.   
[Werner Milert führt aus], dass die alten Funktionäre noch vorherrschen und die 
SED/PDS ihre Leute im FDGB unterzubringen versucht. Positiv sei nur der Schritt zur 
Bildung autonomer Einzelgewerkschaften. Nach den Berichten aus den Gewerkschaften 
über des Stand der Kontakte und der Reformbemühungen in den neuen Einzelgewerk-
schaften des FDGB stellen die Teilnehmer u.a. fest, dass die Erneuerungsfähigkeit der 
bestehenden DDR-Gewerkschaften unterschiedlich einzuschatzen sei und von daher, 
„bei aller Gemeinsamkeit, die es zwischen DGB und Gewerkschaften geben soll, von 
einer unterschiedlichen Vorgehensweise der Gewerkschaften in bezug auf ihre An-
sprechorganisationen in der DDR auszugehen ist“.675 
A regional committee of the DGB and FDGB was opened in Berlin on February 26, with the 
aim of finding common solutions to problems such as unemployment, speculators and the 
black economy.676 Two days later, DGB’s national executive board allocated 2 millions DM 
in funds for expanding contacts between the trade unions in each country. A series of working 
                                                 
672 More than 800,000 FDGB members had left the organization between December 1, 1989, and January 31, 
1990. See: “Verspielt der FDGB seine Millionen-Basis?”, Die tageszeitung, January 31, 1989.  
673 “Die Unsicherheit wächst: Gespräch mit Gewerkschaftern der Firma Bergmann-Borsig über die betriebliche 
und gewerkschaftliche Lage”, in: Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 5-6/90, p. 394. 
674 Fichter/Kurbjuhn 1993, February 12, 1990, p. 78. The extended chronology by Michael Fichter and Maria 
Kurbjuhn shows that those DGB unions, who had not already opened advisory offices in the GDR, did so be-
tween mid-February and the beginning of March.  
675 Ibid., February 16, 1990, p. 79. 
676 “Regionalausschuss. DGB und FDGB gründen für den Groβraum Berlin einen Ausschuss”, Die tageszeitung, 
February 28, 1990.  
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groups was also set up.677 Speaking in front of journalists, Ernst Breit declared that reunifica-
tion should not take the form of a simple extension of West German laws.678  
As the previous chapter illustrated, such declarations no longer reflected the DGB’s actual 
positions at the time they were made in the final days of February. The first DGB union to 
announce a shift in stance was the Chemistry Industrial Union. This union's head, Hermann 
Rappe, called for a cessation of all contacts with the FDGB and for the disbanding of the East 
German unions within the DGB organizations. All attempts by FDGB head Helga Mausch to 
present such views as minority opinions within the DGB were unsuccessful, as they rapidly 
found numerous followers.679 
After the March elections, the DGB started to publicly distance itself from the FDGB. In front 
of the executive committee of the Post Union, DGB head Ernst Breit publicly criticized the 
reforms implemented by the FDGB for the first time. He called on the East German trade un-
ions to speed up the pace of reform. If certain elements within the DGB had any serious mis-
givings on the reforms undertaken by the FDGB, it was rare to find any press statements with 
so much reserve. 
Nachdrücklich kritisierte Breit die „Halbherzigkeiten“ des DDR-Gewerkschaftsbundes 
FDGB und einiger seiner Mitgliedsgewerkschaften. (...) „Noch immer klammern sich 
zu viele an die bisherigen Gewerkschaftsstrukturen und Machtverhältnisse“, kritisierte 
er. (...) „Strenge Zurückhaltung“ [by the DGB unions] sei in zweifelhaften Fällen gebo-
ten.680 
The relationships between the two union federations rapidly deteriorated. By the end of 
March, newspapers were reporting that the Bundesbank was considering a general exchange 
rate of 2 GDR Marks to 1 DM (2:1). The DGB and the FDGB shared a position supporting a 
1:1 rate. Arguably as a means to revitalize its image, the FDGB openly attacked the Bundes-
bank’s proposal and tried to organize a campaign against it.681 On April 3, FDGB head Helga 
Mausch sent a draft joint declaration stating its opposition to the 2:1 rate to Ernst Breit. This 
contained veiled references to the possible recourse to general strike action. 
Die Gewerkschaften wenden sich mit Entschiedenheit gegen die Empfehlung der Bun-
desbank und führender Politiker der BRD-Regierung, die DDR-Mark im Verhältnis 2:1 
umzutauschen. Das ist nicht nur Wahlbetrug. Es ist vor allem ein unzumutbares und un-
erträgliches Spiel mit den Sorgen, Erwartungen und Ängsten vieler Menschen. Sozial-
                                                 
677 Fichter/Kurbjuhn 1993, February 28, 1990, p. 81. 
678 “Breit selbst meinte dazu, es dürfe nicht dazu kommen, dass das BRD-Recht über die DDR übergestülpt 
wird”. “FDGB und DGB auf einer Linie“, Die tageszeitung, March 3, 1990. 
679 Quoted in: Pirker et al. 1990, p. 62. 
680 “Breit: In der DDR ‚schnellstens Tritt fassen’”, March 23, 1990, in: DGB 1991. 
681 “Protest gegen Währungsspekulation”, Tribüne, April 2, 1990, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 62.  
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abbau, Altersarmut und wirtschaftliche Not sind damit programmiert. Das nehmen wir 
als Gewerkschaften nicht hin. (...) Deshalb fordern wir vom Bundeskanzler und der 
Bundesregierung, das Wahlversprechen einzuhalten. Wir werden für die Rechte der 
Gewerkschaftsmitglieder mit allen Mitteln eintreten.682 
Ernst Breit’s answer was brief and to the point:  
Werte Kollegin Mausch. Bezugnehmend auf die Telexe von Kollegen R. Schramm vom 
2. und 3. April teile ich Dir mit, dass der DGB einer gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Wäh-
rungsunion mit dem FDGB nicht zustimmt. Der DGB-Bundesvorstand hat in seiner Sit-
zung am 3.4.1990 dazu eine eigene Erklärung abgegeben.683 
The press statement that Ernst Breit was referring to argued for an exchange rate of 1:1, but 
was not forceful in its style and contained no indication that the DGB considered its opposi-
tion to the Bundesbank’s plans one of its top priorities.684  
Together with East German environmental, women’s and civic organizations, as well as those 
fighting for the rights of the unemployed, the FDGB and its member unions organized a day 
of protest against the 2:1 exchange rate on April 5, with around one million people gathering 
throughout the GDR (100,000 in Berlin).685 The DGB refused to take part for fear of being 
instrumentalized by the FDGB.686  
In fact, the DGB was now concentrating its efforts on the dissolution of the FDGB and unify-
ing German trade unions under its umbrella. When the DGB announced its decision to sus-
pend all collaborative activities with the FDGB, the delegates to the first post-Wende congress 
of the East German mines and energy trade union (IG Bergbau, Energie und Wasser-
wirtschaft) were taken by surprise.687 
Only the collaboration between trade unions was maintained. Yet the positions of the East 
German trade unions did not differ greatly from those that the DGB presented as characteris-
tic of the FDGB. The delegates from the East German Mines and Energy Union voted for a 
resolution supporting a political strike against the 2:1 exchange rate. In an interview, the 
president of the DGB miners union, clearly irritated by the decision, stated in reaction to this 
                                                 
682 “Fernschreiben Nr. 8584822 vom 3.4.1990”, quoted in: Ibid., p. 63. 
683 Idem. 
684 The first sentence is indicative of the text as a whole: “Vor übereilten Festlegungen bei der Verwirklichung 
der Währungsunion zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR warnte am Dienstag der Bundesvorstand des 
Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes.” See: “DGB-Bundesvorstand: Währungsunion mit der DDR muss Vertrauen 
in den Einigungsprozess schaffen”, April 3, 1990, in: DGB 1991.  
685 “Wir sind ein blödes Volk!”, Die tageszeitung, April 6, 1990. 
686 Weinert/Gilles 1999, pp. 116-117. 
687 “IGBE-Gewerkschaftstag mit kleinen Fehlern”, Die tageszeitung, April 9, 1990. 
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vote that “other measures would be more appropriate in a parliamentary political system”.688 
The DGB unions refused to take the debate over the exchange rate into the public arena and 
this choice appears partially determined by a desire to isolate the FDGB.  
The FDGB attempted to escape its isolation. In retrospect, many of the assertions made in its 
declaration from April 27 apparently fail to register the developments of the previous months, 
as if somehow ignoring the crucial steps that had been taken toward the institutional extension 
of the West German system. The FDGB claimed that any merger of the German union 
movements required the collaboration of the federations and trade unions in both countries; 
that workers in the GDR should have the right to determine what kind of workplace represen-
tation they preferred; that East German enterprise-based trade unions should be placed on an 
equal footing with works councils; that the legal distinctions between blue-collar and white-
collar workers should be eliminated in a unified Germany. The declaration called for the sup-
port of the DGB and its union members, though it insisted that these battles were primarily to 
be waged by the FDGB and the East German trade unions.689 
This declaration is the object of severe criticism from contemporary observers, who under-
standably faced great difficulty in explaining its significance.690 In spite of any reservations 
one may have on the content of the text, the publication of this declaration can be seen as a 
sign of resistance to the attempts of the DGB to force the disbanding of the FDGB. In a reso-
lution put to vote on April 18 (nine days before the declaration by the FDGB and the East 
German unions), the DGB had pressed the East German unions to join the DGB.691 By the 
end of the month, Breit announced that the FDGB was “soon to disband”.692 
The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back came in the form of a new declaration by the 
FDGB and the East German trade unions, dated May 2. It criticized the social components 
included in the first draft of the MESU as inadequate and argued in favor of a 1:1 exchange 
                                                 
688 “Streik bei 2:1?”, Die tageszeitung, April 9, 1990. 
689 “Gesellschaft muss sozial gerecht sein. Standpunkt der im Dachverband vereinigten IG und Gewerkschaften 
zur Vereinigung der deutschen Gewerkschaften”, Tribüne, April 24, 1990, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, pp. 75-
77. 
690 “Während sie als Einzelverbandsvorsitzende im Geschwindschritt die gewerkschaftliche Verbandseinheit 
anstrebten, leistete sich die Versammlung derselben Leute eine Kollektivmeinung, die immer noch von einer 
länger andauernden Existenz der DDR auszugehen schien und die ernsthaft glaubte, Zeit genug zu haben, um 
alle Räder des sozialen Rechts- und Verfassungsstaates und der sozialen Marktwirtschaft noch einmal zu erfin-
den.” Ibid., p. 76. 
691 “FDGB entspricht unseren Kriterien nicht – Aufgaben des DGB im Zusammenhang mit dem dem deutsch-
deutschen Einigungsprozess”, express, 5/90, p. 6. 
692 “Breit: Keine Vereinigung mit dem FDGB”, April 27, 1990, in: DGB 1991; “FDGB ohne Zukunft”, Die ta-
geszeitung, April 28, 1990. 
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rate.693 In an open letter to the De Maizière government, the declaration was with a list of 
demands: a two-phase wage increase averaging 50% within two months; the immediate intro-
duction of a 38-hour work week; state guarantees on the liquidity of enterprises (in order to 
ensure workers were paid); more public information on the developments surrounding the 
negotiations on unification, as well as the participation of trade unions in these talks. As proof 
of their resolve to fight for “social security and the democratic co-determination rights of 
workers”, warning strikes and a day of protest were announced.694  
Lothar De Maizière’s reply to both documents was harsh, as he accused the FDGB of seeking 
to destabilize the country.695 He agreed to meet trade union representatives on a regular basis 
and to notify them of any development in the negotiations on MESU and the unification 
treaty, not least because its political partner (the Ost-SPD) echoed concerns about flaws in the 
social component of the MESU similar to those expressed by the FDGB. Yet De Maizière 
explicitly rejected all union demands.696 
The day of action for a 1:1 exchange rate and better social protection was scheduled for May 
10. “Political warning strikes” were announced in the leather and textile industries. The heads 
of the FDGB and of the East German unions had speculated on a similar degree of success 
that they had had on April 5, but internal reports proved these assumptions incorrect: in 10 of 
the 15 East German districts, the unions were unable to agree on what kind of action to take. 
Polls conducted on union members indicated that a majority of workers were opposed to the 
demonstrations and warning strikes and even greeted the MESU.697 While it may appear that 
many in the FDGB thought that the organization’s future existence could only be guaranteed 
by following a radical agenda of defending workers’ interests within the context of reunifica-
tion, a large portion of East German workers did not believe in its strategy of open confronta-
tion with the De Maizière government. 
Without the overwhelming support of its member unions, the FDGB had no future. The DGB 
was, of course, aware of that fact. On May 7, the DGB published a joint declaration with the 
Ost-SPD, which was in effect a partial dissociation of the party from the FDGB. The declara-
tion’s purpose was to state that both organizations agreed that the MESU should not result in 
                                                 
693 “Entscheidende Aussagen fehlen – Gemeinsamer Standpunkt der im Dachverband vereinten Gewerkschaften 
zum Austauschkurs”, Tribüne, May 3, 1990, p. 1, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 79. 
694 “50 Prozent mehr! Offener Brief an Regierung”, Tribüne, May 7, 1990, quoted in: idem. 
695 “FDGB-Forderungen zurückgewiesen”, Die tageszeitung, May 7, 1990. 
696 “Krach in der Groβen Koalition”, Die tageszeitung, May 9, 1990. 
697 Weinert/Gilles 1999, pp. 123-24. 
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a “loss of workers’ rights” and was formulated in such a manner to promote institutional ex-
tension as an acceptable solution.698 
On May 8, Ernst Breit reiterated that German workers were to unite under the umbrella of the 
DGB and that, though the assistance of the East German trade unions was welcome, any form 
of collaboration with the FDGB was explicitly ruled out.699 Two days before FDGB’s day of 
action, the DGB expressed only mild criticisms of the MESU and, in fact, made no effect to 
actively oppose it. The West German trade union federation maintained the tripartite consen-
sus.  
Dieser Linie entsprach es durchaus, dass der DGB zwar Kritik und Bedenken zu einzel-
nen Vorschriften und Formulierungen des Staatsvertragsentwurfs anmeldete, Enttäu-
schung äuβerte, dass „alle Chancen, bessere Mitbestimmungsregelungen zu erreichen, 
ausgeschlossen werden sollen“, wie es in einer Stellungnahme hieβ, auf Abweichungen 
und Widersprüche hinwies, aber dies doch alles in einem äuβerst moderaten bis resigna-
tiven Ton vortrug. Das konnte nur als Signal an die Bundesregierung gewertet werden, 
dass der DGB auf keinen Fall aus dem prinzipiellen Konsens über die Notwendigkeit 
der Einheit ausscheren wollte und den politischen Führungsanspruch der Bundesregie-
rung in dieser frage voll akzeptierte.700  
Pressed by its West German counterpart, the East German miners union (IG Bergbau, Energie 
und Wasserwirtschaft) announced its exit from the FDGB on May 8, which in turn prompted 
other East German trade unions to follow suit.701 The bell had tolled for the FDGB. On the 
next day, in a decision which came as a surprise to journalists but probably less so to the top 
echelons of DGB union leadership, all of the East German trade unions announced their exit 
from the FDGB and the dissolution of the federation in September. They adopted the DGB’s 
statements from previous months: German trade unions were to unify within the DGB, and 
this process had to be completed before Germany’s political unification.702 A Council of 
Spokespersons (Sprecherrat), with Peter Rothe, leader of the railway union (Gewerkschaft der 
Eisenbahner Deutschlands), at its head, was in charge of representing the East German unions 
and of disbanding the FDGB.703 All but a few of the demonstrations and warning strikes 
                                                 
698 “DGB und SPD-Ost erörtern Staatsvertragsentwurf”, May 7, 1990, in: DGB 1991. 
699 “Ein Dach für alle? Der Vorsitzende des DGB, Ernst Breit, lehnt eine Vereinigung ab”, Tribüne, May 8, 
1990, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 81. 
700 Idem. The authors refer to: “Kaum Chancen zur besseren Mitbestimmung. Stellungnahme des DGB zum 
Staatsvertragsentwurf”, Tribüne, May 9, 1990. 
701 “DDR-IG Bergbau tritt aus FDGB aus” and “Der FDGB-Crash ist vorprogrammiert”, Die tageszeitung, May 
10, 1990. 
702 “Beschluβ der Vorsitzenden der Einzelgewerkschaften des FDGB über dessen Auflösung (9. Mai 1990)”, 
reproduced in: Gill 1991, document 21. 
703 The disbanding of the FDGB took place on September 14, by 112 votes in favor and two against. On all these 
questions: Weinert/Gilles 1999. 
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called for the following day were cancelled.704 Explaining the reasons behind this sudden 
abandonment of the FDGB, Peter Praikow, from the East German Post Union (Deutsche 
Postgewerkschaft), confirmed that it was the precondition for any collaboration with the 
DGB.705    
The disbanding of the FDGB was greeted by Chemistry Union president Hermann Rappe as 
“a victory for democracy”.706 DGB head Ernst Breit held meetings with its East German 
counterpart from the Council of Spokespersons, Peter Rothe, in Düsseldorf on May 10 and 
14. Four days later, the DGB assumed control over the finances, assets, and legal and public 
divisions of the FDGB. 
3.7.2 What kind of Works Constitution Act for the GDR?  
At the same time they were working to bring about the dissolution of the FDGB, the DGB 
unions were debating the issue of the exact makeup of the labor law that would be introduced 
in the GDR. The entry of West German social partners onto the East German scene was con-
ditioned upon the introduction of works councils. The West German unions actively sought to 
neutralize any doubts or opposition to the introduction of the dual structure of worker repre-
sentation harbored by many East German union activists.  
3.7.2.1 East German labor: In favor of a revised version of the Works Constitution Act 
The analysis of the restructuring of the instruments for defending workers' interests in the 
GDR proposed in the second part make the arguments that this process mainly took place at 
the workplace. In the East German context, workplace militancy was often incompatible with 
the proper functioning of the dual structure of worker representation. This is revealed by a 
representative survey conducted in 1990 on workers in Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz), by two 
academics at the city’s Technical University.707 
                                                 
704 Some strikes were still held by workers of the Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung-Leder, Gewerkschaft Unter-
richt und Erziehung and the Gewerkschaft Land-, Forst- und Nahrungsgüterwirtschaft. 
705 “Protokoll der Zusammenkunft des Geschäftsführenden Vorstands mit der Betriebsgewerkschaftsleitung des 
FDGB”, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 85. 
706 “Der FDGB ist nur noch ein bürokratischer Torso”, Die tageszeitung, May 11, 1990. 
707 Volkmar Kreiβig und Erhard Schreiber, “Unerfahren in de Marktwirtschaft – Eine Repräsentativbefragung im 
Schraubenwerk Karl-Marx-Stadt”, express, 3/90, pp. 6-7. All quotes and information are taken from this article 
until indicated otherwise. 
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This survey is of such value because of the time it was carried out, namely just before the 
February shift in position by the unions.708 It stresses that workers supported the introduction 
of a version of the market economy in the GDR that would be “as social as possible”, and 
include “strong and independent trade unions” at the workplace (96.5%). Whether one was a 
union member or supported the election of a works council to complement the company union 
did not change the fact that most were in favor of preserving the trade union structures at the 
workplace. 
Interestingly, the survey indicates the “spontaneous support of East German workers for the 
West German model of trade unions and works councils”.709 Yet the authors stress the dis-
crepancy between how the West German dual model was understood by East German workers 
and its reality. Nearly three out of four workers in favor of works councils viewed them either 
as a “provisional trade union” (before a reformed enterprise-based trade union could be estab-
lished) or as a structure of interest representation “to complement the trade union”. Most be-
lieved that works councils had broader co-determination rights than they actually did.710 
As the authors of this survey recall, some DGB secretaries sent to the GDR initially refused to 
promote the institutional extension of West German dual structure of workers’ representation. 
They criticized the rights of the works councils as being no better than union rights under the 
SED regime. Those very same DGB secretaries had exhorted their East German colleagues to 
expand the right to strike and a ban on lockouts the East German labor law, which otherwise 
should be kept. This way, they thought, German reunification would facilitates a broadening 
of worker rights.  
Die Betriebsräte verhielten sich zur Unternehmensleitung wie die alten BGL zu ihrer 
staatlichen Leitung, d.h. sie hätten objektiv auch nicht mehr zu bestimmen als jene. Es 
käme darauf an, einheitliche Interessenvertretungen der Werktätigen zu schaffen, durch 
starke, unabhängigen Gewerkschaften die in der Verfassung und im Arbeitsgesetzbuch 
der DDR gesetzlich fixierten Mitbestimmungsrechte zu verteidigen, insbesondere durch 
das Streikrecht und das Aussperrungsverbot zu erweitern, wesentlich verbindlicher zu 
gestalten und tatsächlich durchzusetzen. Damit würde zugleich der Kampf des DGB für 
eine wesentliche Erweiterung des Mitbestimmungsrechts der Arbeitnehmer unterstützt, 
würde eine wichtige Komponente sozialen Fortschritts verteidigt und erweitert, die die 
                                                 
708 The results were presented by the authors in a conference of “workers and intellectuals” held in Karl-Marx-
Stadt in mid-February, and was initiated by the Neues Forum and other groups. 
709 This spontaneous interest of East German workers for the West German structures of interest representation 
has often been highlighted by West German unionists sent to work in the GDR, but was not  apparent in the 
sources used in this work so far. 
710 Even this formulation does not reflect the West German dual model in its current form. Works councils were 
often set up in the GDR to represent all workers at an enterprise, after many had left the BGL. Their aim was  to 
obtain the same rights as trade unions, which they sought to reform or aimed at replacing altogether. Both struc-
tures were enterprise-based and fulfilled the same functions. 
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DDR in den Prozess der Vereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten einbringen könn-
te.711 
The confusion among East German workers surrounding the respective positions of trade un-
ions and works councils, coupled with the absence of a legal framework for any other form of 
interest representation than trade unions, represented a threat to worker rights.712 In many 
enterprises, the management was trying to take advantage of this confusion and had set up 
works councils according to the Works Constitution Act, thereby restricting worker rights. 
This experience brought some East German activists to fondly “remember the rights” for-
mally conferred upon them by the East German labor law. Their focus was on preserving 
those rights.713 
The resistance of East German trade unionists to the introduction of the dual model has not 
received sufficient attention in literature to date. Authors have generally overlooked the con-
fusion of East German workers as to the actual rights of works councils in West Germany and 
did themselves not quite grasp the meaning of workplace-based worker initiatives which, al-
though called “works councils”, had little in common with their West German counterparts. 
However, it is not possible to describe the introduction of the Works Constitution Act in the 
GDR without mentioning the strategic volte face of the DGB and the constant pressure ex-
erted on the East German unions from the end of February on to follow suit and make the 
demand for the extension of the dual structure of workers’ representation. 
3.7.2.2 DGB unions and the introduction of works councils  
The first appeals by DGB unions for the introduction of the dual model of workers’ represen-
tation and the adoption of the Works Constitution Act in the GDR followed a meeting with 
Helmut Kohl and representatives of industries and banks on February 20, already mentioned 
several times in this paper. In conjunction with the opening of eight offices in the GDR, the 
Trade, Bank, Insurance Union (Handel, Bank Versicherungen) required that East German 
unions relent to the introduction of the Works Constitution Act in their country. “We do not 
                                                 
711 Idem. 
712 The same observations were made elsewhere in the GDR, for instance in Rostock. See: Klaus Balzer, “Bum-
melstreik, als “Bild” ausblieb”, Die Mitbestimmung, 3/90, pp. 188-191. 
713 This assessment was shared by the president of the company union council (Betriebsgewerkschaftsrat) in the 
VEB Kabelwerk Oberspree, Peter Pischner. In December 1989, he explains, the workers in general were under 
the impression that works councils had more rights than BGL. Throughout the discussions between delegates 
from cable enterprises in both countries, West German works councilors beseeched their East German colleagues 
not to relinquish any of their former rights.. Based on their extensive experience with works councils, they in-
formed their East German counterpart that such councils did not have effective co-determination rights. See: 
Hertle 1990, p. 11.  
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have the luxury of a year-long process to determine what it is that trade unions indeed 
want.”714  
By the end of the month, the Chemistry Union had published a list of requirements for further 
cooperation with its East German counterpart, which included the adoption of the Works 
Constitution Act and the elimination of company-based trade unions. In Hermann Rappe’s 
words, the press statement declared: 
Anerkennung des Betriebsrätewesens wie es in der Bundesrepublik durch das Betriebs-
verfassungsgesetz geregelt ist. Das bisherige DDR-System der Betriebsgewerkschafts-
leitungen (BGL) passe nicht in eine parlamentarische Demokratie, sondern nur in einen 
diktatorischen Staat.715  
Toward the end of March, the DGB construction union (IG Bau-Steine-Erden) named the 
introduction of West German-style works councils as one of the preconditions for ratifying 
any unification agreement with its East German counterpart (IG Bau-Holz). The introduction 
of works councils was also stated as a condition for the collaboration of the public service 
union, the mine union, the media union, the chemistry union and IG Metall.716  
3.7.2.3 Trade union indecision on the East German law on trade unions 
On the issue of worker rights, there was a inherent contradiction between the DGB unions’ 
public discourse, which produced a rosy assessment of the level of worker rights in the GDR, 
and their actions in support of legal extension. This contradiction revealed a certain apprehen-
sion toward a policy that signified the abandonment of important demands for the revision of 
those laws.  
The inner DGB debate focused on several constitutional amendments to and the Law on trade 
unions (Gewerkschaftsgesetz) ratified by the East German parliament on March 6. Should 
support be granted or denied? The revised articles 44 and 45 of the East German constitution 
guaranteed the freedom of activity for trade unions, proclaimed the right to strike and out-
lawed lockouts.  
                                                 
714 “Gewerkschaft HBV geht in der DDR”, Die tageszeitung, February 22, 1990.  
715 “Die IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik verstärkt ihre Arbeit in der DDR”, February 28, 1990, in: IG CPK 1993. As 
we shall see in the next chapter, the first works councils based on the West German model were introduced in the 
GDR in April 1990 in the chemical industry.  
716 Fichter/Kurbjuhn 1993, March 26, 1990 and December 16, 1989; “Einheits-ÖTV im Visier”, Die tageszei-
tung, March 30, 1990; Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 117; “Zum Aufbau einer einheitlichen IG Medien in beiden deut-
schen Staaten; Beschluss des Gewerkschaftsrates der IG Medien, 2. Mai 1990”, Kontrapunkt, 11/1990, p. 27; 
“Die IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik verstärkt ihre Arbeit in der DDR”;“Schwierige Annäherung. Feindliche Über-
nahme”, Frankfurter Rundschau, May 25, 1990. 
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The law on trade unions proclaimed the right to work. Article 3 authorized company trade 
unions to ratify agreements on all issues relating to the working and living conditions of 
workers. Article 8 introduced legal safeguards to protect trade union activity at enterprises. 
Article 18 imposed arbitration before any strike action . A strike could be stopped by the gov-
ernment if the common good was at risk. Article 10 granted trade unions the right to propose 
legislation.717  
The law on trade unions contained multiple provisions from previous East German legisla-
tion. The local union leader in the cable plant Kabelwerk Oberspree, Peter Pischner, con-
firmed that the law aimed to protect trade union activists from unilateral decisions by man-
agement. Many newly elected worker representatives were dismissed without legal recourse, 
while crucial decisions were made without first consulting workers’ representation councils. 
As a consequence the law attempted to “push for full and complete application of all East 
German labor laws. (…) Nobody [was] supporting a reduction in workers’ rights.”718 How-
ever, the law on trade unions did not receive the support of left-wing East German union ac-
tivists. Many members of the Initiative for Independent Trade Unions and the United Left 
considered it an attempt to lend legitimacy to discredited former local union leaders still in 
office.719 
Meetings with West German works councilors and union secretaries had convinced some East 
German union activists that it was necessary to obtain greater rights of co-determination than 
those that already existed in West Germany.720 
Unsurprisingly the law on trade unions was harshly criticized by West German employers’ 
and industry associations.  
                                                 
717 Wolfgang Däubler and Thomas Klebe, “Mitbestimmung – ein Angebot für die DDR?”, Die Mitbestimmung, 
5/90, pp. 363-368; Heinz Deutschland, “Was wird aus dem FDGB? Das neue Gewerkschaftsgesetz in der DDR”, 
Sozialismus, 3/90, pp. 48-49; Manfred H. Bobke-von Carmen, “Einstimmung auf den Markt – Das Gewerk-
schaftsgesetz der DDR”, Sozialismus, 4/90, pp. 6-7.  
718 Hertle 1990, p. 21. 
719 Discussions with Renate Hürtgen (IUG) and Bernd Gehrke (Vereinigte Linke), September 2005. 
720 Kreiβig/Schreiber, “Unerfahren in die Marktwirtschaft”. Conversely, information sessions organized by the 
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung for instance, presented West German co-determination rights in a positive light, certainly 
as a model to copy in the GDR (Frank von Auer, “Neu zu entdecken: Mitbestimmung in der DDR”, Die Mitbes-
timmung, 3/90, pp. 232-233). It indicates a certain degree of ambivalence, very limited in time however, on the 
part of West German unions toward the extension of labor law to the GDR.  
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It was described as “an attempt to render neutral the democratic revolution through the inser-
tion of such fraudulent legislation into the law books”721 and as “a prime obstacle to invest-
ment.”722 An editorial in Der Arbeitgeber went so far as to suggest that the law created a 
minefield on the path to reunification and threatened to undermine the economic system of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The DGB unions, in the words of the editorialist, should not 
allow themselves to be seduced by this law and remain faithful to the practices of social part-
nership. It was a call for upholding the tripartite consensus in support of institutional exten-
sion. 
Zwiespältig erscheint die Haltung der DGB-Gewerkschaften zu diesem Gesetz. Zwar 
wird es von ihnen nicht uneingeschränkt bejaht, doch gibt es eine Reihe von Überein-
stimmungen mit ihren Positionen. Werden nicht bis zu heutigem Tage eine Aussper-
rungsverbot gefordert, die Ausweitung der schon sehr weitreichenden Mitbestimmung 
verlangt und eine weitgehende Freistellung von Arbeitskosten beansprucht? 
So verführerisch es auch aus der Sicht der DGB-Gewerkschaften sein mag, eine ver-
meintliche Chance zu nutzen, so sollten sie dieser Versuchung nicht erliegen, denn dann 
wäre auch unsere seit Jahrzehnten bewährte freiheitliche Wirtschaftsordnung beschä-
digt. Es ist zu hoffen, dass sich in den Gewerkschaften die Kräfte durchsetzen, die einer 
unheiligen Allianz widerstehen. Erste Äuβerungen in diese Richtung liegen vor. Hierin 
läge ein Beweis für die Funktionsfähigkeit unserer partnerschaftlich verfassten sozialen 
Marktwirtschaft, mit der nicht nur der Weg zur deutschen Einigung geebnet, sondern 
auch die europäische Integration beschleunigt wird.723 
The ambivalence towards the future of East German labor law hinted at in this editorial in Der 
Arbeitgeber – legal extension or a new set of laws? -, existed among the DGB unions. Indica-
tions of this are to be found in at least three kinds of documents.  
One was the publication of a series of articles in the West German trade union press that pre-
sented the law in a favorable, albeit muted and critical, light. These articles welcomed the 
inclusion of the right to work, the right to strike and the ban on lockouts in the law. They also 
embraced the broad-ranging legal framework that would be established for the protection of 
trade union activities it provided. Those articles make constant reference to the flaws and am-
biguities of the law: Are company unions the only structure of workers’ representation? Do no 
others exist? How would co-determination look in practice? What were the implications of the 
                                                 
721 Werner Dichmann, “Macht durch die Hintertür. Das Gewerkschaftsgesetz: Stoβrichtung und Folgen”, Ge-
werkschaftsreport, 3/90, pp. 5-13. 
722 By the BDI, the DIHT and Ulf Fink, head of the committee representing the interests of wage earners at the 
CDU, the CDA, who was to become DGB vice-president less than three months later (“Gewerkschaftsgesetz”, 
Die tageszeitung, March 8, 1990; “Billiglohnland DDR. DIHT: Gewerkschaftsgesetz und andere regelungen 
müssen vom Tisch”, Die tageszeitung, March 13, 1990; “Kritik an Gewerkschaftsgesetz”, Die tageszeitung, 
March 2, 1990). 
723 Dieter Frank Wienke, “Minenleger”, Der Arbeitgeber, 6/90, p. 212. 
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right to work? They were especially hostile to the right of the government to intervene to pre-
vent strikes, something inconceivable in West Germany because of collective bargaining 
autonomy.  
Yet these reservations did not prevent certain parties from expressing rather sympathetic opin-
ions on the law, and one WSI analyst even called the law on trade unions “one of the most 
intriguing innovations” of the interim period between the fall of the SED regime and the elec-
tions.724 Labor specialist Wolfgang Däubler bluntly stated that the legal extension of the Fed-
eral Republic’s labor law would represent a setback for East German workers. It would 
weaken their position vis-à-vis employers within the realm of what was possibly achievable 
within a free market economy. The extension of the West German labor law, he insisted, 
would not only mean the introduction of a complex set of laws but also forty years of juris-
prudence. It would take years before East Germans could effectively negotiate within this 
extensive legal framework. Until that time, only West Germans would possess the necessary 
skills to defend East German workers’ interests. There was a great risk that the labor law 
would be seen as the “law of the occupying forces” (Besatzerrecht) in eastern Germany.725 
Secondly, the ambivalence of West German unionists to the law on trade unions is docu-
mented in draft legislation on worker representation at the workplace in eastern Germany 
drawn up by DGB’s Legal Division.726 To use an concept taken from the history of philoso-
phy, this proposal attempted a Hegelian synthesis of legal extension and the new laws. The 
proposal had at its core the extension of the Works Constitution Act. Yet it was not the cur-
rent manifestation of the West German law, but a revised version of it which granted greater 
worker rights and protection, that this project sought to introduce in eastern Germany. The 
revisions put forward in this draft legislation echoed the reforms called for by the DGB un-
ions in their program.727 It guaranteed a continuity with union politics in West Germany and 
could be regarded as a fusion of both legal systems. The author is unable to retrace the history 
of this legislative proposal here as it was not possible to obtain access to the archives.728  
                                                 
724“DDR-Volkskammer beschloss Gewerkschaftsgesetz”, WSI-Informationsdienst, 2/90, p. 3; “Was wird aus 
dem FDGB?”; “Mitbestimmung – eine Angebot für die DDR?”; “Einstimmung auf den Markt”. The quotation is 
taken from the last article. 
725 Wolfgang Däubler, “Arbeitsbeziehungen und Recht – Überlegungen zur Situation in der DDR”, Gewerk-
schaftliche Monatshefte, 5-6/90, pp. 353-361, especially p. 360. 
726 “Gesetz über die Interessenvertretung der Beschäftigten in Betrieben und Unternehmen”, May 7, 1990. 
727 Kehrmann 1992, pp. 568-569. 
728 Attempts to contact Karl Kehrmann, former legal advisor to the DGB, by telephone ultimately proved to be 
unfruitful and rather costly. The receptionists at the Berlin DGB headquarters referred me to the (now private) 
DGB legal division in Düsseldorf, while their colleagues in Düsseldorf repeated that the only way to contact 
Karl Kehrmann was through the Berlin office. 
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All indications do, however, point to the fact that its importance in the overall strategy of the 
DGB was extremely limited. There was no public declaration to announce it, no articles about 
it in the union press, and no mention of it in subsequent actions or policies of the DGB un-
ions. The explanation provided by the person in charge of drafting the proposal was somewhat 
cryptic as to the reasons on why it was shelved so quickly: 
Schwierigkeiten bereitete dann aber dessen [of this proposal] Durchsetzung, weil nie-
mand die Probleme vorhergesehen hatte, die sich in der Praxis stellten.729 
Thirdly, despite certain criticism, the official stance of the DGB on the law on trade unions 
remained on whole positive until April. The DGB greeted the fact that it finally established 
the framework for trade union activity in the GDR. A press statement stressed that a new la-
bor law was necessary due to the legal and economic disparities.  
Der DGB hält die pauschale Verdammung eines DDR-Gewerkschaftsgesetzes für unge-
rechtfertigt. So wenig der DDG ein Gewerkschaftsgesetz für die Bundesrepublik wolle, 
so wenig er mit einigen Punkten des DDR-Gesetzentwurfes übereinstimme: Es müsse 
respektiert werden, dass sich die Ausgangsbedingungen für Gewerkschaftsarbeit in der 
DDR gründlich unterscheiden von der Situation in der Bundesrepublik (...).730 
When the law was ratified by the East German parliament, DGB head Ernst Breit spoke of “a 
step in the right direction”.731 
Although they favored legal extension, DGB’s public discourse indicated a degree of ambiva-
lence over the necessity to adapt these laws to the new context. The DGB/BDA agreement 
made no specific mention of that matter. Many authors  fail to consider the fact that the West 
German union movement did not begin to unilaterally condemn the law on trade unions until 
the end of April 1990.732  
                                                 
729 Kehrmann 1992, p. 568. 
730 “DGB: DDR-Gewerkschaftsgesetz nicht pauschal verdammen”, February 28, 1990, in: DGB 1991. 
731 “DGB: DDR-Gewerkschaftsgesetz überwiegend positiv”, March 7, 1990, in: DGB 1991. 
732 Gill 1991, especially p. 77.  
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3.7.3 DGB unions’ activities in support of legal extension (April - May 1990) 
Until the end of March official DGB declarations promoted a form of legal extension of the 
West German labor law that included enhanced worker rights. The DGB’s public discourse 
made specific mention of two key amendments to the law in particular: the right to work and 
the ban on lockouts.733  
In one of his first public statements on the law on trade unions, Ernst Breit had stressed his 
support for a ban on lockouts that it included.734 The DGB’s Declaration on German Unity of 
March 7, reiterated its backing for a ban on lockouts introduced by the East German law and 
stated its desire to see this measure adopted in the Federal Republic.735 Trade union slogans 
for the May 1 demonstrations included the demand for a constitutional right to work and an 
expansion of workers’ rights.736 In its reaction to the first draft of the MESU treaty on April 
17, the DGB named the right to work and co-determination as the “basic conditions” to guar-
antee West German labor movement support for the treaty.737 From this date until the end of 
the month, several calls were made for amendments to the treaty  to include a constitutional 
right to work and the ban on lockouts.738 
The reasons for pushing for such measures were manifold. Both were part of the East German 
law on trade unions and could facilitate a fusion between the respective laws in East and West 
Germany, a strategy favored by many East German unionists. Both claims also had been core 
union demands since the 1970s in West Germany.739 In reintroducing these demands into its 
reunification strategy, the DGB maintained a continuity with its program and activities. Fi-
                                                 
733 The right to work was not an individual right but an incentive to draft new policies aimed at achieving full 
employment. The “ban of lockouts” (Aussperrungsverbot) referred, more realistically, to restrictions on lockouts. 
These were not the only improvements to the West German legislation requested by  the DGB unions. Others 
included: greater environmental protection, more humane working conditions, an end to civil servant status, and 
gender equality. In addition to the reasons indicated in the text, one could legitimately make arguments  for the 
first because of the more immediate impact they had on trade union activities.  
734 “On that point, we agree!”. “DGB übt gegenüber dem FDGB wohlwollende Zurückhaltung”, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, February 6, 1990. 
735 “Entschlieβung zur deutschen Einheit”, March 7, 1990, in: DGB 1991, p. 2. On the same day, the SPD and 
the Greens presented a project of reform of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz to the parliament, welcomed as posi-
tive by the DGB (“DGB: Betriebsverfassungsreform ist überfällig”, March 7, 1990, in: Ibid.).  
736 “Mai-Aufruf des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes: Solidarität sichert unsere Zukunft!”, April 12, 1990, in: 
Ibid. 
737 The catalogue of demands, including more items than those mentioned here, was prefaced with the following 
sentence: “Eine künftige gesamtdeutsche Arbeits- und Sozialordnung muss mindestens die folgenden Elemente 
umfassen”. “Grundzüge der Arbeits- und Sozialordnung in einem geeinten Deutschland”, April 18, 1990, in: 
Ibid. 
738“Blättel: Sozialstaat in Ost und West weiter ausbauen”, April 27, 1990; “DGB: Soziale Errungenschaften 
verteidigen!”, April 30, 1990; “Zimmermann: Aussperrung ächten und verbieten”, April 30, 1990, in: Ibid. 
739 Markovits 1986, pp. 142-145. 
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nally, these amendments could counteract to the erosion of the West German labor law. In 
fact, the DGB union declarations in favor of the introduction of a revised version of the 
Works Constitution Act in the GDR were never followed up by any action. 
3.7.3.1 Delaying action until the battle is over 
A few days before the publication of the second and final draft of the MESU Treaty in mid-
May the DGB focused its interventions on the preservation of the West German worker rights 
and muted its demands for improvements. The GDR should not become, even during any 
short period of transition, an area where workers enjoyed fewer rights.740 A joint declaration 
illustrated that this concern was shared by the DGB and the Council of Spokespersons of the 
East German trade unions. 
Die bundesdeutschen Arbeitnehmerschutz- und Mitbestimmungsrechte müssten min-
destens lückenlos übernommen werden. In Einzelpunkten sollten auch Fortschritte ang-
estrebt werden.741 
The only improvement explicitly mentioned in this declaration – greater co-determination on 
the introduction of new technologies - was significant in the context of the economic reforms, 
it did however not carry the same political weight as the right to work or the ban on lockouts, 
of which no mention was made. 
Six days before the adoption of the MESU by both German parliaments, the text of the treaty, 
which envisioned the extension of the West German labor law, was welcomed by the DGB 
and the East German unions.742 The muted criticisms concerned specific areas where the rule 
of extension was not fully enforced. (Collective bargaining autonomy appeared somewhat 
limited in the public sector, for instance.)743 The DGB and East German unions requested 
such revisions, an unequivocal statement of support for simple legal extension. Calls for im-
provements to this system were vague in nature, including an indirect reference to “economic 
democracy” (p.1) and, again, made no mention of the ban on lockouts or the right to work. 
The weak formulations suggested that trade unions had no intention of criticizing the treaty 
too harshly. 
                                                 
740 “DGB und SPD-Ost erörtern Staatsvertragsentwurf”, May 7, 1990, in: Ibid.  
741 “Unabhängige und starke Einheitsgewerkschaft in Deutschland ist das Ziel”. 
742 “Stellungnahme zum Entwurf der Bundesregierung für einen Staatsvertrag mit der DDR”, May 16, 1990 
(version completed on May 12), in: Ibid.. 
743 Helmut Kohl was to dissipate union worries on the following day, as we shall see. 
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Aus Sicht des DGB und des Sprecherrates der Gewerkschaften der DDR zu kritisieren 
ist, dass mit dem Staatsvertragsentwurf alle Chancen, bessere Mitbestimmungsregelun-
gen zu erreichen, ausgeschlossen werden sollen.744 
On May 20, two days after the MESU Treaty was ratified, claims for a constitutional right to 
work and a ban on lockouts suddenly re-emerged on the union’s public agenda. Such appeals 
were made several times during the 14th DGB congress (20-25 May in Hamburg), this time 
with the Unification Treaty and the future German Constitution on the agenda. Ernst Breit 
mentioned these points in his speech.745 During his report to the congress, he welcomed the 
fact that the MESU Treaty was much improved over the first draft but repeated that there was 
a serious risk that the GDR would become a “paradise for low-cost labor” (Lohndrücker) and 
a “place of social dumping”. To prevent this, Breit explained, the right to work and a ban on 
lockouts were necessary. 
[Dennoch halte ich] es nicht für ein unzumutbares Ansinnen, dass in Bonn aus Anlass 
des Deutschen Einigungsprozesses wenigstens über einige gewerkschaftliche Anliegen 
neu nachgedacht werden könnte. Ich nenne das Verbot der Aussperrung, die Erweite-
rung der Mitbestimmung bei der Einführung neuer Technologien oder ein Recht auf 
Arbeit, verstanden als wirtschaftspolitisches Ziel, mit oberster Priorität für Vollbeschäf-
tigung zu sorgen.746  
Various congress resolutions sanctioned these positions. Motion 1 stipulated that the unifica-
tion process should lead to an improvement in workers’ rights, including the right to work, a 
ban on lockouts, an enhanced right to strike, greater safeguards for collective bargaining 
autonomy in the public sector, and more co-determination rights in enterprises.747 Delegates 
criticized the DGB executive board, which they felt had surrendered the initiative to the fed-
eral government.748 The new president of the DGB, Heinz-Werner Meyer, echoed his prede-
cessor’s concerns that the GDR could become an area where workers enjoyed fewer rights 
and less protection749, and made calls for the revision of the West German labor law as part of 
its adoption by the GDR. 
The month of June witnessed the start of negotiations on the treaty of unification between the 
two German states. At that time, the ban on lockouts would permanently be removed from 
DGB’s public discourse. Of the measures that could facilitate a fusion of the two respective 
                                                 
744 “Stellungnahme zum Entwurf der Bundesregierung für einen Staatsvertrag mit der DDR”, p. 11. 
745 “Breit: Einheit darf nicht zur ‘Ellenbogengesellschaft’ führen”, May 20, 1990, in: Ibid.. 
746 “Breit: Über gewerkschaftliche Anliegen neu nachdenken”, May 21, 1990, in: Ibid.. 
747 The motion mentioned ‘social rights’ and not ‘workers’ rights’. It also included the environmental protection. 
Other motions related to retaining East German laws on abortion and women’s rights, for instance. See: Hert-
le/Schroeder 1990, pp. 3-4. 
748 Neuhaus 1996, p. 306. 
749 “DGB: Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der DDR nur mit wirksamen Betriebsräten”, June 11, 1990, in: Ibid.. 
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labor laws, only the right to work remained. This issue formed the focal point of DGB-
president Meyer’s speech to delegates from the miner’s union.750  
The ratification of the labor and employment laws by the GDR parliament in June represented 
an opportunity for the unions to promote the improvement of workers’ rights in a unified 
Germany, alas one that would go unused. On many issues, these provisional East German 
variants of the West German laws introduced higher standards than those prevailing in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The East German Labor Promoting Law (Arbeitsförderungsge-
setz der DDR), for instance, did not include the controversial article 116, granting workers the 
right to attend vocational training programs even if his or her labor contract was still valid. In 
addition, it, created the necessary legal framework for the accrual of part-time work and voca-
tional training credits. These provisional measures were to remain in place until June 31, 1991 
or the beginning of 1992.751 
Two documents containing the demands and goals of the DGB unions in relation to the unifi-
cation treaty included a reference to the right to work.752 In both documents, however, the 
‘right’ moment for trade unions to address, and eventually push for, improvements to the la-
bor and employment laws was again postponed, this time until after reunification. 
Der DGB und der Sprecherrat fordern den Erhalt der für die Arbeitnehmerinnen und 
Arbeitnehmer günstigeren Vorschriften des geltenden Arbeitsrechts der DDR bis zu 
dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem der zukünftige gesamtdeutsche Gesetzgeber ein einheitliches 
Recht schafft.753 
The publication of the treaty on national unification in mid-August assuaged some of the fears 
of the DGB and the East German unions, as it bolstered the extension process initiated by the 
MESU. The reaction of the German unions to the content of the document was therefore posi-
tive and they called for its rapid implementation. East German workers, they explained, were 
confronted with a rapid rise in unemployment and it was important to provide the necessary 
social security and unemployment benefits. 
Der Leitgedanke des Vertragsentwurfs – die Übertragung der für die Bundesrepublik 
bestehenden Rechtsordnung auf die DDR als Weg zur Schaffung von Rechtsgleichheit – 
ist auch nach Auffassung des DGB und des Sprecherrates grundsätzlich der in der jetzi-
gen Situation geeignete Weg zur schnellstmöglichen Herstellung der deutschen Einheit, 
                                                 
750 “Meyer: Recht auf Arbeit muss Staatsziel werden”, June 8, 1990, in: Ibid.. 
751 For a detailed analysis of labor law in the new Länder, see: Walker 1991. 
752 “Soziapolitische Forderungen des DGB für den deutschen Einigungsprozess”, July 20, 1990, esp. p. 3;  “An-
forderungen an den angestrebten Einigungsvertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik”, July 30, 1990, esp. p. 2, in: Ibid. 
753 “Anforderungen an den angestrebten Einigungsvertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik”, p. 8. 
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die wiederum von den Menschen beider deutschen Staaten gewünscht wird. Zugleich ist 
die schnellstmögliche Herstellung der deutschen Einheit – unabhängig von Wahltermi-
nen – notwendig, um die Folgen der vom DGB und vom Sprecherrat stets als übereilt 
charakterisierten Einführung der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion nunmehr schnell und 
wirkungsvoll beseitigen zu können; Folgen, die heute insbesondere in der bestehenden 
und weiter drohenden Arbeitslosigkeit zum Ausdruck kommen.754 
The DGB and East German unions deplored the fact that some of their main objectives – they 
only specifically indicated the inclusion of the right to work and environmental protection in 
the future constitution - remained unaddressed in the unification treaty. However, they stated, 
the realization of these goals could be acieved through the invocation of article 5 to the treaty, 
relating to constitutional amendments. It can therefore be said the union goals were premised 
on the implementation of the unification treaty. 
Nachdrücklich begrüβen der DGB und der Sprecherrat die vorgesehen Empfehlung an 
die gesetzgebenden Körperschaften des vereinten Deutschlands, sich mit Änderungen 
oder Ergänzungen des Grundgesetzes zu befassen. Allerdings sollten die in Artikel 5 
des Vertragsentwurfs erwähnten Überlegungen zur Aufnahme von Staatszielbestim-
mungen im Hinblick auf einzelne solcher Ziele – z.B.: Recht auf Arbeit, Umweltschutz 
– präzisiert werden; hierzu verweisen der DGB und der Sprecherrat auf ihre Anforde-
rungen an den angestrebten Einigungsvertrag vom 27.7.90 [20.07.90].755 
The constitutional revision anticipated by the German unions would never take place. In No-
vember 1993, the parliamentary commission on constitutional reform presented a report 
which suggested no significant modifications to the Grundgesetz and none that related to top-
ics of great import to the trade unions.756 As with their calls for the right to work and a ban on 
lockouts, which were not followed up by any concrete action, the DGB and East German un-
ions likewise did not launch any campaigns after August to promote the constitutional 
amendments, which according to their claims represented an opportunity to revise the labor 
laws. 
To claim that the DGB and East German unions worked to improve the position of workers in 
the German constitution and legislation would be lending too much credence to words which 
were not followed up by action. The revisions put forward in the declarations between Febru-
ary and August were all acknowledged demands of the West German unions. The Green MP 
Werner Schulz complained that they offered the picture of a catalogue of “unions’ lost strug-
                                                 
754 “Stellungnahme zum 1. Entwurf eines Vertrages zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland über die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands”, August 20, 1990, in: Ibid., p. 1. 
755 Ibidem, p. 2. 
756 However, some modifications based on proposals from the East German government were incorporated into 
the state constitutions of the Bundesländer. See: Rucht 1995, p. 14. 
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gles”.757 Some authors have also stressed how little action was taken to back up the motions 
of DGB’s 14th Congress.  
Der Fülle und der thematischen Spannweite der Forderungen entspricht indes kein poli-
tisch-strategischer Handlungsbezug. Keiner dieser Anträge enthält Hinweise, auf wel-
chem Weg und mit welchen Mitteln eine Einlösung der gewerkschaftlichen Forderun-
gen erreicht werden soll. Die Frage der politischen Relevanz der Beschlüsse stellt sich 
insbesondere bei den Forderungen, die schon seit langem in der Bundesrepublik erho-
ben werden, deren Verwirklichung aber bisher scheiterte, sei es am mangelnden ge-
werkschaftlichen Kräfteeinsatz oder den widrigen politischen Kräfte- und Mehrheits-
verhältnissen – oder beidem. Welche glücklichen politischen Umstände nunmehr Ziele 
wie eine erweiterte Mitbestimmung, das Verbot der Aussperrung oder gar das Recht auf 
Arbeit für das Gebiet der DDR durchsetzbar erscheinen lieβen, wurde auch in der Dis-
kussion nicht deutlich.758 
Even if these demands were indeed part of the unions’ discourse in these months, the objec-
tive of forcing a revision of the West German labor law would never determine their strategy.  
3.7.3.2 Confirmation of the tripartite consensus in May 
It was more a fear that the West German labor law would not be extended in its entirety than 
calls to revise the labor law that ultimately determined the unions’ strategy. What was the 
likelihood that the legal extension agreed upon by the West German government, employers 
and trade unions toward the end of February would be carried out only in part, i.e., with fewer 
workers’ rights and less protection? Could the worst-case scenario of an insufficient legal 
framework for trade union activities in the GDR indeed come true?  
Some within the federal government supported the extension of such a ‘stripped down’ West 
German labor law in the GDR and tried to convince the chancellor of the logic of this course 
prior to adoption of the MESU. The Federal Minister of Finance for instance argued against 
an immediate and full extension of workers’ rights and protection to the GDR, a position 
shared by the representatives of the Bundesbank. They expressed concerns that high levels of 
workers’ rights and protection would threaten the restructuring of the East German economy 
and pleaded for a gradual raising of labor standards to that of their West German counterparts. 
                                                 
757 Werner Schulz, “Wahlprüfsteine auf dem Prüfstand”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte, 11/90, p. 725. Schulz 
was primarily referring to the cornerstones of the DGB’s election platform  with the December 1990 elections in 
mind; these however contain the claims that we have already analyzed in this section. His comment can thus be 
cited here, even if the author is not referring explicitly to the cornerstones of its platform published in November. 
758 Hertle/Schroeder 1990, p. 4-5. 
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As a result of these preliminary discussions, the delegates decided to assess the feasibility of 
introducing lower levels of worker protection in the GDR.759 
Helmut Kohl was receptive to these arguments but wanted to come to negotiations table with 
a draft MESU proposal acceptable to the GDR, i.e., one that included a strong social compo-
nent. Dieter Grosser’s comments on possible resistance within the Federal Republic of Ger-
many if reduced workers’ rights and protection were adopted in the GDR are in clear refer-
ence to fears the DGB trade unions harbored about the impact of partial extension on the West 
German working population. 
Bezeichnend war auch, dass die Ost-CDU und die mit ihr in der Allianz verbündeten 
Parteien im Wahlkampf die unverzüglich „Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion“ 
und nicht lediglich die Währungsunion und Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft gefordert und kei-
nen Zweifel daran gelassen hatten, dass sie den westdeutschen Sozialstaat in vollem 
Umfange wünschten. Auβerdem war abzusehen, dass sich auch in Westdeutschland 
Widerstände regen würden, wenn die Bundesregierung versuchte, in Ostdeutschland ein 
niedrigeres Niveau der sozialen Sicherheit durchzusetzen. Es lag auf der Hand, dass dies 
als erster Schritt zum Abbau ökonomisch nicht mehr vertretbarer sozialer Sicherungen 
auch in Westdeutschland interpretiert werden könnte.760 
In the second (April 8) and third draft (April 19) proposals, the cabinet resolved a majority of 
the contentious issues on the labor and social laws through its support for full and immediate 
extension. This third draft, after minor revision by the chancellor to bolster social protection 
for East German citizens, was the treaty proposition presented by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to the GDR at the negotiating table.761 
By the beginning of May, both German states had agreed on a preliminary version of the 
MESU treaty, which was subsequently announced. The difficulty in predicting the ultimate 
impact of rapid monetary and economic union might have played a role in obtaining  approval 
for a full and immediate extension of the labor law. 
In dieser Lage relativ hoher Ungewissheit, wie sich die Einheit auf die eigene konkrete 
Position auswirken würde, sahen die wichtigsten Interessengruppen wenig Anlass für 
Versuche, auf den Vertragsinhalt Einfluss zu nehmen. Das galt natürlich nur so lange, 
als sie sicher sein konnten, dass die bestehende Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung nicht 
geändert werden würde.762 
If any fears of a weakening of workers’ position were indeed valid, Dieter Grosser believes 
the likelihood that the West German labor law would be extended only partially (or in revised 
                                                 
759 Grosser 1998, p. 257. 
760 Ibid., p. 253. 
761 Ibid., pp. 280-292. 
762 Ibid., p. 323. 
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form) was virtually nil. The ratification of the MESU treaty in May 1990 maintained and 
strengthened the tripartite consensus formed two and a half months earlier in its most obvious 
manifestation, i.e., in full and immediate legal extension. 
Despite its support for MESU, the DBG had certain reservations about the treaty’s formula-
tion, as it would seem to suggest a limitation of collective bargaining autonomy in the public 
sector. The heads of the DGB and the public service union met with the chancellor on May 
15. Helmut Kohl’s letter to Monika Wulf-Matthies the next day removed any such doubts.763 
The 14th DGB congress, held from May 20 to 25, confirmed the bonne entente between the 
trade unions and the government. During the congress, the number of members representing 
the DGB executive board was reduced from nine to eight, while the number of CDU officials 
was kept at two. Furthermore, the new elected president, Heinz-Werner Meyer764, promoted 
an agenda similar to that of the CDU.765 The DGB congress had “forged links” with the 
CDU.766 At the same time, indications of a temporarily cooling in relations with the SPD 
were also evident in some union publications.767  
                                                
The insistence on harmonizing the positions of the DGB unions and the Kohl government, 
based on a common interest in proceeding with the legal extension, should not obscure the 
fact that their views on how this process should move forward were not identical in every 
respect. The DGB considered that contingencies for more temporary, situation-specific, 
measures should have been made. It had also lost a seat on the board of directors of the Treu-
handanstalt, the agency in charge of restructuring and privatizing East German enter-
prises.The MESU treaty, signed in May, confirmed the legal transfer of the West German 
labor law in its entirety, with no revisions or the resultant reduction or increase in rights. 
Within a context where the legal issues relating to the restructuring of the economy promised 
to be frequent, two conditions for legal extension included a guarantee that individuals could 
 
763 Wilke/Müller 1991, pp. 87-8, 230. 
764 He was elected with only 333 votes out of 521, with more than a third of the delegates voting against him 
although he ran uncontested. It was the poorest showing for any DGB president ever in an election.  
765 In the magazine on trade union-related topics published by the Deustches Institut der Wirtschaft, the Gewerk-
schaftsreport, Wolfgang Pege clearly stated that a reduction in the number of CDU delegates to the DGB 
Bundesvorstand would have amounted to less CDU influence over the unitary trade unions (Wolfgang Pege 
1990, “Rotverschiebung? Zur Kandidaten-Diskussion für die neue DGB-Spitze”, p. 22). Two members of the 
CDU thus maintained the influence of the CDU in the DGB, and the election of a president whose positions were 
identified to those of the CDU, increased this influence. The election of Ulf Fink, president of the CDA, as DGB 
vice-president was not easy. He had no experience in trade union action and played no significant role in his 
party. He received only 58,8% of the delegates’ support. The media however greeted his election. 
Hertle/Schroeder 1990, p. 20. 
766 Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 49; similar comments in: Hertle/Schroeder 1990, p. 18. 
767 Klaus Lang for instance criticized the fact that the SPD had not developed any alternative to the rapid mone-
tary union and criticized the first tariff agreements signed by the DGB unions (Lang 1991, p. 187).  
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seek legal recourse and that the labor tribunals would not sufficiently staffed to prevent them 
from being overwhelmed by the caseload. In order to accomplish this objective, DGB legal 
services set up no fewer than 30 legal offices, with more than 80 legal advisers in the GDR, at 
the beginning of 1991. Their main function was to offer East German workers legal assis-
tance. In 1992, the number of offices had increased to 40, with over 170 advisers.768 The 
DGB has also accepted the establishment of workplace-based boards of labor arbitration 
(Schiedsstellen für Arbeitsrecht), which helped to resolve legal disputes according to the stat-
utes of the law and, more specifically, sought out situation-specific solutions. The experiment 
lasted until 1993, with varying degrees of success according to different observers.769 West 
German union officials were strongly opposed to this structure. Yet these examples indicate 
the importance of the efforts made by the DGB to support the rapid adoption of the West 
German labor law and state institutions responsible for monitoring compliance in the eastern 
Länder.  
3.7.4 Conclusion 
After the tripartite consensus was initially achieved in February and March, it was recon-
firmed in no uncertain terms in May. In the intervening months, despite numerous public dec-
larations supporting amendments to  the West German labor law (with a concomitant exten-
sion to the GDR), DGB unions’ strategy had become dedicated to simple legal extension. 
Why? Because calls for amendments to boost worker rights and protection, crucial in gaining 
the support of the East German unions and voices of concern within the DGB, received little 
or no support and were ignored. In regards to the immense organizational task required of the 
trade unions in implementing legal extension, this choice should come as no surprise.  
It is however remarkable that no entity within the German union movement raised any objec-
tions to the abandonment of efforts to amend the West German labor law. The concept of 
simple extension was at first promoted by speakers from the left-wing unions. This consensus 
in favor of transposing one ‘model’ no longer existed because it could no longer guarantee a 
stable framework for trade union politics in the FRG – and therefore represents the unique 
feature in this episode in trade union history in Germany. 
                                                 
768 Kehrmann 1992, p. 570. 
769 Beck/Rosendahl/Schuster 1992. 
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3.8 The DGB Unions and the Institutional Extension of West 
German Industrial Relations II: Expanding trade unions 
structures and collective bargaining rounds 
This final section shifts the focus from the macro-level to our four case studies. It shall high-
light the extraordinary resources committed by the individual West German trade unions to 
the expansion of their structures into Eastern Germany and the impressive display of organ-
izational skills demonstrated in this phase. The establishment of DGB union structures in 
Eastern Germany coincided with the launch of collective bargaining in that region. The 
merger of German unions was a result of the geographical expansion of the DGB unions, the 
disbanding of the East German organizations, and East German workers joining the ranks of 
the DGB organizations. This process was coordinated by the West German unions. The 
launch of collective bargaining rounds was the corollary of the organizational expansion. The 
aim of rapidly lifting the working and living conditions in former East Germany to West 
German levels, a stated goal of the social partners, meant that the first rounds of collective 
bargaining went smoothly and were free of any major conflict. 
3.8.1 Variations on one single theme 
The analysis of DGB union expansion into eastern Germany clearly demonstrates the level of 
influence they wielded over the process of reshaping of the trade union landscape in the GDR. 
Practical considerations forced the DGB unions to continue its collaboration with their East 
German counterparts for a period of time after the disbandment of the FDGB and to take a 
somewhat different tact in the further efforts to expand their structures. One can clearly detect 
certain distinctions between the modalities chosen in seeking organizational expansion. Mi-
chael Fichter and Maria Kurbjuhn distinguish between 
1) DGB unions which, after at first playing an active role in the reform of their East Ger-
man sister organizations, forcibly brought about their dissolution and organized the in-
corporation of these East German workers into their enlarged structures;770 
                                                 
770 Fichter/Kurbjuhn 1993. The authors include the following unions in the first category: IG Bergbau und Ener-
gie, IG Bau-Steine-Erden, IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik, the Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner, the Gewerkschaft 
Gartenbau, Land- und Forstwirtschaft, the Gewerkschaft Holz und Kunststoff, the Gewerkschaft Leder, IG Me-
dien, the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft and the Gewerkschaft Textil und Bekleidung. 
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2) DGB unions which, after initially supporting the reform of East German trade unions, 
favored the creation of new trade unions in the GDR under the same names (e.g., the 
Trade, Banks and Insurance Union of the GDR). These would later be disbanded and 
absorbed into the DGB organization;771 
3) DGB unions which focused their expansion policies on the (controlled) development of 
an East German organization (with the same name and structures) that would later be 
absorbed;772 
4) And the IG Metall, which is said to have followed its own course for expansion. A pe-
riod of close collaboration with the East German IG Metall was followed by a break in 
relations and an assumption of complete control over the process to establish its struc-
tures in the GDR. In contrast to the first two categories of unions, IG Metall did not re-
tain any of the former officials from the former East German union.  
 
These differences highlight the degree to which geographical expansion assumed different 
forms. Such variations were the product of varying levels of receptiveness among the East 
German unions to the West German agenda, coupled with the unequal ability of the DGB 
union to impose this on them rapidly. All these strategies shared common goals (eastward 
expansion of the DGB unions and the incorporation of East German workers), a common 
timeline and remained under the control of the West German unions.773 It is my belief that the 
classification system proposed by Fichter and Kurbjuhn represent only a minor contribution to 
the overall understanding the enlargement process. As we shall soon see, the commonalities 
between the expansion processes at the chemistry and media unions, both assigned to the first 
category in Fichter and Kurbjuhn's system, were no greater than those between similar proc-
esses at the IG Metall and the Public Service, Transport and Traffic Union.   
  
                                                 
771 This category includes the Handel-Banken und Versicherungen and the Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuβ-
Gaststätten. 
772 This category includes the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, the Gewerkschaft der Polizei and the 
Öffentliche Dienste, Transport und Verkehr. In my opinion, the Police Union (Gewerkschaft der Polizei) . 
773 The DGB unions adopted this stance on enlargement some time before the beginning of May. The confer-
ences on disbanding the East German unions were held from the end of September to the end of October. The 
individual DGB unions amended their bylaws to allow for the expansion of their activities into the new Länder 
in the time between September and November. East German workers were invited to join the DGB union on 1 
October and 1 November 1, respectively, (or in the case of IG Metall, on January 1). The first conferences on 
unified trade unions were held between January and June 1991.  
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The point I am attempted to make is that any differences that may exist are of secondary im-
portance when compared to the goals, timelines and resolve that all DGB unions held in 
common. Their activities were concerted and coordinated. We are therefore not dealing with 
three, four or even five different strategies of the DGB unions, but indeed several manifesta-
tions upon one single strategy brought about by contextual differences. The modalities of 
DGB union expansion were mere variations on one common theme. To expand on this anal-
ogy, one could say that the slight variations observed in the expansion process at the DGB 
unions were more like the minor exercises by a novice composer than the wide range of musi-
cal expressions heard in the Goldberg or Diabelli Variations.  
For this reason, the methodology employed by Manfred Wilke and Hans-Peter Müller, whose 
book, published in 1991, details the expansion of each DGB union on a case by case basis, 
presenting these processes as multiple manifestations on one process, is preferable to the 
model proposed by Fichter and Kurbjuhn. This approach is thus promoted in the upcoming 
section, which will detail the expansion process at IG Metall, the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics 
Industrial Union, the Public Service, Transport and Traffic Union and the Media Industrial 
Union.  
3.8.2 The expansion of IG Metall 
Looking back on the first decade of IG Metall activities in the eastern Länder, the then head 
of the Saxony district offices (later Brandenburg-Saxony), Hasso Düvel, underlined, not with-
out a hint of pride, that it took only six months for his organization to establish its structures 
and to ratify the first collective agreements in the (former) GDR.774 This impressive organiza-
tional feat will be described in the pages to come. Greater attention is devoted to the IG Met-
all expansion than to other trade unions because it is the best documented of the four case 
studies. This in-depth study of the process at IG Metall will be useful in approaching the re-
maining three case studies. 
                                                 
774 Düvel 1999, p.  
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3.8.2.1 From cooperation to the merger of the two metal unions 
In February 1990, IG Metall was working to intensify the partnerships between workers at 
“similar enterprises” in East and West Germany. There was growing anxiety among East 
German workers about their future job security. On the one hand, workers maintained their 
memberships in the union (only about 10% of the 1.68 millions had left), arguably to bolster 
their bargaining power vis-à-vis factory managers. Conversely, the numerous types of em-
ployee representation and worker rights in place at East German workplaces created a certain 
sense of confusion. This situation prevented the IG Metall (DDR) from pushing through its 
agenda and was unfavorable to its reform program. In many workplaces, the local union had 
stopped transferring union dues to the IG Metall (DDR).775  
In an editorial published at the beginning of February, IG Metall president Franz Steinkühler 
expressed concerns which brought about the March shift in strategy. Under the motto, “We’re 
joining in on the action”, Steinkühler stressed how developments within the East German la-
bor would determine the situation of trade unions in a unified Germany. He called for a “radi-
cal break from the politics, organization and personnel of [the East German IG Metall's] past”. 
Über die Zukunft der Arbeitnehmer- und Gewerkschaftsrechte in einem geeinten 
Deutschland wird heute auf dem Territorium der DDR entschieden. Wenn dort Sozial-
standards heruntergefahren und Arbeitnehmerrechte beschnitten werden, und wen dort 
ein zersplittertes Gewerkschaftswesen entsteht, dann wird dies schwer zu korrigierende 
Auswirkungen auf die Situation in einem gemeinsamen Deutschland haben.776  
An attempt by the IG Metall to initiate the merger of the two metal unions was made on 
March 15, during a meeting of the union's advisory board. In view of the resounding "suc-
cess" of its first eight information offices, IG Metall announced the opening of seven new 
ones in the GDR six days after the DGB/BDA joint declaration and three before the East 
German elections. This decision transformed the information offices into bases of operations 
for the IG Metall in the GDR. One person involved in the process made the point that it was 
no longer “enough to simply staff the information offices with a few retired trade unionists.” 
He stressed that, due to the major role these offices were to play in achieving a merger be-
tween the two metal unions, it was absolutely imperative for officials to remain in constant 
close contact with the union leadership. For the IG Metall, "becoming involved in the GDR" 
meant allowing the East German industry union to assume the central position among work-
                                                 
775 Michael Böhm, “Im Wartesaal zur Einheit”, metall, 5/90, pp. 8-9; Michael Böhm, “Das Vertrauen muss vor 
Ort wachsen”, metall, 7/90, pp. 8-9. 
776 Franz Steinkühler, “Wir mischen uns jetzt ein”, metall, 3/90 (February 9), p. 3. 
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place structures of worker representation. IG Metall's Council lamented that the reverse situa-
tion still present in the GDR was encouraging “a trend towards company unions” (betrieb-
ssyndikalistische Tendenzen) and undermining the overall effectiveness of trade unionism.777 
Yet IG Metall (GDR) was not able to implement the measures its West German counterparts 
deemed necessary. The 12th General Assembly of Delegates of the IG Metall (DDR), held on 
April 8 and 9, did not produce the outcome anticipated by the West German union. Even if a 
resolution in favor of works councils,and the East German version of the Works Constitution 
Act were passed, internal reforms had brought the structures of the two unions more into line 
and specific criticism was voiced at the FDGB, IG Metall was nevertheless disappointed by 
the results of the assembly. Its main reason for discontent related to the inability of Franz 
Steinkühler to achieve any sort of consensus among delegates on the issue of speeding up the 
pace of the merger (which he wanted to see completed in time for IG Metall’s 100th anniver-
sary in June 1991). The resolution on the merger as adopted merely called for the establish-
ment of a joint commission responsible for determining the conditions and schedule for the 
merger.778 IG Metall had other grounds for caution. IG Metall's observers believed that the 
collective bargaining issues had not received sufficient attention, something they viewed as 
confirming their suspicion that IG Metall (DDR) was in no position to enter into such negotia-
tions in the near future. Despite a motion supporting works councils and the Works Constitu-
tion Act, the delegates refused to criticize the East German law on trade unions. The lack of 
any clear preference for one model of worker representation by the East German delegates 
thus remained unchanged. Finally, even if the FDGB apparatus had ultimately proved unsuc-
cessful in its attempt to defeat the reformer Hartwig Bugiel in the race for the union presi-
dency, its candidate Karin Schubert was elected to oversee the union’s finances.779 
                                                 
777 See the summary of the advisory board meeting: “Bruch mit der Vergangenheit”, Der Gewerkschafter, 4/90, 
p. 7-8. 
778 Zentralvorstand der IG Metall, IG Metall aktuell, Berlin, 1990, p. 3, cited in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 210. 
779 Klaus-Peter Wolf, “Tücken der Vergangenheit”, DerGewerkschafter, 5/90, pp. 12-13; “Erneuerer setzten sich 
durch”, Die tageszeitung, April 11, 1990.  
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3.8.2.2 IG Metall takes control of the merger process  
The collaborative activities between the two unions was initially continued.780 A conflict de-
veloped in the course of discussions between the presidents of IG Metall (East and West) in 
Frankfurt and Berlin. While Frankfurt tried to impose its agenda on expansion, Berlin sought 
a major role in co-determining the merger process, which led to a breakdown in relations be-
tween the two parties in May. IG Metall took measures to isolate the East German union and 
further pursue its organizational expansion. 
On May 8, IG Metall’s executive committee adopted a five-point memorandum which an-
nounced that the merger of the two metal workers union would take the form of individual 
East German workers joining the IG Metall,781 which was indeed a novel approach. The 
memorandum also clearly rejected the East German law on trade unions. In reaction, East 
German metal union president Hartwig Bugiel toned down its criticism of the MESU (the 
vote was scheduled for ten days later although its exact content was already known), even if 
he continued to talk of a “diktat from West Germany”.782 On the next day, May 9, Bugiel co-
signed the declaration calling for the dissolution of the FDGB, together with the other heads 
of East German trade unions. But his attempts to maintain his influence on the merger process 
proved ineffective.  
On May 25 during the DGB congress, Franz Steinkühler reiterated that the merger of German 
unions signified “a unification of the West German trade unions and the East German peo-
ple”. During a meeting held that the very same day, IG Metall’s executive committee con-
firmed its stranglehold on the merger process. Decision-making authority and supervision of 
the process were held centrally in the hands of the union's president, first vice-president and 
                                                 
780 With varying results. The director of the information office in Karl-Marx-Stadt stated how difficult it was for 
IG Metall (DDR) to receive its share of union dues from the enterprise unions. Although the majority of the 
city’s workers were members of the union, less than 8% of the union fees were transferred to the local branch of 
the IG Metall (DDR)! In his view, this could be interpreted as a rejection of the union’s leadership by the rank 
and file. The antiquated bookkeeping methods used by the union also made it almost impossible to trace and 
determine the payment of dues. See: Edmund Möller, “Bei Null anfangen”, Der Gewerkschafter, 7/90, pp. 8-9. 
There were other, more positive, experiences of collaboration between the two unions at that time, for instance, 
at the Robotron Büromaschinenwerk Sömmerda. Workers, management and unions restructured the enterprise. 
75% of the shares in the company were distributed among employees and the remaining 25% were transferred to 
the Treuhandanstalt. 50% of the seats on the board of administrators were reserved for representatives of work-
ers. What had been presented at the time as a “model” for a new approach to co-determination and the improve-
ment of worker rights by the IG Metall was an experiment that was not to be repeated. See: “Volkseigentum 
sichern”, Der Gewerkschafter, 5/90, p. 24; Roesler 2002.  
781 “Die soziale Einheit gestalten! Memorandum des IG Metall zur sozialen Ausgestaltung des Prozesses der 
Einigung der beiden deutschen Staaten”, May 8, 1990, cited in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 210. 
782 “Moderate Gewerkschaftskritik am Staatsvertrag ”, Die tageszeitung, May 9, 1990. 
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treasurer.783 In a declaration to the press, members of the executive committee stated that ei-
ther IG Metall (DDR) was to give “the signal for its disbandment and for its members to join 
the IG Metall” or the latter would “actively recruit members in the GDR”. The threat was ob-
vious and Berlin conceded. On the same day, Steinkühler announced the disbanding of IG 
Metall (DDR).  
Die IG Metall der DDR wird im September auf einer Zentraldelegiertenkonferenz die 
satzungsgemäβen Voraussetzungen für den Übertritt ihrer Mitglieder schaffen.784 
On the following evening, an agreement was ratified by the two metal unions, which revised 
key aspects of the memorandum published three weeks earlier: organizational expansion of 
IG Metall and the admission of individual East German workers into the organization.785 The 
Central Assembly of Delegates of IG Metall (DDR) in September would conclude the process 
of disbandment. A special congress of IG Metall in November would make the necessary 
changes to the organizational bylaws and allow for the expansion and the admission of East 
German workers, which would occur between January 1 and the end of May 2001 - in time 
for IG Metall’s 100th anniversary.786 The agreement confirmed the failure of  IG Metall 
(DDR)’s vision for a negotiated merger.787 
Franz Steinkühler justified the cessation of collaboration with the East German union by stat-
ing that weak unions and poor collective agreements in the GDR represented a real threat to 
wages, working conditions and union power in the Federal Republic.  
Wenn dort schlechte Verträge abgeschlossen werden, dann verschlechtert dies die tarif-
politischen Ausgangsbedingungen in einem vereinten Deutschland und beschwört  da-
mit die Gefahr eines tarifpolitischen Stillstandes oder gar Rückschrittes auch für unsere 
Tarifverträge herauf. Dies gilt in gleichem Maβe für die Mitbestimmung, die Betriebs-
verfassung, die Sozialpolitik und für alle übrigen Gebiete gewerkschaftlicher Interes-
senvertretung. Und dies gilt nicht zuletzt auch für die gewerkschaftliche Stärke 
788selbst.  
                                                 
783 “Vorlage für die Sitzung der geschäftsführenden Vorstandsmitglieder am: 28. Mai 1990”, p. 1. 
784 Jutta Roitsch, “Schwierige Annäherung – feindliche Übernahme”, Frankfurter, May 25, 1990. 
785 All signs would seem to indicate that it is with this commission in mind that IG Metall’s executive committee 
named the president, the vice-president and the treasurer responsible of the negotiations with the IG Metall 
(DDR) on the previous day.  
786 “Gewerkschaftseinheit verwirklichen”, republished in: Der Gewerkschafter, 6/90, p. 5.  
787 “Metaller in Ost und West bald vereint”, Die tageszeitung, May 26, 1990. There was apparently a certain 
degree of confusion among journalists on the precise details of the agreement. This article contains two errors, 
namely that IG Metall (DDR) members were to join the IG Metall en masse and that officials from the East 
German union were to be rehabilitated by the West German union. It is impossible to know the source of this 
confusion. But the direct language used by IG Metall at that time, reported the day before in Jutta Roitsch’s 
article (see above), indicates that they were probably the work of the taz journalist. 
788 Franz Steinkühler, “Eine IG Metall für Deutschland”, Der Gewerkschafter, 6/90, pp. 4-5. 
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Franz Steinkühler put arguments previously made in opposition to the legal extension on their 
head, as he now used them to justify a strategy that excluded any collaboration with East 
German unionists. In this regard, he stated that East German unionists were not sufficiently 
versed in the West German labor law and its legal system and furthermore lacked the support 
of East German workers in the IG Metall (DDR), as factors that motivated the IG Metall to 
act independently. Similarly, an official sent to Leipzig in 1990 portrayed the desire of East 
German metal unionists to uphold union representation at the workplace level as the product 
of a complete “lack of knowledge of the history of the labor movement”.789 The development 
of the system of industrial relations in the Federal Republic of Germany, with all the tri-
umphs, setbacks and compromises of the trade unions, was viewed as “the” history of the la-
bor movement. The fact that IG Metall (DDR) remained ambivalent toward this model was 
seen as confirmation that IG Metall needed to exert greater control over the merger process.790 
After the May 25 agreement, the active campaign to get workers to join the IG Metall, along 
with the organization of the disbandment, were among the few tasks given to IG Metall 
(DDR). 
3.8.2.3 The organization of the expansion: The July 10 meeting  
IG Metall organized five working groups, coordinated by a committee supervised by Franz 
Steinkühler’s right-hand man, Karlheinz Blessing.791 Special attention shall be devoted to the 
activities of this Coordination Committee and the Working Group I (organization, structures, 
staff) and IV (works councils, training and recruitment). Their reports were presented to IG 
Metall's executive committee on July 10.792 
                                                 
789 Kletzin 1994, p. 85. 
790 In all our discussions with him, Jochen Kletzin was visibly more enthusiastic about his experience in Leipzig 
and the people he worked with there, than he was when he wrote his article which would seem to point to the 
difficulties encountered here. It is possible that the tug of war between Frankfurt and Berlin did not take on the 
same dimensions in all East German regions as the top union officials - the discussions between the two IG Met-
all executives - would lead us to believe. According to the head of the IG Metall in West Berlin, the collabora-
tion between unionists from both organizations in this city went rather smoothly and, if anything, went  against 
the wishes of Frankfurt. See: Manfred Foede, “Vereint mit der DDR”, Der Gewerkschafter, 11/90, pp. 21-22. 
791 Working Group 1 was responsible for issues relating to the organization, structures, personnel and confer-
ences. Working Group 2 was responsible of issues relating to membership and finances. Working Group 3 pre-
pared the collective bargaining negotiations. Working Group 4 was in charge of union politics in relation to 
works councils, training and recruitment. Working group 5 was in charge of the team collaboration (Personen-
gruppenarbeit). See: “Vorlage für die Sitzung der geschäftsführenden Vorstandsmitglieder am: 28. Mai 1990”. 
792 “Vorlage zur Gliederung der DDR-Aktivitäten” and “Zeit- und Aktivitätenplan zur Übertragung der Organi-
sationsstrukturen der IGM für die BRD auf das Gebiet der DDR”, both adopted by IG Metall’s executive board 
on June 29, 1990, and included in the: “Vorlage für die Sitzung des Vorstands am 10. Juli 1990”. Also: “Vorlage 
für die Sitzung des Vorstandes am 10. Juli 1990 – Betriebsratswahlen in der DDR”. 
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Reports prepared by the Coordination Committee and the Working Group I illustrate how the 
expansion process hinged on organizational efficiency conditioned by the need to proceed 
with the utmost urgency. Other considerations were of a secondary importance and often sac-
rificed due to need to act as quickly as possible.  
The expansion plan drafted by Working Group I (organization, structures, personnel) prepared 
the “organizational integration of the territories of the GDR into the jurisdiction of the IG 
Metall”.793 It was rooted in procedures originally conceived for the opening of administrative 
offices (Verwaltungsstellen) and was under the supervision of the district office (Bezirkslei-
tung). The recent experience of consolidating four administrative offices in North Rhine-
Westphalia served as a model for expansion. The fact that the fusion of four administrative 
offices in a union stronghold in West Germany could be compared to the establishment of 
top-to-bottom IG Metall structures in the GDR illustrates how the expansion was primarily 
viewed in June of that year as an organizational and bureaucratic challenge. The reports pre-
pared by Working Group I stressed that the conditions for rapid progress towards expansion 
were 1) a retention of the current statutes and 2) continued use of present methods of opera-
tion.794 
To achieve such continuity, the choice of the personnel was crucial. The first staff members 
sent by IG Metall to the GDR had often been retired and honorary officers of the union (Ehre-
namtlichen). The expansion process now required reliable, full-time officials dedicated to 
implementing the strategy drafted in Frankfurt. The selection of personnel was especially im-
portant for initiating the new round of collective bargaining in the near future. The Eastern 
district executive committees (Bezirksleitungen), who were assigned this portfolio, needed 
staff capable of handling the negotiations. The employee policy was thus a key aspect in the 
expansion and the union’s executive committee was careful not to surrender its influence over 
the nomination process and refused to hire IG Metall (DDR) officials, at least initially. 
The financial autonomy of the East German administrative offices in charge of the member 
relations was another priority, and was necessary from the very beginning.795 An administra-
tive office needed about 20,000 members (of which an average of 10,000 were full paying 
members) to achieve financially autonomy. Working Group II (membership and finances) 
estimated that about 60% of the 1.68 millions of IG Metall (DDR) would join the IG Metall, 
                                                 
793 “Vorlage zur Gliederung der DDR-Aktivitäten”, p. 4. 
794  Idem and “Zeit- und Aktivitätenplan zur Übertragung der Organisationsstrukturen der IGM für die BRD auf 
das Gebiet der DDR”, p. 2. 
795 “Vorlage zur Gliederung der DDR-Aktivitäten”, p. 4. 
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figures which in retrospective were quite accurate.796 A simple calculation thus suggests that 
50 administrative offices could be maintained. 37 were initially opened. 
The opening of district headquarters and administrative offices was the top priority and had to 
be completed by January 1, 1991. To date, the IG Metall’s structures in the GDR had been 
officially designated Information and Counseling offices. They were set to become the actual 
structures of representation for the region’s metal workers on July 1, 1990, the date the 
MESU came into effect. To supplement the small teams at the first 15 information offices, IG 
Metall announced the opening of 35 information offices and 100 new officials on July 10.  
Each union information office was given until December 31, 1990, to complete the process of 
restructuring themselves into operational district headquarters or administrative offices. The 
representative secretaries from the district headquarters (beauftragter Geschäftsführer) were in 
charge of coordinating the establishment of the administrative offices, with the number of 
such offices set at between six and nine per district. Their work was closely coordinated by 
Frankfurt, demonstrated by the fact that union officials were obligated to seek prior approval 
from the union executive board for any expenses exceeding 10,000 DM.  
To ensure the first round of collective bargaining could take place, the number of new district 
headquarters was kept to a bare minimum, as seen by the fact that only two fully autonomous 
East German district headquarters were created in Berlin and Dresden. The others were incor-
porated into West German regional chapters, who assumed control over the collective bar-
gaining negotiations. For example, the East German districts of Rostock, Schwerin and Neu-
brandenburg were integrated into the Hamburg regional chapter; Halle and Magdeburg into 
Hanover; Erfurt, Suhr and Gera into Frankfurt, etc. The districts of Chemnitz (Karl-Marx-
Stadt), Dresden and Leipzig were combined to form a regional chapter based in Dresden, 
while the districts of East and West Berlin were combined with Potsdam, Frankfurt/Oder and 
Cottbus in the new Berlin regional chapter.797  
The transformation of the Information and Counseling offices into genuine administrative 
offices was performed parallel to these other activities. The designated heads of the adminis-
trative offices were to remain in their posts until the election of an executive board was con-
                                                 
796 Werner Schreiber, “Gewerkschaftseinheit finanzierbar”, Der Gewerkschafter, 7/90, p. 1 and Ibid., “Solides 
Fundament”, Der Gewerkschafter, 9/90, pp. 4-5. 
797 “Vorlage zur Gliederung der DDR-Aktivitäten”, pp. 6-7. 
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firmed by Frankfurt after May 1991.798 Recent experiences in North Rhine-Westphalia had 
shown that it was easier to split an administrative office in two than merge two into one. The 
recommendations of Working Group I to initially restrict the number of administrative offices 
were thus heeded.799  
The July 10 report by the Working Group IV (works councils, training and recruitment) on 
the organization of works councils’ election recommended holding works councils elections 
in as many metal enterprises as possible before the end of the year.800 Working Group IV 
stressed the vital role these first rounds of elections would be for the future success of IG 
Metall’s endeavors to transplant its structures toeastern Germany. 
Mit dieser Betriebsratswahl werden die entscheidenden Grundlagen für die zukünftige 
Funktionärsstruktur, für das Erscheinungsbild der IG Metall im Betrieb, für die Mitglie-
derbetreuung und Werbung sowie für den Organisationsaufbau gelegt.801 
Working Group IV drafted a training scheme aimed at East German unionists to cover the 
preparation, organization and participation in works council elections. The practical goal of 
this training program was to provide assistance to unionists at enterprises in preparing voter 
lists, candidate lists and in the selection of the election committees. These instructional semi-
nars were taught by full-time West German officers (Hauptamtlicher), assigned in Frankfurt 
by the head of the educational division. Under the recommendation of Working Group IV, the 
union magazine metall published supplements targeted at the East German unionists, which 
explained the intricacies of works council elections. IG Metall’s executive committee also 
tried to dispel any doubts or uncertainties currently held by East German rank-and-file union-
ists. In a letter, they reiterated the responsibility of employers for the material organization of 
works councils elections and stated it was illegal to deduct the time used to vote from working 
hours.802 
                                                 
798 In order to provide the reader with more details on the IG Metall’s plan of expansion in the GDR, the a copy 
of the timetable drafted by the Working Group I and ratified by the Vorstand on July 10 is included in the ap-
pendix.  
799 “Zeit- und Aktivitätenplan zur Übertragung der Organisationsstrukturen der IGM für die BRD auf das Gebiet 
der DDR”, p. 3. 
800 “Vorlage für die Sitzung des Vorstandes am 10. Juli 1990. Betriebsratswahlen in der DDR”. The MESU 
treaty included provisions for works councils election to be held between July 2, 1990 and June 31, 1991. 
801 “Vorlage für die Sitzung des Vorstandes am 10. Juli 1990. Betriebsratswahlen in der DDR”, 2nd page (unnu-
merotated). 
802 Franz Steinkühler and Horst Klaus, “An die Geschäftsleitungen der Betriebe der Metallwirtschaft in der 
DDR”, August 24, 1990, copy in possession of the author. 
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Hence, the July 10 meeting laid the groundwork for the expansion of IG Metall into the GDR. 
The decisions approved and confirmed that day were key to the entire process: the opening of 
35 information offices, the dispatch of 100 West German officials, as well as the confirmation 
that no former officials from the IG Metall (DDR) would be hired to perform functions in the 
new eastern structures of the IG Metall. With this in mind, this meeting could be described as 
the final break in all ties between the two metal trade unions.803 
3.8.2.4 The dissolution of IG Metall (DDR) 
IG Metall (DDR) set the date for its disbandment for December 31 at a congress held on Oc-
tober 5-6. The union also adopted the legal measures necessary for the incorporation of its 
members into the IG Metall.804 The resolutions from the congress were adopted out of neces-
sity and for no other reason. In an open letter to its members, the union's president wrote: 
Uns stehen weitere soziale Kämpfe um unsere Interessen bevor. Um sie erfolgreich zu 
bestehen, bedarf es einer einheitlichen IG Metall im geeinten Deutschland.805 
Some pronouncements, such as the IG Metall’s recognition of the years of membership in the 
East German union, were certainly welcomed by the delegates. Still, many were obviously 
upset by a process which, they felt, left them with no other option but to comply with the de-
cisions made in Frankfurt. Franz Steinkühler was reaching out to these persons when he de-
clared: 
Niemand braucht mit gesenktem Haupt in die deutsche Einheit gehen – und erst recht 
nicht in die geeinte IG Metall. Ich wünsche mir möglichst viele Kolleginnen und Kolle-
gen aus der ehemaligen DDR mit aufrechtem Gang und mit Rückgrat und wir wollen 
nichts tun um dazu beizutragen ihnen diesen Gang noch schwerer zu machen als er oh-
nehin ist.806 
 Hartwig Bugiel, still head of the IG Metall (DDR), made a very similar declaration and added 
that the disbandment of his organization was “not a sign of weakness”.807 According to Franz 
Steinkühler, the redundancy package offered by the IG Metall to the dismissed East German 
                                                 
803 Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 215. 
804 “Zeit des Abschieds”, metall, 21/90, p. 16. 
805 Cited in: “Letzte Etappe”, Der Gewerkschafter, 11/90, p. 7. 
806 The abovementioned article reports the first part of this quote. The longer excerpt printed here is from the 
cover of a brochure distributed during IG Metall’s 2nd Special Congress.  
807 The same brochure contained this declaration on its back side: “Wir als Metaller der ehemaligen DDR können 
erhobenen Hauptes und aufrechten Ganges in die Gewerkschaftseinheit gehen. Die Auflösung der IG Metall der 
DDR ist kein Zeichen der Schwäche!”. 
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secretaries was so generous that they would be well-advised not to publicize it, as many East 
German unemployed workers would show little sympathy for their complaints.808 
Were these officials handed “golden parachutes” in order to pacify any resistance to the ex-
pansion process? Maybe these could be seen as an incentive for the IG Metall (DDR) leader-
ship to keep a low profile after losing the battle for a merger of the two unions. The author 
was unable to find more information about this severance package. Until Spring 2004, Hart-
wig Bugiel was in charge of liquidating the assets of the IG Metal (DDR). He has twice re-
fused to address these issues. I attempted to arrange an interview with him and also offered 
him the opportunity to address the GDR study group at the Centre Marc-Bloch in Berlin. He 
was quite vocal in his refusals over the phone.  
The remaining legal barriers to expansion were lifted during IG Metall’s 2nd Special Congress 
held on 1 + 2 November 1991 in Bonn. The required amendments to the organizational stat-
utes were all approved by the delegates.809  
3.8.2.5 The cost of expansion 
It is very hard to determine the exact cost of expansion for the IG Metall. According to the 
Provisional Report of the union treasurer published in September 1991, the union funds had 
grown by about 6.9 millions DM in 1990. The rise in West German membership had more 
than compensated for the expenditures in the GDR.810 The figures published a few months 
later in IG Metall's Annual Report showed a loss of about 10.8 millions DM in 1990, despite 
an additional 3.5 million DM in interest payments. 
What brought about the 17.7 millions DM difference (from a 6.9 million surplus to a 10.8 
million deficit)? According to the Annual Report, the bulk of this sum (13.3 millions DM), 
was allocated to the union training schools. The Provisional Report indicated costs of 27 mil-
lions DM in 1990 (roughly as much as in 1989), while this sum had jumped to 40.3 millions 
in the Annual Report. The chances that this 50 % rise had not been anticipated are quite slim. 
Nonetheless, the importance of training costs indicate the great efforts made by IG Metall to 
educate the East German unionists about the mechanisms of the West German system of in-
dustrial relations. The training program developed by Working Group IV during the Summer 
                                                 
808 “Letzte Etappe”. 
809 The amendments proposed by the executive committee and adopted by the delegates were published in: “Auf 
dem Weg zur Einheit”, metall, 19/90, pp. 8-9. 
810 Werner Schreiber, “Keine Turbulenzen”, Der Gewerkschafter, 9/91, pp. 6-7.  
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1990 is without doubt partially responsible from the increase in the budget for the training 
schools. 
A comparison with the budget allotted to each department in 1989 clearly indicates an even 
greater financial commitment by IG Metall in 1990 to finance its expansion. Although the 
union’s income grew by 51 millions DM, its spending increased by about 86 millions DM, 
showing a loss of 35 millions DM.811 It is impossible to calculate the share earmarked for 
union activities in the GDR, although one can reasonably assume that it represented a major 
portion of this sum. A similar comparison for the years 1990/1991 shows income rose at a 
faster pace than spending (190 millions vs. 167 millions DM).812 Even if its is impossible to 
verify the claim that all the added expenditures were devoted to operations in eastern Ger-
many, the addition of more than one million new members would appear to compensate for 
any costs incurred.  
No figures for the total cost of expansion appear to exist. The estimates presented here are 
incomplete, as no allowances are made for full-time West German officials working in eastern 
Germany among others. Attempts by IG Metall to recover former properties of the Wil-
helmine and Weimar German Metal Association (Deutscher Metall Verband) through the liq-
uidation of FDGB's assets are an indicator of the tremendous resources mobilized for organ-
izational expansion.813 Unfortunately, I was not able to obtain any figures on the value of the 
assets recovered by IG Metall at the time of publication. 
3.8.3 The expansion of the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union 
The expansion of the chemistry union took a path which, to a certain extent, deviated from the 
one chosen by the IG Metall. The IG Metall’s expansion was premised on the disbandment of 
its East German counterpart, whereas Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union took the 
route of cooperation with the East German Chemistry, Glass and Ceramics Union. The struc-
tures of the East German chemistry union were built on those of its predecessor. This strategy 
can be described as a merger, however one must bear in mind that this was not a merger of 
equals. The conditions for this merger were established in Hanover by the West German 
chemistry union and accepted, without much resistance, by its East German counterpart. For-
                                                 
811 The exact figures are: Revenue = +DM 50,912,010; expenditures = DM 85,742,970. Profit/loss =  
-34.830.960 DM. See: Vorstand der IG Metall 1992, pp. 339-340. 
812 The exact figures are: Revenue = DM 190,558,500; expenditures = 167,110,010 DM. Profit/loss = 
+23.448.490 DM. See: Ibid., pp. 340-341.  
813 The financial statement indicates that the union tried to recover 98 former DMV properties (Ibid., p. 337). See 
also: Franz Steinkühler, “Es geht um Gerechtigkeit”, metall, 18/90, p. 3. 
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mer East German officials assumed roles in the enlarged organization, which forced the union 
leadership in Hanover to commit significant resources to their training. 
3.8.3.1 The five preconditions from February 28. 
The respective presidents of the two chemistry unions met at the end of January to increase 
the level of cooperation between their organizations in day-to-day operations.814 Though this 
declaration was in line with in the first strategy of the DGB unions, the support for German 
reunification included in this statement was indeed new.  
Die IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik und die IG Chemie-Glas-Keramik (DDR) wollen alle 
Bestrebungen unterstützen und fördern, die der Wiedervereinigung der beiden deut-
schen Staaten dienen.  
It was not the first pro-unity stance taken by a DGB member union, but most likely the first 
joint declaration with an East German union. Much evidence indicates that this support for 
German reunification was instigated on the part of the chemistry union to complement its col-
laborative activities. Although hinted at in the January declaration, it did not expressly state 
that the collaborative endeavors pursued by the two chemistry unions would ultimately result 
in their merger. 
The Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union declared its plan for a merger with its East 
German counterpart for the first time one month later. This document, announcing the intensi-
fication of the union's presence in the GDR, marked an end to its former strategy of support 
and collaboration.815 The chemistry union was the first DGB union to make this shift, and its 
measures toward legal extension and organizational expansion were more resolute than those 
taken by IG Metall's Council at its March 15 meeting.816 Its declaration stressed the impor-
tance of the social union and announced the DGB/BDA joint declaration due for publication 
nine days later. The DGB union declared its intention of entering the East German fray and to 
assume control over the organization of collective bargaining there. 
Der Prozess einer Kooperation bis zur Fusion werde auch diktiert von den wirtschaftli-
chen Gang der westlichen Kapitalbeteiligungen in der DDR. Mit den Arbeitgeberver-
bänden in der Bundesrepublik strebe man die Bildung gemischter Kommissionen an, 
um die künftige Tarifarbeit in der DDR vorzubereiten.   
                                                 
814 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Auf dem Weg zum Vertragsgemeinschaft”, January 30, 1990. 
815 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Die IG Chemie-Papier-Keramik verstärkt ihre Arbeit in der DDR”, February 28, 
1990, reproduced in: IG CPK 1993, document 14. 
816 See above, 3.8.1.2. 
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For the first time, the merger of the two chemistry unions was explicitly stated as an objec-
tive. In the DGB union agenda, the term ‘merger’ referred to an expansion process based on 
the absorption of the employees and assets of its East German counterpart. The union's pres-
ence in the GDR was expanded: three new offices were opened in addition to the one in Leip-
zig and more West German officials were sent in to bolster the operation. 
The main points of this declaration stated the five requirements that the IG CGK(DDR) had to 
meet. The chemistry union established these as the preconditions for any merger. The wording 
of the document captures how the expansion of the DGB unions was interconnected with le-
gal extension. The first precondition referred to the acceptance of the main political principles 
of the West German chemistry union, i.e., support for parliamentary democracy, the rule of 
law and independence from political parties and non-union organizations. The second one 
obliged the East German union to enact the West German law on co-determination and to 
establish works councils in the GDR. The third precondition demanded the rescission of the 
law on trade unions and a rejection of political strikes. The fourth precondition related to 
compliance with the principles of social partnership and cooperation as practiced by the West 
German chemistry union. Finally, the headquarters of the unified chemistry union were to 
remain in Hanover.  
Such preconditions basically equate to the eastward expansion of the West German chemistry 
union's structures in the GDR. They probably would have been accepted on principle by 
Hartmut Löschner, head of IG CGK (DDR) since 1982, before their publication. This plan for 
expansion guaranteed future employment for most of the East German union secretaries, rare 
at other unions in the GDR. 
This plan demanded the ratification of the five preconditions by the East German chemistry 
union’s Central Delegates Conference in April. Rappe insisted that no further steps toward 
merger could be taken until that time. He demanded that Löschner use the days and weeks 
until the start of the conference to persuade the delegates to accept these conditions, or the 
strategy of his union might be revised.  
Zurzeit heiβt es für uns bei allen verstärkten Aktivitäten in der DDR vor weiteren 
Schritten abzuwarten. Am 27. und 28. April findet in Bernau eine auβerordentliche 
Zentraldelegiertenversammlung der IG Chemie, Glas und Keramik mit 300 gewählten 
Delegierten statt, auf der auch ein neuer Vorstand gewählt wird. Die dort getroffenen 
Beschlüsse werden erkennbar machen, ob dann nach einer Kooperationsphase mit ver-
schiedenen gemeinsamen Vorstandskommissionen eine spätere Fusion erreichbar ist.817 
                                                 
817 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Groβe Aufgaben für eine starke Gewerkschaft”, March 29, 1990, p. 1. 
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3.8.3.2 Collaboration with employers’ associations 
The West German chemistry union used the months of March and April to establish a col-
laborative framework with the West German employers’ associations. In the direct aftermath 
of the DGB/BDA joint declaration from March 9, the West German chemistry union and em-
ployers ratified three agreements, its most obvious transposition in any sectoral level. In these 
agreements, the social partners called for an extension of the West German labor laws and the 
dual structure of worker representation. They agreed to engage in collective bargaining in the 
GDR. 
A four-point joint declaration by the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union and the 
Federal Chemistry Employers’ Association (Bundesarbeitgeberverband Chemie) was first 
ratified on March 13. Both partners agreed to exchange information in small working groups, 
and on the introduction of a social market economy, works councils and social partnership 
practices in the GDR.818 
A second agreement, with the employers’ associations from the paper industry (Vereinigung 
der Arbeitgeberverbände der deutschen Papierindustrie), was signed four weeks later.819 This 
declaration opened by stating that the form of cooperation practiced in West Germany, “based 
on the social market economy and freely elected works councils”, was a “suitable model for 
the GDR”. Both organizations declared their intent to establish effective industry-level collec-
tive bargaining authority and social partnership in the GDR.  
The third agreement was signed with the employers from the rubber and ceramics industry 
less than one month after the first.820 The similarity of the formulations used in this document 
with the other two declarations is unmistakable.  
3.8.3.3 Difficulties encountered in introducing works councils 
West German union secretaries sent to the GDR actively promoted legal extension and organ-
izational expansion. It would not have been possible for the West German chemistry union to 
superimpose its structures onto those of the former FDGB union without the support of work-
ers at the workplace. Yet suspicions toward the East German chemistry union remained deep-
seated and the collaboration with former officials often questioned. West German union secre-
                                                 
818 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Gemeinsame Verfahrensgrundsätze zur Entwicklung in der DDR”, March 13, 1990. 
819 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Gemeinsame Thesen zur Zusammenarbeit in der DDR”, April 5, 1990. 
820 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Zusammenarbeit bei DDR-Fragen mit Kautschuk- und Keramikindustrie”, April 11, 
1990.  
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taries exploited the broad interest of East German workers in enterprise partnerships and the 
West German system of worker representation821, to systematically promote legal extension 
and the merger with the East German union. Instructions sent to all administrative offices and 
districts made these points clear.822  
Michael Mersmann, head of the West German chemistry union's district office in Leipzig, 
sensed a positive response from East German workers to his actions. In May, he claimed he 
had succeeding in persuading the employees at 90 East German chemistry enterprises to or-
ganize elections for works councils.823 An internal memorandum from June tempered these 
claims.824 Not only was the number of elected works councils in the GDR chemistry lower 
(60, not 90) but there was seemingly little reason to believe these works councils would be 
capable of acting independently in the near future. The works councils usually coexisted with 
the former enterprise-based trade unions, serving as a supervisory board of the latter, and did 
not as such lobby on behalf of the workers’ interests. The absence of legal status for works 
councils made their existence dependent on agreements with the management. These agree-
ments were the sole legal documents safeguarding their work and the actions of works coun-
cilor. The author of the memo doubted whether these works councils were stable enough to 
perform the duties imparted on them by the Works Constitution Act and he recommended 
new elections as soon as possible. 
Many of these concerns were voiced at a meeting on workplace structures of worker represen-
tation organized by the Citizens’ Committee of Wurzen. Questions from the audience indica-
ted an interest in works councils, yet the lack of legal protection and the fear of being associa-
ted with former union secretaries made the task of recruiting works councilors very difficult.  
Berichte von Kündigungsdrohungen der noch amtierenden Betriebsleitungen. Angst vor 
Entlassung, auch wg. Betätigung für eine BR-Wahl bestimmten Diskussion. Viele Ein-
schätzungen liefen darauf hinaus, dass es Schwierigkeiten bei der Findung von Kandi-
                                                 
821 The young official (only 29 at the time) in charge of the IG CPK office in Leipzig, Michael Mersmann, 
placed the number of requests he received for meetings between East German and West German workers and 
unionists from East German enterprises at about 50 per day. According to Hermann Rappe’s associate, Günter 
Malott, IG CPK offices on the East German border also received about 100 such requests a day. See: Michael 
Mersmann“Prüfstein Solidarität”, Umschau, 3/90, reprinted in: IG CPK, 1993, document 26; Günter Malott, 
“Für ein System gewählter Betriebsräte”, Die Mitbestimmung, 3/90, pp. 198-199. 
822 Mitteilung des Vorsitzenden, “Koordinierung der Gewerkschaftskontakte zur DDR”, March 19, 1990, repro-
duced in: IG CPK 1993, document 16. 
823 “Massenentlassungen prägen das Bild der DDR-Chemie”, Chemische Rundschau, 18 (May 4, 1990), reprodu-
ced in: IG CPK 1993, document 45. 
824 Seppel Kraus, “Vermerk: Lehrgang mit den DDR-Kollegen vom 28.05. – 01.06.1990 in Hustedt”, June 5, 
1990, published in: Ibid., document 54. 
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daten geben wird: Frust über bisherige Interessenvertretung, Angst vor Repressalien, 
Gleichsetzung mit alter BGL.825 
3.8.3.4 The completion of the expansion 
What would have happened if the East German chemistry union had refused to ratify the five 
preconditions during its Central Delegates' Conference in April? This question was put to 
Hermann Rappe, in the presence of Hartmut Löschner, just before the start of the conference. 
He responded by stating that his union would launch a new, competing chemistry union in the 
GDR. As already stated above, similar threats would be made by IG Metall a few weeks later. 
Auf die Frage, was denn passiere, wenn die DDR-Gewerkschafter nicht wie gewünscht 
sich zu den Kooperations- und Fusionsbedingungen der IG Chemie bereiterklärten, ent-
gegnete Rappe in Anwesenheit des DDR-Vorstandsvorsitzenden Löschner ungerührt, 
dass dann noch in der nächsten Woche eine neue IG Chemie in der DDR gegründet 
würde. Die Büros in der DDR waren damit mehr als bloβe Beratungs- und Informati-
onsbüros. Sie waren eine organisatorische Option für den Fall, das sich Unerwartetes 
ereignen sollte.826  
No action was required on this threat. The two-day Main Conference of Delegates, held on 
April 27 and 28, modified the organization's statutes and set the stage for merger.827 Motion 7 
unanimously ratified the five preconditions set by the West German chemistry union.828 
Hartmut Löschner was re-elected with 84% of the vote.829 From this point forward, there ap-
peared to be few obstacles on the path towards merger. From October 1 on, the East German 
chemistry union members were allowed to join to the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial 
Union. They remained members of both unions until the disbandment of the East German 
organization on May 31, 1991. On June 1, the chemistry union’s expansion was completed. 
3.8.3.5 The debate on former FDGB officials 
From the perspective of the union leadership, the establishment of the West German chemis-
try union in the GDR went more smoothly than the similar process at IG Metall. Though it did 
                                                 
825 “Aktennotiz über eine Podiumsdiskussion des Bürgerkomitees Wurzen zu Fragen Betriebsräte, Betriebsrats-
wahlen am 22.03.1990, 19.00 Uhr”, printed in: Ibid., document 23. 
826 Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 133. The authors also refer to: Ralf Neubauer, “Rappe und die Heilsbotschaft von der 
IG Chemie”, Frankfurter Rundschau, April 30, 1990.   
827 IG CGK (DDR), “Grundsatzantrag 6 – Schaffung einer einheitlichen Industriegewerklschaft im Rahmen des 
deutschen Einheitsprozesses”, printed in: IG CPK 1993, document 29.  
828 IG CGK (DDR), “Grundsatzantrag 7 – Bestimmung der sozialen und demokratischen Grundpositionene der 
IG Chemie, Glas und Keramik für ihre zukünftige Arbeit und den Prozess der Fusion mit der IG Chemie-Papier-
Keramik der BRD”, reproduced in: Ibid., document 30. 
829 IG CPK presse-dienst, “Jetzt zügig zu einer gesamtdeutschen IG Chemie”, April 30, 1990, printed in: Ibid., 
document 35.  
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not require much maneuvering to compel its East German counterpart to adopt its agenda, the 
West German chemistry union faced stiffer resistance on the part of workers. The April reso-
lutions called for the heads of the administrative offices and district chapters to be appointed 
and not elected, as is usually the case at DGB unions. The effect of this measure was that 
many former FDGB secretaries, whose appointment faced open hostility from rank-and-file 
members, were confirmed in their posts. Many workers felt their efforts to reshape the East 
German union landscape had been in vain. 
Wir haben uns doch zum Trottel gemacht! Haben erneuert und erneuert und erneuert, 
und am Ende saβen dieselben Leute wie vorher an der Tränke. Das geht ja soweit, dass 
der ehemalige Chef des FDGB-Kreisvorstandes hier im Werk, der inzwischen als Tarif-
experte in den Unternehmverband der Chemie gewechselt ist, wahrscheinlich bei den 
nächsten Tarifverhandlungen einem seiner jahrelangen Spezis und Kreisvorstandskolle-
gen aus FDGB-Zeiten gegenübersitzen wird. Einer von denen ist nämlich jetzt im 
Hauptvorstand der IG für Tariffragen zuständig.830 
Many criticized the alliance between the chemistry unions, and were against retaining former 
FDGB secretaries in the new organization. Yet Hermann Rappe made it clear that he did not 
intend to choose which secretaries would remain and which would lose their posts. The sole 
determinant of whether one was deemed capable of working at the unified union was one’s 
willingness to collaborate on building a united chemistry union.  
Interessiert uns nicht, ob einer bis Ende ’89 oder Anfang’90 aus voller Überzeugung 
oder halber Überzeugung oder weil es eben so war und nicht anders ging in der SED 
war. Uns interessiert, wie die Haltung jetzt ist, wo der groβe Zusammenbruch hier da 
ist, und nicht mehr.831 
The workers’ anger could be felt at many of the meetings. On one such occasion, a young 
union secretary named Horst Seel, aged 36 years, suggested that workers send a petition to the 
union president, as in the days of the FDGB. His proposal was greeted with boos and shouts 
of disapproval (“How shall we explain that to our colleagues?”). The displeasure at the reten-
tion of former FDGB secretaries in the new unified chemistry union was strong enough to 
finally compel Hanover to fire many of the more controversial secretaries at the end of Au-
gust.832 
                                                 
830 Peters, “Alte Hintern auf neuen Sesseln. Geburtsfehler der neuen Satzung der IG Chemie/Ost”. 
831 D. Peters, “Alte Hintern auf neuen Sesseln. Geburtsfehler der neuen Satzung der IG Chemie/Ost”, express, 
10/1990, p. 7. Rappe did not view this position as in any way conflicting with the union’s historical rejection of 
“communist” influence, as he added that PDS members, however, were not welcome to join the union’s staff: 
“Ich denke mir, wer jetzt noch in der PDS ist oder sich dahingezogen fühlt, mit den gleichen politischen Inhalten 
arbeiten will, dem würde ich ganz kollegial raten, es bei uns zu lassen. Es wird nicht gehen bei uns”. Quoted in: 
D. Peters, “Überholen, ohne einzuholen. IG Chemie-Ost als getreue Kopie der IG Chemie-West”, express, 9/90, 
p. 10. 
832 Idem. 
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Was there a direct link between the retention of former union secretaries and the low rate of 
new members joining the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union? Some observers be-
lieved this was the case. If claims of 500,000 members made by the East German chemistry 
union in March 1990 are accurate833, the number of 150,782 new members by September 
1990834 probably fell below expectations. At the end of the membership drive in May 1991 
only a handful of new members had joined the organization, which had a total of 160,000 East 
German members.835 
3.8.3.6 The training of East German union secretaries 
The high level of suspicion towards “discredited” officials was palpable even among the East 
German chemistry secretaries themselves. These reservations were especially evident during 
training seminars on West German labor law. 
A report submitted to the union president by the person in charge of overseeing one six-week 
program provides valuable insight on the nature of the instruction given to East German union 
secretaries.836 In his report, he pointed to the “enormity” of the task facing East German union 
officials. Over the course of the seminars, they had to acquaint themselves with the new eco-
nomic, tax, political and welfare systems, as well as the new labor law. Due to vast range of 
topics on discussion, most of the participants were unable to absorb all this information and, 
as a result, insecurity and anxiety were widespread. 
Die Probleme, die auf die Kolleginnen und Kollegen zukommen, sind immens und 
kaum von ihnen zu bewältigen.837 
The influence of former chemistry union secretaries in the workplaces was very limited, and it 
was as a consequent difficult to recruit new members and keep existing ones, he added. He 
joined the chorus of voices within the union who were rather skeptical about the true power of 
the works councils which had been set up too hastily. As it was difficult to obtain a copy of 
the East German Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassung der DDR), there were no mate-
                                                 
833 Helmut Kipp, “Löschner: Zur staatlichen einheit gehört die Vereinigung der Gewerkschaften”, Handelsblatt, 
March 2, 1990, reproduced in: IG CPK 1993, document 21. 
834 Letter from Wolfgang Schultze (IG CPK Vorstand) to the “colleagues” of the IG CGK (DDR)  including the 
table , “Mitgliederzahlen auf dem Gebiet der DDR. Stand: 07.09.1990”, reproduced in: Ibid., document 87. 
835 “Nur noch wenige Tage Zeit für den Übertritt in die Industriegewerkschaft Chemie-Papier-Keramik”, gp 
magazin, 5/91, reprinted in: Ibid., document 156. 
836 Seppel Kraus, “Vermerk: Lehrgagng mit den DDR-Kollegen vom 28.05.-01.06.1990 in Hustedt”, June 5, 
1990, reproduced in: Ibid., document 54. 
837 Idem, p. 1. Similar experiences were made by other IG CPK instructors during the seminar “Grundlehrgang 
für Hauptamtliche aus der DDR, Aufbaulehrgang und Vertiefungslehrgang”. See: Hans Eisenbeiβ, “Sprung ins 
kalte Wasser”, Umschau, 6/90, p. 32, published in: Ibid., document 74. 
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rials to teach the officials about the technicalities of works council election in the GDR! The 
report concluded that in all likelihood most of the “works councils” had not been elected un-
der conditions that met the conditions of the Works Constitution Act. New elections were 
therefore necessary. This added to the uncertainty among those in attendance, as many feared 
that their right to elect works councils would be challenged.  
Die meisten der anwesenden Kollegen gingen davon aus, dass, wenn sie einen Rat ge-
wählt haben, der den Namen Betriebsrat hat und sich an die Bestimmungen des Be-
triebsverfassungsgesetz anlehnt, sie dann nicht mehr neu Wählen müssen. Dieses ent-
spricht jedoch nicht meiner Rechtsauffassung, denn ich kann mir nicht vorstellen, dass 
die so gewählten Räte nicht für die nächsten 4 Jahre bestehen bleiben. Ich kann mir nur 
vorstellen, dass sie eine Legitimation bis zur Neuwahl entsprechend den Rechtsvor-
schriften des Betriebsverfassungsgesetzes haben. Diese Rechtsauffassung habe ich den 
Kollegen mitgeteilt, die daraufhin um groβen Teil recht verunsichert waren, weil sie: 
a) Angst haben, dass den Menschen irgendwann das Wählen über ist 
und 
b) sie wohl bisher andere Rechtsauffassungen gehört haben. 
Deshalb wäre es sehr wichtig gewesen, die Übergangsbestimmungen auch einmal im 
Gesetzestext nachlesen zu können.838 
This report describes the tremendous challenge involved in organizing and carrying out the 
extensive training scheme. It also restated the complications involved in dealing with a wide 
range of personal experiences. This made it impossible for the instructors to address the par-
ticipants as one single group. Some had been active and performed specific duties in the union 
pre-Wende, while others had remained ‘apolitical’ and therefore had little to do with the 
dominance of the East German regime and still others, conversely, had been subject to gov-
ernment reprisals for the views they espoused. One of the few commonly held attitudes of the 
participants at the seminars was a deep-seated suspicion toward those officials who had filled 
high posts in the former union.   
Prinzipiell hatte dies die Auswirkung auf den Lehrgang, dass das Zusammenleben nicht 
ganz einfach war. Die Verbitterung saβ bei den Kollegen sehr tief. Der Zorn richtete 
sich besonders auf einen der DDR-Teilnehmer des 6-Wochen-Seminars. Ihm unterstell-
                                                 
838 Id., p. 4. This report probably contributed to Hermann Rappe’s decision to seek confirmation from Labor 
Minister Norbert Blüm on the legitimacy of “works councils” elected democratically before July 1, 1990, and 
verification that new elections would not be scheduled after the introduction of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz. 
The legal opinion sent by Blüm to Rappe confirmed that, in most of the cases, these works councils were legiti-
mate under law. The concerns voiced by the IG CPK trainer were thus dispelled. See: “Brief von Hermann Rap-
pe und Hubertus Schmoldt an Norbert Blüm bezüglich Betriebsratswahlen in der DDR, 7.9.1990” and “Brief von 
Norbert Blüm an Hermann rappe bezüglich eventueller Betriebsratswahlen im Frühajhr 1991 in der ehemaligen 
DDR, 1.10.1990”, both published in: Ibid., documents 82 and 95.  
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ten die Kollegen eine Zusammenarbeit mit der Staatssicherheit. (...) Redebeiträge von 
ihm seien mit Buh-Rufen begleitet worden. 
Prinzipiell kann man festhalten, dass ein groβes Misstrauen gegen alle Gewerkschafter, 
die bereits vor der Wende hauptamtliche Gewerkschafter waren, vorhanden war.839 
From an organizational point of view, the expansion of the chemistry union was a success, as 
district chapters participated in collective bargaining negotiations only a few weeks after July 
1, and administrative offices maintained contact with union members. The difficulties con-
fronted in any strategy of expansion that involved retaining a majority of the former FDGB 
secretaries explain the relatively limited number of new members joining from the ranks of 
the old East German chemistry union.  
3.8.4 The expansion of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union 
At the core of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union’s strategy of support and col-
laboration was the organization of seminars for East German union activists. Such initiatives 
were implemented by the regional offices, e.g., for Rhineland-Palatine, whose leader, Ulrich 
Galles, was especially active in this area.840 For many months, the union headquarters in 
Stuttgart refrained from releasing further details on its intervention in the GDR. As of Febru-
ary 1990, no far-reaching collaboration program had been developed with any of the nine East 
German trade unions in the transport and public sectors. According to the proposal for mone-
tary and economic union presented by chancellor Kohl on February 6, there was overriding 
need for more clearly defined objectives in the union's East German policy.  
3.8.4.1 The first attempt at developing a common strategy 
A meeting of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union’s executive committee 
(Hauptvorstand) on February 14 and 15 attempted to establish central objectives and goals for 
the union’s disorganized initiatives. Under the banner of unwavering support for "free, inde-
pendent and democratic trade unions in the GDR", the union announced the dispatch of 15 
union secretaries responsible for advising East German activists on issues of collective bar-
                                                 
839 Kraus “Vermerk”, p. 2. To hear an opposing view on the debate, see the report from a second IG CPK in-
structor, who argued that East Germans needed to be taught how to form and express their own opinions and 
views. His seminars were based on the idea that the dictatorship had eradicated the creativity and the independ-
ence of thought in the East German population, and that the top priority should be to help East German unionists 
develop their communications capabilities. See: Walter 1991. 
840 “Deutsch-deutsches Seminar”, ÖTV Magazin, 1/90, p. 31; “Wort und Tat. Materielle Hilfe aus Mainz”, ÖTV 
Magazin 3/90, p. 36. 
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gaining, social policy, labor law and worker representation at the workplace. An information 
and counseling office in East Berlin was placed in charge of coordinating their activities.841  
The most striking feature of the union’s forced involvement in the GDR was less the an-
nounced measures than its demands made to the federal government. In this act, the Public 
Services, Transport and Traffic Union would be the first DGB union to depart from this stated 
component of the strategy of support and collaboration, which required that DGB unions only 
restate demands already made by East German union activists. The Public Services, Transport 
and Traffic Union asked the chancellor to protect West German worker rights by achieving 
unity and to maintain the East German standard of living for its people. Without taking any 
stance on the issue of a monetary and economic union, the union stressed its opposition to any 
process that would open the way to privatization in the transport and public sectors.  
This declaration, published only a few days after Kohl's proposal, was not a definitive shift 
toward a strategy of legal extension and organizational expansion. The first meeting between 
representatives from business and the trade unions and the chancellor was scheduled for five 
days later, on February 20. It nonetheless represented a milestone in this shift. In an interview 
conducted around the time the declaration was published, a journalist from the union-owned 
Magazin tried to press union head Monika Wulf-Mathies into admitting that the Public Ser-
vices, Transport and Traffic Union was in fact preparing its entry (or push) into the GDR. She 
denied this, claiming that ÖTV “is not seeking to dictate the terms but to offer its assistance”, 
and as he indicated in his piece, she became visibly irritated.  
ötv-magazin: Ausverkauf und Einmarsch, zwei Schlagworte – ist bei der Gewerkschaft 
ÖTV Einmarsch in die DDR angesagt? 
Monika Wulf-Mathies: Nein, davon kann keine Rede sein. Aber wenn Kolleginnen und 
Kollegen in der DDR uns um Hilfe bitten; ist es selbstverständlich, dass wir sie nicht im 
Stich lassen. 
ötv-magazin: Gilt da vielleicht Dein Satz: „Bei der rasanten Entwicklung in Deutsch-
land ist nichts auszuschlieβen“? 
Monika Wulf-Mathies: Gemach, gemach.842 
The fact that she had to refute these questions in an interview published in the union press 
would at least indicate that those options were considered. She also refused to accept legal 
extension as a potential solution to the problems faced by East German workers. "We cannot 
                                                 
841 “Aus dem Beschluss des Hauptvorstandes der ÖTV zur Lage in der DDR”, ÖTV Magazin, 3/90, p. 35. 
842 “Wir lassen sie nicht im Stich ”, ÖTV Magazin, 3/90, p. 5. 
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tackle the problems in the GDR, she said, by simply transplanting (überstülpen) the systems 
developed in the Federal Republic and adapting it to the specific realities on the ground."843  
3.8.4.2 A new organization based on former trade unions 
Despite Wulf-Mathies' declarations, legal extension and organizational expansion would nev-
ertheless become pillars of the union's strategy shortly thereafter. In March, the discussions 
focused on possible ways to proceed with the expansion of the Public Services, Transport and 
Traffic Union into the GDR. The existence of nine different trade unions, as well as a number 
of local and independent initiatives in East Germany, represented a real challenge.844 The 
large number of potential partners to a cooperation agreement made it more difficult to reach 
any sort of compromise. Furthermore, the political implications of a possible merger that in-
cluded the discredited former officials from the union of ministries and government bodies 
were hard to avoid. 
From March 5 to 8, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union held meetings with rep-
resentatives from the nine East German trade unions and a similar number of professional 
associations at a conference in Berlin. Though all parties agreed on the goal of forming one 
single trade union for the transport and public sectors in Germany, different visions on how 
this might be achieved were put forward. Some favored the establishment of an ÖTV der 
DDR, while others preferred to merge the West and East German organizations. During the 
meeting, neither of these options stood out against the other and all East German representa-
tives agreed that both options should remain available to the East German workers as long as 
two Germanies were in existence.845 
The alternative to an expansion strategy based on a merger with East German trade unions 
was to establish a new organization (i.e., the ÖTV der DDR), and this rapidly became the 
course promoted by the union president. Representatives from the West German union ex-
pressed this preference during a second meeting with representatives from East German trade 
unions on March 22 and 23. The establishment of an ÖTV der DDR was now necessary, they 
                                                 
843 Idem. 
844 These trade unions included: Gewerkschaft Öffentlicher Dienste, Gewerkschaft Gesundheits- und Sozialwe-
sen, Gewerkschaft Ministerien, Staatsorgane und Kommunalwirtschaft, Gewerkschaft der Zöllner, Industriege-
werkschaft Transport, Gewerkschaft Wissenschaft, IG Bergbau – Energie und Wasserwirtschaft, Gewerkschaft 
der Armeeangehörigen der DDR, Gewerkschaft der Zivilbeschäftigten der National Volksarmee. It should be 
noted that several professional associations, for instance in the health sector, had also been created to represent 
the interests of these specific professions.  
845 Klaus Klöppel, “Komplett in die Gewerkschaft ÖTV” and “Einheitliche Interessenvertretung”, ÖTV Magazin, 
4/90, pp. 7-8. 
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explained, due to a lack of confidence in the East German trade unions among workers. It was 
simply not an option to stand pat, they went on to say, as rival organizations, such as the 
Trade Union of German Employees (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft, DAG) and the 
Alliance of German Civil Servants (Deutscher Beamtenbund), were recruiting East German 
members.846  
The decision to launch the ÖTV der DDR was mainly driven by concerns harbored in Stutt-
gart that the reunification process might actually weaken the union’s power. The union's posi-
tion among workers from the transport and public sectors in West Germany and in a unified 
Germany was at stake. Stuttgart wanted to make sure that it would have a say in determining 
the changes taking place in Germany, and this required its participation in the collective bar-
gaining negotiations in the GDR. This in turn pushed the issue of how fast to proceed with the 
establishment of its structures in this region to the top of the agenda. This viewpoint was 
shared by all DGB unions.  
At the opening of an information office in East Berlin on March 29, Monika Wulf-Mathies 
announced how her union intended to achieve expansion. The path chosen combined the es-
tablishment of a new trade union with collaboration with the East German trade unions. 
Monika Wulf-Mathies portrayed the establishment of ÖTV der DDR as a sign that there 
would be no merger with East German unions, though she did appear open to collaboration 
with those organizations (as well as with other initiatives) to achieve this goal. The following 
weeks demonstrated that she was not merely paying lip service to collaboration, as the Public 
Services, Transport and Traffic Union drew upon of the local chapters and staff of the East 
German unions.847  
The shift of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union toward a strategy dedicated to 
legal extension and organizational expansion took place in March, as the title of one press 
article quoted above – “ÖTV seeks link-up” - indicates. The preference for emulating West 
German organizational structures of the public sector in the GDR was reaffirmed, with the 
exception of the professional designation of Beamte, or civil servant status, which the union 
did not want to see introduced there. 
                                                 
846 Klaus Klöppel, “Votum für die schnelle D-Mark”, ÖTV Magazin, 4/90, p.8. See also: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 
228. The decisions by non-DGB unions, such as the DAG and the DBB, to expand their organizations into the 
GDR surely acted as an incentive for many DGB unions to do likewise. In the four cases under review here, it is 
in the public sector that the threat represented by the DAG (and hence the DBB) loomed largest. Their presence 
in the GDR might have actually increased their influence in West Germany. The appeal of West German unions 
to East German workers set off a “hunt for new members” (express, 10/90, p. 7) which not only set DGB against 
non-DGB unions, but also, as we are about to see, DGB unions against each other.  
847 “ÖTV will Anschluss der DDR” and “Einheits-ÖTV im Visier” Die tageszeitung, March 30, 1990.   
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The union’s opposition to this professional category, with its unique legal status, which 
granted civil servants high levels of protection against dismissal but forbade strike action on 
their part, was common knowledge. If the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union had 
attempted to improve civil servants’ rights to collective action in the 1960s, “they never actu-
ally made any serious attempts to put it to the test (right to strike for civil servants-MD),” ac-
cording to Michael Kittner.848 Hence, it was more or less standard union practice, as Monika 
Wulf-Mathies stated in March 1990, that her union rejected any special legal status for civil 
servants and opposed its extension to the GDR where it did not exist. In July, the union ac-
cused the federal government of seeking to introduce civil servant status in the GDR as a 
means to limit trade union influence on wages in the public sector.849 A few articles in the 
union press echoed these sentiments and underlined that the ban on strike action by civil ser-
vants was incompatible with European Union legislation.850 Such declarations could hardly 
be labeled as “attempts” to prevent the introduction of the West German law to cover civil 
servants, as Manfred Wilke and Hans-Peter Müller write.851 These could best be described as 
drawing on the traditions of the union’s program and past struggles. They had little substan-
tive impact on the union policies. As a supporter of legal extension, the Public Services, 
Transport and Traffic Union helped ensure the continuation of civil servant status in Ger-
many, which it had already by and large accepted in spite of its tradition of public opposition.   
3.8.4.3 Organizing expansion 
In regards to the other DGB unions, the shift in stance by the Public Services, Transport and 
Traffic Union to a “second strategy” occurred in March. In the case of this union, the devel-
opment of its structures in the GDR would truly commence in May. The creation of the ÖTV 
der DDR was ratified by representatives from the different East German trade unions and in-
dependent initiatives on May 9/10. At this time the Public Services, Transport and Traffic 
Union, the newly established structures of ÖTV der DDR and IG Transport (DDR) also rati-
fied a cooperative agreement which arranged for the latter's disbandment, with the date set for 
June 9. Similar agreements with other East German unions followed shortly thereafter.852 
                                                 
848 Kittner 2005, pp. 682-683. 
849 Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 232. 
850 “Beamtenrecht für die DDR: nicht geeignet”, ÖTV Magazin, 6/90, p. 7 and “Beamte gibt es erst von März 
an”, ÖTV Magazin, 1/91, p. 14. 
851 Idem. 
852 “Vereinigen”, ÖTV Magazin, 6/90, p. 15. 
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In 1990 tensions developed between DGB member unions contesting the recategorization of 
industries within the confederation’s organizations. The broad-ranging public service and 
transport union was at the center of many of those disputes. The DGB Mines and Energy Un-
ion had ratified a cooperative agreement with the East German Mines, Energy and Water-
Supply Union. One of the obvious goals of the DGB union was to obtaininfluence the East 
German water supply sector, which it had been claiming in West Germany since 1988. These 
attempts were naturally severely criticized by the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Un-
ion.853 Started in April 1990, the battle between the two unions lasted almost a year. Arbitra-
tion proceedings were finally initiated at the beginning of 1991, chaired by former DGB 
president Ernst Breit. Not surprisingly, the arbitration commission decided to maintain the 
divisions within the DGB unions, and the Mines and Energy Union was forced to “return” 
70.000 East German workers from the water-supply sector to the ÖTV.854 
A similar dispute erupted between the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union and the 
Education and Science Union (Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft) for the workers 
organized in the East German Science Union (Gewerkschaft Wissenschaft). This conflict was 
resolved more smoothly than the one involving the Mines and Energy Union. On April 23, 
1990, both DGB unions agreed that neither would poach workers from the other .855 A coop-
erative agreement was signed between this union and the East German Science Union on May 
21. It envisioned the disbandment of the East German Science Union and the establishment of 
two DGB unions.856 
The expansion strategy was ratified at the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union’s 14th 
Congress, which commenced on May 22. Several motions called on the federal government to 
consult with the union on all issues relating to the reform of the East German transport and 
public sectors.857 A week earlier, on May 16, during a meeting with chancellor Kohl, Monika 
Wulf-Mathies addressed certain specific restrictions to full collective bargaining autonomy in 
the transport and public sectors in the MESU treaty. The first draft of the treaty stated that all 
                                                 
853 Jutta Roitsch, “Gewerkschaften im Konkurrenzkampf”, Frankfurter Rundschau, September 12, 1990. 
854 This transfer was not without its problems, as the first collective agreements had already been ratified by the 
Mines and Energy Union for those workers. Wilke/Müller 1991, pp. 118-124.  
855 “GEW und ÖTV sind im Gespräch: Für Kooperation”, ÖTV Magazin, 5/90, p. 11.  
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1991, p. 231. 
857 “Das Ziel: Eine Gewerkschaftsbewegung unter dem Dach des DGB schaffen”, ÖTV Magazin, 6/90, p. 15. 
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collective agreements in the East German public sector required the prior approval of the 
Ministry of Finance, something the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union considered a 
restriction imposed by the government on the autonomy of the social partners. In a letter to 
Monika Wulf-Mathies sent the following day, Helmut Kohl stated that this phrase would be 
removed from the treaty and collective bargaining autonomy would be respected in the public 
sector. As previously demonstrated, this episode was important to the confirmation of the tri-
partite consensus on May 1990. The union’s joint strategy was reaffirmed during the 14th 
congress at the end of the month. 
An agreement signed on May 30 defined the conditions for the dissolution of the six East 
German unions in the transport and the public sectors and their absorption in the newly estab-
lished ÖTV der DDR.858 This union would come into existence on June 9. The disbandment 
of the East German unions was announced for November 1, as most observers at that time 
thought reunification could occur only after that date. The merger of the two ÖTV unions into 
one single entity was announced for the same day. The East German unions had to organize 
campaigns to convince their members to join the new organization.  
The announcement that summer that reunification was scheduled for October 3 instead of 
January 1, had the cataclysmic effect in Stuttgart. While the East German unions had aban-
doned any hope of autonomy following the dissolution of the East German state, the merger 
of the two ÖTV unions was to be completed only by the beginning of November. The likeli-
hood that a sizable share of the workers would not have joined the new organization by the 
day of the reunification was quite high. This four week gap could be used by employers to 
impose lower wages, while the ÖTV der DDR would not yet be in a position to react ade-
quately. The date of the merger of the two Public Services, Transport and Traffic Unions was 
hurriedly brought forward to October 3.859 The dissolution of the East German trade unions 
was ratified at congresses held during the second half of September and the first days of Oc-
tober.860 
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859 For a summary of the agenda of the conference, see: “Gutes bewahren, Schlechtes ändern”, ÖTV Magazin, 7-
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860 For instance, the East German Health and Social Services Union (Gewerkschaft Gesundheits- und Sozialwe-
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3.8.4.4 Recruiting and organizing new members 
The recruitment of East German members mobilized the resources of the West German offi-
cials. The inevitable administrative chaos resulting from nearly one million new members 
joining within the span of a few weeks had been further heightened by the earlier completion 
of the reunification process on October 3. Of the 640,000 members of the East German Health 
and Social Service Union in Autumn 1989 (this number had dropped to 400,000 by January 
1990), 260,000 joined the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union. The IG Transport 
(DDR) saw 150,000 of its 250,000 join the new union. By February 1991, 800,000 East Ger-
man workers were recruited, slightly less than expected, but not an insignificant number con-
sidering the union had only 1,2 million members in West Germany. Job losses probably 
meant up to one-third of these members would soon leave the organization. 
The completion of all tasks relating to expansion and the stream of new members were the 
main priorities in Stuttgart. It mobilized the union’s human resources during the second half 
of the year 1990. The organization only began to focus on the actual defense of worker inter-
ests once the representative authority of the organization had been secured in the region. The 
way in which activities were prioritized, i.e., the administrative tasks surrounding expansion 
were given priority and were to be carried out before the union would shift its focus to de-
fending its members’ interests, irritated many East German workers who complained that 
their new union neglected the immediate tasks relating to protecting workers against possible 
layoffs.861 
From an organizational point of view, with the time constraints as the main impetus for ac-
tion, the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union’s expansion was facing one main ob-
stacle. As a result of this hastily performed process directed from above, the number of union 
offices in Eastern Germany initially remained limited. In Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, for 
instance, where the union had some 80,000 members, only three district administrative offices 
(Kreisverwaltungen) and a handful of branch offices (Nebenstellen) were opened.862 In the 
initial phase, the union limited the number of district administrations to fourteen – equal to the 
number of former Information Offices.863 In all of eastern Germany, not one single regional 
head office (Bezirksleitungen) was set up. Well aware that this situation made dialogue be-
tween the organization and its new members difficult, Monika Wulf-Mathies promised that 
                                                 
861 “Fehltritte beim Übertritt”, Tribüne, October 1, 1990, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 234. 
862 “ÖTV eröffnet Landesbüro in Schwerin”, Tribüne, November, 14, 1990, quoted in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 
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863 Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 235. 
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the situation would be rectified once they had more information on where district administra-
tive offices and branch offices were required.864  
The main reasons for its decision (made at the union’s headquarters in Stuttgart) to deploy 
small teams to establish its Information Offices as the rudimentary structures in the new 
Länder were time and the necessity to launch collective bargaining as soon as possible. Be-
ginning in mid-December, the fourteen East German regional administrative offices held 
delegates’ conferences and elected executive committees. This process saw about 3,700 dele-
gates elect local leaders and delegates to the first post-reunification conference. The topics 
under discussion varied from one conference to the other, but fears expressed on the impact of 
unemployment dominated the debate.865 
The Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union held its conference on reunification in 
Stuttgart on February 14 and 15, 1991, with 689 delegates from western and 311 from eastern 
Germany in attendance. The union was the first of the DGB unions to complete this process. 
The expansion process was not wrapped up until one year after the leadership in Stuttgart had 
attempted to outline the union’s policy on the GDR (on February 15, 1990). In her address, 
Monika Wulf-Mathies welcomed the union’s success. If there were any concerns about the 
ability of the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union’s to head the collective bargaining 
rounds in the GDR, the arrival of 800,000 new members had proved them to be unfounded, 
she stated.866 
There were no surprises at the conference. Twelve East German members were added to the 
union’s executive committee, which increased in size to 49 members, and eighteen to the ad-
visory board (Beirat), which was expanded from 96 to 114 members. The delegates also 
backed the board’s strategy for the upcoming round of collective bargaining negotiations, i.e., 
the adoption of the West German framework agreement on employment conditions (Mantel-
tarifvertrag) in the former East Germany, as well as the leveling of living standards and work-
ing conditions in the transport and public sectors by the year 1992.867 The union’s president 
wanted to postpone the debate over a potential relocation to Berlin. Originally, the move to 
Stuttgart had only been provisional, until a return to Berlin was made possible by reunifica-
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tion. The delegates agreed and ratified a motion stating that a move to Berlin at this moment 
would be too expensive and that the question would need to be re-examined at a later time.868 
3.8.4.5 The difficulty in integrating East German unionists into union activities 
From an organizational standpoint, the expansion of the Public Services, Transport and Traf-
fic Union was completed in short time. The union had difficulties in establishing a dialogue 
with East German workers from the transport and public sectors. The claims made by the un-
ion president that the Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union had been “the only trade 
union (…) with its roots in [East German] grassroots initiatives and developed independently 
from the old [FDGB] trade union apparatus” is simply untrue.869 The decision to create the 
ÖTV der DDR had been taken in Stuttgart and the expansion was carried out with the active 
participation of former East German trade unions from the transport and public sectors. 
A study conducted in the spring of 1990 suggested that East German workers had a positive 
view of the union.870 The 800,000 new members also confirm that Stuttgart’s strategy has 
found a strong resonance in eastern Germany. Many East German members would soon criti-
cize the minor role they were given within the union. Many were irritated that the strategy 
gave priority to organizational tasks over protecting its members against layoffs. The relative 
lack of local and regional structures in eastern Germany highlighted the disconnect between 
the positions taken by president of the union and the reality of its members. 
East German delegates expressed the concerns of their colleagues after Monika Wulf-
Mathies’ report at the special conference. One delegate from Dresden stated, “The situation is 
actually worse” than it was described by the union’s head. The threat of unemployment was 
the main concern of East German workers. One West German delegate, active in support 
groups for unemployed workers, summarized the situation as follows: 
Ich kann euch sagen, die sind nicht enttäuscht, die packt das kalte Grauen! Denn im Ge-
gensatz zu den westlichen Bundesländern, in denen man sich an diese zwei Jahrzehnte 
bestehende Arbeitslosigkeit in Millionenhöhe zu gewöhnen scheint, werden die Men-
schen in den neuen Ländern von der Arbeitslosigkeit lawinenartig überrollt.871 
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Was it possible to unify such disparate needs as those of East and West German workers and 
prevent employers from playing one region off against another? East German delegates had 
reservations about this. Based by his own experience, one of them concluded that the choice 
for East German workers would be between a job under terms dictated by his employer or no 
job at all. More attention needed to be devoted to the problems of East German workers, East 
German delegates insisted, and they turned to the union’s president for solutions. 
Wir brauchen nicht nur finanzielle Hilfe von den alten Bundesländern, nein, vor allem 
ist es nach meiner Meinung wichtig, moralische und ideelle Hilfe zu geben. Viele Men-
schen sind verzweifelt, wenn sie mit den Problemen des Tages konfrontiert werden und 
keinen Ausweg sehen.872 
West German union secretaries active in the new Länder saw first hand the problems faced by 
the union in the East. One of them acknowledged that the situation had become unmanage-
able: East German unionists apparently had their doubts about the “solutions” proposed by the 
West German officials, as they saw how ineffective these were in the East German context 
and in preventing a rise in unemployment. Union secretaries were working 18 to 20 hours a 
day, frustration was growing among East German workers and communication problems be-
tween East and West Germans were worsening an already difficult situation. As these prob-
lems mounted, West German secretaries sought to centralize decision-making authority, in-
cluding over the upcoming collective bargaining rounds, in their own hands, without 
consulting their East German colleagues. The effect of “several catastrophes striking at once, 
always larger and more numerous than what one could have anticipated” made it impossible 
to get the East German unionists to participate or attend training workshops. No union could 
possibly counter such opposing forces, concluded the secretary.873 
3.8.5 The expansion of Media Industrial Union 
Through the process of expansion, the Media Industrial Union attempted to maintain a greater 
level of continuity with the “first strategy” than the other DGB unions had. This union took 
great care to ensure any expansion plan included the active participation of the East German 
trade unions from the media sectors, as reflected by its insistence on referring to the process 
as a “merger”. In discussions with the author, one official in charge of organizing the expan-
sion process insisted that every effort had been made to act “in a different manner than the 
Public Services, Transport and Traffic Union”, presented as the prime example of expansion 
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imposed upon the East German unions. Despite all its efforts, the complexity of the task in-
volved in organizing a genuine merger of equals within a short period of time eventually 
forced the Media Industrial Union to assume control over the process. Ultimately, the expan-
sion of Media Industrial Union would follow the same pattern and schedule of the other DGB 
unions. 
3.8.5.1 One common goal: Merger 
By the second half of February 1990, the Media Industrial Union and the three main East 
German trade unions in the media sector – the IG Print and Paper; the Art, Culture and Media 
Union; the Association of Journalists – agreed to merge their organizations. The intensifica-
tion of the collaboration was thus envisioned as a stop along the path towards fusion.874 One 
central aspect of this collaboration was providing training to East German unionists on issues 
relating to the West German labor law.875 
A “union cartel” was formed.876 The goal of this first step toward merger was to coordinate 
the collective bargaining activities of the German media unions. This would lessen the impact 
of the industrial reforms affecting the sector in Eastern Germany and improve the working 
conditions here. Rapidly, however, this loose “union cartel” would prove inadequate to per-
form these tasks, as the East German unions were unable to impose their views to employers. 
The Media Industrial Union opened an Information Office in East Berlin to ensure a stronger 
presence in the GDR and hasten the pace of the merger.877  
The East German Print and Paper Union ratified the principle of a merger with the other East 
German media unions and the Media Industrial Union at its conference on March 2 and 3.878  
                                                 
874 “Neugeburt der Gewerkschaften. Werner Peplowski: Die gemeinsamen Aufgaben sehen”, Kontrapunkt, 4/90, 
pp. 20-21. “VdJ-Vorsitzender Kurze: Zwei Journalistenverbände sind tragisch”, Kontrapunkt, 8/90, p. 28.  
875 According to the first Media Industrial Union secretary sent to the GDR, some East German workers did not 
voice any criticism towards the West German labor law, which they wanted to see extended to their country: 
“Freiheit für wen?”, Kontrapunkt, 10/90, p. 20. Based on the experience of other officials, there was consider-
able interest in drafting a new law: “Von Berlin nach Berlin: Gewerkschafter auf Tournee”, Kontrapunkt, 5/90, 
pp. 15-16 and “Für eine wirkungsvolle Interessenvertretung sorgen”, Kontrapunkt, 10/90, p. 38. 
876 “DDR-Gewerkschafter zu Arbeitskampfschulungen eingeladen”, Kontrapunkt, 6/90, p. 4; “Freiheit für wen?”. 
877 This office was inaugurated on March 20, 1990. “IG Medien eröffnet Büro in Berlin (DDR)”, Kontrapunkt, 
7/90, p. 4. 
878 Susanne Anger, “Von der ‘Mit-Mach-Gewerkschaft’ zur kämpferischen Interessenvertretung”, Kontrapunkt, 
6/90, p. 29. 
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Though the contract signed with the Industrial Media Union did not alter the foundations for 
cooperation in place for the last few months (the mutual exchange of information and assis-
tance, partnership programs, joint working groups, training for East German officials), the 
West German Media Industrial Union was placed in charge of collective bargaining for the 
East German Print and Paper Union.879 The Media Industrial Union was now active on East 
German soil. 
Similar steps were made with the foundation of the East German Art, Culture and Media Un-
ion in mid-March. The former FDGB Art Union passed a resolution calling for the merger of 
all German media unions, as well as a “cooperative agreement” which transferred its collec-
tive bargaining authority to the Media Industrial Union.880 
By the end of the month, the East German Association of Journalists also paved the way for 
its merger with the Media Industrial Union. Until January 1990, this union had worked to-
gether with the Media Industrial Union and the non-DGB-affiliated German Journalists’ As-
sociation. It had even signed a cooperative agreement with the latter in February. The indus-
trial turmoil, the “colonization of the East German media landscape” by West German media 
groups, as the union president described it, and the substantial number of bankruptcies that it 
promised to produce, induced the East German Association of Journalists to reorient its strat-
egy to focus on collaboration with the more powerful Media Industrial Union, a volte-face 
that angered the German Journalists Association.881 Its president implicitly accused the East 
German Association of Journalists of using the antidemocratic tactics of the FDGB. 
Wenn sich ein Bundes- oder Gesamtvorstand des Deutschen Journalisten-Verbandes er-
lauben würde, in dieser Weise die Mitgliedschaft von oben zu manipulieren, würde sol-
che Vorstände von der Basis hinweggefegt.882 
The East German Association of Journalists became the impetus behind a cooperative agree-
ment between the three East German media unions, in preparation for the merger with the 
Media Industrial Union. Hence, as with the other cases studied here, the decisive steps toward 
Media Industrial Union’ expansion were made in March.  
                                                 
879 “IG Medien und IG Drupa schlieβen Kooperationsvertrag” and “Gemeinsame Tarifpolitik”, Kontrapunkt, 
7/90, p. 4. 
880 “Kunst-Gewerkschaft in der DDR neu konstituiert”, Kontrapunkt, 8/90, pp. 4-5.  
881 “VdJ-Vorstand: IG Medien schnellstens bilden!”, Neue Deutsche Presse, 4/90 (March 31, 1990), p. 1, quoted 
in: Wilke/Müller 1991, p. 193. 
882 Ernst-Otto Maetzke, “Streit zwischen Journalistenverbänden”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 26, 
1990, cited in: Idem. 
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By the end of this month, all German media unions shared the common objective of merging 
into one single organization and had ratified cooperative agreements with this in mind.  
3.8.5.2 Tensions between East and West German media unions 
While the German media unions may have agreed on the goal, they disagreed over the path 
and pace of the process. For the Media Industrial Union, these issues could only be addressed 
through collective bargaining. This therefore meant that the structures necessary to launch the 
next rounds of collective bargaining needed to be put in place as soon as possible. The fact 
that it was responsible for collective bargaining forced the Media Industrial Union to “speed 
up the pace of the merger”, which entailed taking complete control over the establishment of 
its structures in the GDR.883 The “merger” would indeed have much in common with the ex-
pansion process at the other DGB unions. 
The procedure for establishing local chapters (Ortsverein) in the GDR as specified by the un-
ion council (Gewerkschaftsrat) called for the immediate “merger” of the three East German 
media unions into the West German Media Industrial Union and transfer of decision-making 
authority in the GDR to West German officials.884 The delegates from the East German media 
unions in attendance indicated their opposition to a rapid merger which amounted to dis-
bandment and virtually eliminated any chance for them to influence the process.885 
In an interview published in May, the head of the East German Art, Culture and Media Union, 
Ruth Martin, criticized the prevailing attitude “among DGB officials” – at best a veiled refer-
ence to the Media Industrial Union, which did not assign any portfolios to East German un-
ionists. They acted as if “they knew everything” and did all the work themselves.886 Martin 
felt she had been stripped of her authority to determine union policies. 
3.8.5.3 Convincing the East German rank-and-file to accept expansion 
Despite their criticisms of the Media Industrial Union strategy, the East German media unions 
were unable to propose a realistic alternative. The East German government had refused their 
calls to open negotiations on the general agreements on employment conditions (Mantel-
                                                 
883 Hermann Zöller, “Im Eilzug zur Einheit?”, Kontrapunkt, 8/90, p. 37. 
884 The declaration “Auf dem Weg zur IG Medien Deutschland” was passed on May 2, 1990. It was published in: 
Kontrapunkt, 11/90, p. 26. 
885 “Auf dem Weg zur IG Medien Deutschland”, ibid.  
886 “Interview von Ruth Martin, Vorsitzende der Gewerkschaft Kunst-Kultur-Medien in der DDR”, ibid., pp. 34-
36. 
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tarifverträge), with the argument that it would only negotiate with organizations “similar to 
the DGB unions”.887 
The need to launch a new round of collective bargaining, together with the government’s re-
fusal to negotiate with them, succeeded in forcing the East German media unions to come into 
line with Media Industrial Union’s strategy. After a long and heated discussion, the East 
German media unions finally agreed to rapid expansion during a meeting on May 28 in Stutt-
gart.888 The Media Industrial Union’s expansion process was now controlled centrally by the 
union leadership from its headquarters in West Germany. The idea of a ‘merger of equals’ had 
been effectively abandoned. 
Like other DGB unions, the Media Industrial Union initially thought that East German union 
members would gain an insight into the new union, laws and procedures during the first col-
lective bargaining rounds. Yet many obstacles remained along the route. East German work-
ers tended to focus on workplace structures of representation (works councils etc.) and acted 
far too independently of the union.889 Training workshops on the Works Constitution Act of-
ten devolved into discussions on how to combine the East and West German labor laws to 
provide the best possible protection to workers.890 Such discussions, encouraged in the Media 
Industrial Union press at the beginning of the year, had become problematic five or six 
months later, once the opportunity to propose such changes, if any indeed ever existed, had 
passed. 
The Media Industrial Union bet on collective agreements favorable to the workers to over-
come these difficulties.891 Once such agreements were signed, East German workers would 
come to understand the advantages of a strong union. The lack of East German participation 
in the union would be tackled once a collective bargaining routine practice had been firmly 
established in eastern Germany. Using this roundabout logic, the centralization of decision-
making in West German hands was hastened by the urgency originating from the upcoming 
round of collective bargaining and ended up in a confirmation of the necessity of this centrali-
zation. 
                                                 
887 “Gewerkschaft Kunst, Kultur, Media (DDR): Wir brauchen neue Manteltarifverträge”, Kontrapunkt, 13/90, p. 
24 and “Unsere Sofortforderungen zur Tarifpolitik”, ibid., p. 25.  
888 “Schnelle Fusion mit IG Medien beschlossen” Kontrapunkt, 12/90, pp. 24-25. 
889 “Kooperation mit Maxwell bedroht 800 Arbeitsplätze”, Kontrapunkt, 12/90, p. 27 and “Neue Formen der 
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890 “Das neu erworbene Wissen weiterermitteln”, Kontrapunkt, 15/90, p. 29. 
891 “Neue Formen der Gewerkschaftsarbeit”. 
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The resentment among some East German unionists for the loss of input was once more ex-
pressed during the conference on disbanding the Print and Paper Union in June. The resolu-
tions passed here approved the agenda of the Media Industrial Union’s president: the dis-
bandment of the organization on September 30 and its replacement by the Media Industrial 
Union on the next day; priority given to collective bargaining negotiations with the goal of a 
rapid leveling the working and living conditions in Germany; setting up of works councils in 
the GDR and election of union workplace representatives (Vertrauensleute). One called for an 
increase in the number of West German union secretaries in Eastern Germany.892 Another 
declared that all union activity would be supervised by the West German officials from the 
East Berlin office. Until indicated otherwise, the East German members of the union’s execu-
tive committee (Hauptvorstand) would not be elected but co-opted by the other members. 
Finally the delegates were asked to approve the dismissal of all union officials on September 
30, without the possibility of re-election to their former posts.893  
The resolutions continued to refer to the activities of the West German union secretaries as a 
form of “assistance” provided to the East German union. Similarly the dissolution was termed 
a “merger” and described as a “grassroots level” process in the conference documents. The 
continued use of such vocabulary from the first strategy was intended to gloss over the actual 
changes that were passed at the conference. Speaking at the podium, the president of the East 
German Print and Paper Union admitted that the “merger as it was originally planned” was 
not complete. Yet the resolutions endorsed West German control over Media Industrial Un-
ion’s expansion plans.  
The delegates harshly criticized the resolutions and voted against the organization’s disband-
ment and the dismissal of its staff. Many denounced a process “directed from above”, which 
presented the East German unionists with practically no chance for rebuilding their union. In 
an impromptu speech, Media Industrial Union’s vice-president Detlef Hensche convinced the 
delegates to reconsider their decision. A second vote on disbandment was scheduled after the 
addition of an amendment instituting the automatic transfer of all Print and Paper Union’s 
members to the new union.894 The new resolution, which took the aspect of a collective action 
                                                 
892 “Beschlüsse des Gewerkschaftstages der IG Druck und Papier (DDR) am 23. Juni 1990”, Kontrapunkt, 14/90, 
p. 19.  
893 “Ab 1. Oktober: Einheitliche IG Medien Deutschland”, ibid., pp. 12-17. 
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of all members into the Media Industrial Union, was adopted unanimously.895 Delegates ex-
pressed their doubts and fears in their comments after the conference.896 
The conference of the East German Association of Journalists on disbandment was convened 
around that time (June 23-24) and was characterized by similar debates. Unlike their col-
leagues at the Print and Paper Union, the delegates from the Association of Journalists did not 
reject the resolutions proposed by the president of the union and the disbandment was adopted 
without amendment, with the date set for September 30. Hence the decision to join the Media 
Industrial Union (or the German Journalists Association) was left to each individual member. 
The establishment of a “section” (Fachgruppe) for East German journalists within the Media 
Industrial Union related to an attempt by the East German union to guarantee a framework for 
intervening in the new organization.897 
The conference on disbandment of the East German Arts, Culture and Media Union was held 
on September 9.898 Although none of the union’s delegates voted against disbanding, many 
criticized the influence exerted by Stuttgart in the process. The youth section of the organiza-
tion was especially vocal in its criticism. The resolution on disbanding made arrangements for 
the automatic transfer of the 40.000 members to the Media Industrial Union.899  
3.8.5.4 Establishing the structures for the new union in eastern Germany 
Several resolutions on opening the Media Industrial Union to East German members and the 
establishment of state and district offices in Eastern Germany were adopted in Stuttgart in 
July. By the beginning of 1991, about 185,500 workers from the East German media sectors 
had joined or remained members of the Media Industrial Union. In view of the roughly 
200,000 members in the three East German unions that had disbanded, this number is re-
markably high. The majority were workers “automatically” transferred to the Media Industrial 
Union thanks to resolutions adopted by their former organizations. The Media Industrial Un-
ion estimated the number of East German workers who had joined in the previous months at 
4,500, i.e. those who had not been members of one of the disbanded unions. Furthermore the 
total number of East German unionized workers was insufficient to guarantee a strong pres-
ence for the union in eastern Germany. 
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The issue was discussed during the 11th session of the Media Industrial Union’s executive 
committee on September 6 and 7. It stressed how economic transformation and unemploy-
ment made recruiting workers ready to take up posts in works councils or the union all the 
more difficult. The low rate of union membership among workers prevented a satisfactory 
number of district offices from achieving financial autonomy. This meant further expansion of 
the network of offices had to remain at the current low number until further notice, which 
made the recruitment of new members evermore complicated. In order to increase the rate of 
participation of East Germans in the organization, the union’s head announced the creation of 
75 full-time positions reserved for East Germans. It continued to go on assume the positive 
impact of the first collective agreements would be the solution to its current problems.900 
Media Industrial Union’s expansion was completed during the special conference on October 
25-26. The transfer of the union members from the Print and Paper Union and the Art, Culture 
and Media Union was approved and the union’s territory was expanded to include the new 
Länder. The temporary assumption of control over the union’s activities in the new Länder by 
the East Berlin office was also ratified. Until further notice, the co-opted East German mem-
bers of the union’s executive committee would not have the right to vote.901  
In his speech, Detlef Hensche stressed that there was no alternative but for the Media Indus-
trial Union to play “an active role” in eastern Germany. This statement was somewhat arro-
gant in its tone, Hensche acknowledged, and it opened the door to numerous conflicts. He 
rejected, however, the accusation made in former East and West Germany that his organiza-
tion had “taken over” the East German media unions. The pace of reunification had forced it 
to speed up the expansion process, Hensche explained, which ran counter to the preferred 
strategy of his union. 
Natürlich verlief die Zusammenarbeit nicht ohne Brüche und Konflikte, etwa, als die IG 
Druck und Papier die Übernahme aller Beschäftigten verlangte, was wir schon aus fi-
nanziellen Gründen ablehnen mussten. Oder, als in Leipzig die ersten Beauftragten aus 
dem Westen ihre Arbeit aufnahmen, hatten sie vor Ort durchaus nicht nur Unterstützung 
des alten Gewerkschaftsapparats erfahren. Damit bin ich beim anderen Pol unseres Vor-
gehens: Auch wenn wir immer wieder, bisweilen geradezu beschwörend, von ‚Hilfe zur 
Selbsthilfe’ reden – der eigenen, aktiven Rolle im Erneuerungsprozess konnten wir uns 
nicht entziehen. (...) So kann es nicht überraschen, dass der Vorwurf der Vereinnah-
mung erhoben wurde, auch im Westen. Was den Umgang miteinander angeht, gibt es 
sicher manches an westlicher Besserwisserei und Unduldsamkeit zu kritisieren. Den-
noch geht der Vorwurf der Vereinnahmung historisch an der Sache vorbei. Der Anstoβ 
                                                 
900 “11. Sitzung des Hauptvorstandes der IG Medien. Die IG Medien steht vor einem groβen Berg von Aufga-
ben”, Kontrapunkt, 19/90, pp. 30-31. 
901 “Ab 1. Oktober: Einheitliche IG Medien Deutschland”. 
 337
zur Vereinigung kam nicht vom Westen, schon gar nicht von den westlichen Gewerk-
schaften. Auch wir haben in Ziel und Tempo nur atemlos nachvollzogen, was die 
übergroβe Mehrheit der DDR-Bevölkerung eingeleitet hat, indem sie sich vom SED-
System und damit auch von den alten Gewerkschaften abgewandt hat. Wenn die Ge-
werkschaften der DDR zu irgendetwas gezwungen worden sind, so durch die eigene 
Krise und den eigenen Vertrauensverlust, und damit letztlich durch die eigenen Mitglie-
der. Und das hat ja wohl etwas mit der eigenen vierzigjährigen Geschichte zu tun, nicht 
dagegen mit den westdeutschen Gewerkschaften.902 
3.8.6 Conclusion 
The statement from Detlef Hensche quoted above applies to the process not only at his orga-
nization but also at the three other DGB unions under consideration in this work. In all four 
cases, most actors to the process perceived the pace of the East German collapse and the 
speed of the reunification process as leaving no other alternative but to accelerate the process 
of organizational expansion. The expansion of the DGB unions cannot be viewed as separate 
and distinct from their actions in support of the legal extension of West German labor laws as 
described in the previous section. Together these formed the core strategy for institutional 
transfer of West German industrial relations to eastern Germany. 
The most obvious manifestation of this overlap lies in the chronology. The months of March 
and May had been crucial to establishing and consolidating the tripartite consensus. They 
were central to the process of organizational expansion. Each of DGB unions had shifted their 
strategy to one of expansion by March, between February 28 in the case of the Chemistry, 
Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union, with the publication of its list of “Preconditions”, and 
March 22-23 in the case of the Public Service and Transport Union, with the announcement of 
the creation of the ÖTV der DDR.  
The conflicts with East German unionists unwilling to surrender their power and influence 
were more open within the IG Metall and Media Industrial Union, who were also initially 
more inclined to support a merger of the East and West German organizations. The expansion 
of these two unions ultimately resulted in a refusal to keep former East German officials in 
the organization. Yet even the expansion of the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union, 
which retained a significant share of the former East German officials, was marked by dis-
trust. The union president in Hanover repeatedly reminded them that the organization could 
be enlarged without their assistance.  
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The conferences on disbanding the East German unions were marked by emotional debates 
and sharp criticism of the strategy of the DGB unions. Yet in all four cases studied in this 
work, the month of May saw the latter reaffirm their control over the expansion process and a 
renewed emphasis on the opening of local offices, collective bargaining and recruitment.  
3.9 Conclusion 
The DGB unions implemented two different strategies during the events of 1989-90. 
Their first strategy was based on the support and collaboration of the renewal of workers' de-
fense of interests in the GDR. It was implemented with more or less acuity by the different 
DGB trade unions. In the sample observed in this study, the continuum ranges from IG Metall 
and Media Industrial Union, closely associated with the support and collaboration strategy, to 
the Chemistry, Paper, Ceramics Industrial Union, to the Public Services, Transport, Traffic 
Union, which only initiated it.  
Yet in their diverging intensity the action of all DGB unions shared the same four characteris-
tics. First of all, they made genuine efforts to follow how the revolution found expression in 
GDR’s workplaces. The West German union press published numerous articles on the FDGB 
unions’ reform and other initiatives by workplace activists and members of opposition groups. 
These articles show that most changes occurred at the workplace level. 
Second of all, the DGB unions assisted and supported reform initiatives taken by FDGB un-
ionists and other activists. One typical form of assistance were twinning programs between 
workers of comparable enterprises in both countries. They allowed East German workers to 
learn about the West German labor law, dual structure of interests representation and indus-
trial relations. Material assistance was also frequent, as well as seminars. Some West German 
union secretaries may have tried to convince their East German colleagues to adopt these law, 
structures and model. Yet others insisted on the limits imparted to trade union politics in the 
Federal Republic. Fundamentally, such meetings were thought as a way to help East German 
workers and unionists make their own choices as to the kind of labor law and labor organiza-
tions they wished to have.  
The insistence of DGB unions that all forms of concrete support and cooperation fulfilled an 
explicit request by East German unionists and workers forms the third characteristic of the 
first strategy. It is closely linked to the principle of any support action, which stipulates that 
the first interested, in that case East German workers, have to make their own choices.  
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The fourth characteristic concerns the possibility for the DGB unions to develop the strategy 
with more or less intensity, along the difficulty of these tasks or other priorities. This charac-
teristic had been already recalled above. 
The strategy of support and collaboration lasted from October 1989 until the first weeks of 
February 1990. Yet from January onward, calls for adjustments of this policy were published 
in the union press. Two main reasons explained that union leaders felt such adjustments es-
sential. The first was the need for an official stance on Germany’s unification, which the bulk 
of DGB unions had insufficiently addressed. In January, the calls for the unification had be-
come so loud that they made a clear position of the DGB unions on the question unavoidable. 
The second reason behind the adjustment of the DGB strategy concerned deep worries as to 
the outcomes of the fall of the GDR on the situation of trade unions in the Federal Republic. 
Weak East German unions risked to be unable to bargain on an equal basis with employers. 
The result threatened to be negative outcomes on wages, worker rights and the strength of 
unions in the Federal Republic as well. Unification made the necessity to avoid such a situa-
tion only more urgent. 
Since the second half of the 1980s, new economic circumstances had induced a vast pro-
grammatic reflection within the West German union movement. This reflection suddenly 
reached its peak with the so-called fall of socialism and the growing necessity of defining 
what it was that the DGB unions wanted in the context of unification. The Debate over social-
ism has not received its due attention so far. About sixty articles were published in different 
union publications over a period of three years, the bulk of which between December 1989 
and December 1990. The Debate over socialism deserves to be considered amongst the most 
crucial theoretical debates of the post-war German labor movement. However, despite the 
importance of the issues tackled and the quantity of contributions, the Debate’s main feature 
was the impressive similarity of the arguments put forward either for or against the upholding 
of the reference to democratic socialism in the DGB program. The respective arguments were 
very analogous and defended very similar positions. They identified the goals of trade union 
politics with the existing labor legislation, in other words with the preservation of the Federal 
Republic’s acquis social. Whereas the Debate arose from the urgency of adapting the program 
to new circumstances, none of its contributors was able to identify what new union goals and 
strategies could look like. The Debate expressed the profound programmatic crisis of the 
West German labor movement at the end of the 1980s. 
With regard to the unification, the will to preserve the West German labor law had obvious 
repercussions. It meant a reorientation of the DGB strategy around the objective of the legal 
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extension of Federal Republic’s labor legislations in the GDR. West German union activists 
were not alone to privilege this option. A look at the employers’ press between January and 
March 1990, allows to see how West German employers’ associations also became supporters 
of the legal extension. The reason behind their preference had to do with the lack of a legal 
framework for investment in the GDR and the advantages of transposing one they knew well. 
One major influence in the transformation of the West German unions and employers’ asso-
ciations into resolute partisans of the legal extension was the unification course of the federal 
government. Helmut Kohl’s unification plan, publicized as a proposal to the East German 
government on February 6, 1990, supposed the participation of the West German collective 
bargaining partners. This proposal intended to achieve a rapid two-step unification: first, the 
monetary and economic union, second, the political union. It was based on GDR’s annexa-
tion, or in other words on the eastward extension of the Federal Republic’s legal order. The 
internal reports of the Federal Chancellery (among other sources) show that the implementa-
tion of this unification scheme supposed the participation of collective bargaining partners 
who could determine, though collective bargaining, the social outcomes of the monetary and 
economic union. Unemployment in particular promised to grow rapidly in the GDR, yet one 
major objective of the unification was to stop the migration of East German workers to the 
Federal Republic. In the chancellery, only the West German unions and employers’ associa-
tions were considered for these tasks. 
As representatives of unions and employer’ associations met with the Helmut Kohl on Febru-
ary 20, they signaled their readiness to play their part in the chancellor’s unification plan. Dif-
ferent indications were given in chapter 3.6 suggesting the holding of informal tripartite meet-
ings at that time. Let us recall two. First of all, immediately after February 20, union and 
employers' associations rapidly published declarations in favor of the legal extension. The 
main documents in that respect were the pro-unification declaration of March 7 and the joint 
declaration with the BDA two days later. The latter was especially important. The second 
indication of the setting up of a tripartite consensus was the transformation of the initial 
monetary and economic union into the Monetary, Economic and Social Union. The inclusion 
of the social aspect marked the participation of the trade unions and employers’ associations 
to the achievement of the unification. 
Two weeks after the February 20 meeting, a consensus reigned between the Federal Repub-
lic’s government, trade unions and employers’ associations. It was based on a common pref-
erence for the extension of the labor law in the GDR and the launching of industrial relations 
in the GDR on the basis of the organizational expansion of the West German collective bar-
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gaining partners. For the DGB unions this consensus confirmed a new logic of action, aiming 
at preserving the West German labor legislations in unified Germany. It established predict-
ability and rapidity as main criteria for evaluating any strategic option. It finally introduced a 
preference for solutions negotiated at the top, with the federal government and employers' 
associations. 
A two-pronged strategy rapidly ensued from the new logic of action adopted in March. One 
the one hand, this new strategy aimed at guaranteeing the rapid enlargement of the West 
German legal institutions of industrial relations to Eastern Germany. Contrary to their previ-
ous guidelines, the DGB unions now struggled against any East German institution and pro-
posal that was not in key with the legal extension. They engaged the battle against the resil-
ience of workplace union structures and for the introduction of works councils. They fought 
the Law on trade unions, which granted worker organizations extended co-determination 
rights but allowed the government to stop a strike – a violation of the sacrosanct principle of 
the collective bargaining partners’ autonomy. They also managed to bring the East German 
trade unions to call for the dissolution of the FDGB, in May.  
If the DGB unions were successful in guaranteeing the institutional extension, this result 
could not be obtained without conflicts with East German union activists, the bulk of which 
privileged the fusion of both labor laws. Yet the DGB achieved to obtain East German un-
ions’ support of the institutional enlargement just before the ratification of the MESU treaty 
by mid-May 1990. The treaty ratified by the two German governments confirmed the 
enlargement of the West German labor law, and the success of Helmut Kohl, the DGB unions 
and the West German employers’ associations. 
The second prong of the new strategy concerned the organizational expansion of the DGB 
unions in the GDR. Massive exits from the East German unions and the necessity to initiate 
collective bargaining rapidly were perceived in DGB unions’ headquarters as leaving no other 
option than a hurried organizational expansion. The consequence was a loss of power of East 
German to the benefit of West German actors. Decision-making processes were monopolized 
by West German secretaries. As a result, conflicts with East German unionists were present in 
all cases studied here. Yet by May the DGB unions had successfully brought all East German 
unions to accept the expansion and act at their dissolution. From an organizational point of 
view, the setting up of operative union structures on the East German territory within six 
months can be looked at as a tour de force by the DGB unions. 
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The chronology indicates how this two-pronged strategy was closely linked to the tripartite 
consensus. The months of March and May marked the implementation and the confirmation 
of the tripartite consensus. It was also in these months that the DGB unions took the major 
decisions and made their most decided steps in order to guarantee the institutional extension 
and undertake their organizational expansion. 
 343
  
 344
Part 4: Conclusion: The Paradox of Continuity 
Four questions were explored within this study. The first concerned the role of workers in the 
collapse of the GDR. This historical event can be observed from a long or short-term perspec-
tive. Our investigations deal with the impact of labor conflicts as one of the enduring factors 
that brought about the collapse and with the participation of workers in the 1989 revolution. 
With respect to the impact of labor conflicts on this, the argument developed in part II empha-
sizes the crucial role they were to play.  
Various sources testify to the presence of top-down struggles at East German workplaces. 
These sources include reports prepared by the trade union, the Stasi, and the SED up until the 
1970s. These reports allow one to identify periods of relative calm and times of social tension. 
Yet the ever-greater levels of workplace surveillance and suppression of such activities pre-
vented these conflicts from taking on an open, collective nature. As a consequence, worker 
actions were individual and non-public. They took the form of production slowdowns, resis-
tance to the introduction of new modes of compensation, absenteeism, systematic redistribu-
tion of bonuses among workers, and so forth. Such practices essentially aimed at decreasing 
the work quotas and increasing wages. The evolution of wages is thus a second category of 
source that can be indicative of the presence of hidden labor conflicts. Periods where wages 
grow faster than productivity (it often  takes the form of a rise in one component of wages, 
i.e., bonuses) suggest a greater capacity of workers to resist the government’s economic plan. 
Such individual actions can only be identified as a form of labor conflict because of their wi-
despread nature and important outcomes in the East German context. The repercussions the-
reof in the specific context of the GDR are unmistakable. The reports from the FDGB and 
Stasi, as well as the evolution of wages, indicate stronger top-down struggles over wages and 
quotasin the following periods: 1959-1962, 1967-1972, and in the second half of the 1980s. If 
the general strike of 1953 is also included, the portrait is unambiguous: labor conflicts, in the 
form of (post-1953) hidden struggle over wages and norms, were a factor in all of GDR’s po-
litical crises. The nature of the antagonism changed according to the economic, political and 
social conditions, and re-emerged, perhaps never sufficient in its own right, but always a ne-
cessary catalyst in these episodes. 
Needless to say, interaction between workers and the regime was never limited to these strug-
gles, nor were the social conflicts in the GDR solely premised on this conflict. Furthermore 
the widespread occurrence of small-scale forms of workplace resistance should not blur the 
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fact that East German workers never as such formed one unified group with shared interests. 
“East German Workers” had, of course, diverse and conflicting interests, which could also be 
expressed in the struggles over wages and norms. To reiterate, the argument put forward in 
this work states that the struggles over wages and norms were part of broader political crises 
and  indicate the role these conflicting interests between works and the state at the workplace 
played in directly shaping the history of that country. They contributed greatly to the long 
term factors that facilitated the collapse of the GDR. 
The 1989 revolution was no exception in that respect. Signs of growing dissatisfaction had 
been reported at workplaces in the previous years. Contentious BGL elections in March 1989 
were the precursor to tensions in the May municipal elections. Most of those who left the 
GDR during the summer were workers. The protests began when people reported back to 
work in September and realized that thousands of their colleagues had fled. The great majority 
of the 5 million persons that participated in the 2,600 demonstrations were workers. Moreo-
ver, significant moves towards democratization were made in East German workplaces during 
those months: directors and union officials were removed from office, new mechanisms for 
defending worker interests were tested, 200 strikes recorded, and various models of worker 
participation and rights attempted. 
These are indications of different types of overlap between developments inside and outside 
the workplaces. Four kinds of overlap were identified: the debate of political developments in 
the shop floor; the recruitment at the workplace for political action outside the factory gates; 
the repercussions of the regime’s collapse on the power structures at the workplace; the parti-
cipation in political activities outside the factory resulting from dissatisfaction with the situa-
tion at the workplace. Such important interconnections imply that the workplace should be 
considered when seeking to understand the dynamics in place during the East German revolu-
tion. 
How the revolution affected labor can be considered by analyzing the changes in worker de-
mands. Sources from 51 East German enterprises were examined in the course of this study 
and several conclusions were drawn from this review. Firstly, the overarching concerns of the 
previous months and the first weeks of the revolution were replaced by initiatives to restructu-
re the mechanisms for defending worker interests. These initiatives shared the common goal 
of establishing the optimal structures for worker representation. Secondly, although some of 
these initiatives amounted to competing options – i.e., the reform of the FDGB unions or the 
establishment of new organizations –, this contest was not to play a conclusive role. Their 
respective supporters regarded them as complementary, overlapping options. Time would 
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ultimately tell which strategy proved superior. Thirdly, the bulk of structures for worker re-
presentation set up during the revolution were workplace-based. Fourthly, the East German 
labor law and constitution inspired most of the concepts put forward by labor activists. They 
often targeted the effective practice of rights that still remained on the books. Fifthly, there 
was an interest in ‘foreign models’ of worker representation and labor laws. The situation in 
West Germany was looked at with a particular interest, though France and Sweden were also 
brought into consideration.  Together these trends make up the dynamic restructuring of the 
mechanisms for defending workers interests in the GDR. Although this process was not dri-
ven by the active participation of large numbers of workers, there are indications that many 
such initiatives sprouted at East German enterprises. 
 
The second question explored in this work concerns the strategies adopted by the West Ger-
man trade unions and the goals behind these. The DGB and its member unions implemented 
two strategies successively. Their first strategy is described here as a support and collabora-
tion policy. Its aim was to aid in restructuring the mechanisms of worker defense in the GDR 
by actively supporting the initiatives. The provision of assistance was premised on the fact 
that any resources supplied had to fulfill direct requests made by East German activists. The 
DGB unions considered themselves defenders of the right of East Germans to free self-
determination, i.e., free from the pressures of West German political and economic actors. 
Typical measures of the first strategy included partnership programs and seminars. They sup-
ported and encouraged the discussions over the future forms of worker representation and the 
labor law in the GDR. The precepts of the support and collaboration strategy would determine 
the DGB unions’ policies with regard to the East German revolution until February 1990. 
This strategy was eventually abandoned out of the concerns expressed within the DGB of a 
mass influx of unemployed East German workers into West Germany and the absence of 
strong unions in the GDR. The situation and strength of West German trade unions, not yet 
significantly challenged at the end of the 1980s, risked further destabilization from the East 
German revolution. Beginning in January 1990, union leaders started to consider the exten-
sion of West Germany’s institutions of industrial relations to the GDR as an appropriate me-
thod to obviate the occurrence of such problems. 
Yet the direct impulse for strategic shift came from the federal government at the beginning of 
February 1990. Its plan for a two-step reunification process – first, monetary and economic 
union, following by political union – required the participation of unions and employers’ as-
 347
sociations to manage the social impact of this rapid process. A meeting at the Federal Chan-
cellery on February 20 – probably followed by others of a more informal nature – established 
a tripartite consensus between the West German government, unions and employers’ associa-
tions in support of legal extension. Fourteen days later, on March 9, the consensus was sealed 
with the publication of a joint declaration by the DGB and the BDA (The Confederation of 
German Employers' Association) calling for the introduction of the West German labor law 
and dual structure of worker representation in the GDR. 
The second strategy of the DGB unions was thus implemented beginning in March. Its objec-
tives were legal extension and institutional expansion, i.e., the expansion of the DGB unions 
into eastern Germany. The institutional extension involved bringing the East German structu-
res of worker representation into line with those in West Germany. Until May the DGB 
unions struggled to persuade their East German counterparts to act in accordance with this 
strategy. Immediately before the publication of the MESU treaty on May 18 (planned for July 
1), the DGB unions had gained the support of the East German unions for the introduction of 
works councils, the abandonment of the East German law on trade unions and the dissolution 
of the FDGB. The process leading to this outcome was not without its conflicts between labor 
organizations in both Germanies; the DGB repeatedly threatened to break off ties if its posi-
tions were not accepted. The decision-making process leading to the dissolution of the East 
German unions and their members joining West German organizations, i.e., the decision to 
expand the DGB unions into the East, followed the same timeline (from March and May). 
The rapid establishment of DGB union structures in East Germany, the capacity of the latter 
to influence the social impact of the economic “cold start” together with employers, was a 
remarkable display of organizational mobilization by the West German unions. Reliable figu-
res on the financial and human resources devoted to achieving institutional extension and or-
ganizational expansion are hard to find and would require further research. Yet all indications 
point to the fact that the completion of these tasks consumed a considerable share of the DGB 
unions’ resources. 
The major number of new members joining the DGB unions in the second half of 1990 indi-
cates a certain convergence of the “second strategy” with the aspirations of the East German 
workers. Contrary to the assumptions expressed in the literature to date, much would indicate 
that this convergence began in the West and spread to  East Germany. In other words, the 
clear guidelines of the DGB from March onward were highly influential in bringing the East 
German labor to consider institutional extension and organizational expansion as a valuable 
option. Prior to this, some had favored such solutions, although there is little evidence that 
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would allow one to conclude that such opinions were dominant among East German workers. 
All of DGB’s East German counterpart organizations had always stated their preference for 
combining the East and West German labor laws (in some cases, elements from other models 
were also considered, as indicated above) into a new set of laws. 
In fact, many East German union and workplace activists continued to defend the fusion of 
both German labor laws for use in a unified Germany well after the reunification treaties had 
secured simple institutional extension. The workshops held for East Germans on the technica-
lities of the West German labor law sometimes devolved into uncontrolled discussions on the 
optimum fusion of both laws, much to the irritation of the DGB organizers. The perception 
amongst West German unionists that their East German colleagues could not yet effectively 
function in the new system, as well as the urgent need to proceed with the launch of trade 
union activities in Eastern Germany as rapidly as possible, resulted in a strong centralization 
of decision-making authority in the hands of unelected West German officials. The dissatis-
faction of East German members and activists with this situation was soon evident in the East 
German structures of the DGB unions. Hence the consensus between East and West German 
labor activists was partial and only for a limited period of time. The consensus by itself does 
not fully explain the unification process of the German unions, contrary to the dominant ar-
gument put forth in literature on the topic. Tensions and an unequal balance of power between 
East and West German unionists must also be considered. 
 
The third question explored in this study concerns the impact DGB policies had in bringing 
about unification. On this point, the historiography splits. While literature on institutional 
transfer considers industrial relations to be the first sector in which the general transfer was 
completed, studies on DGB politics in 1989-90 criticize what they see as the unions' inability 
to keep up with the pace of political developments. 
The present study of DGB politics provides multiple arguments that support the hypothesis 
found in literature on transfer. The documents of the Federal Chancellery and Labor Ministry 
indicate how unions (and employers’ associations) were part of reunification plans from the 
very beginning. As already indicated on several occasions in the previous pages, the need to 
stop the westward stream of migrants required not only rapid reunification but also a realign-
ment of living and working conditions in both regions to bring them into line. The active par-
ticipation of well-proven tariff organizations could lead to, e.g., a lower anticipated rise in  
unemployment, negotiated redundancy packages, and programs for vocational retraining. In 
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the volatile political context of the GDR, the West German social partners help preserve so-
cial stability during the dramatic economic and social upheaval. An exaggerated formulation 
of the argument would state that the DGB unions did not adapt their policies to the realities of 
the reunification process because there could be no reunification (or more aptly no MESU) 
without their participation. This would be taking the argument too far. The point, however, is 
that the actual reunification process left it up to the West German social partners to perform 
the crucial restructuring of the labor market. The shift in strategy by the DGB unions to one 
dedicated to institutional extension was completed with the publication of the DGB/BDA 
joint declaration on March 9. This was more than a week before the East German elections, 
widely presented as the moment in time when the East German population accepted Kohl’s 
reunification plan. The DGB was not a passive onlooker to these developments and indeed 
played an active role in them. 
 
The fourth, and final, question examined in this study concerns the incorporation of the 1989-
1990 events into the history of the German labor movement. Two aspects have been highligh-
ted in that respect. The first concerns the merger of the East and West German labor in the 
same trade unions. With it, a new chapter in the post-war history of the German labor had 
begun. Again, reunification was the result of a partial and temporary convergence in the res-
pective positions, but also a centralized process led by West German union secretaries. The 
rapid success of organizational expansion should not blur the fact that the process was never 
free of East / West tensions. It would take longer before East German workers and unionists 
found a place within their new organizations and contributed to setting its agenda. Although 
this hypothesis is not tested in this study, it would appear in all likelihood  that the first major 
industrial conflicts in the new Länder often aided in integrating and adding a regional dimen-
sion to these organizations. 
The second aspect concerns the institutional extension policy and how it took place within the 
debates at the time on the future of trade union politics. This  debate had begun in the second 
half on the 1980s as a means to revise labor’s goals and practices in view of high levels of 
unemployment and the intensification of international capital flows. Despite unemployment, 
the West German unions had maintained high membership rates throughout this decade. They 
did not suffer the kind of critical setback their British, American and Canadian counterparts 
had. Yet a broad programmatic review was nonetheless seen as unavoidable, precisely to pre-
vent a similar weakening of unions from occurring in Germany. The high number of contribu-
tions to IG Metall’s Zukunfstdebatte is one sign of the importance of the debate on the future 
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of trade union politics; such reflections had started in most of the DGB unions toward the end 
of the decade. 
The events of 1989-90 in the GDR intensified the debate and provoked its premature conclu-
sion. The fall of the GDR confirmed the urgency to redefine the unions’ goals. The questio-
ning of the “democratic socialist” foundation of the DGB program within the union ranks 
became louder. The need to define a reunification policy also added to the urgency for unions 
to redefine what it was that they wanted. The debate over socialism, initiated in December 
1989 as the calls for reunification came to dominate the East German demonstrations, was a 
palpable manifestation of how the East German events gave renewed impulse to the review on 
the future of trade union politics. Yet, while every article stated a need for revisions to union 
politics , the majority of the contributions to the debate on socialism limited themselves to 
identifying core values that should act as a guide in making these adjustments. It is quite re-
vealing that the same values – democracy, solidarity, equity, social justice – were put forth by 
both those who supported retaining the reference to democratic socialism and those who op-
posed it. It is hence the lack of real proposals on how labor’s goals and policies could be 
changed that is most striking to anyone reading these articles. 
Many contributions to the debate reduced union goals to the existing labor law and institu-
tions of industrial relations in place in the Federal Republic of Germany. The practical affect 
of such ideas was evident: the main task of the West German labor movement in the 1990 
context was to guarantee the preservation of these laws and institutions in a unified Germany. 
The policy on institutional extension implemented by the DGB unions from March 1990 on-
ward marked the actual conclusion of the debate over socialism. Even if articles on this debate 
continued to be published until 1993, none was able to  see beyond the existing reality.  
The debate over socialism and the strategy for institutional extension are closely interlinked. 
They express two sides of one reality: the programmatic exhaustion of the West German labor 
movement. It would come as no surprise to any historian of the German labor movement that 
some DGB union leaders sought to preserve the established institutions. He or she would have 
no trouble finding previous events where similar inclinations guided the tactics of union lea-
ders. The consensus among those in the West German labor movement for institutional exten-
sion confers specific historical significance to this episode. No force within the DGB unions 
fought for a revision of the West German labor law in a unified Germany. All unions suppor-
ted institutional extension in an unaltered form; the left-wing unions, such as the Media In-
dustrial Union, which might seem likely defenders of such positions, were the first to call for 
extension. 
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Never in the history of DGB unions had these organizations aligned their goals with the sim-
ple preservation of the existing institutions. After all, their ability to act within the framework 
of these institutions and to intervene in political debates rested on their capacity to see beyond 
the existing order. In 1990, the DGB unions did not merely temporarily drop key programma-
tic demands, such as revised co-determination laws and a ban on lock-outs. They spoke out 
against them, while fighting to prevent any type of combination of the East and West German 
labor law. The one-sided approach of the West German unions in support of the West German 
labor laws and institutions of industrial relations was indeed a novelty. 
The preservation of these laws and institutions in 1990 in their present, unaltered form was 
perceived by the DGB unions as a guarantee of continuity. Yet the consensus in favor of a 
strategy consenting to the abandonment of key demands was the result of a year-long process 
ending in programmatic exhaustion, unexpectedly exposed by the events of 1989-90. In this 
regard, reunification marked the end of one chapter in the West German labor history. 
 
The expression “paradox of continuity” refers to this interplay between permanence andter-
mination of a period. The institutional extension policy was indeed a choice for a specific set 
of continuities and discontinuities: a decision favoring the preservation of labor’s victories in 
West Germany at the expense of those demands that remained unfulfilled. It was a confirma-
tion of what already had been accomplished, accompanied by a sense of relief that any nega-
tive impact to the programmatic foundations of union politics in the West Germany could thus 
be avoided. Historians of the labor movement were keenly aware of this interplay whereby 
any action designed to maintain continuity inevitably brought about a dramatic upheaval. So-
me, including Helga Grebing, Michael Schneider, and Klaus Tenfelde in particular, tried to 
sound the alarm bells. They suggested that other configurations of continuity / discontinuity 
would be more appropriate in a context determined by a changing economy and reunification. 
They examined the struggle to reform the West German labor law, with revised goals and 
tactics as a preferable alternative. The labor movement history, recalled Tenfelde, contains 
many examples of transformative political and economic shifts resulting in strengthened trade 
unions. Adaptation to a new context should not mean a renunciation of broader goals, he said.  
In any case, one obvious holdover from the pre-unification period to the one that was to fol-
low is the apparent crisis in the agenda adopted by the German union movement. The triparti-
te consensus had clearly crumbled sometime in 1992 with the first breach of a collective labor 
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contract in post-war Germany by the metal industry.903 It was the announcement that the leve-
ling of working and living standards in Germany would be a longer process than originally 
envisioned in 1990. After slightly more than fifteen years, the standards specified above were 
still out of line in all but a few  industrial sectors, despite limited wage demands by trade 
unions. After an unsuccessful strike in the eastern metal industry in 2003, the slow pace of 
improvement to working conditions was reversed in this industry and instead replaced by lo-
wering standards, a process  rapidly introduced in other sectors, e.g., retailing. The past years 
have been marked by a stripping down of the labor law and erosion of worker rights in Ger-
many. The DGB unions have lost more members than they had gained through new East 
Germans members joining their organizations in 1990-1991.904 If anything, alarming pre-
reunification developments that guided DGB policy in 1990 appear stronger slightly more 
than fifteen years on. While debate on programmatic reorientation was an open and vital pro-
cess in the DGB of the late 1980s, the same cannot be said of today. The German unions, like 
their European counterparts, appear to face an even more critical "loss of perspective" now, 
one that hampers their current policies and puts their future success in doubt.905 For German 
unions, the experience of reunification was crucial in that respect. The choice of institutional 
extension and their unsuccessful policy of leveling working and living conditions in Germany 
make programmatic reorientation an even more difficult process today than it was then. Yet it 
is an inescapable reality. The author would not be the first person to state that the redefinition 
of trade union policies will be the main challenge faced by labor organizations in the coming 
years. It is nonetheless with these words, and with a certain confidence that the movement 
will be successful in renewing itself, that I conclude this work. 
                                                 
903 Turner 1998. 
904 Denis 2005. 
905 Patsure/Verberckmoes/De Witte 1996. 
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Appendix 
Setting up the tripartite consensus in favor of the Monetary, Economic and Social Union 
– A Chronology 
 
1989 
December 7  
Chancellor Kohl worries about the fact that the power lays in the street in the GDR 
 
December 14 
“Revenge is in the air” in the GDR, explains Chancellor Kohl.  
 
December 19 
Kohl’s visit to Dresden persuades him that every attempt to delay the unification will inten-
sify the stream of immigration. From then on he should try to control the developments in the 
GDR, although hey must look as if ensuing from “the street”. The East German revolution 
must remain “incomplete”. 
 
1990 
January 12 
During a Niedersachsen Industrie- und Handelskammer meeting, Chancellor Kohl declares 
that economic growth in the GDR will only occur if the overall framework is adequate and 
investors have confidence 
 
January 15 
Theo Waigel hands in his Vermerk Zehn Punkte auf dem Weg zu einer deutsch-deutschen 
Währungsunion. It is a plan for a monetary union along the 10 point-plan of November (re-
alisation of unification in between 2 to 4 years). Kohl is more and more inclined to consider a 
rapid introduction of the DM in the GDR, as the only way to stop the political crisis in that 
country and the stream of migrants in the FRG. The 4th Division of the BKA works on a plan 
for a rapid monetary union. What is still missing, according to Kohl, is a legal and economi-
cal framework.  
 
January 25 
During his meeting with Helmut Kohl, Hans Modrow depicts the social protest as being on 
the rise and the power of the state as vanishing. He vainly asks for 15 Billion DM in immedi-
ate help from the Federal Republic. Rudolf Seiters requires an East German plan for the re-
alisation of unity and for the adaptation to the social and labour laws of the Federal Republic. 
Modrow replies that it is impossible as the situation is too unstable.  
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January 29 
Paper of the Ministry of Finances on the immediate introduction of the DM in the GDR (“D-
Day solution”). 
 
February 5 
Kohl depicts an unstable GDR plagued with strikes to President Mitterrand and insists on the 
necessity to stabilise the situation as fast as possible. Two days later, he describes the situa-
tion with similar terms to the president of Poland. 
 
February 6 
Chancellor Kohl announces a roadmap for the rapid realisation of political unity, with a 
monetary and economic union as first step. 
 
February 7 
1st meeting of the Cabinet Committee on the Unity, under Chancellor Kohl’s presidency, 
whose goal is to prepare the rapid introduction of the monetary and economic union. The 
social component is not explicitly mentioned, but the Ministry of Labour is represented re-
ceives the task of setting up a plan for the adaptation to the labour and social laws, and to the 
education and vocational training systems of the Federal Republic. The Sachverständigenrat 
underlines that the rapid introduction of the DM will result in calls for rapid levelling of the 
living standards in the East. Such hopes, impossible to fulfil, should not be provoked.  
 
February 9 
Horst Köhler (BKA) writes in an intern note that the rapid monetary union will probably re-
sult in a momentary loss of jobs in the GDR. It is important to define the legal framework 
allowing for the introduction of the DM in the GDR. The Bundesländer accept to take part to 
the negotiations with the East German government beside the Federal government. 
 
February 10 
Lothar Späth states to the Stuttgarter Zeitung that the monetary union makes sense only if the 
entire West German economic framework is transferred in the GDR, only of the GDR “ca-
pitulates”.  
 
February 12 
To the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chancellor Kohl states his preference for the unity 
to be achieved along article 23 instead of article 146. The latter, he explains, could enable the 
SPD to include “socialist elements” into the Grundgesetz.  
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February 13/14 
Rudolf Seiters meets some ministers of the East German government. Members of the Round 
Table ask for an immediate financial aid and reject a rapid monetary union. Tatjana Böhm 
argues in favour of a “social union”906 with encompassing welfare provisions for the eastern 
population, because of the inevitable problems that will ensue from the reform of the econ-
omy.  
 
February 14 
2nd Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on the Unity. All departments (including Labor and 
Social Affairs) are given until March 5, to document the different questions and problems 
likely to emerge during the negotiations with the East German government on the monetary, 
economic and social union. The government leads active “internal preparations”, in order to 
start the negotiation as soon as possible after March 18.  
 
February 20 
1st Experts Talks in the Bundeskanzleramt. The FRG, so the government, has to make it clear 
that the transposition of the entire legal frame of the social market economy is a condition 
sine qua non to the monetary union. The BDA has a similar position. In front of journalists, 
the DGB restates its official position favorable to the payment of an immediate assistance of 
15 billions of DM to the GDR. 
 
February 21 
First round of expert discussions on open assets (offene Vermögensfragen).  
 
March 2 
Labor Minister Norbert Blüm proposes the implementation of an Arbeitsförderungsgesetz in 
the GDR strongly similar to that of the FRG. He is also favourable to the introduction of Ar-
beitsverwaltungen (included in the AFG/DDR), Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen and a sys-
tem of vocational training strongly inspired by the West German institutions. 
CSU MP Scharrenbroich enjoins the DGB to extend its organisations to the GDR and to 
unify German workers under its roof. The FDGB, he states, belongs to the “dustbins of his-
tory”. 
 
March 5 
2nd Experts talks. For the FRG, the structures of prices and wages in the GDR have to be re-
formed. Little social elements mentioned. The GDR tries to bring more social consideration 
in the discussions. 
 
                                                 
906 The Federal government talked at the time of a “monetary and economic union”, and considered the social 
dispositions included in the plan as instruments towards economic goals. The insistence on the social union then, 
and ultimately the ratification of the “monetary, economic and social union”, acknowledged a greater importance 
to the protection of the population during the transformation and to the goal of an increase of the standard of 
living of the East German population than first considered by the Federal government, even though one of its 
foremost objective had been from the beginning the increase of the standard of living in those regions. 
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March 6 
The Volkskammer adopts the Grundlinie of the Social Chart, written the preceding week end 
by members of the Round Table together with West German specialists of social policy. It 
foresees a social union between both countries which would be the result of a reciprocal 
process of reforms. It lists social rights, including the right to work. The Volkskammer also 
adopts the Law on trade unions, which grant these organisations with wide ranging co-
determination rights, from the shop floor to the parliamentary. 
 
March 7 
The DGB publishes a declaration in which it supports the political unity, the introduction of 
the collective bargaining autonomy, the unification of the union movement within  the DGB. 
It asks the West German government to include unions in the discussions on the realisation 
of the monetary and economic union, to which the social component should be added. 
 
March 9 
DGB head Ernst Breit and BDA president Klaus Murmann meet. Both organizations publish 
a joint declaration in which they support Chancellor Kohl’s plan for a rapid monetary, eco-
nomic and social union, and announce their wish to act within its realm in the GDR.  
 
March 12 
First meeting of the Working Group formed by the Labour Ministry, DGB, BDA and DAG. 
BDI and Deutsche Bank heads plead for the rapid realization of Kohl’s plan of a monetary 
and economic union, at the opening of the Leipziger Messe. 
 
March 13  
Temporary report of the Commission of Experts on the preparation of the monetary union. 
 
March 18  
The electoral results are greeted as a gift of god by Helmut Kohl. He is especially proud that 
East German workers have voted for him.. 
 
March 23 
DGB head Ernst Breit addresses the delegates of the Deutsche Postgewerkschaft. Because of 
the lack of conviction engaged in the reform of the FDGB, he explains, the DGB unions have 
to unify as soon as possible. Despite the links, DGB unions should keep as much distance as 
possible from FDGB functionaries, as soon as doubts as to the nature of their work arouse.  
 
March 29 and 30 
Second round of experts discussions on open assets (offene Vermögensfragen).  
 
April 3 
DGB head Ernst Breit refuses to sign a joint declaration submitted by the FDGB against ex-
change rate of 2:1 for wages. Although the DGB is also favourable to a 1:1 conversion of 
wages, it rejects strike as a means to reach this end, as evoked in the declaration, states Breit. 
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April 4 
First proposition by the West German experts of treaty with the GDR on a “Währungsunion 
mit Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft”. 
 
April 10 
First meeting between DGB and East German unions on collective bargaining. 
 
April 12 
In the union magazine Die Quelle, DGB head Ernst Breit criticises the East German Law on 
trade unions. Although he himself is favourable to the interdiction of lock-outs, any legisla-
tion restricts the autonomy of collective bargaining partners. This is a Pandora Box, as the 
West German government would use this opportunity to adopt anti-labour legislation. Breit 
explains that he does not know if East German trade unions will comply to unify into the 
DGB unions. The will of East German workers will have to be respected.  
 
April 18 
Publication of the Tasks of the DGB in relation with the unity. It follows the declaration of 
March 7, and supports free and independent trade unions in the GDR, favourable to the col-
lective bargaining autonomy, to co-determination, to elected representation of workers in the 
workplace and against lock-outs.  
East German trade unions publish a joint declaration in which they support the German unity, 
the unification of trade unions within the DGB, the social market economy and the democ-
ratic renewal of East German trade unions.  
 
April 18 and 19 
Third round of experts discussions on open assets (offene Vermögensfragen) 
 
April 25 
Beginning of the negotiations between both countries on a “Monetary, Economic and Social 
Union”. 
 
April 26 
Meeting of the DGB Working Group on inter-German relations. DGB’s Legal Advisor (Karl 
Kehrmann?) considers the unification of trade unions “by takeover” the only practical way. 
East German unions should consequently dissolve their organisations, their members and 
assets be recuperated by the corresponding DGB union.  
 
April 27 
Second meeting between the FRG and the GDR on a “Monetary, Economic and Social Un-
ion”.   
In a letter to the FDGB, DGB head Ernst Breit explains his organisation’s support of the 
Monetary, economic and Social union.   
 
April 30 
Third meeting between the FRG and the GDR on a “Monetary, Economic and Social Union”.
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May 1 
Commemorations for the 100th May 1 demonstrations. DGB and FDGB unions do not dem-
onstrate together (with the exception of the IG Metall in Berlin). 
 
May 2 
Declaration in 12 points on the exchange rates by the West German government. 
The DGB executive is favourable to the adhesion of the 18 independent East German trade 
unions to the DGB, without the FDGB.  
 
May 3 and 4 
Fourth meeting between the FRG and the GDR on a “Monetary, Economic and Social Un-
ion”. 
 
May 5 
Five-point Declaration by the FDGB and the East German trade unions on the gradual reali-
sation of the unification of German trade unions. At each steps mutual respect, reciprocal 
comprehension and co-operation should prevail between organisations of both countries. 
They should considered themselves equal in rights, as partners in the realisation of a common 
goal.  
 
May 7 
Publication of a scheme for a law on co-determination rights in East German enterprises, 
worked out by lawyers, judges and the DGB Rechtsschutz division (Gesetz über die Interes-
senvertretung der Beschäftigten in Betrieben und Unternehmen). It foresees many improve-
ments to the rights allotted to workers by the BetrVG. 
 
May 8 
Declaration by the DGB executive on the economic reform of the GDR. Although some crit-
ics should be made about the Monetary, Economic and Social Union, these questions are 
now closed. The unification of trade unions will occur under the roof of the DGB aith the 
help of the East German trade unions.  
 
May 9 
The 21 East German trade unions quit the FDGB. A Sprecherrat is formed, headed by the 
railway union’s president Peter Rothe. 
DGB’s Committee on activities in the GDR the reports of the different unions as to the state 
of the co-operation between unions of both countries. Three possible ways for the unification 
are considered: a merger after reforms of the East German union supervised by its DGB 
counterpart in the form of a dissolution of the former into the latter; adhesion of East German 
workers to the DGB union; merger with a new East German trade union formed and super-
vised by the DGB union. 
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May 10 
Different actions by East German trade unions against the Monetary, Economic and Social 
Union are cancelled.  
DGB head Ernst Breit meets Sprecherrat’s speaker Peter Rothe. The latter declares that he 
now approves the Monetary, Economic and Social Union, although it could be improved. 
Breit states that the political unity should be realised as soon as possible.  
 
May 11 to 13 
Last round of negotiations on a “Monetary, Economic and Social Union”. 
 
May 14 
The FDGB is dissolved. The DGB takes the responsibility of the buildings, legal services and 
public relations of trade unions in East Germany. The DGB and the Sprecherrat adopt a joint 
position on the Monetary, Economic and Social Union. The West German labour laws should 
at least be respected in the GDR (freedom of association, collective bargaining autonomy, 
BetrVG, protection against dismissals). The interdiction of lock-outs is not mentioned.  
 
May 15 
DGB and ÖTV’s heads, Ernst Breit and Monika Wulf-Mathies, meet Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, who guarantees that the collective bargaining autonomy will not be restricted for the 
public sector during the collective bargaining in the East. 
 
May 18 
Ratification of the Treaty on a Monetary, Economic and Social Union. 
 
May 20 to 25 
DGB’s 14th Congress. Heinz-Werner Meyer is the new president.   
 
June 11 
DGB adopts its Schritte zur Wahrnehmung von Aufgaben der Gewerkschaftsbundes im ge-
einten Deutschland. It foresees the establishment of DGB regional divisions. 
 
June 18 
The Conference of Chamber of commerce (DIHT) states that economic forces can restructure 
the economy of the GDR by its own forces and resources. 
 
June 21 
Adoption of the Monetary, Economic and Social Union.  
 
June 22 
The VK introduces the West German laws concerned by the Monetary, Economic and Social 
Union. The SPD-Ost is successful in crossing off the paragraph 4 of the article 116 
AFG/DDR. With the political unity on October 3, this paragraph is finally introduced in the 
new Länder. 
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June 25 
The West German law on surveillance committees (Aufsichtsratsgesetz) comes into effect in 
the GDR. 
 
June 26 
Second meeting of the Working Group formed by the Labour Ministry, DGB, BDA and 
DAG.  
 
June 28 
Abrogation of the East German Law on trade unions 
 
June 29 
Law on the Schiedsstellen für Arbeitsrecht in the GDR. Every enterprise with more than 50 
workers is required to have one, others can.  
 
August 7 
Third Meeting of the Working Group formed by the Labour Ministry, DGB, BDA and DAG. 
 
